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What does trust look like? How can it be designed? These are questions that today’s 
designers face, particularly in the digital world. This thesis lends these challenges a 
historical context. To do so, it examines the print culture of the fire insurance industry in 
England in three historical periods. It argues that print was the tangible material that 
was designed to build trust for this intangible industry. Scholarship has identified the 
relationship between print culture, trust and credibility. My contribution is to make a 
detailed analysis of how one financial service made its commercial print effective, and 
how this can be attributed to design.  
In this thesis, past and present work in dialogue. Part I reviews the ways in which 
contemporary design practice has engaged with the concept of trust, in four case 
studies: Airbnb, Projects by If, a publication by the UCL Urban Laboratory and a project 
by Service Design students at the Royal College of Art. This survey informs my 
approach to the historical material. Part II analyses the printed and part-printed 
documents produced by the Insurance Office (Nicholas Barbon’s Fire Office) between 
1680 and 1700, the Sun Fire Office between c. 1800 and c. 1820, and the Sun 
Insurance Office between c. 1894 and 1914. This part shows how these graphic 
objects elicited trust. The printed page communicated qualities such as security and 
afforded the format of the fire policy. It also shaped the work of the people involved in 
these companies – directors, agents and firemen. The final part of the thesis shows 
how news print assisted the fire insurance industry in the building and maintaining of 
trust, at the same time as being a channel which on occasion challenged this message. 
A multitude of printed matter was designed to dispel the uncertainty upon which fire 
insurance rested. But the same channels made fraud and distrust both possible and 
visible.  
By studying the graphic objects of fire insurance in dialogue with contemporary 
design issues, I test the philosophical and sociological discussions of trust against the 
material approach of designers. This thesis deepens the study of ephemera and 
everyday graphic design. It expands the boundaries of design in Britain since 1680, 
and builds a bridge to practice today. 
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Notes on the Text  
 
Until 1752, the new year in England began on 25 March. The text of this study 
maintains the current convention that the new year begins on 1 January. Footnotes 
retain the printed date.  
In quoting early modern sources, this study retains the spelling and punctuation of 
the original. ‘[Sic]’ has been inserted only where not to do so would create confusion. 
Text has been transcribed in bold and italic when it appears so in the source material. 
London is the place of publication for published primary sources except where 
indicated. 
The text capitalises ‘Office’, like so, when it refers to a specific office. Throughout, 
the text uses the ‘Insurance Office’ even after that company’s name had changed. The 
printed material of this company is consistently credited to the ‘Fire Office’, in line with 






This thesis is about the design of trust. It discovers how trust can take material form in 
the shape of graphic objects. The starting point for this inquiry is the engagement by 
contemporary designers in how they might design trust in the digital realm. This thesis 
offers a historical perspective on those designers’ endeavours. It takes the history of 
the fire insurance industry in England as the vehicle by which to explore the 
relationship between design and trust. The thesis focuses on how printed matter built 
trust in this industry. The aim of this thesis is not only to analyse historical printed 
matter from the point of view of trust, but to put that material in a dialogue with a 
current concern of designers. 
The fire insurance industry put down its roots in London in 1680. Marine insurance 
already existed in England but it was for a specialist market. This new type offered 
insurance on houses from damage or destruction by fire. Early in the eighteenth 
century, fire offices – as they were known – began to offer insurance on the 
possessions contained in houses and businesses as well. The industry relied on print 
as the material by which it promoted itself, by which it communicated with its policy 
holders, by which it substantiated its product; in short, by which it gained trust. For this 
new industry needed to build trust and to maintain it. In this way, print is comparable to 
the digital material that drives new products and services in the twenty-first century. 
Like today’s digital material, the printed matter generated by fire insurance companies 
was designed, in ways that this thesis will draw out. This study of historical fire 
insurance material is informed by today’s discourse by designers about trust. In turn, it 
is hoped that the historical analysis will be relevant to contemporary design. 
This introduction will outline the pair at the centre of this thesis: trust and design. It 
shows how insurance is an apt subject in a study of this pair. The introduction sets out 
four guiding ideas that will be tested in the course of the thesis. It goes on to present 
the scholarship that has provided models for this material approach to trust. It ends 
with an explanation of the sources that will be used to interrogate the relationship 
between design and trust, the method of the thesis and its structure. 
 
Trust in theory 
In Britain in the twenty-first century, trust has currency.1 The media refer to it in relation 
to politics and government, institutions and brands, technology and personal 
relationships. It has reach in the disciplines of philosophy, sociology, economics, 
                                                
1 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), p. 29: ‘The 
term “trust” crops up quite often in ordinary language.’ 
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theology and politics. It is also discussed in psychology, marketing and advertising, and 
computer science. This definition in the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy confirms its 
wide application: 
The attitude of expecting good performance from another party, whether in terms of 
loyalty, goodwill, truth, or promises. The importance of trust as a kind of invisible glue 
that binds society together is most visible when it is lost. Trust involves an element of 
risk, and epistemologists can have trouble categorizing it as rational, since it works 
best in advance, for example to motivate performance on occasions when defection 
may be to the advantage of the person trusted. Economically trust is precious, 
enabling parties to bypass the costly precautions and safeguards needed in 
transactions with parties whom one does not trust. Trustworthiness is a virtue, 
subsuming varieties such as truthfulness and fidelity. It is a general ambition of 
democratic politicians to be trusted whether or not they are trustworthy.2 
This definition makes the point that trust is most visible when it is lost. Moreover, it is 
often said to be in crisis.3 By contrast, this thesis attends to the material and tangible 
qualities of trust: how it can be seen and recognised, and how it can be designed and 
built. The question of visibility comprises one of this study’s four guiding ideas: can the 
process of building trust be visible? How so? This theme is conjoined with a second, 
about materialisation. It depends upon an assumption about the nature of insurance. 
As a financial service, insurance does not rest in its own physical form. No material 
determines it. It cannot be seen in itself. But the industry shapes products, according to 
variables of time and value and in line with the law and regulation. This intangible 
nature makes it an old kind of enterprise akin to the new kinds of business of the digital 
economy.4 From its foundation in 1680 the fire insurance industry used graphics on 
paper to give itself form. How did that material do so? What were the changes and 
continuities in how trust was materialised in this industry at different points in time? 
How far do the new digital products depend and draw upon developments in graphics 
in the past? Celia Lury’s conceptualisation of a brand as intangible but not immaterial 
has encouraged this line of inquiry about the product of insurance.5 The materialisation 
of the invisible entities trust and insurance constitutes the second of this study’s four 
themes. 
                                                
2 ‘Trust’, in Simon Blackburn, ed., Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd edn (Oxford University 
Press, 2008). 
3 Geoffrey Hosking, Trust: A History (Oxford University Press, 2014). Rachel Botsman, Who 
Can You Trust? How Technology Brought Us Together – and Why It Could Drive Us Apart 
(Portfolio Penguin, 2017), is the latest advocate of the crisis. 
4 Jonathan Haskel and Stian Westlake, Capitalism without Capital: The Rise of the Intangible 
Economy (Princeton University Press, 2018); Celia Lury, Brands: The Logos of the Global 
Economy (Abingdon, Routledge, 2004). 
5 Lury, Brands. Also, Joshua Simon, Neomaterialism (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2013). 
 17 
The philosopher Onora O’Neill emphasises the breadth of trust. Trust is a matter of 
‘the way we live’, she writes; it is a ‘basic fact of social life’.6 It is central to human 
relationships: ‘We need it because we have to be able to rely on others acting as they 
say that they will’, and they on us.7 O’Neill’s evaluation of trust in her short book on the 
subject is a guiding light of this thesis. As she points out, rulers and governments need 
trust as does every profession and institution, similarly businesses and their products. 
On these grounds, the insurance industry too needs trust. O’Neill’s ethical evaluation of 
trust hints at a non-abstract view; it is rooted in the practical. This thesis uses her 
account as the basis for an empirical, historical study centred on one industry as a 
case study and on design as the practical means of building trust. 
In specific ways too, the nature of the insurance business makes it an appropriate 
industry in which to probe trust. On a broad interpretation, trust can be conflated with 
faith and confidence. The purchase of insurance comprises a payment of money which 
protects against the uncertainty of events in the future. This protection allows one 
greater confidence in the future.8 The benefit of insurance is delayed, it is prospective. 
But its benefit resides mostly in the sense of security it offers – as its buyer should not 
desire the circumstances that would see its material benefit come to fulfilment. The 
alignment of trust with confidence can be dismissed as merely ‘weak inductive 
knowledge’.9 At its weakest, we trust that the sun will rise in the morning. From this 
vantage point, much of our trusting in daily life is routinised. However, this facility of 
insurance to affect its buyers’ ability to feel secure in, to have confidence in, to trust in, 
the future makes it distinct. Moreover, it makes routine our trusting in daily life, free 
from certain fears. This thesis addresses the communication of security to fire 
insurance customers.  
In its strong formulation, sociologists prefer to distinguish trust from confidence, 
hope and faith, and bind it with risk and disappointment instead.10 In this relationship to 
risk, trust and insurance overlap. At the heart of an insurance contract, ‘there must 
exist a risk to be insured against; the property must possess value; there can be no 
possibility of profit; a premium must be paid’.11 On the narrow interpretation, one places 
trust when there is a risk of disappointment; where there is not this risk, then trust has 
no role. In this view, trust is not a matter of routine; rather it involves a decision from a 
choice of alternatives. It must be an investment.12 ‘Trust is a solution for specific 
                                                
6 Onora O’Neill, A Question of Trust (Cambridge University Press, 2002), Chapter 2, p. 1, 4. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Hosking, Trust, p. 102, makes the same point about trust. 
9 Giddens, Consequences of Modernity, p. 54. 
10 Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power (Chichester: Wiley, 1979). 
11 G. Clayton, British Insurance (London: Elek Books, 1971), pp. 14–15. 
12 Luhmann, Trust and Power. 
 18 
problems of risk.’13 Insurance too is a solution to risk. It aims to counteract the risk, 
uncertainty and anxiety of the future by putting a price on the risk. In this regard, 
insurance offers a price for trust at the same time as it prices risk. It substitutes the 
strong form of trust – risk – for the weak form, confidence. For if trust is ‘the absence of 
complete assurance’, insurance gives one assurance in relation to certain 
eventualities.14  
In their accounts of trust, philosophers and sociologists underline that the modern 
world is more complex than it was before and trust is an effective means of reducing 
that complexity. The processes of urbanisation, modernisation and depersonalisation 
have brought about fundamental changes in societies. In O’Neill’s words, trust 
‘increases the tolerance of uncertainty’. Therefore, it ‘eases the world’. But sociologists 
like Anthony Giddens have placed upon trust a negative inflection.15 He is interested in 
it in order to explain his concept of modernity; that is, a shift in Western societies from 
traditional to modern. He portrays this as change for the worse, from face-to-face 
relationships to a society of strangers and to the rise of ‘impersonal’ institutions. In The 
Consequences of Modernity, Giddens identifies ‘disembedding mechanisms’ as a 
feature of modernity. They ‘distantiate’ people in time and location, and they depend on 
trust.16 They have come about as a means to deal with interactions with strangers.17 
Giddens explains that ‘[t]rust is related to absence in time and in space. There would 
be no need to trust anyone whose activities were continually visible and whose thought 
processes were transparent, or to trust any system whose workings were wholly known 
and understood.’18 ‘Trust here is vested, not in individuals, but in abstract capacities.’  
Giddens’s line between the modern era of impersonal institutions and the face-to-
face society that preceded it, furnishes this thesis with its third guiding idea. Does an 
empirical study of fire insurance fit his formula? How impersonal was fire insurance? 
Giddens dates his ‘institutional analysis of modernity’ ‘from about the seventeenth 
century’ in England.19 Money is the primary disembedding mechanism that Giddens 
works with, but the rise of institutions is key to his story. ‘[T]he nature of modern 
institutions is deeply bound up with the mechanisms of trust in abstract systems’.20 As 
                                                
13 Niklas Luhmann, ‘Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives’, in Diego 
Gambetta, ed., Trust: Making and Breaking Co-operative Relations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1988), p. 95. 
14 Anna Sexton, Elizabeth Shepherd, Oliver Duke-Williams and Alexandra Eveleigh, ‘A Balance 
of Trust in the Use of Government Administrative Data’, Arch Sci, 17 (2017), 305–330. 
15 Giddens, Consequences of Modernity; Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity 
(London: Sage Publications, 1992). 
16 Giddens, Consequences of Modernity, p.26. 
17 Ibid., p. 80. 
18 Ibid., p. 33. 
19 Ibid., p. 1. 
20 Ibid., p. 83. 
 19 
an industry made up of institutions, insurance is implicated in this shift as are banks 
and pension providers. It is reasonable to observe that financial services institutions 
run on this kind of impersonal trust.21 As such, we might expect to find that fire 
insurance followed Giddens’s theory. It required a volume of customers that exceeded 
the bounds of personal relationships. This type of business requires mechanisms by 
which to navigate strangeness. However, Giddens’s mechanisms are not well 
contextualised in the seventeenth century. O’Neill’s attitude to trust is more generous: 
that face-to-face relationships still exist today but the nature of our world means that 
‘we need to place or refuse trust far more widely’.22 This thesis tests Giddens’s sharp 
distinction between trust that is personal and face to face and trust that is impersonal, 
faceless and ‘distantiated’. 
A distinction between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ forms of trust marks another gloss on the rise 
of the impersonal institution. Thick trust is the kind generated by face-to-face 
relationships that have been lost in urban environments, and therefore need to be 
imitated by other means.23 Accounts on these lines reason that there is an especial 
need for trust in faceless entities, and that it is especially elusive to them. Yet it is an 
ingredient for their success, and indeed in successful economies in general.24 
Sociologist Lynne Zucker’s study of the history of businesses in the United States of 
America argued that institutional-based trust replaced process-based trust in the 
nineteenth century.25 This prompts the question whether the fire insurance industry 
similarly replaced other practices. What did its mechanisms – in Giddens’s terms – 
imitate and displace? Moreover, Zucker makes the case that intermediary mechanisms 
such as banks and systems of accreditation and professionalisation manufactured and 
commodified trust; they made it a saleable product. The product of trust bypassed the 
requirement for reputation that had existed previously. On Zucker’s terms, insurance is 
a trust product. It is a business that sells trust.  
Financial institutions offer money in exchange for money. The uncertainty of this 
exchange likely accounts for their aptness in discussions of trust. On both sides of a 
fire insurance transaction there is an asymmetry of information. On one side, the buyer 
                                                
21 O’Neill, A Question of Trust; Giddens, Consequences of Modernity; Lynne G. Zucker, 
‘Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic Structure, 1840–1920’, in B. M. Staw 
and L. L. Cummings, eds, Research in Organizational Behavior, 8 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 
1986); Theodore Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life 
(Princeton University Press, 1995). 
22 O’Neill, A Question of Trust, Chapter 4, p. 6. 
23 Hannah Barker, ‘Medical Advertising and Trust in Late Georgian England’, Urban History, 
36:3 (2009), 379–98 (p. 382), following R. Putnam. 
24 Diego Gambetta, ed., Trust: Making and Breaking Co-operative Relations (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1988); Giddens, Consequences of Modernity; Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social 
Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (London: Penguin, 1995); Hosking, Trust. 
25 Zucker, ‘Production of Trust’. 
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places trust that he or she will be recompensed when or if the need arises. The buyer 
must hold this belief for the purchase. On the other side, the insurance company 
accepts information from a customer on which it must rely to calculate a premium rate. 
This is an exchange of a small amount of money for the conditional promise of a larger 
sum. On each side of the exchange, the amount of money depends on the information 
that the buyer provides to the company, in combination with the company’s own 
knowledge and experience. The implications of the terms of the agreement may only 
become clear when one makes a claim.  
To touch again on this study’s second theme of materialisation, theoretical accounts 
of trust have shown little concern for the detail of how trust can take material form. 
Giddens’s ‘disembedding mechanisms’ and ‘expert systems’ point to the ‘material and 
social environments in which we live today’, such as money and roads system; but he 
does not colour in these aspects to his theory. Zucker uses the metaphor of the 
manufacture of trust without following it through to the literal physical manifestations. 
Though she does not put it in these terms, O’Neill is the most interested to point out the 
objects that have been developed to supply trust, and that conspicuously express trust 
and security. This includes technologies such as locks, safes, passwords, identity 
cards, CCTV cameras and encryption, and also paperwork such as contracts and 
agreements. These are the steps we take ‘to deter and prevent deception and fraud’.26 
O’Neill is sceptical of these objects as technologies of trust. Nonetheless her list offers 
a way to interpret the printed matter of fire insurance. 
O’Neill’s A Question of Trust gives rise to the fourth and final guiding idea of this 
thesis: the bond between trust and distrust. Does fire insurance reflect the correlation? 
According to O’Neill’s argument, those objects which aim purely to prevent breaches of 
trust often contain their own undoing. The knowledge of how to forge a banknote, 
break a lock or copy a key is quickly shared. A further ambivalence arises from these 
objects of security: a heavy safe or the reports that deliver transparency might speak of 
a lack of trust as much they demonstrate assurance and security. O’Neill is critical of 
layers of ‘audit culture’ as a means to build trust. She prefers ‘informed consent’ as a 
solution in politics and public life. It is often thought that more information creates trust; 
O’Neill argues that ‘the very technologies that spread information so easily and 
efficiently are every bit as good at spreading misinformation and disinformation.’27 The 
paths to distrust and mistrust run along the paths to trust.  
In summary, the four themes that run through this thesis are the visibility of trust; the 
materialisation of trust and of insurance; the personal or impersonal nature of the trust 
manifested in fire insurance; and the distrust that may come in the wake of trust. While 
                                                
26 O’Neill, A Question of Trust, Chapter 1, p. 2 and Chapter 4, p. 3 and 6. 
27 O’Neill, A Question of Trust, Chapter 4. 
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accounts of trust may little examine material qualities of trust, they do highlight 
particular aspects to trust, which are a route to thinking about the expression of trust in 
materials. Thus this thesis contains additional repeating motifs. Time has a key bearing 
on the building of trust. As Giddens says of trustworthiness, with reference to face-to-
face trust: ‘There is that established between individuals who are well known to one 
another and who, on the basis of long-term acquaintance, have substantiated the 
credentials which render each reliable in the eyes of the other.’28 Time builds up 
experience and reputation. Experience gives one reason to trust a person, an 
institution, a system or an object. This is materialised in branding. Brands build up over 
time the expectation of certain signs of quality. We have seen the routine nature of 
certain kinds of trusting. Routine can be understood in terms of familiarity, reliability 
and repetition. The presence or absence of trust has a bearing on everyday life. 
Although O’Neill highlights the pitfalls of endless accountability, openness and 
transparency are associated with building trust. 
 
Trust in history 
The point at which shifts in trust happen is more difficult to locate in historical time than 
as a process. Historian Geoffrey Hosking wrote Trust: A History in order to counter 
Anthony Giddens’s theoretical perspective and to address the issue that trust had not 
been discussed with ‘a historical dimension’.29 He argues for the role of trust in key 
developments of human history: in the world’s major religions, in nation building and in 
economies. He posits trust’s role in the changing dynamic between society and religion 
and society and money: in the twenty-first century people in the West are more likely to 
‘get their trust’ from the financial system than from religion.30 Both of these phenomena 
have material manifestations; Hosking’s remit takes in neither’s. While those of religion 
have been studied in depth, those in the financial sphere are only recently attracting 
research.  
Business, finance and economic historians have given the detail to this view in their 
disciplines, particularly in the explanation of the development of Western capitalism.31 
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Avner Greif has detailed how reputation mechanisms within communities of Jewish 
traders made trade efficient and reliable in the late-medieval Mediterranean. Deborah 
Valenze has traced the social life of money. Jongchul Kim, Peter Mathias and Craig 
Muldrew have examined trust in economic institutions and in credit relations in early 
modern England. Natasha Glaisyer has demonstrated the importance of ‘credibility’ in 
commercial culture in London between 1660 and 1720, using news-sheets and 
instruction manuals.32 Anne Murphy has touched upon the importance of trust between 
participants in the early financial markets in London in the late seventeenth century. 
Many of these accounts fall at the same time as the first fire offices sprang up, 
indicating the wider context in which fire insurance played a part. 
Distrust – a theme of this thesis – has already proved to be a productive way of 
understanding the past. Koji Yamamoto has brought to light the distrust around 
‘projecting’, the practice of securing investment for new economic ideas in early-
modern England. He argues that distrust shaped projecting culture. Kate Loveman has 
emphasised distrust in the same period in relation to news, coffee houses and the 
development of the genre of the novel, in her illumination of ‘shamming culture’. Joad 
Raymond corroborates the distrust that specifically encircled news in the seventeenth 
century. Valerie Hamilton has made a comparison between the establishment of the 
Bank of England in 1694 and Daniel Defoe’s development of the novel, a form that 
manipulated truth. Hamilton argues that both were ‘projects’ that made a business out 
of trust and risk.33 Indeed, it is pertinent that the Bank and the novel were new forms 
that blended risk-taking, fantasy and speculation. James Raven has pointed out that a 
distrust of print lingered well into the eighteenth century and that that informed how it 
was used.34  
A distinct group of early-modern historians has made studies of the culture of early-
modern finance and commerce in Britain that not only use graphic objects as a source 
of knowledge about the history and context of trust, but consider these objects as 
                                                                                                                                          
Markets: Investment and Speculation Before the South Sea Bubble (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009); Nancy Fowler Koehn, Brand New: How Entrepreneurs Earned Consumers’ Trust 
from Wedgwood to Dell (Harvard Business School Press, 2001); Paul Crosthwaite, Peter Knight 
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(Manchester University Press, 2014). Notable outside academic scholarship: the Money gallery 
at the British Museum was re-hung in 2012; D. Graham Burnett, ‘The Bonds of Catastrophe’, 
Cabinet, Issue 57 (Spring 2015). 
32 Natasha Glaisyer, The Culture of Commerce in England, 1660–1720 (Woodbridge: Boydell 
Press, 2006). 
33 See also Geoffrey Wilson Clark, Betting on Lives: The Culture of Life Insurance in England, 
1695–1775 (Manchester University Press, 1999), p. 39, which points out that the authorial 
credibility of a novel was dependent on the admission of uncertainty. 
34 James Raven, Publishing Business in Eighteenth-Century England (Woodbridge: Boydell 
Press, 2014), p. 259. 
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fostering trust.35 Their attention coincides with this study’s material theme. In the world 
of eighteenth-century commerce, Sarah Lloyd has looked at tickets as vehicles to trust, 
and Hannah Barker at the use of advertising in newspapers to build trust and sell 
medicine. Natasha Glaisyer has analysed how authenticity was conveyed and betrayed 
in print by the use of signatures. In Publishing Business, print historian James Raven 
has built on these accounts to argue that the growth of trade and commercial business 
– from financial services to market trading – in England in the long eighteenth century 
was dependent upon the expansion in the choice of printed formats produced by 
jobbing printing. Publishing Business included ten pages on ‘insurance work’; 
otherwise, insurance has been passed over by print and graphic design histories.36 
Most recently, the social historian Naomi Tadmor has built on these studies and their 
methods in her examination of the production of the printed forms that regulated the 
settlement of the poor from the late seventeenth century.37 She highlights the trust-
building properties of this commercial product. 
These historians have lent confidence to this research. Hannah Barker and James 
Raven used sociological theories of trust as a tool to widen the applicability of their 
historical analyses. Naomi Tadmor used the commercial production of government 
forms to argue against theories of top-down state bureaucratisation. Raven is alone in 
acknowledging that the success of print as a trust-builder was also related to the 
design of print. He writes that certain items of print in relation to trade ‘are rarely 
considered in terms of their origination, design and use.’38 Print ensured confidence 
through these ‘characteristics: reliability, reputation, regularity, authority and 
familiarity…These features were supported by … design and aesthetics.’39 It is this 
design aspect that this thesis develops: what does it mean to say that the design of 
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print can build trust? How can it do so? There exist studies that trace through time the 
idea and manifestation of luxury and glamour.40 This study aspires to treat trust in a 
comparable fashion. 
We have seen how theorists make financial institutions central to their discussions 
about trust. Though this study focuses on print, it is instructive to draw on studies which 
show the dependence of invisible services on other types of visible object. This avenue 
relates to the theme of visibility. Within the field of art history but without objects of art 
historical merit, Barnes and Newton have studied the portraiture of banks’ directors and 
its display in bank buildings, in the nineteenth century.41 Portraits portrayed the 
reputation of these enterprises. The buildings of the financial sector are the most 
conspicuous. Liz McFall and Francis Dodsworth have studied the buildings of life 
insurance companies in the same century.42 A sturdy-looking building is an investment. 
It creates an impression of confidence and time, and with this comes trust that the 
institution behind the building will last as long as its walls. Importantly, these types of 
object – portrait or building – are not necessarily praiseworthy within their fields of art 
history or architectural history. All the more, they are everyday. Financial products tend 
not to be ones that can be seen but their companies have had a huge impact on the 
material environment, whatever its merits.43 These studies show the opportunity for 
looking at financial companies, trust and everyday materials. 
The study of bureaucracy is best suited to a material turn centred on paper. Jessica 
Berenbeim has examined medieval documents both as examples of art and as material 
culture, demonstrating how they empowered institutions. Berenbeim’s source material 
cannot be described as everyday. By contrast, Frances Maguire has studied the 
earliest printed formats in use by the English state from the sixteenth century, similarly 
the aforementioned Naomi Tadmor. Ben Kafka has discussed the wry realities of 
bureaucracy particularly in France before, during and after the French Revolution.44 As 
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a sociologist, Liz McFall has shown the impact of the marketing material produced by 
industrial life insurance companies in the nineteenth century and doorstep loan 
companies in the twentieth, both types of business which depended on door-to-door 
sales.45 McFall brings out the fascination in such everyday material. She uses in-depth 
research into the printed matter of companies in this field – manuals for agents, 
information distributed by them to customers and potential customers, national 
advertising campaigns, forms, notebooks – to draw conclusions about consumption, 
working-class culture, and relations between people, corporate messages and vast 
commercial organisations. These historical perspectives on paperwork show what is 
special about what is not spectacular. They make an empirical counterweight to the 
blithe disregard for bureaucracy that pervades The Utopia of Rules by the 
anthropologist David Graeber.46   
Some scholars have made explicit the role of trust in bureaucracy. In the same spirit 
as Giddens and Zucker, the historian of science Theodore Porter posited a shift from 
personal judgement to objective forms of quantification, in government and professions 
in the nineteenth century in Europe and the United States.47 He described new 
processes in the period as ‘technologies of trust’. Although Porter’s phrase implies 
material forms of trust, he uses it abstractly; he is not concerned to refine it in practice. 
By contrast, recently the architectural historian Çelik Alexander Zeynep has applied the 
same useful phrase to an office building designed by Frank Lloyd Wright at the start of 
the twentieth century. Zeynep shows how the details of the building were designed to 
manage the proliferating paperwork of the mail-order soap business they housed.48 Her 
innovative study has encouraged the use here of the idiom ‘technology of trust’. 
Branding is another area that naturally relates to trust. Since the 1980s when Lynne 
Zucker complained that trust had not been recognised in relation to brand names, 
contributions have been made to this topic.49 A brand is a means to build qualities of 
trust such as reputation and loyalty.50 Brands are a peg by which to maintain a 
relationship with a customer, and this is particularly apposite to financial services. The 
                                                                                                                                          
England, c. 1550–c. 1700’ (PhD thesis, University of York, 2017). I regret that this thesis 
became available too late for me to take into account its significant findings in depth. 
45 Liz McFall, Devising Consumption: Cultural Economies of Insurance, Credit and Spending 
(London: Routledge, 2015). 
46 David Graeber, The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity and the Secret Joys of 
Bureaucracy (New York: Melville House, 2015). For the antipathy of theorists such as Lefebvre 
and Adorno towards the everyday, see Rita Felski, ‘The Invention of Everyday Life’, New 
Formations, 39 (1999), 13–31, and Don Slater, ‘The Ethics of Routine: Consciousness, Tedium 
and Value’, in Elizabeth Shove, Frank Trentmann and Richard Wilk, eds, Time, Consumption 
and Everyday Life: Practice, Materiality and Culture (Oxford: Berg, 2009), pp. 217–230. 
47 Porter, Trust in Numbers. 
48 Çelik Alexander Zeynep, ‘The Larkin’s Technologies of Trust’, Journal of the Society of 
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inclusion of ‘established’ in a brand is a mark of its longevity and relationships. Celia 
Lury’s nuanced elucidation of brands as objects ripe for consideration as part of the 
material turn has been influential for this examination of insurance. Scholars have 
brought to light the use of what can crudely be called branding in the selling of 
medicines in England since the seventeenth century.51 Their studies carry the 
implication that branding was well suited to medical products, whose benefits were 
uncertain. Fire insurance companies also put to work early forms of branding, as we 
shall see. Branding developed through the selling of insurance just as through the 
selling of medicine. However, the subject of insurance has not proved as popular as 
that of medicine.52 It is tempting to infer that the makers of both products had an 
especial need to prove the worth of what they were selling. The study’s theme of 
materialisation tries to capture this endeavour. 
 
Design in history 
Fire insurance is not an obvious subject for the history of design to consider but 
materials, objects and products provide the link. Fire insurance companies produced 
printed matter – the primary material of this study. Fire insurance companies sold 
protection for ordinary people’s belongings; first, their houses, then their objects, both 
the tools and goods of trade and personal possessions. As such, the industry is 
apposite to historical studies of design and consumerism. Fire insurance has a direct 
association with materials because it compensates policy holders’ possessions. It 
makes a statement of how money can replace the losses of fire. But it puts a particular 
gloss on the value of those possessions, one which is monetary, rather than 
sentimental or cultural. It was not only a purchase of consumerism but it likely changed 
the perception of other purchases one might make. Insurance has shadowed social 
change, new technology and society’s new desires, as burglary insurance, car 
insurance and pet insurance testify. In terms of economics, insurance is classed as a 
service but it is marketed within the industry as a product. Consumer insurance points 
                                                
51 Wallis, ‘Commercial Innovation in Early Modern England’; Francis Doherty, ‘The Anodyne 
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52 Miranda Clow, ‘From Nothing to Something: The Making of the Sun Fire Office in the 
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to a new kind of consumer product in England, yet one which has not been included in 
histories of consumption and product innovation.53  
Business historians recognise that the history of fire insurance had an impact on the 
history of advertising and marketing. One such historian, Robin Pearson puts the fire 
insurance industry ‘at the cutting edge of business development’ in the period, in 
‘marketing, cartel formation, the corporate takeover and investment strategies’. ‘[T]he 
sales and marketing systems’ of an office like the Sun, ‘were far more extensive than 
those of Britain’s biggest merchants and manufacturers’.54 Yet the subject has been 
omitted from advertising history.55 
This research deliberately takes a viewpoint from before the eighteenth century. 
This is to disrupt the historiography, which prioritises the history of design starting from 
the Industrial Revolution. Design receives little recognition before mechanisation, yet 
mass production is arguably the essential element to design. Scholars date the 
architecture profession in Britain to the seventeenth century but they understand 
professional designers, of products and furniture, as a phenomenon of the Industrial 
Revolution.56 Scholarship treats the rise of branding and marketing similarly, with 
Josiah Wedgewood often cited as the first in a trajectory.57 This is when the design 
canon begins. Design itself before that transformation, and before named designers, 
has been neglected. The first course in Britain in design history, the Open University’s 
A305, began at 1890.58 The Victoria and Albert Museum and Royal College of Art’s 
joint master’s programme in the History of Design – of which I am a product – 
encouraged the study of early-modern objects, but ‘design’ remains not widely or 
comfortably used before the nineteenth century. This is demonstrated by the subject 
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matter of conferences hosted by the Design History Society and the periods addressed 
by papers therein and in the Journal of Design History.59 
Two terms other than design have forged a greater association with the pre-
industrial past. The first is ‘decorative arts’. For the pre-industrial period, the study of 
this subject has a history that long pre-dates the discipline of design history. It is a 
category for objects outside art that show beauty, craft and intention alongside 
function. Expertise in the decorative arts has been built up among connoisseurs and 
museum curators, and at auction houses, for some hundreds of years.60 ‘Decorative 
arts’ carries with it connotations of valuable materials, luxury craft practices, courtly 
cultures, and overall, the exceptional rather than the everyday.61 
The second term is ‘material culture’. Increasingly in the past decade, authors within 
design history have borrowed this term from the disciplines of archaeology and 
anthropology and used it for everyday objects and environments that pre-date mass 
production but are everyday, the belongings of ordinary people. The V&A/RCA History 
of Design programme has urged its adoption (even adding the phrase to the name of 
the course). Judy Attfield is among authors who have deliberately placed ‘design’ in 
conjunction with ‘the everyday’.62 This project intersects with the everyday because it 
looks at the development of what is perceived to be, in our own times, a mundane, 
unexciting, though necessary, act of consumption.  
The study of material culture helpfully treats anonymously made objects. This 
scholarship coalesces with the interest shown by industrial designers of the twentieth 
century in anthropological and folk objects.63 But this framework unhelpfully reinforces 
the lack of a canonised ‘everyday’ design before the Industrial Revolution. Although 
designed objects may be positioned as a subset within material culture in the way that 
Attfield has done, this positioning avoids the contemplation of pre-industrial design 
rather than resolving it.64 How and where can we discover not just everyday material 
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culture but everyday design before the nineteenth century? Pre-industrial design has 
escaped notice because it does not fit the paradigm of designers. As there were not 
designers, those nominally performing other tasks enacted design. 
Design thinkers Judy Attfield, Richard Buchanan, Nigel Cross, Victor Margolin and 
Guy Julier have all offered broad definitions of design, which locate the activity in the 
unspectacular rather than the special – that is, in everyday life. Nigel Cross presents 
design as a universal practice: 
Everyone can – and does – design. We all design when we plan for something new to 
happen – a recipe, arrangement of furniture, a personal web page. So design thinking is 
inherent within human cognition; it is a key part of what makes us human.65  
In Richard Buchanan’s view, the profession of designers represents those that are 
masters of these practices and are willing to take responsibility for it on behalf of 
others, for a fee.66 If we subscribe to this breadth, as is reasonable, then the gap in 
appreciation of pre-industrial design only widens.67  
Any hope that, given the 500-year-old history of printing, graphic design history 
might lay the groundwork for understanding pre-industrial everyday design, leads to 
disappointment. Studies of graphic designers since the twentieth century, when the 
profession established itself, overshadow understanding of graphic design history.68 
Like the first accounts of insurance history, to a great extent fellow graphic designers 
write these accounts.69 There are paths to the subject that are grounded in historical 
analysis; for example, Paul Jobling and David Crowley’s case studies of the production 
of mass communication.70 But otherwise survey books of examples of graphic design 
and its changing styles, dominate the field.71 Generally they attend to the exceptional 
and they calcify attention on the past since industrialisation. Meggs’ survey is welcome 
as it begins with the earliest mark-making by man, but while displaying examples it 
does little to analyse them.72  
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Studies of ephemera are kin to graphic design research. They are less concerned 
with fine examples and more interested in methods of production. Despite inclusion of 
the types of printed formats which insurance companies generated at high volume – 
the products of jobbing printing –, publications that are focused on graphics or richly 
illustrated, have passed over insurance print.73 However, Michael Twyman made a 
towering contribution to the conceptualisation of this type of object and its significance 
to social life. Moreover, his work made a bridge to literary theorists such as Walter Ong 
and the discussion of information technology.74  
There is a gulf between graphic design history and print history. The one focuses on 
looking at examples without saying much about them, and the other writes about them 
without looking at them. The scholarship that has been mentioned that has made the 
link between the history of print and trust has not yet percolated through to books on 
ephemera and on the history of graphic design, to which it is apposite. Raven’s 
Publishing Business is important in regard to ephemera because it emphasises the 
significance of jobbing printing to the financial revolution.75 But beyond the subject of 
currency design, which is widely addressed in publications and exhibitions, financial 
print gets overlooked in picture books.76 The reason for the neglect of financial print 
may be obvious: it does not meet certain graphic or visual standards set for documents 
of interest in the past. But that does not preclude its significance as design. Adrian 
Forty distinguishes between who makes an object and who determines its form; therein 
lies ‘design’.77 Mass-produced print sits in a grey area; it is not convincing as a craft 
object, but its authorship before the twentieth century falls between the roles of the 
author of the text, the publisher, the typesetter, and the period’s conventions, 
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themselves working with the period’s technology. This thesis emphasises graphic 
design before graphic designers.78  
A research project at Reading on railway ephemera brought together the often-
siloed currents of graphic design, ephemera and print, in an analysis of the design of 
timetables.79 The project’s authors applied twentieth-century terms such as ‘information 
design’ to describe their everyday nineteenth-century material.80 They conducted their 
analysis in terms of design, in a way that has proved to be a model approach for this 
research. Further within the discipline of graphic design, the application of ‘rhetoric’ to 
graphic text and graphics in general has set an example for how to look at 
documents.81 Leslie Atzmon has argued that, in the material turn, the aesthetic and 
material qualities of objects and things should not be ignored. 
 
Design models 
The V&A/RCA History of Design MA programme has been radical in how it has 
stretched design – to style, to performance, to bodies – but it has struggled to bridge 
the gap between design history and design practice.82 Designers commonly engage 
with design of the past and take inspiration from it. The reinvention of historical forms 
pervades the design industry, often powered by new technologies and materials.83 
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Books devoted to changing typologies – such as the chair – serve this purpose. In the 
twenty-first century the practice of design has engaged with trust but this engagement 
lacks a past. If designers are to have the objective of trust before them, they should 
have recourse to a historical perspective. The invisibility of trust accounts for the 
difficulty in perceiving it in the past. Moreover, it is difficult to notice something that is 
everyday. This is then a study of the design of something that escapes notice in 
multiple ways. Some designers have themselves prescribed that good design should 
not be noticed.84 We might even see design as a trust-building practice in the way that 
it builds confidence and belief in material things and in environments in general.  
In attending to a gap in design literature, this thesis seeks to confer a history on a 
particular field of contemporary design practice – one engaged in designing trust. This 
study also applies the tenets of this field of contemporary design practice to the study 
of the past. As Victor Margolin has pointed out: ‘Design history … has not had much 
success in engaging with current practice’.85 This study examines design in the past 
and uses contemporary design as a tool for that. This constitutes the thesis’s dialogue. 
In a comparable fashion, which she described as an experiment, Catharine Rossi 
examined Daniel Defoe’s character Robinson Crusoe as a maker and in turn examined 
recent design projects in which she detected the influence of Crusoe.86 Thereby she 
brought together contemporary design practice with a novel of the early eighteenth 
century in order to illuminate both. Her study was ‘informed by the paucity in both craft 
and design history of tools to critique contemporary practice’.  
This thesis develops Rossi’s experiment in the opposite direction: by putting a 
historical study at its heart. New perspectives on the practices of critical design have 
been shown in another experimental study, in which design fictions were used as a 
way to re-think smart products and make them more trustworthy.87 This article shows 
how the design of smart products has encouraged experimental design methods. It is 
fitting to consider insurance in relation to speculative design given that insurance is a 
tool for ‘speculative futures’.88 
 
This project indicates the back-story for today’s recent subdisciplines within design of 
service design, the design of ‘smart’ products, digital design and ‘design thinking’ in 
general. Design thinking is a way of problem solving using the methods of a designer 
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such as observation, collaboration and prototyping.89 The industrial designer Tim 
Brown first articulated the term in 2008.90 Accounts of design thinking – of the 
processes of design as an activity – have little historical perspective; they focus on 
current design and designers. As Lucy Kimbell has stated, there has been no 
‘historically-informed account of design thinking’.91 Accounts of design thinking take 
their analysis from living memory. Nigel Cross, for example, applies different methods: 
he interviews designers and he uses data from experiments with designers in which 
they are under observation while asked to carry out an imagined brief.92 But these 
methods could be seen to suggest that design thinking is, and must remain, a static 
process, unaffected by the historical shifts that affect other practices. This matters 
given the wide application of design thinking, for instance in business schools.93 The 
more that design moves into business (and public services), its history in this field must 
be known. History of design needs to meet these burgeoning disciplines of design 
practice. As one commentator surmises, ‘whereas design once was concerned with the 
production of physical, tangible, things, it now is concerned with the design of 
intangibles (such as knowledge or services)’.94  
This context makes for another reason to draw the history of insurance – an 
immaterial product – into the history of design. This embrace is in line with the 
experimental design practices of, for example, Ilona Gaynor and Nelly Ben Hayoun, for 
whom the dynamics of any phenomenon of the contemporary world can be looked at in 
terms of design. Ilona Gaynor has herself worked around insurance. Nelly Ben Hayoun 
with NASA. Just as they use design as a constructive practice, I use it to analyse 
aspects of the past. An insurance company is wholly artificial.  
There has been some academic writing on trust from the field of contemporary 
design, particularly pertinent to service design.95 Recent research articles show that 
trust is a consideration of service designers working on live projects. This likely follows 
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from service design’s human-centred perspective. Researchers argue that service 
platforms and intelligent services must be built with trust in mind.96 A key motive for this 
consideration is the principle that the use of a platform depends on trust. ‘[T]rust is one 
of [the] key factors determining the success of most online entities’.97 Articles on the 
subject appear to have increased since 2014, but discussions of building trust in 
platforms commonly refer to a discourse on ‘online trust’ that has existed since the 
early 2000s, where the point was already made: ‘Trust is the foundation upon which 
relationships are built, therefore it forms the base for our hierarchy of customer 
experience’.98 This discourse has been drawn from psychology and computer science 
studies into business and design publications, both industry and academic. With their 
profile rising, service designers have argued that theirs is an appropriate practice to 
‘address all components’ that others have identified as necessary to establish online 
trust.99 
A second theme related to trust emerges from design literature. Certain articles 
make clear that the co-creation methods used by service designers require thought to 
ensure that different groups of people trust each other: participants must trust the 
designer in a co-design project; and so must different organisations which are being 
designed to work together.100 Researchers highlight the trust component particularly in 
projects in healthcare, those related to the elderly, and government-led projects in 
general. 
Another issue that is pertinent to designers of platforms relates to users’ data and 
privacy. These discussions, which have also existed since the early 2000s, make the 
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point that privacy violations will detract significantly from brand loyalty and trust.101 The 
Design Management Review, a publication of the Design Management Institute, which 
promotes design thinking in business, has especially addressed these concerns. An 
article in the Harvard Business Review by three practitioners stated that: ‘Numerous 
studies have found that transparency about the use and protection of consumers’ data 
reinforces trust.’102 It concluded that ‘in an information economy, access to data is 
critical, and consumer trust is the key that will unlock it.’103 As service design 
establishes itself and absorbs some of the tasks of user experience design – that is, 
the design of online environments – its practitioners must address these issues. 
Moreover, for projects in healthcare, in the public and private sector, service designs 
must communicate and be trusted with people’s most sensitive personal information.  
Founded in 2009, Touchpoint was the only service design-specific publication at the 
time of writing.104 It is ‘Published by practitioners for practitioners’ by the professional 
body the Service Design Network. In 2016 Touchpoint published an article on user 
data that drew on the latest thinking in this area, from the Harvard Business Review, a 
publication sympathetic to design thinking.105 Touchpoint has just one article on the 
subject of trust itself but it is significant that, in a 2016 issue for example, trust is 
commonly mentioned in passing as also in publications which promote design 
thinking.106 These passing mentions show that trust is an element to consider, but they 
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rarely explain the how.107 The discourse is modest but significant. Discussion of trust is 
present but it rarely forms the subject matter. The evaluation of trust within service 
design is relevant to this study because this area of design has been adopted by 
financial services: ‘Perhaps more than any other sector, banking and financial services 
have seen the widespread application of service design.’108 This includes insurance.109 
To draw on Margolin again, there is the need of ‘analysing the role of design in the past 
in order to explain its value in the present’.110  
 
Method and sources 
What does it mean to say that the design of print can build trust? How can it do so? 
This thesis addresses these questions by taking a close look at individual printed items 
within a specific industry, one which has a particular relationship to trust. The study 
travels over a long timeframe. James Raven points to ‘the connection between the 
matter carried by print and how print conveyed it, the most important products of that 
connection being knowledge, accuracy, efficiency, security, authority and the creation 
of trust.’111 I have taken these remarks and run with them. The thesis uses the 
historical materials of insurance to contribute to the understanding and appreciation of 
design in the past.  
This thesis holds two comparisons in play, which answer: how can trust be 
designed? On the one hand, the thesis hinges on a dialogue between engagements 
with trust in contemporary design and methods by which the fire insurance industry 
materialised trust in the past. On the other hand, it investigates the design of trust in 
the fire insurance industry by a comparative method which looks at two fire offices, in 
three historical periods. They are: the Insurance Office from its establishment in 1680 
until 1700; and the Sun Fire Office between 1800 and c. 1820 and the same company, 
officially operating as the Sun Insurance Office, between c. 1894 and 1914. This 
comparative sampling makes it easier to detect and see trust over time.  
The consistency in the fire insurance industry makes it suitable to a comparative 
historical study of this kind. Fire offices lasted a long time. The industry holds intrigue 
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not for its vicissitudes but for its constancy. It enables this study to highlight and trace 
characteristics from the Insurance Office’s material to the Sun’s material in the two 
periods that follow. The thesis avails itself of four main sources, three historical and 
one contemporary: on one side, insurance archives, insurance agency records and 
newspapers; on the other, documentary evidence of contemporary design projects. 
In this study, fire insurance acts as the case study for an examination of design and 
trust. However, insurance archives are at the study’s core and also its inspiration. The 
literature on insurance has benefited from vast archives of documents held in the name 
of insurance companies, many of which lasted for decades and continue today, kept 
privately by companies or in public archives.112 In addition, documents relating to 
insurance companies can be found scattered in the archives of family papers, and in 
libraries’ special collections as examples of publicly distributed printed material. 
Insurance archives show the internal workings of companies by their minute books, 
account books, lists of policies and policy holders; but also their documents produced 
for public consumption including advertising, forms and policy documents. Insurance 
archives also include newspaper cuttings; the news is crucial to an insurance business. 
For that reason, this study has taken news print as one of its three historical sources.  
Specifically, the Sun’s archive was the point of departure for this study. The 
company deposited the bulk of its records to the London Metropolitan Archives (as it 
became) in the 1970s, soon after it merged with another large insurance company. The 
vestiges of the company – and some of its earliest and most recent records – remain 
today in the RSA Insurance Group. Among the Sun’s deposited records are also 
systems by which the companies themselves historically maintained a company 
memory, for staff maintained scrap books of contemporary material, such as 
newspaper cuttings or the advertising of rivals.113 Sun staff also collected together 
historical documents in a set of ‘guard books’, so called by archivists. This set has 
provided the groundwork, and much of the material, for this research.114 (See 
Illustrations 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3.) Guard books can themselves be seen as technologies of 
containment, arrangement and finding; their discovery has itself motivated this visual 
study of trust. As the medievalist Jessica Berenbeim puts it, ‘archives are the images of 
an institution’. 
As historical source on the Sun, its institutional records are here supplemented with 
records of fire insurance agencies, which are held by local public archives. These 
include the agents’ policy registers, ephemera, notations and letters exchanged with 
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the head office and with customers. This is possible for the Sun from its founding in 
1710; by contrast, there are no archival deposits for the Insurance Office, founded in 
1680. The material produced by the Insurance Office is scattered in libraries. Its printed 
sheets are catalogued on the English Short Title Catalogue and in most cases digital 
copies are available on Early English Books Online. 
The authors of insurance history have consulted this material.115 The sources for 
insurance history were largely collected by Cornelius Walford, parts of whose 
unfinished Cyclopaedia were published in 1871, and Francis Relton, whose history of 
fire insurance companies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was published 
in 1893. Both authors had enjoyed careers in the insurance industry. They were 
interested in the detail of company histories and the evolution of aspects to insurance, 
but not in historical context nor historical argument. In the twentieth century, research 
into insurance history has travelled in two directions. There have been straightforward 
accounts of the development of the industry. These culminate in global triumph in the 
twentieth century, with British companies at the forefront.116 Alongside these, the oldest 
fire offices have received scholarly monographs, the most important of which for my 
purposes is P. G. M. Dickson’s on the Sun Fire Office.117 Dickson’s is a sparky 
account, which is full of details of the people behind the company and its processes. 
The publication of a company monograph often appears to have coincided with that 
company’s takeover. The Sun announced its merger with the Alliance Assurance 
Company, just as its biography went to print.118 In the second phase, since the 1990s, 
fire insurance has been a subject in business history, particularly in the hands of Robin 
Pearson and Oliver Westall. This study is dependent upon these authors to outline the 
salient developments in the fire industry, with a focus on the Insurance Office and Sun 
Fire Office particularly. It is noticeable that the Sun’s biographer Dickson loses interest 
in his subject as it enters the twentieth century.119 
Scholars with bents other than insurance history have also used insurance archives, 
for their depth. These researchers have taken slices from these resources and followed 
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one of two paths. One group has focused on harvesting the historical data it provides 
and fed it into the fields of economics, geography, business history and sociology.120 
Family researchers have used the data from insurance records on a small scale, as 
policy registers reveal addresses, occupations and wealth. Larger sets of data have 
been used to draw conclusions about capitalisation and assets of workshops, 
businesses and factories. Human geographers have looked for patterns of human 
behaviour, seeing life insurance as a disciplining technology in relation to alcohol for 
instance. In all cases, insurance material has been treated as an object to be extracted 
from. Another group has abstracted from the history of insurance to uncover concepts 
that arise from it, such as attitudes to risk, danger and probability.121 Lorraine Daston, 
Geoffrey Clark and Liz McFall have given significance to the domestication of 
insurance, tracking how it gained not just a market but became part of everyday 
consumption. They have focused on life insurance. The domestication of fire insurance 
has a bearing on this research, for domestication was achieved by material means 
including branding.122  
In contrast to the aforementioned studies, this study examines the archival 
documents for themselves.123 It takes an object-focused approach, with the archival 
material as its starting point. It aims to get inside these materials and to avoid making a 
separation between the history that they tell and their own qualities. It approaches 
these documents from the point of view of their design. As such, although this research 
relies heavily on historians of insurance such as Robin Pearson and Peter Dickson, 
and draws out the same themes, such as advertising and marketing, people, and fraud, 
its purpose is otherwise.  
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Due to the size of the Sun’s archive, two periods were set in which to examine the 
Sun’s archive of paperwork: 1800–1820 and 1894–1914. These periods of history have 
been chosen for their significance to the Sun company and to the industry as a whole. 
The Sun Fire Office ended the eighteenth century as the largest fire office in Britain but 
it saw its status and its profits threatened at the turn of the century by bubbles of new 
fire insurance companies in London and across Britain and by the new and uncertain 
risks posed by factories in the north of England. The company’s internal organisation 
struggled to cope with these tensions, particularly due to its reliance on agents.  
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Sun transformed its structure to take 
advantage both of new kinds of insurance and of opportunities overseas. Thereby the 
company made itself more transparent than it had previously been. By this period, the 
wayward spread of agents had become a network of agencies. Different kinds of 
insurance had become normalised across Britain but the task of choosing risks was not 
straightforward. World War One is a natural threshold with which to end the time 
periods examined in this study. This timeframe has allowed the study to take into 
account the era when the design and advertising professions established themselves, 
and with them mass production.124 Yet this is an era before ‘modernity’ and mass 
culture can be seen to have settled in, and before new technologies and mechanisation 
transformed the work place in the twentieth century.125  
A set of three historical periods comprises the study’s second temporal dialogue. 
The Sun’s printed matter from two periods is compared with the material of the 
Insurance Office in its first twenty years, 1680–1700. This set of three makes this a 
comparative study. Moreover, news print provides a counterpoint to my main historical 
source, the printed matter produced by companies. News and serial print is another 
resource for the building of trust in insurance companies. It offers a different 
perspective on fire insurance and its trustworthiness, one not directed by the company. 
News print had its own price tag to the reader; it was fundamentally distinct to that 
produced and distributed by companies.  
For the examination of news and fire insurance in the period 1680–1700, all serial 
publications have been consulted, as the news business was small in these decades. 
Sources include all examples of what might be called time-critical publications, such as 
pamphlets which report on recent fires. By contrast, the quantity of news sources for 
the periods 1800–1820 and 1894–1914 made it necessary to focus on the Sun’s 
presence in just one newspaper, The Times. This restriction resulted in a manageable 
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body of material to analyse.126 The Times fitted the criteria of being a serious, sober, 
trusted London newspaper that existed across the two latter periods under 
examination. Fittingly, The Times is the most common source of clipping in the Sun’s 
own archive.  
 
The digitisation of early English newspapers and of The Times led to a distinct way of 
working with this source material, one that I think matters.127 Search facilities allow one 
to narrow results to words and phrases – in this case, ‘fire-’ – within a date range, and 
to do so anywhere. But making sense of the results is not as straightforward. They are 
divorced from historical and material context. This made for a different research 
experience than the one I had become accustomed to: visiting an archive with a 
postcode, sifting through the catalogue and then through volumes, archive boxes, files 
and folders, deluged, baffled but open-minded. The difference in method shows in the 
difference in the illustrations: digital news pages leave one with arsenals of consistent 
but flat, lonely, Arctic downloads, while through my own photography, poorly framed, 
out of focus and featuring fingers, I can remember small details of the day. As well as 
making two comparisons over time, this study also makes a comparison of the 
possibilities offered by different kinds of source material and the nature of the trust they 
built. The available source material guides the thesis’s historical chapters. The 
inevitable but regrettable result is that the attention that each chapter gives to each 
period is unevenly spread. For the earliest period, it has been possible to consult all 
known printed material; for the later periods, it is necessary to be selective. 
The examination of trust in contemporary design practice rests on material in the 
public sphere. This includes the promotional material of a company and a design 
studio, including their websites and their public statements and blog posts; material 
that arose from student projects, and an academic publication directed at a general 
audience. The examination of contemporary design projects deals with living 
participants; however, this material is scrutinised as documentary evidence, in the 
same way as the historical documents. 
The method of this thesis is intended to be inventive.128 As befits its subject matter, 
it is speculative. For it makes assumptions about the intentionality and effects of visual 
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printed material. The focus is on material generated by companies, and the design 
therein. This study takes for granted the developments in printing technology over the 
long stretch of time it considers: presses got quicker and cheaper, paper got cheaper, 
new processes like lithography came into use. By the late nineteenth century, the 
change was profound from two centuries earlier. In what follows, terms with distinct 
meanings in certain contexts, such as print, documents, graphics, printed matter and 
print culture, are bound up together. This study is interested to look at the products of 
printing presses themselves, and in that analysis, to collapse the boundary between 
the form and the content. How did the design possibilities of print – both what you say 
and how you say it – create consumer insurance? 
Similarly, this study has not looked for evidence of the use and consumption of fire 
insurance. As evidence for the fulfilment of the aims of insurance print, it is enough that 
people bought and bought into the product. Moreover, it is an open question how to 
judge the existence of trust particularly in the past, given its invisible nature. To 
assume that use implies a level of trust is an attitude of convenience that follows Onora 
O’Neill and Hannah Barker. As long as people repeatedly chose a product or an 
institution to be a part of their lives then it is fair to assume they trusted it, even in a 
weak sense. Barker infers that if a medicine saw great success for decades then its 
buyers must have believed in its efficacy.129 As O’Neill puts it, ‘Our money shows it.’130 
Practice and repetition indicate trust.  
 
Structure 
The source material has determined the organisation of the thesis into three Parts. Part 
I examines the contemporary material and Parts II and III examine in turn the two types 
of historical material: that produced by insurance companies, and news print. The 
juxtaposition of Part I with Parts II and III creates the main temporal dialogue, between 
present and past.  
Part I’s sole chapter makes a critical survey of the ways in which contemporary 
design practice has grappled with the concept of trust. This Part gives a glimpse into 
the practice of the design of trust. This glimpse complements the theory of the design 
of trust which has been outlined above. This first Part to the thesis has two purposes. 
First, it shows how designers think that materials can build trust. From the four projects 
surveyed in Part I, there arises a pair of analytical tools by which to examine the 
historical material of the subsequent chapters: the qualities of trust and the 
technologies of trust. These tools are put to use in Part II. Secondly, by providing these 
tools, Part I sets up a dialogue with, and informs, the study of the past.  
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The second temporal dialogue occurs in Parts II and III, between the three historical 
periods. The four themes introduced above run through these Parts: the visibility of 
trust, the materialisation of trust and insurance, the personal/impersonal dichotomy, 
and distrust. Part II turns from looking at design from a designer’s point of view, as in 
Part I, to considering designed objects. It examines the printed matter of insurance 
companies as being the product of a design practice aimed at generating trust. The 
first chapter in Part II lays the groundwork for this examination by documenting the role 
of print, and graphics specifically, in the development of fire insurance. It introduces in 
chronological order the material that will be discussed in subsequent chapters, to lend 
clarity to what follows. It focuses on the trajectories of the Insurance Office and the 
Sun.  
Part II’s three subsequent chapters examine the historical material of the Insurance 
Office and the Sun, in the three periods of time, using Part I’s analytical tools: the 
qualities of trust, the technologies of trust, and the interrelations of graphic objects and 
people. Each aspect sheds light on how graphic objects can build trust. Each chapter 
cuts across time to draw together visual and textual threads, motifs and tropes from a 
range of documents whose correspondences might not be obvious. Chapter 3 is 
concerned with how words, images and visual rhetoric can evoke and repeat qualities 
of trust. It addresses the materialisation of trust and insurance. Textual and visual 
languages coincided to constitute the material of fire insurance. Chapter 4 adds to the 
materialisation theme. It is interested in how aspects of the printed page, or the entire 
printed page, can themselves be technologies, and how these too substantiated fire 
insurance. From this perspective, graphic objects are impersonal; thereby this new 
theme is introduced. However, Chapter 5 confronts that theme directly. It explores how 
people were integrated with graphic objects, and shows how personal the fire 
insurance industry was. This personal aspect to the business threaded it with distrust 
as well as trust.  
Part III takes up the distrust theme. It scrutinises newspapers as another type of 
printed object that built trust in the fire insurance industry. The design of newspapers 
suited the ambitions of fire insurance. However, the relationship between the two 
enterprises generated distrust. This thesis looks at everyday graphic objects in detail. 
For that reason, it is necessary to complement the text with a large body of illustrations, 
which puts the method, approach and process of the research on show. 
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Part I: How Contemporary Design Practice Treats Trust 
 
Chapter 1: ‘Designs for Trust’ 
 
In 2018 the website of the digital home-renting company Airbnb included a page 
entitled ‘Trust & Safety’; it began:  
On any given night, 2 million people stay in homes on Airbnb in 81,000 cities all over the 
world. There are nearly 5 million listings in 191 countries to choose from – that’s more than 
the top five hotel chains combined. 
What makes all of that possible? Trust.1 
In this way, Airbnb, founded in 2008, credited its remarkable growth to trust, and also 
asserted its dependence upon it. In other public statements, the company’s belief in the 
significance of trust to its business has been inseparable from its promotion of how it 
has created and built trust, and how it has designed it. This emphasis on design is 
likely in part a result of two of Airbnb’s three founders having studied design as 
undergraduates. In 2016, one of its founders gave a high-profile talk under the title, 
‘How Airbnb Designs for Trust’.2 In the talk, Joe Gebbia explained how he and his co-
founders had worked to produce trust among Airbnb’s users.  
Over the same period of time, others in the design field have talked of trust as a 
product of a design process. In 2014, design students at the Royal College of Art 
undertook a project to repair trust in the audit profession. The project was written up 
under the same phrase as used by Airbnb’s co-founder, ‘Designs for Trust’, but as a 
noun rather than a verb.3 Meanwhile, the design studio Projects by If, founded in 2015, 
positioned trust at the centre of its practice. In 2018, a member of its team used 
‘Designing for trust’ as a gloss to characterise the studio’s work.4 These examples 
demonstrate that practitioners of design have purposefully applied themselves to the 
production of trust. The slippery nature of trust raises questions about how they sought 
to effect this in practice. 
This first Part of the thesis, consisting of this one chapter, explores the 
circumstances in which the concept of trust entered design practice in each of these 
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examples, in turn. It interrogates the different ways in which their practitioners 
understood trust, and how they perceived design practice to produce trust.5 The 
chapter considers not only the words used to discuss trust but also the expression of 
trust through graphics, in an effort to tease out the contemporary look of trust. For a 
counterpoint to these three examples, the chapter turns to Design and Trust, a booklet 
published by the Urban Laboratory at University College London in 2014.6 This booklet, 
which consists of contributions from a range of academic authors, debates the merits 
of designing for trust in urban environments. It forces friction into any easy alliance of 
design and trust. 
 
Digital company 
Airbnb enables people who seek a place to stay to find, communicate with and pay 
people who have a room or a property to let. In the platform’s parlance, its users are 
respectively ‘guests’ and ‘hosts’. Given that anyone can be a host, the platform offers 
greater variety and flexibility than the traditional accommodation industry. Guests can 
use search filters to narrow down their choices from every possibility that a host might 
offer, from price, to neighbourhood, to privacy; and then they can browse the results for 
fashionability and personal touch. But the plethora of options and the site’s accessibility 
pose their own kind of risks. Neither guests nor hosts can be sure of the stranger with 
whom they communicate nor of the promises held out to them. The guidance given by 
travel agents, hotel brands, guide books or friends’ recommendations is missing.  
In facilitating financial transactions online between strangers, Airbnb is similar to 
other digital companies, such as eBay, on which goods are bought and sold by online 
auction, and Uber, an app which deals in taxi rides. These digital platforms, like many 
others, use features such as user profiles and ratings in order to reduce the 
strangeness between individuals.7 They reinforce these features with measures in 
place against fraud. Airbnb is built of comparable features and measures, as will be 
outlined. It differs in that its representatives have specifically vaunted this digital 
machinery for its trust-producing capabilities and as the product of design. This is in 
evidence on the page of its website entitled ‘Trust & Safety’ as well as in public 
statements by Airbnb’s representatives. Airbnb has bound itself to the practice of 
design and the concept of trust in order to counteract the perceived risks of its service. 
It has integrated design and trust into its brand. 
                                                
5 I use the term ‘practitioners’ generally to mean the people involved in each example, whether 
or not they were design practitioners specifically. 
6 Ben Campkin and Rebecca Ross, eds, Design and Trust, Urban Pamphleteer 3 (London: UCL 
Urban Laboratory, 2014). 
7 On the trust ecosphere of the digital world see Rachel Botsman, Who Can You Trust? How 
Technology Brought Us Together – and Why It Could Drive Us Apart (Portfolio Penguin, 2017). 
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Airbnb’s representatives have proudly framed the company’s ‘reputation system’ in 
terms of design and trust. According to their own narrative, the founders made an early 
calculation that people’s fear of strangers was the greatest hurdle to the success of 
their idea of home-sharing. Their solution was a reputation system, consisting of the 
reviews that guests and hosts left for each other following a stay. Reviews and ratings 
comprise a valuable supply of third-party information for subsequent users. Co-founder 
Joe Gebbia summarised this development as follows: ‘a well-designed reputation 
system is key for building trust. … Design can overcome our most deeply rooted 
stranger-danger bias.’8 Airbnb’s head of design endorsed this message in an interview 
under the title ‘Building Trust’: ‘A large part of what we do is really creating trust 
between two strangers. You could say that is the Airbnb innovation’.9 By using the 
phrase ‘reputation system’, Airbnb’s representatives show their understanding that 
reputation is conducive to people trusting one another. 
In Airbnb’s reputation system, creating trust is also a matter of forging familiarity. 
Alongside reviews, users familiarise themselves with each other by their profiles, which 
include a name, a description, a photograph and links to social media accounts. (See 
Illustration 1.1.) Photography and information about the hosts’ properties are also 
carefully organised.10 Should guests like what they see, their communication with hosts 
deepens the information and the familiarity on each side. Joe Gebbia has explained 
how his team designed the architecture of conversation via the platform such as to 
increase the likelihood that the parties get on. For the initial communications, the 
platform gives prompts for subject matter. It also prescribes the size of the text boxes 
by which people communicate. Thereby, it seeks to prevent users from alienating each 
other.11 As a result, users give neither too much nor too little information about their 
proposed stay, at the same time as they answer the questions the host is likely to 
have. Thus Airbnb standardises its users such that they appear less strange to each 
other.  
At the same time as building trust, Airbnb has in place measures against what 
Gebbia called ‘trust breaking’.12 This aspect of Airbnb’s trust is a matter of security. For 
this reason, the company hosts the text communications between guests and hosts 
                                                
8 Gebbia, How Airbnb Designs for Trust. 
9 ‘Alex Schleifer – Airbnb: Building Trust’, Movidiam Creative Leaders Podcast, 2018, 
www.movidiam.com/blog/1022/airbnb-alex-schleifer--building-trust. Accessed 6 June 2018. 
10 At an early point, Airbnb provided a photographer to depict properties in the best way 
possible. Gebbia, How Airbnb Designs for Trust. 
11 Gebbia, How Airbnb Designs for Trust: ‘So how do we design for just the right amount of 
disclosure? We use the size of the box to suggest the right length, and we guide them with 
prompts to encourage sharing.’ 
12 ‘Trust breaking’ is the phrase used by Gebbia, How Airbnb Designs for Trust. 
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and urges users not to stray from them.13 The company hosts payments, thus 
‘removing the transactional element from the conversation’.14 It also uses machine 
learning to ‘score for risk’ each reservation. It provides free smoke detectors on 
request. But, as the company’s co-founder admits, ‘there are times when things don't 
work out’.15 For these eventualities, the digital platform offers personal customer 
support around the clock. In addition, it runs an insurance scheme for hosts, the ‘Host 
Guarantee’. 
Airbnb’s features and measures for trust are its digital materials. Through building 
familiarity, they make trust possible between users. As regards security, the company 
manages the spectrum of preferences and ensures that encounters are as safe and 
reliable as possible. Airbnb has integrated trust and design into its public face. The 
company has conducted research into ‘building trust’ and ‘building for trust’, which it 
has circulated by means of both talks and articles.16 In this research, its engineers and 
data scientists have spoken of Airbnb’s features and measures as ‘mechanisms’, 
whereas the co-founder Joe Gebbia characterised them as design.17 Airbnb’s website 
includes a ‘design’ portal which promotes the company’s participation in that industry, 
such as at design fairs.18 In a company in which design and marketing are blurred, 
Airbnb’s avowed dependence on design and trust is a part of its sales pitch.19 
On the corner of its website devoted to the subject of ‘Trust & Safety’, Airbnb 
markets its own security. Ideally, users should trust the platform on account of their 
experience of navigating it and its designs for trust, but the url airbnb.co.uk/trust 
addresses those who might be wary. The ‘Trust & Safety’ page has four tabs which 
address the user groups individually and together: ‘Overview’, ‘Travelling’, ‘Hosting’ 
and ‘Community Standards’.20 (See Illustration 1.2.) They explain the trustworthiness of 
the platform by outlining its features and measures. The Overview tab demonstrates 
                                                
13 ‘Always pay and communicate directly through the Airbnb website or app.’ Airbnb, Trust & 
Safety, ‘Overview’.  
14 ‘Alex Schleifer – Airbnb: Building Trust’, Movidiam Creative Leaders Podcast. 
15 Gebbia, How Airbnb Designs for Trust. 
16 Riley Newman and Judd Antin, ‘Building for Trust: Insights from our Efforts to Distill the Fuel 
for the Sharing Economy’, Airbnb Engineering & Data Science on Medium, 14 March 2016, 
www.medium.com/airbnb-engineering/building-for-trust-503e9872bbbb. Accessed 22 May 
2018. Alok Gupta, ‘Study: Airbnb’s Reputational System Builds Trust & Overcomes Biases’, 
Airbnb Citizen, 7 September 2017, 
www.airbnbcitizen.com/study-airbnbs-reputational-system-builds-trust-overcomes-biases/. 
Accessed 22 May 2018. Alok Gupta, ‘The Trust Game: How Data Scientists at Airbnb are 
Cracking the Trust Code’, talk at Imperial College London, 21 May 2015. 
17 ‘Mechanism’ is used by Airbnb’s engineers and data scientists and not by its founder nor its 
head of design.  
18 Airbnb, Design, www.airbnb.design. Accessed 6 June 2018. 
19 ‘Alex Schleifer – Airbnb: Building Trust’, Movidiam Creative Leaders Podcast: ‘I mean, those 
two areas [design and marketing] are pretty blurred for us. We think great product is great 
marketing, and great marketing is great product.’ 
20 Airbnb, Trust & Safety, www.airbnb.co.uk/trust. The page is accessible from the footer of 
Airbnb’s website. 
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the components of the reputation system under the heading ‘Know what to expect’: 
‘Profiles’, ‘Reviews’ and ‘Secure messaging’. (See Illustrations 1.1, 1.3 and 1.4.). The 
same tab collects together the safety measures, such as ‘Secure payments’ and 
‘Account protection’. The ‘Travelling’ and ‘Hosting’ tabs enumerate the steps to making 
a transaction. Both guests and hosts are advised to read reviews and to collect as 
much information as possible in advance of a stay.21 The Overview page signals to 
Airbnb’s design credentials. It introduces the safety measures under the heading 
‘Safety by design’ and with the tagline, ‘Airbnb is designed with safety – both online 
and off – in mind’. (See Illustration 1.2.) 
Airbnb’s ‘Trust & Safety’ page supports its theme by using techniques of repetition, 
familiarisation and word association that themselves elicit trust. ‘Your safety is our 
priority’ stands at the top of each of the four tabs as a reassuring refrain, in a typeface 
equal to the largest on the page. The trust portal acquaints first-time users not only with 
the fact of Airbnb’s features but also with how they look. This is achieved by a realistic 
image of a smart phone, which shows the flow of an imagined exchange. (See 
Illustrations 1.1, 1.3 and 1.4.) The large size of this image relative to the frame size, the 
engaging pictures on the mock screens and the friendliness of the exchanges convey 
the ease, accessibility and unthreatening nature of the process.22 Lastly, the titles on 
these pages use a constellation of words associated with trust, which make their point 
in heavy weights of typeface: ‘secure’, ‘fairness’, ‘confidence’, ‘reliability’, ‘checks’, 
‘preparedness’, ‘protection’, ‘prevention’ and ‘expect’. 
These techniques are supported by visual qualities which further seek to generate 
trust. The ‘Trust & Safety’ page looks clear, simple and honest. It is marked by its 
distinction to the main pages of Airbnb’s site. Its tabs are devoid of the colourful 
photography of people, domestic interiors, places and experiences that constitute the 
key tool by which the platform makes its sales. (See Illustration 1.5.) Instead, they are 
defined by typography. (See Illustration 1.6.) In this they share in the typographical 
language of other text-based pages on Airbnb’s site, which are grouped in the website 
footer as ‘Terms, Privacy, Currency & More’. These pages are designed around a 
hierarchy of the company’s proprietary sans-serif font, which is deployed in dark grey, 
as is customary across Airbnb’s site. The use of different weights and sizes of type 
fashions a hierarchy of titles and body text.23 The ‘Trust & Safety’ page employs three 
                                                
21 Airbnb, Trust & Safety, ‘Travelling’: ‘Read the ratings & reviews’, ‘Get your questions 
answered’. Airbnb, Trust & Safety, ‘Hosting’: ‘Read profiles & reviews’, ‘Get to know your guest 
in advance’. 
22 The size of the depiction of a smart phone is dependent on the size of one’s screen, but it is 
large in proportion to the screen space. 
23 In 2018 Airbnb introduced its custom-made sans-serif font, Airbnb Cereal. It has six weights. 
Derek Chan and Karri Saarinen, ‘Introducing Airbnb Cereal’, www.airbnb.design/introducing-
airbnb-cereal. Accessed 6 March 2019. 
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weights of title. This careful ranking means that subject matters nest beneath each 
other. (See Illustration 1.2.) Titles and subtitles punctuate short paragraphs and define 
neat and clear parcels of information. The generous white space that surrounds 
sometimes sparse text on these footer pages endows them with sobriety. The ranging 
of titles to the left serves to emphasise the sense of space. This confidence both in 
emptiness and in restraint evokes honesty. The ‘Trust & Safety’ page leaves enough 
space to be transparent; nothing is hiding. Horizontal rules and bullet points reinforce 
its thematic clarity. (See Illustration 1.7.) 
Without compromising its atmosphere of restraint, the tone of the ‘Trust & Safety’ 
page is lightened by a sprinkling of photography and of small, sparse, descriptive 
illustrations. (See Illustration 1.8.) The restraint in the use of images adds to the 
stripped-back mood. Echoing that, the colour palette of the page is limited to three. 
Aquamarine, which is used to emphasise certain text and in the illustrations, and 
mustard yellow, which is used in the illustrations alone, enliven the dark grey of the 
website’s text.  
Its photography and illustrations add an important human touch to the ‘Trust & 
Safety’ page. This imagery drives the point that trust at Airbnb rests in human relations. 
Photographic imagery shows people: model Airbnb users and a smiling Airbnb 
representative wearing a company t-shirt. (See Illustrations 1.1, 1.3 and 1.9.) The latter 
personifies the messages ‘We’re here if you need us’ and ‘Just reach out if there’s 
anything you need’. A set of illustrations, which brings to life the six points that make up 
‘Safety by design’, contributes to this familial mood. The set includes a person smiling 
gently, a hand and a house with trees. (See Illustration 1.8.) Their artist has drawn 
these illustrations such that they evoke his or her hand, with soft edges, naïve lines 
and splashes of colour. The humanity injected by the imagery dovetails with the short 
paragraphs and informal language of the ‘Trust & Safety’ page, exemplified by the use 
of abbreviations and personal pronouns (‘we’re’, ‘our’, ‘your’). This tone humanises the 
digital features and measures to which the page draws attention. In addition to the 
projection of sobriety and transparency, Airbnb’s graphic aesthetic for trust requires the 
presence of people. Its measures alone are not sufficient for trust. 
The ‘Trust & Safety’ page makes assertions that point to another aspect of trust 
which comprises Airbnb’s product: authenticity. Under the heading ‘Authenticity’, the 
company tells its community: ‘Your Airbnb experiences should be full of delightful 
moments and surprising adventures.’24 It tells guests: ‘Every home and every 
experience on Airbnb is unique’.25 This same sentiment is cossetted in assurances 
                                                
24 Airbnb, Trust & Safety, ‘Community Standards’, www.airbnb.co.uk/trust. Accessed 22 May 
2018. 
25 Airbnb, Trust & Safety, ‘Travelling’, www.airbnb.co.uk/trust. Accessed 22 May 2018. 
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about safety. Under the heading ‘Safety’, the site says: ‘Your Airbnb experience begins 
the moment you embrace adventure.’ (See Illustration 1.6.) These statements carry the 
implication that authentic experience arises from the element of trust that transactions 
on Airbnb require. Risk and uncertainty make for adventure. To trust a stranger is 
promoted as a positive and enriching act which users partake in through the platform. 
Airbnb offers ‘connections beyond the transaction’.26 In this way, the company 
promotes risk-taking at the same time as it explains how it has made the risks as 
unrisky as possible. Airbnb has engineered a secure way to take a risk and to relish 
that. 
The company extends the notion of an authentic experience to that of an authentic, 
trusting community, in which users are involved and invested. The site encourages 
guests to share their stories, which are posted by Airbnb on social media. As the ‘Trust 
& Safety’ page puts it: ‘we’re constantly rethinking our approach as we learn from the 
community what’s best for Airbnb.’27 Airbnb’s head of design has stated the company’s 
intention to provoke the thought, ‘“travelling on Airbnb does seem like something 
special.”’28 He clarified: ‘trust is reliability – it’s helping people take a bit of a leap of 
faith and experience the world in a new way.’29 However, Airbnb’s claims to create a 
trusting community have been undermined by the criticism that it has replaced 
structures of accountability and state regulation with its own mechanism of customer 
feedback.30 Research has indicated that the reputation system facilitates discriminatory 
judgements of the kind that legislation has outlawed, for example on the grounds of 
race. These challenges show how Airbnb’s digital mechanisms for trust have disrupted 
pre-existing mechanisms for trust in the sector. They suggest a reason why the 
company has made an enthusiastic embrace of trust as part of its brand. 
Trust has been richly designed into Airbnb. The company rests on digital 
mechanisms which build trust. It discusses these mechanisms using words and 
graphics which draw on and inculcate a vocabulary of trust. That vocabulary underlines 
reputation, security, sobriety and transparency but also humanity. For all that Airbnb is 
built on its digital technology, the company emphasises the presence of human support 
in its system and it invokes humanness in the aesthetics of its ‘Trust & Safety’ page. 
Airbnb has even designed the discussion of trust into its product and its brand, such 
                                                
26 Gebbia, How Airbnb Designs for Trust. Newman and Antin, ‘Building for Trust’, also 
emphasises the connections and relationships enabled by the company. 
27 Airbnb, Trust & Safety, ‘Community Standards’. 
28 ‘Alex Schleifer – Airbnb: Building Trust’, Movidiam Creative Leaders Podcast. 
29 Similar phrasing is used on Airbnb, Trust & Safety, ‘Hosting’, www.airbnb.co.uk/trust. 
Accessed 22 May 2018. Hosts are advised: ‘Sharing your space or passions with someone 
you’ve never met can feel like a leap of faith[.] Here’s how you can help ensure your hosting 
experience, and your guest’s trip, goes off without a hitch’. 
30 Botsman, Who Can You Trust?, p. 94. Gupta, ‘Study: Airbnb’s Reputational System’. 
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that trust is a part of what users of the platform are preconditioned to receive, in the 
form of an authentic experience.31 
 
Design studio 
Projects by If (abbreviated to If) has made trust the target of its design practice. The 
studio was founded in London in 2015 by Sarah Gold, a graduate of Central Saint 
Martin’s Industrial Design MA. By 2018 it consisted of fifteen designers, developers, 
engineers and support staff,32 and had worked for the technology giant Google, the 
Coop set of retail businesses and the trade union Unison.33 Gold was motivated to 
open her studio by the ethical implications of the internet’s development. In the first 
blogpost on Projects by If’s website, she explained: ‘As the Internet becomes 
increasingly embedded within our daily lives, it is encountering design questions that lie 
deep in our cultural DNA; privacy, security, trust, transparency, ownership, 
citizenship.’34 The collection and use of data comprised the key issue from which 
Gold’s design questions flowed.35 Her studio has summed up its work in the slogans, 
‘We help organisations be trusted with data’ and ‘We help teams build services people 
can trust’.36 It has organised events for fellow designers and technologists under the 
title ‘Trust & Design’.   
Certain principles of the practice, encapsulated by the word trust, emerge from 
Projects by If’s public statements. The studio understands trust as security: that people 
should feel secure in their digital experiences with regard to the personal data that 
those experiences harvest. A corollary of large-scale data collection is an increase in 
the risk of data breaches.37 The studio emphasises the need for transparency. It 
advocates that technology users should be informed of what data a digital service is 
                                                
31 In this way, Airbnb is similar to US banks in the nineteenth century, as discussed by Lynne G. 
Zucker, 'Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic Structure, 1840–1920', in B.M. 
Staw and L.L. Cummings, eds, Research in Organizational Behavior, 8 (Greenwich, CT: JAI 
Press, 1986), pp. 53–111. 
32 Projects by If, ‘Team’, www.projectsbyif.com/team. Accessed 4 July 2018. 
33 Projects by If, www.projectsbyif.com. Accessed 4 July 2018. 
34 Sarah Gold, ‘Hello World’, 1 December 2015, www.projectsbyif.com/blog/hello-world. 
Accessed 17 July 2018. 
35 As shown by the public statements by the studio, the blogposts by the studio’s team and the 
descriptions of their projects. See for example, Ian Hutchinson, ‘Putting a Value on Personal 
Data’, 20 June 2016, www.projectsbyif.com/blog/putting-a-value-on-personal-data. Accessed 16 
July 2018. 
36 Projects by If, www.projectsbyif.com and www.projectsbyif.com/services. Accessed 25 May 
2018.  
37 On breaches of government-held data see Richard Pope, ‘Data: Government, Privacy and 
Understanding’, 12 June 2018, www.projectsbyif.com/blog/data-government-privacy-and-
understanding, Accessed 17 July 2018. On breaches of commercially held data, see news 
stories passim. 
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collecting from them, and how that data might be used and shared with third parties.38 
This requirement is particularly sensitive in healthcare and government digital services. 
It also extends to users’ interactions with machine-learning tools. The studio 
incorporates consent into the scope of trust.39 It wants users to be offered meaningful 
choices over the data they give, and thereby to have control over it. This entails that 
the permissions by which users give consent are made fundamental to a digital 
service. For the studio, data issues are a matter of a product’s or a service’s safety. 
Projects by If applies design skills to the fulfilment of these principles. The studio 
was established contemporaneously with non-profit organisations in the USA spurred 
by similar concerns. Simply Secure carries the tagline: ‘Everyone deserves technology 
they can trust / We’re building a community of practitioners who put people at the 
center of privacy, security, and transparency’.40 Data & Society is ‘a research institute 
in New York City that is focused on the social and cultural issues arising from data-
centric technological development.’41 If’s niche is to design its principles into the 
products, services and working practices of clients. It argues that it is in the long-term 
interests of brands to reinforce their trustworthiness regarding data and to make 
products transparent.42 The studio portrays its stance as a commercial imperative. As it 
tells clients, ‘Trust is your competitive advantage’.43  
                                                
38 Georgina Bourke, ‘Understanding Healthcare and Data’, 13 October 2017, 
www.projectsbyif.com/blog/understanding-healthcare-and-data; Sarah Gold, ‘The NHS can 
Lead the Way in Data Ethics – but Will it?’, 25 May 2018, www.projectsbyif.com/blog/the-nhs-
can-lead-the-way-in-data-ethics-but-will-it; Will Dixon, ‘Strengthening Public Trust in Sharing 
Health Data for Research’, 13 June 2018, www.projectsbyif.com/blog/strengthening-public-trust-
in-sharing-health-data-for-research; Georgina Bourke, ‘Designing a New Approach to Consent 
in Healthcare’, 2 July 2018, www.projectsbyif.com/blog/designing-a-new-approach-to-consent-
in-healthcare. Pope, ‘Data: Government, Privacy and Understanding’; Matthew Sheret, ‘Making 
it Clear When Machines Make Decisions’, 20 April 2017, www.projectsbyif.com/blog/making-it-
clear-how-machines-make-decisions; Richard Pope, ‘Five Thoughts on Design and AI’, 27 
October 2017, https://projectsbyif.com/blog/five-thoughts-on-design-and-ai; Georgina Bourke, 
‘Designing for AI Generated Interfaces’, 15 March 2018, https://projectsbyif.com/blog/designing-
for-ai-generated-interfaces; Ian Hutchinson, ‘Discovering How to Explain Automated Decisions 
with LSE’, 19 March 2018, www.projectsbyif.com/blog/discovering-how-to-explain-automated-
decisions-with-lse; Sarah Gold, ‘Trust and Rights in Learned Systems’, 22 March 2018, 
www.projectsbyif.com/blog/trust-and-rights-in-learned-systems; Nat Buckley, ‘Explaining 
Machine Learning Systems’, 6 July 2018, www.projectsbyif.com/blog/explaining-machine-
learning-systems. Accessed 17 July 2018. 
39 On this point, Projects by If echoes the positions put forward in Timothy Morey, Theodore 
‘Theo’ Forbath and Allison Schoop, ‘Customer Data: Designing for Transparency and Trust’, 
Harvard Business Review, May 2015, pp. 96–105, the authors of which work in design and 
strategy. They also share in the criticism of terms and conditions and in the view that it is in a 
company’s interest to behave responsibly, to be discussed below. I have not discovered any 
reference to this article by Projects by If. 
40 Simply Secure was founded in 2014: www.simplysecure.org. Accessed 5 July 2018. 
41 Data & Society was founded in 2014: www.datasociety.net. Accessed 5 July 2018. 
42 Sarah Gold, ‘Trust and Advocacy’, 18 July 2016, www.projectsbyif.com/ideas/trust-and-
advocacy. Accessed 17 July 2018. 
43 Heading on the ‘Services’ page https://projectsbyif.com/services 5 July 2018. 
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Project by If’s incorporation of trust into design practice constitutes a realignment of 
the priorities of the design profession when it works with digital technology. Under the 
subtitle ‘We need to make trust as important to design as accessibility’, Sarah Gold has 
claimed that ‘Data, privacy and permissions need to be taken as seriously as 
accessibility and usability.’44 ‘Trust is about design’. With the slogan ‘Trust isn’t about 
compliance it’s about design’, the studio makes trust a goal of design rather than a 
requirement of regulation. Gold has argued that the rights granted in 2018 by the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) ‘need to become part of the way things 
work, not conditions services grudgingly comply with.’45 The studio conceives its work 
as being of benefit to society and to democracy. On the one hand, it seeks to create a 
culture of accountability by showing its clients how to behave responsibly and ethically. 
On the other hand, it wants technology users to be informed about their rights and 
thereby empowered.46  
Smart products epitomise the design problems that Projects by If identifies. An 
increasing number of product types are designed to be connected to the internet and 
controllable by a smart phone. Things from thermostats, to lighting, to cars, are 
effective because they collect and feed back data from their usage.47 Smart toys 
expose the ramifications of this. Sarah Gold has drawn attention to a doll that can 
speak to its child owner, but ‘records everything said to it, transmitting it across the 
internet to be stored indefinitely in servers in the US’.48 This doll speaks to Gold’s two 
concerns; the first relates to transparency: ‘mass-produced products aren’t clear about 
the data they collect’.49 The second is a matter of security: ‘they haven’t taken steps to 
protect the data they’re collecting’. These concerns apply equally to smart televisions, 
smart fridges and Amazon’s Alexa, a voice-activated virtual assistant. The studio puts 
the responsibility on designers. ‘If the next generation of digital products is going to be 
trusted with more of people’s data and make more decisions on their behalf, every 
designer needs to be thinking about issues of data, privacy and permissions.’50 
‘Trustworthy products should be governed by strong principles about how data is used, 
                                                
44 Sarah Gold, ‘We Need New Patterns’, 27 March 2017, www.projectsbyif.com/blog/we-need-
new-patterns. Accessed 13 June 2018. Richard Pope, ‘Design Patterns Meetup’, 27 February 
2017, www.projectsbyif.com/blog/design-patterns-meetup, made the same statement. Accessed 
7 June 2017. 
45 Gold, ‘We Need New Patterns’. 
46 Pope, ‘Data: Government, Privacy and Understanding’. On ‘digital rights’ see Pope, ‘Design 
Patterns Meetup’. 
47 Examples are Nest thermostats and Ikea’s smart lighting system products. 
48 Gold, ‘We Need New Patterns’. 
49 Sarah Gold, ‘Trust and IoT’, 8 December 2017, www.projectsbyif.com/blog/trust-and-iot. 
Accessed 7 June 2018.  
50 ‘Trust & Design meetup’, event information, www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/trust-design-0-tickets-
33051501932. Accessed 16 April 2017. 
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and how that is communicated.’51 The issues are the same for the websites, apps, 
digital services, wifi and social media platforms – some of which may be connected to 
objects – which users access nominally for free but which collect data from their 
activity.52 In regard to these devices, ‘product safety’ has a new meaning.53 
Projects by If’s designers have focused their diagnosis of the internet’s evasions 
over trust on the concept of design patterns.54 A design pattern is a formula that 
performs a function.55 As a template it can be copied and used by others. In the 
physical world, examples range from a staircase to a zebra crossing.56 On this view, 
‘terms and conditions’ are the conventional pattern by which a product makes itself 
safe, compliant and transparent and by which the rights of users are explained to them. 
But the studio regards them as ‘broken’.57 ‘Ts & Cs are long / They’re full of jargon / 
They transfer all the risk’. ‘Products used to come with instruction manuals. Now they 
come with an app and terms and conditions that you don’t read, don’t understand, but 
must accept.’58 As Sarah Gold sees it, the failure of terms and conditions is only 
compounded by their ubiquity in the digital world: ‘As more and more things become 
connected, that’s an awful lot of things that we have different “rules” or contracts with. 
It’s going to be very hard, if not impossible, to know what you can trust and what you 
can’t.’59  
The studio considers that the solutions to trust lie in the same concept of design 
patterns: ‘We need new patterns’. In 2016 it began to compile a catalogue of the 
different patterns that can manage the process of consent in a user interface.60 The 
                                                
51 Gold, ‘Trust and IoT’. 
52 Sarah Gold, ‘How Much Does Free Wi-Fi Really Cost?’, 25 November 2016, 
www.projectsbyif.com/blog/how-much-does-free-wi-fi-really-cost. Accessed 17 July 2018. On 
consent issues around Google Street View see Ian Hutchinson, ‘Controlling Who Sees Our 
Personal Spaces’, 2 November 2016, www.projectsbyif.com/blog/controlling-who-sees-our-
personal-spaces. Accessed 17 July 2018. 
53 Richard Pope, ‘Product Safety and Connected Devices’, 26 January 2018, 
www.projectsbyif.com/blog/product-safety-and-connected-devices. Accessed 17 July 2018. 
54 I have encountered a discourse about design patterns among design practitioners but not 
within design academia. See Adam Silver, Form Design Patterns (Smashing, 2018). 
Contributors to the Government Digital Services blog share in this concern, 
www.designnotes.blog.gov.uk.  
55 Christopher Alexander, Sara Ishikawa and Murray Silverstein, A Pattern Language: Towns, 
Buildings, Construction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977). 
56 The blog post Gold, ‘We Need New Patterns’, is illustrated by an image of a person wearing 
headphones and gazing at her mobile phone, while she crosses a zebra crossing on a high 
street. The image is overlaid with ‘Trust is about design’. 
57 Gold, ‘We Need New Patterns’; Projects by If, Data Permissions Catalogue, 
www.catalogue.projectsbyif.com/about. Accessed 22 May 2018. Morey, Forbath and Schoop, 
‘Customer Data’, also questions whether terms and conditions are fit for purpose in digital 
space. 
58 Gold, ‘Trust and Advocacy’. 
59 Sarah Gold, ‘The Things We Trust Are Changing’, 7 July 2016, 
www.projectsbyif.com/ideas/the-things-we-trust-are-changing. Accessed 7 June 2018. 
60 Sarah Gold, ‘Designing Permissions Worth Trusting’, 13 May 2019, 
www.projectsbyif.com/blog/how-do-you-design-permissions-worth-trusting. Accessed 15 May 
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patterns correspond to the different requirements a service might have with data, for 
example whether consent be granted ‘up-front’ or ‘just-in-time’. The Data Permissions 
Catalogue groups patterns according to the problems they solve, such as 
‘Authentication’, ‘Give consent’ or ‘Manage consent’. (See Illustration 1.10.) By 2018, it 
contained forty-two patterns, each with a concise name so that it could be easily 
spoken about and knowingly copied.61 It is common for service designers to re-use 
patterns that they see working in existing services.62 One service might use different 
patterns at different points in its flow. In another example of the use of patterns, the 
studio has developed ‘Data Ethics Toolkits’ to guide organisations in how to use data. 
Projects by If discusses patterns comparably to how Airbnb’s engineers have drawn 
attention to the ‘mechanisms’ which build reputation on that platform. They are 
adaptable pieces of technology. 
Projects by If shows appreciation of the value that a historical perspective can bring 
to its specialist practice. It positions its work as the latest development in the history of 
consumer advocacy and the methods by which products have been made safe over 
time.63 The studio has compared the use of fairtrade marks on bananas to the need for 
transparency in internet-related products.64 The If staff look for models for design and 
trust both in physical systems and from the past in order to ascertain how digital 
problems might pre-date digital technology and to inform their own methods.65 The staff 
took a day-out to observe railway safety features as examples of design patterns. In 
2018 If took on a policy intern to conduct research into ‘historical parallels’. Justine 
Leblanc asked: ‘How can historical parallels inform the way we think about the current 
policy debate around digital rights?’66 As she explained, ‘History can teach us a lot 
about these issues and how they can be regulated.’ She has studied ‘regulation history 
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through railways, engineering and cars.’67 The studio has conducted its own research 
because publishing has not already served its area of design.  
As a company, Projects by If enacts trustworthy practices just as it seeks to design 
them for clients. The Data Permissions Catalogue aims to encourage and facilitate 
good practice across the community of digital designers and developers by sharing 
proven patterns. By means of the Catalogue, the studio spreads its principles at the 
same time as it endorses its own work. If extended this spirit of sharing and openness 
with its ‘Trust & Design’ ‘meetups’, which were intended to complement the Catalogue. 
The first was explained as ‘the trial run of a meet-up to bring together designers and 
technologists to learn and to share what works.’68 At the meet-ups, held in design 
studios, speakers presented service designs that they had worked on, walking the 
audience through the stages of the service and pointing out the trust issues that they 
had to resolve, particularly following user testing. At the events, the studio promoted its 
specialism with graphic, branded stickers and postcards. 
If’s employees further highlight the studio’s transparency by posting regularly on its 
blog about ideas and projects they are working on. They give talks and participate in 
exhibitions, written up on the blog.69 The practice sends out an email newsletter. It runs 
an active Twitter account. It evokes the human touch on the ‘Team’ page of the 
website, which provides the portraits and names of its employees. Client testimonies sit 
at the end of descriptions of projects on the ‘Work’ pages. By its activity If shows that it 
wants the public to be able to see into its work and its individuals and it wants to 
engage them in its concerns.  
Projects by If has emphatically made trust a subject for design practice. Like Airbnb, 
it discusses security and transparency under the heading of trust, but it applies them to 
different problems. Where Airbnb’s staff talks of that company’s mechanisms for trust, 
If relies on what it calls design patterns. It views design patterns, and their collection, 
as a means by which good practice can be built into digital products and services. 
Importantly, If has recognised the need for a historical perspective to its understanding 
of design and trust. It has used the concept of the design pattern in order to investigate 
models in the past. 
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In 2014, a body from the accountancy industry, Audit Futures, formed a collaboration 
with the Service Design programme at the Royal College of Art (RCA). The 
collaboration was centred on design and trust. The Service Design programme’s first-
year MA students received a design brief, under the title ‘Trust: Designing the future of 
Audit’. The subject of the brief was the audit profession, whose job it is to review 
company accounts and ensure that they comply with statutory regulations. The 
students had to ‘discover what the opportunities are for the audit profession to reinvent 
its services’.70 Over four months students worked closely with Audit Futures on the 
brief. In May 2014 five students presented a design each.71 Audit Futures listened to 
their proposals and decided awards.72 At the end of the project, Audit Futures hosted 
an ‘Accountancy Salon’ at the RCA under the title ‘Design & Trust’.73 It was addressed 
by Brannan Jacoby, a philosopher, who spoke about trust; an auditor, Robert 
Hodgkinson; and Nick de Leon, head of the Service Design programme at the RCA.74 
Audit Futures documented its collaboration with the RCA online and in print.75 It wrote 
up the project under the title ‘Designs for Trust’.76 
The involvement of the RCA in the accountancy industry was instigated by Audit 
Futures, the ‘thought-leadership programme’ of the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in England and Wales (ICAEW). Accountancy is an industry that turns on trust. The 
historian of science Theodore Porter characterised it as a ‘technology of trust’, in which 
‘[m]echanical objectivity serves as an alternative to personal trust’.77 In Audit Futures’ 
view, ‘Trust is what auditors sell.’78 Audit is ‘trust-producing’. The ‘auditor’s signature’ is 
the mark of trust as it approves a company’s financial health.79 But trust in the audit 
profession suffered from the global financial crisis of 2007–8 when the near-collapse of 
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a number of high-profile British financial institutions raised questions about its value.80 
Audit Futures was set up in the wake of the crisis with the goal of ‘rethinking the 
profession’.81 For this purpose, it generated different initiatives: it brought audit 
professionals together with representatives from other fields to exchange ideas in 
‘assemblies’, it hosted experts at ‘salons’ and it organised events, reports and 
publications.  
In approaching a design school among its other initiatives, Audit Futures showed its 
desire to draw on ‘design thinking’ to help fulfil its mission.82 Design thinking refers to 
the application of ways of working from design practice to other spheres of endeavour. 
Seen as a way to break down complexity and spur innovation in business, its principles 
include collaboration between an organisation’s departments, the use of prototyping, 
tolerance for failure and uncertainty, and ‘empathy for users’.83 Design thinking typifies 
a trend within the business world since the 1990s. It has made design relevant to 
companies that do not manufacture products as well as raising its status at those that 
do.84  
The failures exposed by the global financial crisis in 2007–8 boosted the profile of 
design thinking, as they signalled that ‘neither MBAs nor their professors have all the 
answers’.85 Audit Futures reflected this turn. It sought ‘behaviour change’ and 
‘innovation projects for systemic effect’, and the ‘people-centric’ approach offered by 
design practice.86 ‘ICAEW wanted more out of the box thinking and while you can get 
this from a business school, we [the RCA] were able to add human and cultural 
dimensions to the question about trust’.87 Audit Futures was clear that further regulation 
of the profession was not the answer to revive trust in audit.88 Audit is already a layer of 
regulation on companies, but ‘new tiers of regulation’ have ‘reduced professional scope 
and dampened aspiration’. ‘Regulation … crowd[s] out judgment’.89 
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Service Design was the natural design programme for Audit Futures to work with. It 
shares ‘quite a lot of DNA’ with design thinking, in its language and its tools.90 A focus 
on service meshed with the new conceptualisation of its industry that Audit Futures 
wished to confer: ‘Instead of an audit report being a trust-producing product, the audit 
process should become a trust-producing practice’.91 This proposed shift put the 
emphasis on a long-term relationship between parties, as opposed to a one-off, 
bounded event in the physical form of an audit report. It marked an effort to counter 
auditors’ frustration that the insight they gained into a business served no purpose in 
the formal audit process.92  
Service Design fitted more generally with the narrative of change espoused by Audit 
Futures. It is a design practice born in the twenty-first century, which pertains not just to 
the design of services but more fundamentally to the transformation of an organisation 
by means of the development of its services.93 Intrinsic to that mission is the 
exploitation of digital technology in order to communicate effectively with people 
individually.94 As a result, service designs often depend upon the digital interfaces of 
websites and apps. But an important characteristic of the practice is to orchestrate 
carefully times when a service user interacts with a business’s representatives, 
designed artefacts and physical space. These are Service Design’s ‘touchpoints’, as 
they are called, and they punctuate a user’s interactions with digital technologies.  
The ‘Trust: Designing the future of Audit’ brief stipulated that the student service 
designers use the methods and terminology that define their discipline. It instructed: 
‘You will develop personas and user journeys to use in co-creation workshops in order 
to create plans for new trust based interactions and interfaces that can be blueprinted 
and tested’.95 Service designs are plotted on the basis of a ‘user journey’. The students 
were to ‘work with the Audit Futures team’ and they ‘co-created design ideas’.96 The 
process was iterative: over the months the students presented their ideas in prototype 
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to representatives from Audit Futures.97 Phases of prototyping involving users are 
essential to the practice of Service Design.98 This was ‘a co-creation process’. The 
specification of the process in the brief – in which people were at the forefront as users 
and stakeholders with needs, as personas and in co-creation – reiterated the ‘human 
dimension’ that Audit Futures sought from design thinking on the matter of trust.99  
The project brief set out the design methods for the students to use but the 
assignment itself was deliberately ‘very broad’.100 The instruction was ‘to unlock 
opportunities for the profession to gain public confidence and deliver trust in society’. 
For this it wanted ‘radical and innovative solutions’.101 The brief expanded beyond 
audit. Students should ‘design and develop future services that support the 
development of trust between organisations, communities and individuals’.102 The brief 
aimed at ‘a better society’.103 It held the ambition of ‘Building a trust-rich society’.104 In 
keeping with projects on the Service Design programme, the brief allowed students to 
respond to real and current challenges in society, as they had been framed within an 
industry. Students had the task of ‘developing’, ‘rebuilding’, and ‘delivering’ trust.105 As 
is typical, the brief did not place limits on students’ creativity, but they were expected to 
deliver feasible proposals.  
The breadth of the brief came with little clarification as to the trust side of the project. 
An appendix to the brief provided some context. Entitled ‘Renewing trust’, it was a 
reproduction of a chapter of a report co-authored by Audit Futures and the Royal 
Society of Arts.106 ‘Renewing trust’ explored the fractured interrelations between trust, 
audit and society and gestured at routes to their repair. It interpreted the political 
scientist Francis Fukuyama’s understanding of trust as ‘a complex, networked 
phenomenon’, dependent on relationships and expectation.107 This was opposed to 
trust ‘as a quantum’. This conception of trust served the point of view that audit should 
shift from being a time-bounded product to an ongoing process and relationship.  
The authors of the appendix gave a long purview to a ‘crisis of trust’, reporting that it 
had ‘taken hold long before the financial crisis’ and went beyond the profession: ‘Trust 
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in audit is fraying as part of much wider social and professional change.’ In the course 
of ‘Renewing trust’, they alluded to certain qualities that were desirable for the renewal 
of trust. The authors gently criticised the visibility of the audit industry, which went 
about its work too quietly.108 They highlighted the need for ‘contact’: ‘frequent and 
reliable contacts’ strengthen trust. Transparency became a target: the work of audit 
should ‘move from “black box” to “glass box”’; as did the need to show vulnerability and 
honesty: audit should ‘offer more realistic levels of certainty’.109 For all the worth of 
these suggestions, the rich contextual information of the appendix was not tailored to 
the student designers. The brief offered no comment on the dynamic of design and 
trust as a typology. 
As a foil to the brief’s contents, a broad perspective of trust illustrated its cover 
page. It showed ‘trust’ in capital letters in a display typeface, white against black ink, 
acting as a target. (See Illustration 1.11.) In a typographical graphic that portrayed its 
multiplicity and gravity, the word ‘trust’ was underlined by a horizontal rule made up of 
the words trusting, belief, loyal, intuition, faith and confidence, and surrounded by a 
pattern of these and other nouns related to it, aligned to make a circular band. These 
words included dialog, idea, honesty, respect, relationship. They were differently sized, 
as if weighted according to their significance. They comprised an assemblage of the 
desirable terms with which trust can be associated.  
‘Trust: Designing the future of Audit’ provided the students with no historical or 
theoretical context for their project that married design to trust, not even in its list of 
‘Some Useful Resources’. Despite this omission in the brief, the auditor who addressed 
the ‘Design and Trust’ salon at the end of the project, ‘positioned audit as something 
that naturally goes with design’. To endorse his claim, he cited double-entry 
bookkeeping as ‘an invention that has design at its core. … When people invented 
double-entry bookkeeping, it was very profound as it involved a moral relationship of 
trust.’110 A report by Audit Futures had referred to the same example, citing double-
entry bookkeeping as an example of an innovation which transformed capitalism and 
‘our world’ as well as the accounting profession. 
Despite the subject’s omission from the brief, certain of the students’ proposals 
made reference to the history of the audit profession.111 They saw relevance in its 
historical development and they made its changing role and tools a starting point for 
their projects. All the students’ projects focussed on how to expand the role of audit out 
of numbers alone and into social values as well, whether by nurturing the values of a 
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company’s employees internally, by measuring a company’s values externally, or by 
promoting in public the values of audit in general. Each student found and enumerated 
their own patchwork of resources, books and project interviews. Their proposals 
intuitively sought to temper the sharp distinction drawn by Theodore Porter between 
‘mechanical objectivity’ and ‘personal trust’.  
Three of the five projects are worth reviewing to show the different directions in 
which a service design could travel to address the loss of trust in audit. Two of them 
depended upon auditors’ measuring a business’s values in addition to its finances in 
the expectation that this would incentivise trustworthy behaviour. In ‘Futureblend’, Lynn 
Chung designed a new, supplementary set of practices for auditors, whose expertise 
would be applied to scrutinising the fulfilment of a business’s purpose and values. She 
proposed that auditors host workshops with a company’s various stakeholders and 
together decide improvements to it. These meetings would take place in an especially 
designed café, which was a touchpoint of her project. In addition, Chung designed a 
digital platform for clients which would record and evaluate the balance between a 
business’s profitability and its agreed purpose. Chung worked to the principle that 
‘When a business fulfils its role, it earns trust.’ She believed that if a business was 
encouraged to be accountable to itself and its own values, then it would be more 
trustworthy to the public.  
‘The Count’ by Jo Blundell similarly looked to build trust by inventing new ways to 
measure a business’s values. In contrast to Chung’s, Blundell’s idea was public-facing 
and rooted in graphic display. She proposed the introduction of ‘a series of visual 
checks akin to food-labelling or energy consumption monitoring’, which ‘would show 
whether businesses are doing the things they should do’.112 Importantly, the proposed 
ratings would take into account feedback from the public, ‘[t]he principle being that if 
businesses have to look at the impact they create as expressed through channels they 
do not control, they are more likely to act responsibly without regulation or legislation.’ 
Blundell made use of the existing associations between traffic-light colours and values 
in order to devise a scheme which would graphically express a company’s 
trustworthiness and its reputation. Her proposal documented her prototypes for how 
best to achieve this.   
Harry Trimble alone of the student designers chose not to develop new ways of 
measuring auditors’ clients. Like Jo Blundell, he sought to evoke reputation but he did 
so in the long-standing form of a museum. His design built trust by developing the 
‘Human Exchange Museum’ as a space where the public could engage with the audit 
profession on new terms. The Human Exchange Museum would tell the stories of 
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invisible inventions, with exhibitions, events and contributions by professionals and the 
public on the subject of money. As its touchpoints, the museum would exist online 
before having a physical presence as well. Trimble sketched the interfaces by which 
parties could upload their own content according to themes. He specifically engaged 
with the past. He sought to promote in public the fact that audit has a historical 
connection to inventions. ‘The inventions of intangible systems, instruments and 
procedures have transformed the way we live,’ he stated in his project description. His 
project responded, on the one hand, to audit’s history; on the other hand, to the 
profession’s lack of visibility and its need to ‘build rapport’ with the public and put its 
vulnerability on display. Trimble was struck that the British public, far from not trusting 
auditors, was not aware of what an auditor did. A ‘first step was to help people 
understand what audit is and why people use it’.113 Trimble admitted that he had 
interpreted the brief as being speculative, but this suited the wide trawl of ideas that 
Audit Futures was undertaking.  
In the collaboration between Audit Futures and the Service Design MA programme 
at the RCA, student designers gave thought to trust. This task was prompted by a 
financial crisis, shifts in business trends and the desire by a profession to tap into the 
possibilities of innovative digital technology. The blend of this project carries 
significance since the graduating projects of student service designers at the RCA 
routinely refer to trust. Trust is written into the aims or the stated context of many of 
their proposed services across the gamut of topics.114 One example, ‘Nomad’, sought 
to smooth international students’ experience of migration, by providing a platform 
where they could meet, find accommodation, set up bank accounts and dispose of 
possessions at the end of their studies. It stated of its values that: ‘it creates trust, 
minimises risk and improves cultural alignment’.115 ‘Mara’ was a project on Artificial 
Intelligence that grappled with the problem that people ‘distrust’ AI.116 Service designs 
commonly manage sensitive areas of life such as health and finance, where the 
requirement for trust and security is acute, just as Projects by If advocates.117 Many of 
the platforms proposed by student service designers use technology to match 
strangers. They have the same burden as Airbnb to enable parties to trust each other; 
otherwise, they will not be used.  
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The students that worked on ‘Trust: Designing the future of Audit’ built their 
proposals around a notion of trust as an ongoing process and a relationship, as 
durational. They aimed at the qualities of visibility, transparency and in most cases 
sociability. The project shows up a paucity of discussion about trust from the 
perspective of design. Audit Futures composed the brief based on its own research 
and mission statement. But budding service designers show an interest both in trust 
and in precedents, which indicates that the history of trust-producing products and 
practices can contribute to the terms of contemporary design. The changes in 
technology that service design hinges on does not make the history less relevant. The 
students’ proposals discussed here were built around the familiar types of a café and a 
museum and the graphic device of food labelling. In turn, the terms of service design 
offer a way of analysing the past. The ‘touchpoints’ of the discipline are markers of 
where parties seal trust. For the designers, these personal interactions are an essential 
counterbalance to the impersonal nature of a service. 
 
Publication 
In 2014, the UCL Urban Laboratory published a thirty-six-page booklet entitled Design 
and Trust, as the third in its Urban Pamphleteer series.118 The Urban Laboratory is an 
interdisciplinary research centre at the University of London which examines 
contemporary cities.119 The Urban Pamphleteer series ‘confront[s] key contemporary 
urban questions from diverse perspectives’ in themed issues.120 Design and Trust 
followed Future & Smart Cities and Regeneration Realities in the series, and preceded 
Heritage and Renewal in Doha and Open-source Housing Crisis, among others. (See 
Illustration 1.12.) The body of contributors to each issue of Urban Pamphleteer reflects 
the interdisciplinary nature of the Urban Laboratory. Design and Trust brings together 
academics from literature, law, geography, archaeology and social sciences, 
practitioners in art, design, photography and architecture, and the spokesperson of a 
charitable enterprise.  
The Urban Pamphleteer series is targeted at a diverse readership of ‘professionals, 
researchers, institutions and policy-makers’, with the objective ‘to empower citizens’. Its 
tone is deliberately ‘accessible’.121 The contributions to Design and Trust are short, 
between 500 and 1200 words, and several are built around images. The authors use 
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the space to present summaries of their research or projects, or to explore offshoots of 
the same. The issue is designed to the Urban Pamphleteer’s lively, graphic template, 
which allows each page to be different and diverting.122 Text is broken up by prominent 
titles, pulled quotes, footnotes, author biographies and a scattering of images of 
varying sizes and positions. There are flashes of blue, which are coordinated with the 
colour of the issue’s cover. The series’ light-hearted presentation belies its serious 
content at the same time as it complements the playfulness and experimental nature of 
some of the contributions, particularly those by artists.123 Each issue is distributed for 
free in 1000 copies and available to download as a pdf file. These decisions distinguish 
the series from academic publishing. 
Design and Trust conceives of trust principally as a matter of security. In this regard, 
it overlaps with one of the ways in which both Airbnb and Projects by If understand 
trust. From their various fields, the publication’s contributors respond to the editors’ 
central question: ‘What are the consequences of prioritising defence and security as a 
first principle in design?’, specifically what are the ‘social consequences of our theories 
of security, including both intended and unintended effects’. The responses revolve 
around preventative security and physical safety in public space. The editors’ narrow 
viewpoint on trust derives from Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design 
(CPTED), a body of thought which advocates measures by which crime can be 
prevented by design. Developed from the 1970s, CPTED has been influential on 
planning policy in developed countries.124 The majority of articles in Design and Trust 
recount case studies which epitomise the principles of CPTED. They cover crime 
prevention and risk reduction in relation to surveillance, cash machines, anti-social 
behaviour, theft, fire regulations and fences. One discusses the development of 
CPTED itself. The editors harness these topics together as being ‘about the role of 
design in ensuring safety … and facilitating trust in urban environments.’125 Few of the 
authors use the word trust; instead they speak of security, safety, protection and risk-
prevention.126 
Design and Trust’s editors sought ‘to stimulate a critical discussion’ on the subject of 
design and trust. Unlike this chapter’s previous examples, the authors offer a largely 
negative assessment. They show how design dictated by security harms sociability in 
public space. Geographer Johan Andersson argues that railings in Russell Square 
                                                
122 The designer of the series is Guglielmo Rossi. 
123 For example, Adam Walker-Smith, ‘Dubious Nature’, in Campkin and Ross, eds, Design and 
Trust, pp. 10–11, which is the artist Max Colson. 
124 Lorraine Gamman and Adam Thorpe, ‘Design for Democratic Crime Prevention’, in Campkin 
and Ross, eds, Design and Trust, pp. 6–8. CPTED was inspired in part by Jane Jacobs, The 
Death and Life of Great American Cities (London: Jonathan Cape, 1962). 
125 Campkin and Ross, Design and Trust, p. [i]. 
126 ‘Trust’ is used on pp. 1, 16, 23–4, 32, 36. 
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have created exclusivity on terms set by the landowners. Archaeologist Jonathan 
Gardner maintains that the various fences that bounded the London 2012 Olympics 
reflected the paranoia of the authorities, while co-authors and law academics Anne 
Bottomley and Nathan Moore highlight the paranoia that surveillance technologies 
provoke in the public. Artist researchers Tilly Fowler and Anna Hart together contend 
that security guards in private–public spaces make certain sections of society feel 
unwelcome. In contrast to the inferences made by Airbnb, Audit Futures and Projects 
by If, certain articles mount the critique that design and trust policies undermine 
democracy by excluding and dividing people.127 Measures intended to make 
environments secure – that is, to make them trustworthy – have, conversely, 
‘jeopardised trust or sociability’ and demeaned public life and its freedoms.  
Lorraine Gamman and Adam Thorpe form the lone constructive voice when they 
defend the theory and practice of CPTED. Gamman is the pioneer of Central Saint 
Martin’s Design Against Crime Research Centre, which draws from CPTED. The centre 
aims to design objects which assist with crime prevention and thereby enable people 
instinctively to trust public spaces.128 An example of their work is street furniture which 
enables bicycles to be easily locked in two places. In their article, Gamman and Thorpe 
admit shortcomings of CPTED; they agree that it has been insensitive to social space. 
But they argue that a ‘second generation’ of the theory incorporates consultation with 
communities and participatory design methods. As a result, ‘crime preventers need to 
work to build social capital’.129 The title to their article – ‘Design for Democratic Crime 
Prevention’ – makes a decisive distinction: what was previously ‘crime prevention’ has 
been reformulated as ‘democratic’. However, most of the rest of the articles in Design 
and Trust imply that the negative impact of the first generation of CPTED remains to be 
felt. 
Design and Trust offers a model for how to perceive the physical environment in 
terms of trust. In its pages, design points to physical things. It is made of bricks and 
mortar, and metal and plastic, material things that take up space and demand to be 
seen. These kinds of designed object contrast with the services, digital devices and 
online platforms that dominated this chapter’s previous examples. Design and Trust’s 
focus on physical infrastructure is akin to Projects by If’s regard to railway technology 
                                                
127 Gamman and Thorpe, ‘Design for Democratic Crime Prevention’, pp. 6–8; Henrietta 
Williams, ‘Fortress Britain’, in Campkin and Ross, eds, Design and Trust, pp. 18–19; Teresa P. 
R. Caldeira, ‘City of Walls’, in ibid., p. 27; Tilly Fowler and Anna Hart, ‘Enjoy this Estate’, in ibid., 
pp. 31–32. 
128 Lorraine Gamman and Adam Thorpe, ‘Criminality and Creativity: What’s at Stake in 
Designing Against Crime?’, in Alison J. Clarke, ed., Design Anthropology: Object Culture in the 
21st Century (Vienna: Springer, 2011), pp. 56–71. 
129 Gamman and Thorpe, ‘Design for Democratic Crime Prevention’, p. 7. 
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of the past as physical devices for security; yet the publication narrows the terms of its 
subject such that it offers a negative assessment overall.  
Types of boundary constitute the object that most commonly fits Design and Trust’s 
remit. ‘Railings in Vanity Fair’ and ‘De-Sexualising Public Space Through “Restoration”’ 
discuss the meanings of park railings.130 ‘Fortress Britain’ recounts the fortunes of Zaun 
Ltd, a company that makes fences in Wolverhampton.131 Its fences were designed for 
use in prisons but they are increasingly used to cordon off schools because they have 
received accreditation from Secured by Design (SBD). SBD is a CPTED-informed 
‘group operated by the police in the UK, which aims to “design out crime”. All new 
public developments in the UK now have to adhere to their guidelines’. This article and 
‘Securing the Past in the Present’ also bring to light the various fences that surrounded 
the site of the London 2012 Olympics.132 ‘City of Walls’ sums up the problems that 
follow from the ‘movement to build walls’: ‘segregation and intolerance’.133  
Articles in Design and Trust also treat smaller objects. Air vents and sprinklers are 
relevant to fire protection systems.134 Safety features such as anti-climb paint and 
lighting, CCTV and the means of surveillance of ‘roads, cables, pipes, engines, 
computer chips, phone towers, machines, fiber optics, pumps, generators, wires, gas’ 
are incorporated into a way of looking determined by trust.135 Just one article 
addresses itself to the potential of intangible security infrastructure in cities.136 
Design and Trust’s attention to material forms also illuminates the stuff that has 
been taken away in a bid to make spaces safe. In ‘Design for Democratic Crime 
Prevention’, that stuff is ‘public conveniences, seating and litterbins…to reduce anti-
social behaviours’.137 In two case studies, greenery was sacrificed for safety. The 
renovation of Russell Square in London saw ‘the removal of robust planting and, in 
particular, the hedge that used to surround the park’.138 When it comes to Zaun’s 
fences, ‘Tree planting is limited for enhanced visibility’.139 By contrast, a project by the 
                                                
130 Matthew Ingleby, ‘Railings in Vanity Fair’, in Campkin and Ross, eds, Design and Trust, pp. 
1–2; Johan Andersson, ‘De-Sexualising Public Space Through “Restoration”’, in ibid., pp. 9–10. 
131 Williams, ‘Fortress Britain’, p. 18. 
132 Jonathan Gardner, ‘Securing the Past in the Present’, in Campkin and Ross, eds, Design 
and Trust, pp. 20–22. 
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Trust, pp. 13–14. 
135 Walker-Smith, ‘Dubious Nature’, p. 12; Thireshen Govender and Andrew Charman, ‘Home 
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artist Max Colson humorously uses photography to demonstrate how plants are 
introduced to soften and conceal surveillance infrastructure.140  
Design and Trust’s authors are attuned to the visual connotations of the material 
forms they discuss. By their words and their choice of pictures, they depict the 
conspicuous and threatening nature of design which is motivated by security. SBD 
‘policies have been criticised for creating characterless environments that are 
needlessly threatening’.141 The Olympic Perimeter Fence in London is described as 
having had ‘gross proportions’ and being ‘rather frightening’.142 Even those who 
advocate this kind of design as safety infrastructure, admit that in the past those who 
have implemented it ‘forgot to design in beauty and hope’.143 The dreary images that 
accompany the articles endorse this stance. Zaun’s factory has the look of despair on 
the inside and out. The blue hoarding around the site of the London Olympics had 
been ‘emblazoned with panels depicting a computer-generated pristine future 
landscape’, but its remnants are depicted here as a pitiful, low-tech intervention on the 
landscape.144 Similarly banal-looking are photographs of a cash machine and of the 
exterior of an illegal drinking house in South Africa which is devoid of the revellers to 
bring it to life.145 Through their sensitivity to visual matters, the contributors to Design 
and Trust imply that visibility, and by association transparency too, are not invariably 
positive, trust-fulfilling qualities. This perspective contests that gleaned from Audit 
Futures and Projects by If. 
In Design and Trust, visibility also determines the effectiveness of surveillance 
measures, the very objective of which is to see. Security staff are ‘the face of the rules’ 
in ‘privatised estates’.146 CCTV is meant to have a ‘deterrence effect on crime’, even 
though there is little research to confirm this.147 Sociologist AbdouMaliq Simone calls it 
‘Seeing Security’.148 But ‘Arsenal Kicks: Reclaiming Elthorne Park’ ‘shows how a visible 
presence can counteract threat in a positive way. It tells how an inner-city park was 
used for football games for young people thereby stemming a ‘youth crime problem’ in 
the park. ‘[L]et’s say there wasn’t a football session going on, people might not want to 
pass through that park. They’d go around it. Whereas if they can see there are loads of 
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kids playing … there’s someone leading it, then they will walk past.’149 This is exactly 
the kind of initiative that, in the words of another article, ‘build[s] social capital and 
contribute[s] to more “eyes on the street”’.150  
By contrast, ‘Urban Security and the “Tricks” of Endurance’ argues that security in 
cities of the Global South depends on endurance through invisibility. ‘[T]he persistence 
of large numbers of districts … where people of different incomes, doing different 
things and using space in different ways manage to live in close proximity to each 
other’ has stayed within local bounds and gone unnoticed.151 Designed interventions in 
the name of safety threaten these kinds of successful communities. 
Design and Trust’s dual emphasis on the built environment and its visual qualities, 
reads as a methodological statement for how to see the design of the invisible concept 
of trust in the material world. The publication makes conspicuous those structures in a 
city which go unseen because they are banal, such as fences and CCTV. This method 
is duly reflected in the presentation of the articles, and in the series as a whole. The 
Urban Pamphleteer places almost as much value in images as in text. The back cover 
of each issue shows a black and white photograph, a slither of which seeps onto the 
front cover to occupy the left margin. Design and Trust’s back cover is the end wall of a 
terrace house covered in a menacing grid of CCTV cameras.152 It offers a dystopian 
view on the endpoint of policies apparently informed by trust. The series even uses 
images for its page numbers, which comprise photographs of the fabric of urban life. 
Showing handwritten or printed numbers on display on street signs and furniture and in 
shop windows and on shop signs, the numbers bring the everyday life of the city inside 
the pages of each publication. By doing so, they comically take up more space than 
one expects of a page number. 
Design and Trust deals with a narrow conception of trust as preventative security. 
On its terms, walls and CCTV cameras best materialise trust; they are its mechanisms 
and devices. The publication provides a critique of design and trust in urban 
environments. It shows how the design of trust has resulted in the reverse; it has 
brought about unsocial spaces. This is a valuable insight which coalesces with Onora 
O’Neill’s questioning of the effectiveness of layers of accountability (discussed in the 
Introduction), and positions it in the context of design.153 Design and Trust provides a 
model for how to interpret, look at and see trust in the design of physical objects. Its 
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contributors emphasise the physical, visual and sensual qualities of material forms of 
trust, in a way that this thesis takes forward. These contributors variously conceive of 
trust as an entity to be seen or not to be seen.  
 
Conclusion 
This Part I of the thesis has shown that today’s designers are contemplating the design 
of trust in order to grasp the opportunities offered by internet technology, to solve the 
problems caused by it, to reshape a profession and contentiously, to make safe urban 
spaces. The projects discussed here legitimise trust as an analytic category for 
perceiving the man-made world. But there is a lack of research which gives a historical 
context to these endeavours. The next part of the thesis shows how these endeavours 
bear comparison with the development of the fire insurance industry in Britain from 
1680, an industry that required trust.  
The Part’s single chapter has drawn out from each example of ‘designs for trust’ the 
ways in which their practitioners understood trust and their conception of the designs or 
mechanisms or patterns by which they could produce trust. The same distinction 
between the understanding of trust and the means to produce it, provides the 
framework for how Part II considers the historical material of fire insurance, in its 
analysis of the qualities of trust and the technologies of trust. In different ways, each 
example considered in this chapter called on the essential human element in making 
trust. Part II develops this by showing how people interrelated with the material objects 
of fire insurance. Part III takes from this first Part the idea that efforts to build trust may 
in fact undermine it, as conveyed by the publication Design and Trust. Thus, Part I, in 
its examination of contemporary design projects, has set up a temporal dialogue with 




Part II: How the Fire Insurance Industry Built Trust between 
1680 and 1914 
 
‘This ingenious and usefull invention’; so was described the Insurance Office in 1690, 
the first enterprise in Britain to subscribe policies for houses against damage or 
destruction by fire.1 The Insurance Office’s insurers subscribed the first policy in 
London in September 1681 following more than a year of planning. After three years, 
they had issued 4000 policies in London and they made it known that they had ‘paid 
Back for Losses above’ £7000 out of £18,000 of premiums.2 At the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, this nascent industry encompassed three fire insurance 
companies. They claimed to have 41,000 policy holders between them.3 From the early 
eighteenth century, one could buy a fire policy on one’s possessions as well as on 
one’s house. By the 1780s, a fire policy was general among householders in London 
and a century later, among householders and businesses across Britain, in a market of 
dozens of insurance companies.4 In the early twentieth century, British insurance 
companies sold insurance in a greater number of iterations than ever before.  
To echo the question Airbnb asked of its own success, what made all of that 
possible? Just as for Airbnb, one answer is trust. From the inception of the fire 
insurance industry, people trusted it in significant numbers that only grew over time. 
Policy holders placed their trust in companies that by paying a premium, they would 
receive recompense in the event of a fire. They also believed that a policy offered 
value, that its price matched the risk. On what grounds did buyers hold these 
propositions? This Part of the thesis answers that question by attention to the printed 
matter that the industry generated. Printed matter allowed companies to build trust and 
maintain it over long periods of time. The Insurance Office existed for at least thirty 
                                                
1 Thomas DeLaune, Angliae Metropolis or Present State of London (1690), Section 12, quoted 
by Francis Boyer Relton, An Account of the Fire Insurance Companies Associations Institutions 
Projects and Schemes Established and Projected in Great Britain and Ireland during the 17th 
and 18th Centuries, including the Sun Fire Office: Also of Charles Povey, the Projector of that 
Office, his Writings and Schemes (London: Sonnenschein, 1893), p. 44. 
2 N[icholas] B[arbon], A Letter to a Gentleman in the Country, Giving an Account of the two 
Insurance-Offices; the Fire-Office & Friendly-Society (1684), p. 2. 
3 Relton, Account of the Fire Insurance Companies, p. 263. Relton’s figures match those in 
Edward Hatton, A New View of London: Or, An Ample Account of that City (1708). Edward 
Chamberlayne, Angliae Notitia: or the Present State of England with Divers Remarks upon the 
Ancient State thereof (1704), p. 439, states that the Insurance Office has insured 10,000 
houses and the Friendly Society 12,500 since the founding of each. 
4 H. A. L. Cockerell and Edwin Green, British Insurance Business: A Guide to its History and 
Records (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994), p. 40. 
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years; one of its peers in the late seventeenth century lasted into the twentieth century, 
as did several others founded in the eighteenth century.5 
The Insurance Office’s first piece of communication began thus: ‘There is no Design 
more universally desired by Landlords and Tenants of Houses, than such as may 
secure their Interests from Loss by Fire’.6 Fire insurance was not only a business that 
required its purchasers to place their trust; it was also a business which sold aspects of 
trust as embedded in its product. For the fledgling Insurance Office sold itself as a 
design for security. Security is one of the understandings of trust that Airbnb, Projects 
by If and the publication Design and Trust hold, as discussed in the previous Part. This 
second Part uses Part I’s contemporary examples to unlock understanding of how fire 
insurance companies in the past designed printed matter in order to build trust with 
people. Those people were policy holders and potential policy holders, investors and 
early adopters, and companies’ own employees. 
Part II will itemise how print forged trust in fire insurance through the language and 
tropes that it used, its graphics and graphic language, the devices it afforded and how 
it interrelated with people. This Part conducts its historical analysis based on a 
distinction between the qualities of trust and the technologies of trust that was drawn in 
Part I. Chapter 3 sets out the qualities of trust by which print sold fire insurance. It 
discovers the expression of these qualities in print’s words and images. The design of 
ideas on the page, either through text, images or graphics, created associations for fire 
insurance with trust. Chapter 4 identifies the graphic technologies upon which fire 
insurance rested. The term technology covers mechanisms, devices and patterns, 
which came to light at turns in the projects discussed in Part I. They are graphic 
because their effectiveness rested on their appearance on the printed page.  
Chapters 3 and 4 are focused on how companies used printed matter to build trust 
with customers. Chapter 5 shows the key role that people and face-to-face interactions 
played in how companies built trust, often working in tandem with printed matter, and 
represented and shaped by it. Part II asserts a historical precedence for the 
contemporary examples of design and trust in Part I. The main temporal dialogue of 
the thesis is set in motion. In this way the design of trust can be seen as a typology of 
design. This analysis of printed matter demands first of all a summary of the history of 
fire insurance in the following chapter. This summary focuses on the development of 
                                                
5 The Hand in Hand was established in 1696, the Sun in 1710, the Union in 1714, the 
Westminster in 1717, Royal Exchange and the London Assurance in 1720 and the Phoenix in 
1782. All of them lasted into the twentieth century, when they were bought out or amalgamated. 
As such, their traces exist in the twenty-first century. Cockerell and Green, British Insurance 
Business, Section I, offers a guide to the archives of British insurance companies. 
6 Fire Office, Propositions (1680). The first sentence remained unchanged in the revised 
Propositions of 1681, as did most of the rest of the sheet. 
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the two fire insurance companies which comprise Part II’s content, the Insurance Office 
and the Sun. Importantly, this chapter introduces the print that will be discussed in 
detail in the subsequent chapters. The developments in fire insurance are inseparable 
from the graphic objects by which they came about. 
 
 
Chapter 2: The Development of Fire Insurance 
 
Before he was known to posterity as a novelist, Daniel Defoe wrote about insurance in 
one of his works of non-fiction, Essay Upon Projects, published in 1697. In a section on 
‘Assurances’, he discussed the enduring usefulness of marine insurance, 
encapsulating it as ‘a compact among merchants’. Defoe proceeded to consider how 
the formula of assurance had extended its application in his own time:  
This way of Assuring has also, as other Arts of Trade have, suffer’d some Improvement (if I 
may be allow’d that Term) in our Age; and the first step upon it, was an Ensurance-Office for 
Houses to Ensure them from Fire; Common Fame gives the project to Dr Barebone; a Man, I 
suppose, better known as a Builder than a Physician. Whether it were his, or whose it was, I 
do not enquire; it was settled on a Fund of Ground-Rents to Answer in case of Loss, and met 
with very good Acceptance. 
But it was soon follow’d by another, by way of Friendly Society; where every one who 
Subscribe, pay their Quota to Build up any Man's House who is a Contributor, if it shall 
happen to be Burnt. I won't decide which is the Best, or which Succeeded best, but I believe 
the latter brings in most Money to the Contriver. 
Only one Benefit I cannot omit which they reap from these Two Societies who are not 
concern’d in either, That if any Fire happen, whether in Houses Ensur’d or not Ensur’d, they 
have each of them a set of Lusty Fellows, generally Water-men, who being immediately 
call’d up, where-ever they live, by Watchmen Appointed, are, it must be confess’d, very 
Active and Diligent in helping to put out the Fire. 
Having reported on fire insurance, Defoe considered other possibilities for insurance: 
As to any further Improvement to be made upon Assurances in Trade, no question there 
may, and I doubt not but on Payment of a small Duty to the Government, the King might be 
made the General Ensurer of all Foreign Trade: Of which more under another Head. 
I am of the Opinion also, that an Office of Ensurance Erected to Ensure the Titles of 
Lands, in an Age where they are so precarious as now, might be a Project not unlikely to 
succeed, if Establish’d on a good Fund. But I shall say no more to that, because it seems to 
be a Design in hand by some Persons in Town, and is indeed no Thought of my own.  
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Ensuring of Life I cannot admire; I shall say nothing to it; but that in Italy where Stabbing 
and Poysoning is so much in Vogue, something may be said for it, and on contingent 
Annuities; and yet I never knew the thing much approv’d of on any account.7 
Daniel Defoe’s précis of different kinds of insurance explains the context from which 
fire insurance sprang. Insurance on ships’ stocks and the lives of captains had been in 
continuous use in Europe since the fourteenth century. In the course of the 
seventeenth century, insurance went from being a specialist, commercial purchase to a 
concept with wide application and growing appeal in England.8 The history of insurance 
is a ‘process of false starts, copious speciation, hybridization, and pervasive failure’.9 
Within that turbulence, the history of fire insurance looks steady as well as long, as 
testified by the longevity of several of its companies mentioned above. By contrast, it 
was not until the establishment of the Equitable in 1762 that a life insurance company 
proved its staying power. Life insurance suffered financial and moral scandals, and 
went in and out of fashion.10 Its earliest forms variously covered events from war to 
marriage, birth and cuckoldry. Fire insurance never enjoyed the associations with 
gambling that its sibling garnered in popular culture throughout the eighteenth century. 
As a result, it has not accrued research into its social and cultural implications in the 
manner of life insurance.11 The history of fire insurance has largely absorbed men who 
worked in it. Since the 1990s, it has been a subject in business history.12 Despite its 
omission from cultural studies, the fire industry’s development was chequered with 
colourful characters, cut-throat competition, setbacks and overblown promotional 
material – a taste of which follows. 
 
The projecting age 
The different kinds of insurance that developed in the seventeenth century and into the 
eighteenth century, whether unsuccessful or successful, arose from the ‘projecting 
age’, as coined by Daniel Defoe. In those centuries, ‘project’ was a label applied to all 
sorts of commercial schemes. Projects were promoted publicly in the hope of finding 
supporters, subscribers and investors, raising funds and becoming a reality. Print 
propelled these schemes, flagged with words such as ‘proposals’ and ‘propositions’.13 
                                                
7 Daniel Defoe, An Essay upon Projects (1697), pp. 115–117. 
8 Geoffrey Wilson Clark, Betting on Lives: The Culture of Life Insurance in England, 1695–1775 
(Manchester University Press, 1999), p. 3. 
9 Ibid., p. 71. 
10 Ibid., passim. 
11 Lorraine Daston, Classical Probability in the Enlightenment (Princeton University Press, 
1988); Geoffrey Wilson Clark, Gregory Anderson, Christian Thomann and J.-Matthias Graf von 
der Schulenburg, eds, The Appeal of Insurance (University of Toronto Press, 2010). 
12 See, for example, Oliver Westall, ed., The Historian and the Business of Insurance 
(Manchester University Press, 1984). 
13 This is based on the occurrence of these words on Early English Books Online (EEBO). 
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(See Illustrations 2.1 and 2.2.) A wide range of ideas became projects, albeit few went 
past the promotion stage, as was commented at the time. Many schemes were 
infrastructural such as building a canal, or otherwise physical and material such as 
commercialising a mine, draining land or establishing a worthy institution.14 A few 
schemes pitched the possibilities of riches from overseas. Others showed ingenuity in 
the way that money might beget money, such as lotteries.15 The Bank of England, 
founded in 1694, arose from this context.16 Many schemes entailed a joint-stock 
company. Printed proposals often referred to projects in their nascent stage as 
‘designs’, to indicate an idea that was not yet materialised.17 
Historians since Joan Thirsk have classified the culture of projects under the 
modern rubric of economic innovation. These innovations promised profit. As a defining 
economic-cultural expression, today’s ‘startups’ suggest an analogy. The rhetoric of 
projectors was absorbed with trade and in particular with a notion of ‘improvement’. 
The frequent failure of projects to live up to their promises, led projectors to be 
maligned figures already by the early seventeenth century. Koji Yamamoto’s case 
studies unveil the distrust which tainted them.18 He argues that this distrust in turn 
shaped their culture and behaviour. Projectors’ poor reputation did not stem the 
practice of projecting.  
As much as the projecting age forms the backdrop for insurance schemes, 
insurance also forms part of the conceptual historical event of the English financial 
revolution at the end of the seventeenth century, as framed by Peter Dickson.19 This is 
characterised by the rise of the stock market and of banking facilities, which was 
                                                
14 See Joan Thirsk, Economic Policy and Projects: The Development of a Consumer Society in 
Early Modern England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978); Paul Slack, From Reformation to 
Improvement: Public Welfare in Early Modern England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Paul 
Slack, The Invention of Improvement: Information and Material Progress in Seventeenth-century 
England (Oxford University Press, 2015); Koji Yamamoto, Taming Capitalism Before Its 
Triumph: Public Service, Distrust, and 'Projecting' in Early Modern England (Oxford University 
Press, 2018).  
15 On financial innovations see Anne L. Murphy, The Origins of English Financial Markets: 
Investment and Speculation Before the South Sea Bubble (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
Murphy discusses the state lottery, The Honourable Undertaking; or Five Hundred Pounds for 
One Shilling [1696?]. 
16 On the Bank of England as a project, Valerie Hamilton and Martin Parker, Daniel Defoe and 
the Bank of England: The Dark Arts of Projectors (Winchester: Zero Books, 2016). 
17 A. Newbold, Londons Improvement and the Builder’s Security Asserted, by the Apparent 
Advantages that will Attend their Easie Charge, in Raising such a Joint-Stock, as many Assure 
a Re-building of those Houses, which shall hereafter be Destroyed by the Casualties of Fire 
(1680), p. [ii], asks that his design for fire insurance ‘may be made to appear the same in 
Practice, as it is Presented in the Proposals’. 
18 Yamamoto, Taming Capitalism. 
19 P. G. M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public 
Credit 1688–1756 (London: Macmillan, 1967). The same author’s previous book was a 
company history of my subject, the Sun Fire Office: The Sun Insurance Office 1710–1960: The 
History of Two and a Half Centuries of British Insurance (Oxford University Press, 1960). 
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anchored in the establishment of the Bank of England.20 Financial historians treat 
developments in insurance as peripheral to these changes but insurance was one of 
the new kinds of enterprise in which people could place their money, either as 
investors and shareholders or as policy holders.21 Lotteries offered the same 
possibilities. From the eighteenth century, the capital amassed by insurance 
companies was a factor in the financial system according to how it was invested.22 
Insurance, then, contributed to the new market of the revolution.23 
 
Before 1680 
In the seventeenth century, victims of fire, as of other misfortunes, had recourse to an 
officially organised system of charitable donation, ‘briefs’. (See Illustration 2.3.) The 
new system of fire insurance was developed to meet the greater risks of fire 
occasioned by London’s growth in population and goods.24 First of all, the seventeenth 
century witnessed some failed attempts at fire insurance.25 These false starts have a 
bearing on the rivalry that arose between the two fire insurance enterprises that were 
at length set up. In 1638, two individuals petitioned the king for a patent to run a fire 
insurance scheme across London, with a security fund deposited in the Chamber of 
London.26 They argued: ‘From hence will arise great profit, comfort and safety to the 
inhabitants and to their landlords, for many times a poor man’s house is burnt, being all 
his livelihood’. The king granted the petition on the condition that subscription to the 
scheme was voluntary. Nothing further is known of it.  
Following the Great Fire of London in 1666, the idea of fire insurance was revived 
and at intervals proposed to the Corporation of the City of London, for that institution to 
administrate. In 1669, Benjamin DeLaune presented a scheme ‘for Ensuring Houses 
against the evill and loss of Fire within the City and liberties’.27 In 1674, Augustus 
Newbold, a deputy in the Corporation, proposed another. These ideas ran alongside 
legislation to make new buildings fire-safe and to enforce fire-fighting practices.28 As 
the Corporation’s Committee proved unable to make the time to carry through his 
                                                
20 Murphy, Origins of English Financial Markets. 
21 Insurance is little mentioned by Dickson, Financial Revolution, nor more recently by Murphy, 
Origins of English Financial Markets, which pays great attention to lotteries. 
22 ‘The Investments of the Office’, in Dickson, Sun Insurance Office, pp. 234–263. 
23 ‘The Market in Securities’, in Dickson, Financial Revolution. 
24 G. Clayton, British Insurance (London: Elek Books, 1971), Chapter 3. 
25 Relton, Account of the Fire Insurance Companies, recounts every scheme, including at least 
one that is spurious; namely, his insistence that the Insurance Office was a development of an 
earlier scheme by Nicholas Barbon. 
26 Relton, Account of the Fire Insurance Companies, pp. 11–12.  
27 Minutes of the Court of Common Council, 8 December 1669, quoted by Relton, Account of 
the Fire Insurance Companies, p. 22. 
28 The Act for the Rebuilding of the City of London, 1667; Act for Preventing and Suppressing of 
Fires within the City of London, and Liberties thereof, 1667. 
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scheme, Augustus Newbold waited until 1679 when he presented them with a revised 
version. Newbold’s final proposal depended on a joint-stock to be held by the 
Corporation. He calculated that the scheme could run at a profit. In April 1680, a news-
sheet reported on this proposal, under the Corporation’s wing, ‘of raising such a Joynt 
Stock as may for ever assure the Rebuilding of any of the Casualties happening by 
Fire to any of the Houses of the City of London’.29 (See Illustrations 2.4 and 2.5.) The 
‘Design’ was published in the same year, as a pamphlet Londons Improvement.30 (See 
Illustration 2.6.) 
 
Insurance Office vs Corporation of the City of London 
In May 1680, the same news-sheet that had reported on the Corporation of the City of 
London’s proposal now reported on a ‘New Office’ set up by private individuals, which 
‘do undertake for a very reasonable rate to secure the Houses in London and the 
Suburbs thereof from Fire, and if burnt down to build them again at the cost of the 
Office’.31 (See Illustration 2.7.) This office came to be the Insurance Office, one of the 
two companies whose policies, promotional material, pamphlets and notices in news-
sheets this thesis closely examines.32 The Office’s design for fire insurance was 
broadly similar to August Newbold’s printed proposal. The news story coincided with 
the publication of Propositions for the scheme, which set out the proposers’ intention to 
insure 10,000 houses.33 (See Illustrations 2.8 and 2.9.) Shortly after the Propositions, 
the proposers published Arguments for Insuring Houses from FIRE. (See Illustrations 
2.10 and 2.11.)  
These announcements by the Insurance Office’s proposers proved hasty; the 
‘design’ was not yet finally ‘setled’.34 In spring 1681, the proposers published a new 
version of Propositions, showing small adjustments to their scheme, alongside an 
Advertisement to promote the revision. (See Illustration 2.12.) The Insurance Office 
was not in a position to sign policies until September 1681, at which point it made a 
new announcement. (See Illustrations 2.13 and 2.14.) In the interim, its backers settled 
in a trust the fund of land upon which the scheme rested. The ground rents from this 
                                                
29 Protestant (Domestick) Intelligence, 2 April 1680, No. 78, pp. [1]–[2]. 
30 Newbold, Londons Improvement. The Protestant (Domestick) Intelligence had referred to ‘a 
Copy of a Design’ presented to the Lord Mayor and advised, ‘The Design is Promised in a short 
time to be Published’. 
31 The True Protestant (Domestick) Intelligence, 7 May 1680, No. 5, p. [1]. The True Protestant 
(Domestick) Intelligence was published as a substitute for The Protestant (Domestick) 
Intelligence, likely by the writer of the latter, though not its editor. On the thorny relationships 
between these publications, see James Sutherland, The Restoration Newspaper and its 
Development (Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 14–15. 
32 The text capitalises Office, when it refers to either the Insurance Office or the Sun. 
33 Fire Office, Propositions for Insuring Houses from Fire [1680], p. 1; also, Fire Office, 
Propositions for Insuring Houses from Fire [1681], p. 1. 
34 ‘Setled’ was the term applied by the proposers of the Insurance Office.  
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land would pay claims. The Office commissioned an engraved ‘Instrument or Policy of 
Insurance’, which it issued to its customers. This document remained the same for the 
next twenty years.35 (See Illustration 2.15.) 
While the Insurance Office made its preparations, from November 1680 the 
Corporation of the City of London was bringing to fruition Augustus Newbold’s plan for 
fire insurance.36 The Corporation was ready to issue policies in November 1681, and 
published notices of the same.37 (See Illustrations 2.16 and 2.17.) The offers made by 
the Insurance Office and the Corporation were almost indistinguishable. The purchaser 
of a policy paid a premium, the amount of which depended on the term of years he or 
she preferred (between seven and thirty-one years, in the case of the Insurance 
Office), the value of his or her house and the materials from which the house was 
made: a timber house doubled the price of the premium, due to its greater vulnerability 
to fire. The distinction between brick and timber had been enshrined in building 
regulations following the Great Fire. The Insurance Office and the Corporation assured 
that if a house was damaged or destroyed by fire within the term then its policy holder 
received a sum of money according to the value insured. The Insurance Office now set 
out to insure the reduced number of 3000 houses, in proportion to the ground rents it 
had managed to arrange and the risk of fire that its backers had calculated.38 The 
Corporation placed no limit. 
The backers of the Insurance Office reacted aggressively to the launch of the 
Corporation’s scheme. Their displeasure generated four publications (each from one 
page to four pages in extent), in which they claimed themselves to be the originators of 
the design of insurance on houses – a claim which the record disproves. They 
undermined the Corporation’s scheme as best they could. (See Illustrations 2.18; 2.19 
to 2.22; 2.23 to 2.26; 2.27.) The Corporation’s side defended itself in two four-page 
pamphlets. (See Illustrations 2.28 and 2.29.) Two points of divergence between the 
offerings frustrated the Insurance Office’s backers. First, the Corporation’s premium 
was less, forcing the Insurance Office hastily to match it. Secondly, while the Insurance 
                                                
35 The earliest known Insurance Office policy is Number 111, dated 5 October 1681, TNA, 
C103/157. I am not aware of examples after 1699. 
36 Relton, Account of the Fire Insurance Companies, pp. 51–54. 
37 City of London, The Book of Subscriptions, for Insuring of Houses (by the City of London) in 
Case of Fire, is now Open […] [1681]; City of London, Moore, Mayor. At a Common Council 
Holden in the Chamber of the Guild-hall … Upon Reading of Proposals This Day Presented by 
the Committee of This Court for Insuring of Houses in Cases of Fire […]; City of London, A 
Table of all Terms of Years from One to Thirty One Inclusive; and from thence by Every Ten 
Years to One Hundred Inclusive, and from thence for ever; where is Set Down the Sums of 
Money to be Paid for Insuring a Brick House for any of those Terms of Years Proportionably to 
Four Pounds for ever, for every Hundred Pounds Value Insured on such Buildings; Calculated 
by Order of Common Council (1681). 
38 Fire Office, September the 16th, 1681. An Advertisement from the Insurance-Office for 
Houses, &c (1681). 
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Office had limited the possible term to thirty-one years, the Corporation offered the 
option of one hundred years and even ‘for ever’.  
The claims of imitation made on behalf of the Insurance Office were partly 
disingenuous given that the new endeavour had evidently taken freely from the 
substance and the timing of Augustus Newbold’s scheme. However, the Insurance 
Office had incorporated one important adaptation, which the Corporation indeed 
followed. The Insurance Office was secured by estates in trust, the ground rents of 
which would be enough to cover claims, so it was calculated.39 This was a 
development from Newbold’s proposal, which had outlined that a joint stock be 
accumulated from premiums. The Corporation’s eventual undertaking borrowed this 
aspect from the private scheme.40 Its printed proposals stated that lands and ground 
rents belonging to the Corporation would be settled in trust as the security fund. Both 
the Corporation and the Insurance Office hoped to make a profit from their schemes. 
The Insurance Office used these facts against the Corporation, accusing the institution 
not only of being an imitator but of acting recklessly with the lands in its possession. 
Under pressure, the Corporation ceased issuing fire policies in 1682. 
 
Nicholas Barbon 
All but one of the pieces of print generated by the Insurance Office in its lifetime were 
authored anonymously, but the Office is irrevocably tied to one of its founders, 
Nicholas Barbon.41 As Daniel Defoe wrote: ‘Common fame gives the project to Dr 
Barebone’.42 Barbon is not known to have used his qualification as a physician; 
instead, he practised as a property developer in London, one whose sharp building 
practices and smart use of financial and legal instruments were recognised before, and 
increasingly after, he added fire insurance to his portfolio in 1680.43 His inclination to 
amass debt had the consequence that his liquidity ran out in the 1690s and he died in 
                                                
39 Robin Pearson, Insuring the Industrial Revolution: Fire Insurance in Great Britain, 1700–1850 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), p. 235, explains company foundations in the law of trusts: 
partnerships ‘were commonly formed under the law of trusts, based on a ruling of 1673 which 
stipulated that assets held on trust could not be claimed by the trustees’ creditors. The court of 
chancery permitted unincorporated companies to vest their assets in trustees through a deed of 
settlement, thus allowing the liability of individual shareholders to be limited to their share in the 
company.’ 
40 Clayton, British Insurance, p. 38, makes the same assumption. 
41 Alone of the Insurance Office’s broadsides, A Letter to a Gentleman in the Country is 
authored by ‘N. B.’, which has been assumed to indicate Nicholas Barbon. 
42 Defoe, Essay upon Projects. Other evidence that Barbon led the project is that in 1694, he 
was the lead name on a scheme for a waterwork, which was pitched in connection to the fire 
office: An Advertisement. Being a Proposal by Dr Barbon and Partners for Insuring Houses and 
Goods from Fire, by a Water-Work […] (1694). Barbon was named in advertisements for the 
Office in 1698. A petition to the queen in 1703 came from ‘Barbon’s Insurance Office’, 
regardless that he had been dead for four years by that point, TNA PC 1/1/274. 
43 For a perspicacious account of Barbon’s tricks, see Roger North, The Lives of the Norths, ed. 
by A. Jessopp, vol. 3 (London: Gregg International Publishers, 1972 [1890]), pp. 53–60. 
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debt in 1698, having been sued frequently. Since the twentieth century, Nicholas 
Barbon has been recognised not just as a notorious property developer but as a 
significant early political economist for one pamphlet in particular that he wrote about 
trade.44  
Nicholas Barbon’s biography is pertinent to this study of the Insurance Office. First, 
his entry into insurance was built upon his property developments. The Insurance 
Office’s estates in trust, by which it was secured, were Barbon’s property 
developments, the land for which was itself purchased with debt.45 There was overlap 
in Barbon’s partners between the two endeavours. Barbon’s insurance scheme looks 
like a venture to realise a lump sum from his developments, with a gamble on the 
incidence of fire. Secondly, Barbon’s Office had to overcome the problem of his bad 
reputation. He was eminently untrustworthy. These two factors likely helped shape the 
Insurance Office. They explain the careful corporate legal structure that the Office’s 
partners created for the estates, which would protect the estates from the unscrupulous 
behaviour of individuals. They explain the Office’s methods and its arguments to build 
trust in this structure, which print communicated. The Office proved that a private 
corporate structure could counteract an individual’s doubtful credibility.46 In this regard, 
as well as in the innovative aspects to its scheme and the use of print to promote itself, 
the Insurance Office bore the hallmarks of the projecting culture from which it emerged 
and to which it contributed.  
 
                                                
44 Nicholas Barbon, A Discourse of Trade (1690). Barbon also advocated for building in the 
pamphlets A Discourse Shewing the Great Advantages that New-Buildings, and the Enlarging 
of Towns and Cities, Do Bring to a Nation (1678) and An Apology for the Builder: or A Discourse 
Shewing the Cause and Effects of the Increase of Building (1685). On Barbon as a political 
economist see Paul Slack, 'The Politics of Consumption and England's Happiness in the Later 
Seventeenth Century', English Historical Review, 122:497 (2007), 609–631. On Barbon as a 
property developer see N.G. Brett-James, 'A Speculative London Builder of the Seventeenth 
Century, Dr Nicholas Barbon', Transactions of the London and Middlesex Archaelogical Society, 
6 (1927–31), 110–45; John Summerson, Georgian London (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978); 
Elizabeth McKellar, The Birth of Modern London: The Development and Design of the City 
1660–1720 (Manchester University Press, 1999); Leo Hollis, The Phoenix: St. Paul's Cathedral 
And The Men Who Made Modern London (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2008). McKellar 
used Barbon’s law suits as a rich source of information on the period’s building practices. 
45 John Merriman Sims, ‘The Trust Lands of the Fire Office’, Guildhall Miscellany, 4:2 (1972), 
88–113. I am not aware of a study of Nicholas Barbon and his Insurance Office since this 
article. The evidence for the early fire offices was collected in the nineteenth century by 
Cornelius Walford, The Insurance Cyclopaedia: Being a Dictionary of the Definition of Terms 
Used in Connexion with the Theory and Practice of Insurance in All Its Branches: a Biographical 
Summary ... a Bibliographical Repertory ... an Historical Treasury […], 6 vols (London: Layton, 
1871–1880), vol. 3. Relton, Account of the Fire Insurance Companies, built on this work.  
46 On credibility in this period, see Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science 
in Seventeenth-Century England (University of Chicago Press, 1994); Natasha Glaisyer, The 
Culture of Commerce in England, 1660–1720 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2006). 
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Fire offices 
This thesis consistently uses the name the Insurance Office – which is how this entity 
referred to itself from 1681 – but its name changed.47 By 1684, the Insurance Office 
also referred to itself as the Fire Office. It adopted this name officially in 1693.48 The 
Office’s nomenclature and offering can be tracked on its series of promotional sheets 
distributed from 1682 to 1700, which began ‘A Table’. (See Illustrations 2.30 to 2.36.) 
In the course of the thesis, ‘A Table’ is often used as a shorthand to refer to one or 
other of these examples. By 1705, the former Insurance Office promoted itself as the 
Phoenix Office.49 (See Illustration 2.37.) By the early eighteenth century, ‘fire office’ had 
become a generic term for this kind of business, a coinage which this thesis makes use 
of.50  
The Insurance Office was located in the City of London ‘at the backside of the Royal 
Exchange’. In 1687, it opened a second location at a coffee house on Fleet Street.51 
Before the end of the seventeenth century, two other fire offices had joined it in the 
market: the Friendly Society and the Amicable, established in 1683 and 1696. (See 
Illustration 2.38.) Both were run as mutual schemes, which meant that policy holders 
could be asked to cover the losses of fellow policy holders. The arrival of the Friendly 
Society inspired in the Insurance Office a new effort to drive away a competitor, in the 
form of a pamphlet authored by ‘N. B.’ – Nicholas Barbon. (See Illustration 2.39.) H. S. 
– Henry Spelman, the founder of the Friendly – matched Barbon’s barbs in his own 
pamphlet. (See Illustration 2.40.) Both offices then tried to obtain an official monopoly 
on fire insurance until they dropped the matter and resolved to co-exist.52 The 
Insurance Office came to offer mutual insurance in order to compete. By 1717, it had 
dissolved.53 By 1730, the Friendly Society had too. But already by the early eighteenth 
century, other fire offices had sprung up. Authors on London appreciated the young 
                                                
47 I follow the bibliographical convention of accrediting the Office’s printed material to ‘Fire 
Office’. 
48 Fire Office, A Table, Shewing the Rates of Insuring Houses from One Year to Eleven: at the 
Fire-Office, Kept against the Royal-Exchange in Cornhill; and at the Rainbow Coffee-House by 
the Inner-Temple-Gate in Fleet-Street (1693). 
49 Fire Office, Phenix Office. The Rates of Insuring Houses, for 1 Year to 7 by Mutual 
Contribution; at the Fire Office, kept against the Royal Exchange in Cornhill, and at the Rainbow 
Coffee-House, by the Inner-Temple-Gate, in Fleet-Street (1705). 
50 Forms were printed with a blank before ‘Fire Office’, such that an identifying name could be 
entered by hand; for example, TNA E 192/29. 
51 Fire Office, A Table of the Insurance Offices: one, against the Royal-Exchange in Cornhill; 
and the Other, at the Rainbow Coffee-House, next the Inner-Temple-Gate (1687). 
52 Rivalry continued to be expressed in print; see the put-downs in Fire Office, Phenix Office. 
Houses are Insured at the Phœnix Office for a Sum Certain, without any Contribution or 
Contingency whatsoever. And also by Mutual Contribution [1705?]; Friendly Society, A Proposal 
for Insuring Houses by the Friendly Society [1707?]; Friendly Society, A Proposal for Insuring 
Houses by the Friendly Society [1710?]. 
53 Relton, Account of the Fire Insurance Companies, p. 50. 
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Each fire office ran its own band of men to fight fires, the ‘set of Lusty Fellows’ 
observed by Daniel Defoe. These men came from the ranks of watermen, who ran the 
boats across the Thames. Augustus Newbold’s design for fire insurance in 1679 had 
proposed ‘in readyness’ just such a ‘Supply of Persons of Skill, for managing of 
Engines, Buckets, &c’.55 The Insurance Office had incorporated the proposition into its 
‘charges of Management’ and realised it as a means to reduce the risk to the 
enterprise.56 Subsequent offices did the same. Each band wore livery and was 
provided with engines and tools. This specialised body of men was known as ‘insurers 
men’ before they became ‘firemen’ in the eighteenth century.57 Firemen relied upon the 
free and efficient water-supply provided by London’s growing number of private water 
companies.58  
Firemen continued to come from amongst the Thames watermen in the nineteenth 
century. In London, the private bands carried out fire fighting until the London Fire 
Engine Establishment was founded in 1833. Following a destructive fire of warehouses 
on Tooley Street in London in 1861, the Metropolitan Fire Brigade took over in 1865. 
Outside London, fire offices boosted community efforts with funds and gifts of engines. 
Municipalities took increasing responsibility for fire-fighting towards the end of the 
nineteenth century. 
 
                                                
54 Hatton, A New View of London, quoted by Relton, Account of the Fire Insurance Companies, 
p. 433. Also Chamberlayne, Angliae Notitia (1704), pp. 438–439. 
55 Newbold, Londons Improvement, p. 4. 
56 Fire Office, Propositions; Fire Office, Arguments for Insuring Houses from Fire [1680]; and 
Fire Office, An Enquiry, Whether it be the Interest of the City to Insure Houses from Fire; and 
Whether the Insured may Expect Any Advantage thereby, more than from the Insurance-Office 
Already Setled [1681], allude to fire fighters. L. R, A Second Letter to his Honoured Friend Mr 
M.T. one of the Committee Chosen by the Common Council of London for the Insuring of 
Houses from Fire (1682) confirms the existence of the Insurance Office’s band of men. 
57 The term ‘insurers men’ is used in A True Relation of the Sad and Dreadful Fire in Thames 
Street on the 8th of August, 1688 Containing the Manner of its Beginning, Progress, and Dismal 
Effect, the Number of Houses &c. Consumed and Blown Up, Parties Kill'd and Wounded &c. 
During that Fatal Conflagration (1688), p.[2]. Sun Fire Office, From the Sun-Fire-Office, April the 
10th, 1710. Proposals Set Forth by the Company of London-Insurers, for Insuring Houses, 
Moveable Goods, Merchandizes, Furniture and Wares, from Loss and Damage by Fire (1710), 
p. [1], refers to ‘Fire-Men’. Before this, a ‘fireman’ was one who fired a gun or made a fire, 
according to searches of EEBO.  
58 Carry van Lieshout, ‘“The Most Valuable Means of Extinguishing the Destroying Fires”: Fire-
fighting and the London Water Companies in the Long Eighteenth Century’, London Journal, 
42:1 (2017), 53–69. 
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Graphics 
Another practice to which the fire offices adhered was to identify the houses they 
insured by a ‘firemark’, for the attention of their firemen. A firemark was a hand-sized 
mould of an office’s seal placed high on the front of each insured building. The 
Insurance Office used a phoenix, the symbol which sealed its policies. The Office’s 
subsequent name-change derived from its symbol. The Amicable chose a hand-in-
hand, the symbol of mutuality, from which it became known as the Hand in Hand. (See 
Illustration 2.41.) The firemarks were objects that proceeded to create a graphic identity 
for the fire offices.  
From the early eighteenth century, fire offices began to put these symbols at the 
head of their promotional material, in a manner comparable to how state proclamations 
carried a coat of arms. The Phoenix placed its phoenix, the Friendly its sheath of 
arrows entwined by a snake. (See Illustrations 2.37 and 2.42.) As Illustration 2.42 
shows, by 1707 the Friendly’s legal and graphic sensibilities came together as it 
explained its offer in ten enumerated paragraphs. By the 1710s, symbolic graphics 
adorned the policy too. The Hand-in-Hand’s policy was wholly engraved, headed by a 
stylised depiction of the office’s firemen as they flanked its firemark. (See Illustration 
2.43.) From its foundation in 1714, the Union topped its letterpress policy with a 
woodcut of its firemark alone.59  
These graphic identities differentiated the companies. They performed like a brand, 
for an intangible product. Firemen wore their office’s symbol as a badge on their 
uniform. Thus, firemarks linked to firemen, to policies and to other printed material. 
Already in the early nineteenth century these objects were viewed ‘only as a mode of 
advertisement’ and their use declined.60 However, some fire offices still distributed 
them in the 1890s. The graphics on printed matter proved more enduring than on lead 
and tin. This is the visual scene which the Sun entered and in which it participated. The 









                                                
59 Union Fire Office, policy, dated March 1714, Bodleian, John Johnson Collection, Insurance 
Folder II. 
60 Relton, Account of the Fire Insurance Companies, pp. 372–373. 
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Sun Fire Office, established 1710 
The first two decades of the eighteenth century watched the formation, and usually the 
failure, of a spate of financial schemes in London, among them lotteries, life insurance 
vehicles, fire offices and famously the South Sea Company.61 Charles Povey was a 
man of many schemes; one of them became the Sun Fire Office, the other fire office 
whose printed matter this thesis examines. In 1705, Charles Povey set up the Traders’ 
Exchange House in Hatton Garden, as a place where people could buy and sell goods 
and property, and offer employment.62 To complement the purpose of this venue, 
Povey published the General Remark on Trade, which was at first an advertising sheet 
and then a news-sheet.63 (See Illustration 2.44.) Povey used the General Remark to 
promote his next two projects. In 1706, he set up a life assurance office, the Exchange 
House Life Office. In 1708, he founded the Exchange House Fire Office. Povey’s fire 
office insured not houses but ‘moveable goods, merchandizes, and wares from Loss 
and Dammage by Fire’.64 Subscribers enjoyed the benefit of his Salvage Corps 
Scheme, which would remove and protect possessions in the event of a fire. Povey’s 
turn to insurance for goods was likely an attempt to cater to local traders and 
craftsmen, many of whom ran a shop from the same building in which they lived, and 
whom the existing fire offices had failed to attract.65 
Charles Povey saw opportunities for expanding fire insurance outside London. For 
this he required capital and partners with whom to share the risk. Thus he put together 
a syndicate, the Company of London Insurers, in 1709.66 However, his ‘strange and 
unbalanced personality’ resulted in his exclusion from the company in 1710.67 In the 
year of his departure, the company was officially founded by a mutual deed of 
copartnership.68 Thereafter, its partners dated its establishment to 1710. The new 
company offered insurance on houses and goods, in separate policies. It took pride in 
claiming the credit for the innovation of insurance on goods.69 
Povey had represented the Exchange House Fire Office by the symbol of a sun 
face. The company’s new backers quickly adopted the name by which the Office had 
                                                
61 Helen J. Paul, The South Sea Bubble: An Economic History of Its Origins and Consequences 
(London: Routledge, 2011). 
62 Dickson, Sun Insurance Office, p. 20. 
63 Glaisyer, Culture of Commerce, pp. 156, 160. 
64 General Remark, 22–24 December 1708. 
65 Miranda Clow, ‘From Nothing to Something: The Making of the Sun Fire Office in the 
Eighteenth Century’ (MA thesis, Royal College of Art, 2013), pp. 75–76. 
66 Dickson, Sun Insurance Office, p. 28. 
67 Ibid., p. 18. 
68 Ibid., p. 31. 
69 Nicholas Barbon had put forward the objective of goods insurance in 1694 in An 
Advertisement. Being a Proposal by Dr Barbon: ‘And because some persons have Goods in 
Houses, which are not easily removed, such as the Goods of Glass-Men, Potters, Coppers and 
Vessels in Brew-houses, and several other Trades’. 
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already become commonly known: the Sun Fire Office.70 (See Illustration 2.45.) It 
promoted itself with Proposals – initially as the Company of London Insurers and then 
as the Sun Fire Office – that pictured its symbol. (See Illustrations 2.46 and 2.47; and 
2.48.) Similarly to the Friendly’s proposals before it (see Illustration 2.42), the Sun’s 
arranged itself into twelve distinct ‘Articles’. New issues of the Proposals appeared at 
irregular intervals every several years. The Sun continued Povey’s practice of 
publishing a news-sheet. The news-sheet took the name the British Mercury and was 
delivered to policy holders. (See Illustrations 2.49 and 2.50.) In 1716 it was replaced by 
the Historical Register. The Office ended its custom of a newspaper in 1738.  
The Sun’s policy started off plain before the addition of a discrete scene of firemen 
in 1726. (See Illustrations 2.51 and 2.52.) The scene received an overhaul in 1748. 
(See Illustration 2.53.) At its founding, the company introduced a system of receipts by 
which policy holders could renew their policy. This precluded the need for new policies 
to be issued. (See Illustration 2.54.) The Sun operated from changing locations near 
the Royal Exchange until it settled in premises on Cornhill in 1766.71 A century later it 
occupied a new head office on Cornhill. From 1726 it ran a second office in Charing 
Cross.72  
The Union, the Westminster, the London Assurance, the Royal Exchange and later 
the Phoenix (an entirely new entity) all joined the Sun in the London fire insurance 
market in the course of the eighteenth century. These fire offices cemented the 
industry’s conventions of firemen in livery and firemarks, by which they differentiated 
themselves. (See Illustration 2.55.) They promoted themselves with ‘Proposals’: single- 
or double-sided sheets which were customarily topped with their symbol, just as the 
Sun’s. (See Illustration 2.56.) By the mid-eighteenth all fire offices topped their large 
policies with an engraved illustration which made reference to their name.73 (See 
Illustration 2.57.) Branding was by now entrenched in the fire insurance industry. In 
                                                
70 In 1710, the title to the Office’s Proposals named the Company of London Insurers but were 
‘From the Sun Fire Office’: Sun Fire Office, From the Sun-Fire-Office, April the 10th, 1710. 
Proposals Set Forth by the Company of London-Insurers, for Insuring Houses, Moveable 
Goods, Merchandizes, Furniture and Wares, from Loss and Damage by Fire (1710); Sun Fire 
Office, From the Sun-Fire-Office, August the 30th, 1710[.] Proposals Set Forth by the Company 
of London-Insurers, for Insuring Houses, Moveable Goods, Merchandizes, Furniture and Wares, 
from Loss and Damage by Fire, in Any Place within Great Britain, out of the Cities of London 
and Westminster, and the Liberties thereof (1710). By 1712, it was wholly the Sun Fire Office: 
Sun Fire Office, From the Sun-Fire-Office, July 4, 1712. Proposals Set Forth by the Company of 
the Sun-Fire-Office, in Threadneedle-Street, behind the Royal-Exchange, London, for Insuring 
Houses, Moveable Goods, Merchandize, Furniture, and Wares, from Loss and Damage by Fire, 
in Any Part of Great Britain (1712). 
71 Dickson, Sun Insurance Office, pp. 42–45. 
72 Ibid., p. 50. 
73 The policy of the Union Fire Office was printed by letterpress with a woodcut illustration in 
1714: Bodleian, John Johnson Collection, Insurance Folder II. In the same year, the Hand in 
Hand’s policy was engraved and included an illustration: LMA, DRO/014/J/01/027.  
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general, policies were renewed each year and their scope changed every seven 
years.74 Offices charged a one-off fee for a new policy.75  
At the eighteenth century’s end, three fire offices dominated the market: the Sun, 
the Royal Exchange and the Phoenix. In the last quarter of the century, The London 
Adviser and Guide showed how general insurance had become to the milieu of its 
audience. It advised: ‘When your house is furnished, the next precaution to be taken is, 
to insure it from fire’.76 The fire offices initially placed limits on the sums they were 
willing to insure per policy. They raised these as the century went on. ‘The value of 
property insured expanded faster than the economy, and even faster than industrial 
output, while the proportion of assets insured also rose.’77 The business historian Robin 
Pearson calculates that fire insurance was generally profitable for its undertakers in the 
eighteenth century.78  
 
The country 
The Sun had formed with the intention of taking advantage of risks outside London. In 
fact, its expansion into the country took half a century to take effect, through a network 
of ‘unspecialized’ agents.79 The London offices expanded into the country in step. By 
1786 the Sun overshadowed the rest with its 123 agents. In certain regions, the 
London offices met competition from local offices, such as the Bath Sun Fire Office and 
the Liverpool, established in 1767 and 1777 respectively.80 (See Illustration 2.58.) By 
1800, ‘the market for fire insurance outside London…accounted for 45% of all sums 
insured in Britain’.81 However, the London offices struggled to control and monitor their 
growing networks of independent agents. This failure led to the organisation of 
branches in the second half of the nineteenth century.82 
 
Cooperation and competition 
Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the increasing complexity of certain risks 
began to undermine the existing knowledge of the London offices and cause them high 
losses. The complexity was centred on the growth of the cotton industry, which now 
                                                
74 Dickson, Sun Insurance Office, p. 79. 
75 Ibid., p. 95. In the early nineteenth century new offices tended to cancel fees for new policies 
in order to attract business. 
76 John Trusler, The London Adviser and Guide: Containing Every Instruction and Information 
[...] (London, 1790 [1786]), p. 10. 
77 Dickson, Sun Insurance Office, p. 74; Pearson, Insuring the Industrial Revolution, p. 140:  
78 Pearson, Insuring the Industrial Revolution, pp. 85, 90. 
79 Dickson, Sun Insurance Office, p. 70. Pearson, Insuring the Industrial Revolution, p. 264, 
provides a table of agency numbers and of agents’ occupations. 
80 Cockerell and Green, British Insurance Business, p. 30. 
81 Pearson, Insuring the Industrial Revolution, p. 101. 
82 Ibid., p. 264. 
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brought risks that the insurance industry lacked the experience to price. Regarding 
mills, ‘little was at first known about their methods of production or the construction and 
heating of their factories.’83 The complexity of rates in this area is shown by this large 
printed table, designed to guide the Sun’s agents. (See Illustration 2.59.) As a result of 
these challenges, from 1780 the leading London offices began to consult each other 
and cooperate.84 They agreed tariffs, regulations and methods of fire-fighting.  
The London offices already agreed on the categories of risk. The Insurance Office 
had made a distinction between brick and timber houses. In 1721 the Sun introduced a 
‘hazardous’ classification for certain trades. From 1727, there were three categories, 
which the London offices shared: Common Insurances, Hazardous and Doubly 
Hazardous.85 These lasted until 1870.86 From 1694, insurance policies incurred a 
modest stamp duty. As the levy gradually rose, the result was that for those insuring a 
small amount of property, the cost of stamp duty became significantly more than the 
annual premium.87 In 1782 a new percentage tax increased the burden, despite the 
offices’ protests.88 It was abolished in 1869.89  
At the turn of the nineteenth century, the status and profits of the three market 
leaders – the Sun, the Royal Exchange and the Phoenix – were threatened not just by 
the new risks of factories but by new fire insurance companies, first in the country and 
then in London.90 Ten new fire offices were established in London between 1797 and 
1809 and another fifteen outside London.91 The new offices maintained the industry’s 
marketing practices. The county offices drew names from their locale. (See Illustration 
2.60.) The London offices chose bold names such as Globe, Hope and Atlas. (See 
Illustrations 2.61 and 2.62.) All commissioned dramatic imagery to represent 
themselves. The new offices proved that there were ‘potential properties still 
uninsured’, but they frustrated the old guard by reducing premiums, thereby reducing 
the ‘security of the public’, in the view of the Sun’s members.92 In 1801, the Sun 
reassured its agents regarding the British Fire Office: 
There are many Persons who would prefer perfect Security against Fire … to the saving of a 
few Shillings. … A Society who acts contrary to the sound Policy laid down for Insurances, I 
                                                
83 Dickson, Sun Insurance Office, p. 91. Pearson, Insuring the Industrial Revolution, pp. 134, 
140 on the ‘difficulty of assessing new risks associated with the factory system’. 
84 Dickson, Sun Insurance Office, pp. 94–95. Pearson, Insuring the Industrial Revolution, pp. 
150–5. 
85 Dickson, Sun Insurance Office, pp. 83–4. 
86 Ibid., p. 143. 
87 Pearson, Insuring the Industrial Revolution, pp. 140–141. 
88 Pearson takes this as evidence that parliament still perceived fire insurance as a ‘superfluity’ 
rather than a ‘decency’, still less a ‘necessity’; ibid., p. 141. 
89 Dickson, Sun Insurance Office, pp. 97–98. 
90 Pearson, Insuring the Industrial Revolution, p. 140; Dickson, Sun Insurance Office. 
91 Pearson, Insuring the Industrial Revolution, p. 156. 
92 Dickson, Sun Insurance Office, p. 97. 
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trust, in a few Years, from their Losses and Expenses, will feel the Impropriety of such 
Conduct, and learn that Fire-Insurances do not yield the Profits or Gain which speculative 
Imaginations have calculated.93 
‘Furious’ competition continued in the 1810s, causing profits to fluctuate.94 But many 
of the new offices did not last to 1830. From the 1820s, the Sun and the Phoenix 
began to counter the competition in the country by buying it up. After 1815, the sums 
insured by English fire offices continued to grow; Robin Pearson calculates from £378 
million in 1815 to £731 million by 1850.95 ‘Urban and industrial development not only 
stimulated this growth but also created new types of hazard such as railway accidents 
and steam boiler explosions.’ The ‘value of goods and property in Britain’s industrial 
centres and commercial entrepots’ was also ‘steadily increasing’. In the late nineteenth 
century, ‘the aggregate size of the British fire insurance market grew rapidly’. Insured 
values in London surpassed £1100 million in 1913.96 
Cooperation between the big three had fractured around 1807 but was revived by 
1830.97 This cooperation led ten London offices to merge their fire brigades and form 
the London Fire Engine Establishment. In the 1850s the leading offices formed the 
Tariff Association, which set rates and standards and shared information essential to 
underwriting.  
 
The Sun as an organisation 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Sun Fire Office was run by its twenty-
four ‘managers’, a label interchangeable with the term ‘director’ used at other fire 
offices. According to rules laid down in 1786, a manager of the Office must own fifty 
company shares before being elected by a General Quarterly Meeting.98 The managers 
tended each to be allocated to sit on one of the Sun’s committees, among which were 
Accounts, Town and Country, and at the top, the General Committee and the 
Committee of Management. The key responsibilities of the latter were to approve all 
expenditure and to sign policies. Managers committed to attend meetings, although the 
minutes show the disregard of this obligation.99 Attendance at a committee was 
                                                
93 Sun Fire Office, circular to agents, 28 August 1801, LMA, CLC/B/192/DD/008/MS38828/001, 
fol. 59. 
94 Pearson, p. 160. 
95 Pearson, p. 181. 
96 Cockerell and Green, British Insurance Business, p. 40, citing Barry Supple, The Royal 
Exchange Assurance: A History of British Insurance 1720–1970 (Cambridge University Press, 
1970), pp. 212–213. 
97 Dickson, Sun Insurance Office, p. 94; Cockerell and Green, British Insurance Business, p. 35. 
98 LMA, CLC/B/192/B/001/MS11931/007, fol. 52. 
99 This is visibly shown by the names crossed out at the top of each meeting’s minutes, and the 
often paltry number of signatures to sign off a day’s minutes. Dickson, ‘The Organization of the 
Office in the Eighteenth Century’, in Sun Insurance Office, pp. 32–61, explicates the company’s 
structure in this period. 
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rewarded with a decent fee, at a rate dependent on the significance of the committee. 
Orders from the Committee reiterated that managers must not be late and must remain 
for the entire meeting to avoid forfeiting the fee.  
In the first decade of the nineteenth century, the General Committee twice had 
reason to appoint a Committee of Enquiry from among the managers to review the 
‘Rules & Orders’ of the organisation.100 The Committees of Enquiry reviewed the 
practices of the Sun’s fire service, its surveyors, its agents, its porters and its office 
staff of clerks and messengers. They recommended that the organisation define 
employees’ roles, conduct and working hours, cap numbers of staff, adjust salaries and 
specify levels of qualification for new hires. A woman was to be employed to ‘keep the 
office clean’. However, the implementation of these recommendations was not wholly 
successful. Staff were displeased by the loss of privileges, and some managers 
resisted an efficiency drive of this kind which would limit their ability to give favours to 
those in their social circle.  
As the historian of the company Peter Dickson describes it, the Sun was a ‘closed’ 
system.101 There was great continuity in the families that were involved in the running 
of the Office, with roles commonly passed between kin. Shareholders had little power 
unless they became managers, and shares were little traded. Dickson credits the Sun’s 
success to these family relations and to certain long-serving individuals.102 The closed 
circuit reflected the fire insurance industry in general in this period: ‘Board members 
were often drawn from close-knit networks of business elites. This could alleviate the 
pernicious effects of mistrust’.103 
In 1891, the Sun Fire Office transformed its structure.104 It could no longer be 
closed. Formal statutes obliged it to publish its accounts. It appointed a professional 
accountant. Since 1810, the Sun had sold life insurance but due to restrictions in its 
original deed of settlement, it did so from a distinct organisation, the Sun Life Office. 
The constitutional change ended the restrictions on the insurances the Sun could offer. 
The managers now became directors. Their power was reduced, while the 
shareholders’ was increased. The company became the Sun Insurance Office, which 
suited its wider offering. However, ‘Sun Fire Office’ remained a trading name for the fire 
branch.  
                                                
100 The first Committee of Enquiry was appointed and re-appointed in April 1804, on 10 April 
1805 and on 9 April 1806. The second Enquiry was appointed on 8 October 1807. LMA, 
CLC/B/192/B/001/MS11931/008. The minutes show ‘Enquiry’ and ‘Inquiry’ used 
interchangeably. The records of the Committees comprise LMA, CLC/B/192/B/023/MS38771, 
CLC/B/192/B/025/MS38773 and CLC/B/192/DE/002/MS38849, among others. 
101 Dickson, Sun Insurance Office, p. 287. 
102 Ibid., pp. 267, 275, 297, 298. 
103 Pearson, Insuring the Industrial Revolution, 253. 
104 Dickson, Sun Insurance Office, pp. 111–113, 231. 
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At the time of the change to the Sun’s constitution, the company had a total staff of 
150 excluding its network of agents, who on the whole still worked independently. By 
1960, the staff in Britain and overseas had grown to 3000 including agents, who now 
worked from agencies.105 Peter Dickson supposes that the change to the Sun’s 
constitution was motivated in part by its overseas ambitions. The Phoenix was the 
pioneering British fire office abroad. In the 1830s, the Sun began to follow its lead, first 
within Europe before the rest of the world from the 1860s.106 But its growth abroad was 
restricted as certain countries barred it from operating without the disclosure of its 
accounts. 
The Sun used its new constitution to expand into accident and marine insurance. In 
the nineteenth century many new varieties of insurance sprang up, among them 
schemes to cover funeral expenses, to cover against the possibility of untrustworthy 
employees, and to guard against the risks of travel on the new railways.107 In the early 
twentieth century, travel insurance extended to include journeys across the ocean and 
in cars. In the same period in Britain, the increasing types of insurance on the market 
were joined by state-run insurances. State pensions and National Insurance were 
introduced by Acts of Parliament of 1908 and 1911. By the middle of the twentieth 
century the welfare state had come to incorporate universal provision of pensions and 
unemployment benefits along with health insurance for all, in the form of the National 
Health Service. 
 
The Sun’s marketing 
Against this backdrop, in the early nineteenth century, the Sun Fire Office continued to 
produce its Proposals and policy according to the same parameters as the previous 
century. (See Illustrations 2.63 and 2.64; 2.65; 2.66; and 2.67.) The Proposals 
comprised the Office’s ‘Terms and conditions’. To policy holders, the company 
delivered a notice to renew and the receipt which confirmed payment of the premium 
for renewal. (See Illustrations 2.68, 2.69 and 2.70.) 
In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the Sun’s policy was 
broadly unchanged but with subtle and stylistic differences. It now carried a set of 
‘Conditions’ on its reverse. (See Illustrations 2.71 and 2.72) By contrast, the Proposals 
format had served its purpose. The Sun now supplied customers with a renewal leaflet 
from its fire department and a renewal receipt. (See Illustrations 2.73 to 2.75; and 
2.76.) It produced a proposal leaflet form for new customers. (See Illustrations 2.77 
and 2.78.) It generated stationery for internal communication. (See Illustration 2.79.) 
                                                
105 Ibid., p. 297. 
106 Ibid., pp. 162, 188. 
107 On the breadth of insurance by the 1880s, see Pearson, Insuring the Industrial Revolution. 
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The Sun’s agents merited their own printed matter in these periods. They made 
themselves known by small notices of their appointment, posters and advertisements 
in local newspapers. (See Illustrations 2.80 to 2.84.) The company published books of 
Instructions in order to guide their agents in their work. (See Illustrations 2.85 to 2.86.)   
 
Fires 
Fire insurance was a business consequent on the incidence of fire. The growth of 
London in the seventeenth century, and the rough and ready housing that went with it, 
was its spur.108 By the end of the century, London’s population was over half a million. 
Urbanisation in London, and then in Britain, increased the damage that one fire could 
do, as exemplified by the Great Fire of London. The sums insured grew as houses and 
businesses increased the number of combustibles and the number of valuables that 
they contained. In the early nineteenth century, the big three of the fire insurance 
industry knew how to price multi-house fires but they were wrong-footed by factory fires 
in the north of England.109 The phenomenon of multi-house fires in Britain may also 
have subsided after 1760, due to changes in building materials, regulations and city 
planning.110  
The danger posed by fire morphed from one period to another, and the industry 
chased after expertise and methods to contain it. In the mid-nineteenth century, the 
industry was threatened by single-property destruction, given the value stored in 
certain residential properties, manufactories and warehouses. New forms of crime were 
a by-product of the fire insurance industry. Arson and fraud on claims concerned the 
industry from the late eighteenth century. Fire offices involved themselves in law suits 
despite the risk of appearing unsympathetic to the public. Fire offices also faced fraud 







                                                
108 ‘The Birth of Fire Insurance’, in Clayton, British Insurance. 
109 Pearson, p. 134. 
110 ‘Urban Fire’, in Stephen J. Pyne, Fire: A Brief History (London: British Museum Press, 2001); 
Shane Ewen, ‘The Problem of Fire in Nineteenth Century British Cities: The Case of Glasgow’ 
in M. Dunkeld, ed., Proceedings of the Second International Congress on Construction History, 
vol. I (Cambridge: Construction History Society, 2006), 1061–74; E.L. Jones, S. Porter and M. 
Turner, A Gazetteer of English Urban Fire Disasters, 1500–1900 (Norwich: Geo Books, 1984). 
111 Dickson, Sun Insurance Office, and Pearson, Insuring the Industrial Revolution, bring this to 
life with anecdotes from the archives. 
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Conclusion  
This chapter has provided a summary of the progression of fire insurance through 
England from 1680 to 1914, recounted with a focus on the Insurance Office and the 
Sun. It provides the reader with the historical context to follow the rest of the thesis. 
The growth of the number of policy holders and the growth of sums insured underlie 
this industry’s development. Print sits ever-present in the background to this 
development, as the illustrations to this chapter have made manifest. This is the 
argument of this chapter. Briefly but adroitly, insurance historians have touched on 
print’s role in fire insurance in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.112 Robin 
Pearson highlighted the distinct and enthusiastic marketing techniques used by 
insurance companies.113 These were delivered by print: by ‘[n]otices in newspapers, 
handbills and circulars distributed by post, and an array of other advertising devices’.114 
Fire offices sold insurance by means of print. Fire offices differentiated themselves by 
means of print. In the nineteenth century, ‘[a]s competition increasingly shifted toward 
marketing, it found expression through posters, pamphlets, circulars and newspaper 
advertisements.’115 Agents established themselves by posters and advertising.116 This 
chapter has documented examples of these sheets before they are examined in detail 
in the rest of this Part.  
From the eighteenth century, fire offices were branded, by means of their emblems, 
their firemen, their promotional print and their policy illustrations. Scholars of 
promotional history have not considered this material nor the way the industry used 
print. The fire insurance industry was aligned with print from its beginning. Even before 
the eighteenth century, the Great Fire of London gave the Corporation of the City of 
London the impetus to run a fire insurance scheme but it was outwitted by a band of 
private individuals who used print to communicate to an audience, and thereby win 
trust for their new corporate body over the Corporation of old. The next chapters 
interrogate the characteristics which gave printed matter its effect for this industry. By 
means of print, ‘the insurance offices formed part of the feedback mechanism by which 
trust and confidence multiplied within business communities.’117 In this way, Part II 
substantiates the remarks by insurance historians and fills a gap left by historians of 
promotion.  
                                                
112 Pearson, Insuring the Industrial Revolution; Oliver Westall, ‘Marketing Strategy and the 
Competitive Structure of British General Insurance, 1720–1980’, Business History, 36 (1994), 
20–46; Dickson, Sun Insurance Office; Clark, Betting on Lives, p. 171, makes this point in 
relation to life insurance. 
113 Pearson, Insuring the Industrial Revolution, pp. 264–299, 363. 
114 Ibid., p. 264. 
115 Ibid., p. 185. 
116 Ibid., p. 281. 
117 Ibid., p. 368. 
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Chapters 3, 4 and 5 compare and contrast the printed material generated by the 
Insurance Office from 1680 to 1700, the Sun Fire Office between c. 1800 and c. 1820 
and the Sun Insurance Office’s fire department from c. 1894 to 1914. Chapters 3 and 4 
also draw on the material produced at the time of the Sun’s establishment in 1710 as a 
point of comparison. This sampling of historical periods makes up the second temporal 
dialogue to the thesis, as a means to expose trust’s characteristics in print. In its first 
twenty years, the Insurance Office set the terms for the industry, as a private 
endeavour, reliant on print. The Office used printed matter to persuade an audience of 
its validity, to promote itself, and to quash the chances of similar enterprises, first the 
Corporation of the City of London in 1681, then the Friendly Society in 1684. The 
juxtaposition of its material with that which followed illuminates both.  
Like the rest of its industry, the Sun sold fire policies by means of print. It was the 
dominant fire office in the market in both periods under examination. Between 1800 
and 1820, its processes and its member-managers faltered in the face of uncharted 
risks, competition from new offices inside and outside London and the challenges of 
harnessing its agents. The attempt to reform staff and practices in the Committee of 
Enquiry reflected the strain. In the final period, the Sun’s directors formalised the 
company’s structure and standardised its staff and its processes, largely through the 
imposition of agencies. Its processes and its relationships still rested on print. 
The print that has received passing reference in this chapter, is subject to a 
dissection in the succeeding chapters. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 show how part of the 
achievement of the printed matter that made the offices function, was to build trust from 
company to people. These chapters use the material of fire insurance to show how 
print constructed trust through what it said, how it looked, and what it could do. 
Notwithstanding the changes in England and in the industry between 1680 and 1914, 
there was continuity in how print upheld the Insurance Office and the Sun, in terms of 
the qualities it promoted and the technologies it afforded. The Insurance Office shows 
the starting point for subsequent developments. While Chapters 3 and 4 hold their 
attention on the sheets that passed between the offices and their customers, Chapter 5 
also pays attention to internal printed matter that passed between the Sun and its staff. 
This wide scope brings to light the way that print defined the personal relationships at 
the heart of the company. 
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Chapter 3: The Qualities of Trust 
 
In 1682, in the war of words between supporters of the Corporation of the City of 
London’s scheme for fire insurance and the Insurance Office, the Corporation’s side 
disparagingly compared its aggressor to a piece of architecture. The author, who 
signed off as ‘L. R.’, sneered, ‘If therefore I can but pull down this main Pillar, their 
whole Insurance Office like a rotten Building falls about their ears.’1 The ‘pillar’ that L. 
R. referred to here was a criticism made from the Insurance Office’s side that the 
Corporation’s offer ‘to Insure for Ever’ threatened to ‘spoil the whole Design’ because 
the premiums, paid upfront, could not hope to meet the losses over time.2 L. R. 
countered that that argument made by the Insurance Office’s supporters applied 
equally against the Insurance Office itself; that ‘for ever’ was as risky as the thirty-one 
years offered by the Insurance Office.  
L. R.’s ironical comparison of the Insurance Office to a piece of three-dimensional 
design exposed the trifle upon which the Office rested. The Insurance Office was a 
vulnerable design which built itself up by words in print and just so it could be brought 
down by words. L. R. advised that ‘these Gentlemen [of the Insurance Office] that offer 
to Insure for 31 Years, should not be trusted with all the Premiums for so many Years 
at once’. The readers of these remarks had a real choice before them: whether to trust 
their money over a long term to an ancient institution or to private individuals. Print 
made material the immaterial product of fire insurance. While the previous chapter 
outlined the presence of print in this product’s development, the rest of this Part of the 
thesis is absorbed with analysing print’s role. Print’s bestowed materiality by its 
physical substance, by the textual, numeric and graphic languages imprinted on it and 
the ideas they expressed, and by the formatting of those languages. 
To echo L. R.’s building metaphor, this Part shows how printed sheets built up the 
Insurance Office and the Sun. This chapter isolates four qualities of trust that the 
printed sheets expressed: security, identity, reputation and transparency. These 
qualities correspond to the different ways by which contemporary design projects have 
parsed trust, as shown in Part I. Printed sheets used words, numbers and images, 
graphically articulated, to communicate the trustworthiness of the office that they 
                                                
1 L. R., A Second Letter to his Honoured Friend Mr M.T. one of the Committee Chosen by the 
Common Council of London for the Insuring of Houses from Fire (1682), p. 3. L. R., To my 
Honoured Friend Mr M.T. one of the Committee Chosen by the Common Council of London, for 
the Insuring of Houses from Fire (1682), p. 2, had already used metaphors around building: 
‘they are building on other mens grounds’ and ‘And I dare say this Office, erected by the City, 
shall pay the Losses of those whose Houses are burnt down sooner than this Enquirer shall the 
wages of those that built his up.’ 
2 L. R. was responding to this pamphlet, published on the side of the Insurance Office: Fire 
Office, Observations on the Proposals of the City to Insure Houses in Case of Fire (1681). 
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represented. The printed sheets examined here communicated at those who would buy 
in to fire insurance: investors and then policy holders. In this chapter, the printed matter 
of the Insurance Office from 1680 to 1700 provides the starting point for the 
examination of each quality. The practices of the Sun Fire Office at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century and of the Sun Insurance Office at the turn of the twentieth century 
developed from those of their predecessor. 
Given their reliance on print, as detailed in this Part of the thesis, it is salient that the 
Insurance Office and the Sun enjoyed long relationships with printers. Where a 
publication for the Insurance Office credited a printer, it was consistently Thomas 
Milbourn of Jewen Street, between 1682 and 1700.3 From its first year, the Sun used 
the printer Hugh Meere, and it was still using the successors to Meere’s shop in 1752.4 
Subsequently it used Clark, Morrison and then Norris, who ran the same business in 
succession. Norris’s descendants still printed for the company in the 1880s.5 At that 
time, Harrison & Sons took over work for the Sun, being a distinguished print business 
that had printed the Sun’s receipts since the start of the nineteenth century.6 The Sun 
paid a significant bill to its printers each month.7 
 
Security 
Airbnb, Projects by If and the publication Design and Trust associated trust with 
security. The insurance companies under discussion here used print to attach this word 
and its ideas to themselves. A Sun renewal leaflet in 1909 contained the stand-out 
heading, ‘THE ESSENCE OF INSURANCE IS SECURITY’.8 This statement carried 
two meanings of the word security. It referred to the protection imparted by insurance 
to its purchaser and to an insurance company’s financial security. The former was 
dependent on the latter. The backers of the Insurance Office and the Sun built trust by 
                                                
3 Intriguingly, Thomas Milbourn had printed A. Newbold, Londons Improvement and the 
Builder’s Security Asserted, by the Apparent Advantages that will Attend their Easie Charge, in 
Raising such a Joint-Stock, as many Assure a Re-building of those Houses, which shall 
hereafter be Destroyed by the Casualties of Fire (1680), from which the Insurance Office took 
much of its design, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
4 R. Nutt was the printer of Sun Fire Office, February 10, 1752. Proposals from the Sun-Fire-
Office, near the Royal-Exchange, for Insuring Houses, and Other Buildings, Goods, Wares and 
Merchandize, from Loss and Damage by Fire (1752). He had married into Hugh Meere’s family: 
Talbot Baines Reed, A History of the Old English Letter Foundries with Notes Historical and 
Bibliographical on the Rise and Progress of English Typography (London: Elliot Stock, 1887), p. 
205. 
5 ‘Norris & Son, Printers, 54, Bishopsgate Street Within, London, E.C.’ is the imprint on a Sun 
Fire Office policy printed for Ireland for use in the 1880s, dated 1886, Private Collection. 
6 Harrison, Cecil Reeves, The House of Harrison: Being an Account of the Family and Firm of 
Harrison and Sons, Printers to the King (Harrison & Sons, 1914); Harrison, Guy, Harrison: A 
Family Imprint 1750–1950 (Harrison & Sons, 1950). ‘Harrison & Sons’ is the imprint on Sun 
policies in the 1890s and early 1900s, Private Collection. Harrison is the imprint on Sun Fire 
Office receipts in LMA, CLC/B/192/DD/008/MS38828/001. 
7 LMA, CLC/B/192/B/009/MS11932. 
8 Sun Insurance Office, Fire Renewal Notice (1909), Hillingdon, MC25C/SF1/1570/1/3/1. 
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affirming in print this motif of their product and of their companies. The associations 
that the companies made with security had different meanings and they applied to 
different interest groups, whether investor, consumer or the company itself.  
 
Security for the customer 
Foremost, fire insurance gave security to those who purchased it. By offering 
compensation, it protected against the sudden loss by fire of one’s wealth. With an air 
of understatement, the Insurance Office advised potential investors in its scheme: ‘It is 
no small advantage to be freed from those melancholy apprehensions of being undone 
in a night … for the like misfortune hath too often hapned to many.’9 As Nicholas 
Barbon, the founder of the office, put it: fire insurance ‘preserves’.10 But the proposers 
of the scheme perceived other advantages in relation to security, which they hoped 
would attract early support to it. For it would boost the security of what one had:  
First, it will improve the value of Houses: for the Rents of the City of London were it not for 
their casualty from Fire, would be esteemed the best Rents in the Land … 2. It would make 
Houses a better Security, and more money would be lent upon their Value than now is, 
because if the Security be burnt, the Lender is in some possibility of losing his Money. 
The proposers sought to sell personal financial protection alongside greater financial 
leverage for the buyer, another form of security. With insurance, the landlord ‘Improves 
his Estate as well as Secures it’.11 The Insurance Office provided its insured with ‘Care 
and Industry of the Office for their Protection’.12 
In its printed communications, the Sun Fire Office repeated the association of fire 
insurance with security. Those who wrote on the company’s behalf focussed on the 
material and personal safety and preservation that a policy provided. In the early 
nineteenth century, the Proposals began: ‘the Insuring from Loss or Damage by Fire 
tends to the Safety of Property in general, and to the Preservation of many Families in 
particular, who otherwise might be exposed to Poverty and Ruin’.13 In the same period, 
when the company advised policy holders to renew, it reminded them that it was 
                                                
9 Fire Office, Propositions for Insuring Houses from Fire [1680], p. 1, and Fire Office, 
Propositions for Insuring Houses from Fire [1681], p. 1. 
10 An Advertisement. Being a Proposal by Dr Barbon and Partners for Insuring Houses and 
Goods from Fire, by a Water-Work […] (1694). 
11 Fire Office, Arguments for Insuring Houses from Fire [1680], p. 2. Indeed, security by other 
means was called into question: ‘…though the Landlord may expect to be secured by the 
Tennants Covenants, yet it is his Interest (if his Tennant do not) to Insure.’ 
12 W. I., A Letter to a Gentleman of the Insurance Office, Concerning the Cities Insuring Houses 
[1681]. 
13 Sun Fire Office, June 14, 1804. Sun Fire-Office, Cornhill, near the Royal-Exchange, and at 
Craig’s Court, Charing-Cross. Proposals for Insuring Houses, and Other Buildings, Goods, 
Wares and Merchandize, and Ships in Harbour, in Dock, or Building, and Craft, from Loss and 
Damage by Fire (1804). 
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motivated ‘(in Regard to your Security)’.14 The company’s writers did not see fit to 
argue in these sheets that a policy might increase the value of what one had because 
they addressed only consumers and not investors. They discarded that aspect to a 
policy’s security. 
The design of the Sun’s printed matter lent significance to the message of safety. 
The Proposals placed the message at its start. In its Propositions, the Insurance Office 
had begun its text with this sentiment of permanent potential loss, but the Sun set it 
apart in a freestanding paragraph. (See Illustration 3.1.) Thus the graphics enforced 
the sentiment. Moreover, the Sun’s policy amplified the association of the product to 
material security by the engraving printed at its top. The illustration depicted a scene of 
rescue. It showed a fireman and a salvage man returning from a fire. The smoke from 
the fire billows outside the window. The salvage man is loaded with the possessions 
that he has rescued. (See Illustrations 3.2 and 3.3.) The men wear badges to show that 
they belong to the Sun’s private band employed to defend the company’s policy 
holders from fire. As outlined in the previous chapter, in this period, the prevention and 
rescue service was part of the fire-insurance product. This illustration graphically 
depicted that. The firemen that the illustration portrayed on the policy enacted the 
security of the policy holder’s possessions. The scene alluded to the Sun’s history as 
the first to insure goods, by which it promoted itself. 
In the twentieth century, the Sun Insurance Office applied its illustration of the 
rescue it provided to its policy and more widely. The illustration appeared on its 
renewal pamphlets and in advertisements in newspapers. (See Illustration 3.4.) New 
practices in printing facilitated the use of images on ephemeral print. However, by this 
time, the Sun and other insurance companies no longer ran their own bands of firemen 
in Britain. Local government had taken responsibility for the fire service. Nonetheless, 
the Sun’s illustration remained in its place on the policy, and was added to other 
printed items. As the established identifier of the company, it evoked the protection 
acquired by the purchase of fire insurance. 
 
Emotive security 
The Insurance Office and the Sun used emotional cues to boost the sentiment of 
security that their product offered. Evocations of loss, in words and in imagery, 
underlined the security to possessions and life on offer. Emotional resonances 
connected the companies to their readership. In this vignette, the Insurance Office’s 
author brought to life what was at stake:  
                                                
14 Sun Fire Office, renewal letter-form, 7 December 1804, LMA, 
CLC/B/192/DD/008/MS38828/001, fol. 77. 
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A man would part with Five or Ten Shillings in an Hundred Pounds, only to Sleep Quietly for 
a Year; and not to be Disturb’d with that Dismal Cry, Of Fire, Fire, when himself is not in 
Danger to be Burnt. Neither would a man for such a small Sum, if a Loss should happen, be 
disquieted with the too late Advice of Friends, every one blaming, and asking, Why he did 
not Insure? Or be Tormented by his own Thoughts, with the Wish I had Insured.15  
The author’s use of direct speech and emotive words such as ‘dismal’ and ‘disquieted’ 
make this a vivid interjection into his financial argument for an insurance office.  
It was in the interests of the Office’s proposers to remind readers of the constant risk 
of fire. The proposers affected regret for the houses damaged before their scheme was 
operating: ‘some Persons, who have had the Misfortune in the Interim, to lose their 
Houses for want of the Office being settled; (they being since Burnt)’.16 They derided 
the City’s scheme for the bureaucratic delays in its realisation: men’s ‘houses may be 
Burnt before they are Insured’.17 
The Sun’s illustration of firemen carried even greater emotional weight than had the 
Insurance Office’s words. This image transferred the emotional drama of a fire to fire 
insurance. The fireman in the scene looks authoritative while the salvage man is 
appropriately exhausted and bedraggled, his clothing shredded. Light and shade 
accent the story. Spread over the company’s ephemera, the scene inflected fire 
insurance with feeling. In doing so, it amplified the company’s rousing words about 
security. Fire insurance was ‘so laudable an Undertaking’, one that ‘every Part of the 
Nation might have the Benefit thereof’. The company’s writers used ‘Benefit’ here and 
elsewhere as a menacing euphemism for what could be lost. They warned policy 
holders not to ‘lose the Benefit of your POLICY by omitting the Payment’, not ‘to have 
no Benefit from their Policies’, not to ‘be excluded any Benefit therefrom’ and to ‘make 
all future payments … upon Forfeiture of the Benefit thereof.18 In these cases, ‘benefit’ 




The insurance offices also worked to communicate not only their consumers’ security,  
but their own security. They used the term to refer to the financial security that 
underwrote their ability to pay the claims that arose. Trust in their businesses 
depended on this type of security. The Insurance Office’s backers made known their 
                                                
15 Fire Office, Arguments, p. 2. 
16 Fire Office, September the 16th, 1681. An Advertisement from the Insurance-Office for 
Houses, &c (1681), p. 2. 
17 Fire Office, Observations, p. 1. 
18 Sun Fire Office, renewal letter-form, 7 December 1804; Sun Fire Office, receipt, dated 29 
September 1812, Kent Archives, EK/U1453/B6/1/28; Sun Fire Office, June 14, 1804 … 
Proposals, Article III. 
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rigorous process of arranging the Office’s security. They told readers how ‘the Value 
and Nature of the Security, Manner and Method of Settling it’ were ‘Debated, and 
Regulated’.19 They assured readers of the rigour of their thinking. They argued that 
land was the most secure security, as opposed to ‘Mony or Goods’:  
it was found absolutely necessary in the settling of this design to place the Fund or Security 
in Land; For nothing uncertain could be a security for term of years that is certain: besides 
Houses, being themselves realities, their security ought to be Real.20  
By associating security with physical certainty, the Insurance Office’s proposers 
emphasised the security of their office’s security. They intended their Office to be ‘like 
the Oak, Durable’, as a result.21 The Insurance Office’s supporters tried to undermine 
their rival the Corporation of the City of London in this regard.22 As on of them wrote, 
‘the Security is better in private hands than in publick’.23 They claimed that the 
Insurance Office was ‘safer’.24 They received the same scepticism by reply: ‘the 
Security which they give is nothing near so good as that which the City offers to the 
Insured.’25  
In the Office’s promotional texts, the Insurance Office’s backers put on a 
performance of its security. They assured their readers that their scheme could be 
trusted because it was based on something certain, namely a fund of land, and they 
gave details to prove it. Their openness on this matter was defensive. They 
distinguished their design from ‘some Publick Designes, whose Fund have been 
Reputation, & Personal Credit, [which] have Thriven best without Examination’ and 
quickly failed, 
their Creditors having lost their Money, before they had the Leisure to consider why they 
Trusted them. So, on the contrary, those Designes, whose Fund are in Land, being Real and 
Certain, can have no greater Advantage, than to have their Foundation Examined by those 
that Trust them.26  
The proposers’ openness extended to transparency. They welcomed examination.27 
Their fund in land was real in contrast to schemes based on projectors’ reputations. 
This made it trustworthy. 
                                                
19 Fire Office, September the 16th, p. 1. 
20 Fire Office, Arguments, p. 2. 
21 Fire Office, September the 16th, p. 1. 
22 Fire Office, An Enquiry, Whether it be the Interest of the City to Insure Houses from Fire; and 
Whether the Insured may Expect Any Advantage thereby, more than from the Insurance-Office 
Already Setled [1681], pp. 1–2, claims that the security of the Corporation’s scheme rests solely 
on its seal. 
23 W. I., Letter to a Gentleman of the Insurance Office. 
24 An Advertisement. Being a Proposal by Dr Barbon and Partners. 
25 L. R., Second Letter to his Honoured Friend Mr M.T., p. 2. 
26 Fire Office, September the 16th, p. 1. 
27 This suggests that the Insurance Office sought to counteract the bad reputations of projects in 
the past, in the way that Koji Yamamoto has argued in the culture of projects, in Koji Yamamoto, 
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Even once the Insurance Office was established the subject of its financial security 
remained a refrain, stripped down, on its advertising. Each issue of its sheet A Table, 
published between 1682 and 1700, made mention of the Office’s ‘Security’. The 
editions of 1682 and 1683 used the word three and five times respectively, setting out 
the number of houses, their locations and the value of their ground rents that so 
constituted it. Issues thereafter furnished simply the value of the ground rents, 
described as ‘a Fund’ from 1693. The Sun Fire Office’s Proposals and then the Sun 
Insurance Office’s renewal leaflet continued this practice, as will be seen under the 
next heading. 
 
Security by numbers 
Insurance companies printed numbers to confirm their words about their financial 
security. Numbers were evidence of security credentials. They carried natural graphic 
advantages and they received prominent display. The proposers of the Insurance 
Office dazzled readers with giant figures. Initially they proposed to settle ‘1500 l. or 
2000 l. per Annum in Grounds Rents … which will be to the Value of Thirty or Forty 
thousand pounds’.28 As it turned out two years later, in fact they settled the sum of ‘One 
Thousand Four Hundred Pounds per Annum’.29 In A Table from 1693 on, the proposers 
promoted the larger figure of ‘Sixty Thousand Pounds in Ground Rents’ rather than the 
annual rent. Over one hundred years later, the Sun Fire Office could impress readers 
with a far larger number. Its Proposals exclaimed: ‘in Order to render the Security 
unexceptionable, the Sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND POUNDS is raised, to be a 
Fund’.30 This number merited attention by its position in capitals at the end of the initial 
paragraph. (See Illustration 3.5.) 
In the early twentieth century, the Sun Insurance Office amplified the insertion of 
numbers onto its printed matter. In 1906, a proposal leaflet stated: ‘In the all important 
matter of Security, the figures quoted overleaf … speak for themselves’. The said 
figures were shown in a dynamic illustration on the front. (See Illustration 3.6.) The 
latest amount of its ‘Reserve Funds’ was ‘£2,788,638’, and the leaflet included figures 
                                                                                                                                          
Taming Capitalism Before Its Triumph: Public Service, Distrust, and 'Projecting' in Early Modern 
England (Oxford University Press, 2018). 
28 Fire Office, Propositions, p. 1. 
29 Fire Office, A Table of the Insurance Office at the Back-side of the Royal Exchange (1682). 
30 Sun Fire Office, July 28th, 1803. Proposals from the Sun Fire-Office, in Cornhill, near the 
Royal-Exchange, for Insuring Houses, and Other Buildings, Goods, Wares and Merchandize, 
and Ships in Harbour, in Dock, or Building, and Craft, from Loss and Damage by Fire (1803); 
Sun Fire Office, June 14, 1804 … Proposals; Sun Fire Office, July 7, 1808. Sun Fire-Office, 
Cornhill, near the Royal-Exchange, and at Craig’s Court, Charing-Cross. Proposals for Insuring 
Houses, and Other Buildings, Goods, Wares and Merchandise, and Ships in Harbour, in Dock, 
or Building, and Craft, from Loss and Damage by Fire (1808). 
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for ‘Subscribed Capital’ and ‘Premiums’.31 In this instance, the Office fixed its security 
fund in a precise figure. This exactness increased the credibility of the statement. In 
1909, the company boasted that ‘It has Capital and Reserves of more than FIVE 
MILLIONS OF POUNDS’, alongside an account of its capital and its premium income. 
(See Illustration 3.7.)  
 
Claims 
Financial security was bound up with trust in the offices because it implied the ability to 
pay claims. The proposers of the Insurance Office showed themselves keenly aware 
that it was only by paying claims that they would be trusted. As they said: 
those that projected this design, thought it their interests at first to set the Premium, rather 
too low than too high; the Easinesse of the Terms, being an Encouragement to the insured; 
for, when by paying of Losses, the Office had gain’d Reputation, it might be easily raised.32 
In 1685, Nicholas Barbon undermined the Friendly Society, a mutual contribution 
scheme, on the grounds that it would not be able to cover claims except by calling on 
its policy holders.33 He lent his criticism credibility by drawing upon the three years’ 
experience his Office had built up by that time. The Sun made much of its reputation 
for paying claims, in the Proposals in the early nineteenth century and in the renewal 
leaflets in the early twentieth century. It did so at the same point in the text where it 
advised of its funds, demonstrating the connection.34 One leaflet proclaimed: ‘The 
Office has long enjoyed a reputation for prompt and equitable Loss Settlements.’35 
 
Security was a consistent theme in the literature of fire insurance companies, both the 
word itself and related ideas of safety and protection. The security of policy holders 
depended on the security of an insurance company’s fund, and the companies 
emphasised both these meanings. They imbued the former sense with emotional 
resonance, and they proved the latter in printed numbers. While security of one’s 
possessions was the purpose of fire insurance, a company’s individual security was a 
competitive matter. The insertion of numbers underscored the offices’ credibility in 
                                                
31 Sun Fire Office, Proposal for Fire Insurance, leaflet-form (1906), p. [2], Hillingdon, 
MC25C/SF1/1570/1/3/1. The figure is the same as on Sun Insurance Office, renewal notice 
(1907), Hillingdon, MC25C/SF1/1570/1/3/1. 
32 Fire Office, Enquiry, p. 2. By my count, this is one of only two uses of ‘project’ as a verb or a 
noun by the Insurance Office. The other occurs in Fire Office, September the 16th, as a noun. 
33 Nicholas Barbon, A Letter to a Gentleman in the Country, Giving an Account of the two 
Insurance-Offices; the Fire-Office & Friendly-Society (1684), p. 2, regarding the Friendly 
Society. See also, Fire Office, Enquiry, p. 2. 
34 John Trusler, The London Adviser and Guide: Containing Every Instruction and Information 
[...] (London, 1790 [1786]), p. 10, supported this: ‘The Sun-Fire Office … has been esteemed 
the most eligible, because the proprietors act liberally to the insured, and pay the amount of any 
loss with little trouble to the supplicant.’ 
35 Sun Fire Office, Proposal for Fire Insurance, leaflet-form (1906), p. [1]. 
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regard to rivals and it conveyed their transparency. The statement of a company’s 
security demonstrated its transparency, and therefore its trustworthiness.  
 
Identity 
As reviewed in Part I, Airbnb requires that its users create a profile. The home-renting 
platform takes the view that these profiles help to build trust within its community of 
users. Through a profile constituted by a name, an image and some text, each user 
builds an identity and conveys a personality. Airbnb and Projects by If use the same 
techniques on a larger, professional scale to create brands for themselves. The 
backers of the Insurance Office and the Sun Fire Office used print to create a corporate 
identity for their companies. Through an identity, the two Offices built relationships with 
investors and policy holders. For the fire offices, an identity had two components: a 
corporate name, graphically communicated, and imagery. The Sun developed 
practices laid down by the Insurance Office, deploying them more emphatically than its 
predecessor. Between the Insurance Office in the seventeenth century and the Sun 
Insurance Office in the twentieth century, a fire office’s identity increasingly manifested 
itself in imagery. 
 
Name 
The proposers of the Insurance Office embarked on their project without giving it a 
name. In 1680, they made their pitch in general terms: ‘It is very reasonable that such 
Losses should be repaired by a Common Contribution, which can no otherwise be 
done but by an Insurance-Office’.36 In the following year when they began signing 
policies, the proposers used ‘the Insurance Office’ as the name for their entity. The 
assumption of a name allowed the company to be referred to precisely in print. Their 
choice reflected their determination that theirs be the only such office in the new field. 
The adoption of the Insurance Office as the name was accompanied by its display in 
print. The name was graphically presented. The typesetters gave the ‘Insurance Office’ 
graphic prominence not only in titles but in colophons and body text. (See Illustrations 
3.8 to 3.14.) They set the name in a typeface larger than the body text (see Illustrations 
3.8 and 3.9) and they used black letter for it (see Illustrations 3.8, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13 and 
3.14). The authors of the Office’s sheets repeated the name. (See Illustrations 3.10, 
3.11 and 3.12.) Placed in a layout, the name drew in the reader. The Office’s 
representatives became the ‘Gentlemen of the Insurance Office’.37 Prior to that, they 
had been variously the ‘Insurers’, the ‘Undertakers’, ‘the Parties that are Principally 
                                                
36 Fire Office, Propositions, p. 1. 
37 The first sheet to use this nomenclature was Fire Office, To the Right Honourable the Lord 
Mayor … The Proposals of the Gentlemen of the Insurance Office is humbly Offered [1681]. 
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concerned’ and ‘the Persons concerned’.38 Through the emphasis on its name, the 
Office indicated that it did not depend on the names and reputations of any individuals; 
its representatives became members of that corporate body. The threat posed by the 
Corporation of London’s insurance scheme gave the Insurance Office cause to repeat 
its name in print. (See Illustrations 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12.) In these pamphlets, the name 
became a tool of differentiation and therefore of competition. The repetition of the 
name in print served to make the new entity real, especially against the opposition.  
Despite the graphic importance that the Insurance Office’s backers assigned to the 
name in print, its nomenclature prevaricated over the company’s lifespan. By 1683 the 
office was also known as the Fire Office.39 From 1693 it promoted itself officially with 
this moniker, by which it had become ‘commonly called’.40 By 1705, it promoted itself 
as the Phoenix Fire Office but in the same period it went by just the ‘Fire Office’ and 
was referred to in the name of its deceased founder as Barbon’s Insurance Office.41 
With the official adoption of the ‘Fire Office’ in 1693, the company’s promotional format 
A Table was re-designed from previous editions. (Compare Illustrations 3.14, 3.15, 
3.16 and 3.17, to Illustration 3.18.) The title to the sheet received greater prominence 
than before. It was now set in larger typefaces such that it was split over multiple lines. 
The title was further enlivened by the use of a greater variety of typefaces. The 
company’s new name became the stand-out feature both of the title and of the page as 
a whole. The typesetter made much of the advantage of having a short name in a 
display typeface.  
The re-working of the A Table format in 1693 made for an effective poster as well as 
a handbill. The emphasis continued in the subsequent editions of this format.42 (See 
Illustrations 3.19 and 3.20.) The sheet and the Office were re-branded. The repeated 
use of this revised format suggests that the Office’s managers and its printers were 
satisfied with it. The typographic styling of the title and the name gave the sheet a 
                                                
38 Fire Office, Propositions, pp. 1–2; Fire Office, Arguments, p. 2; Fire Office, [Advertisement] 
from the Insurance-Office for Houses on the Back-Side of the Royal-Exchange [1681]; Fire 
Office, September, the 16th, p. 1. 
39 Barbon, Letter to a Gentleman in the Country, uses the name the Fire Office, as well as the 
Insurance Office. London Gazette, 16 February 1687, p. 2, (repeated 1 March 1687 and 5 
March 1687), referred to ’the said Office of Insurance, commonly called, The Fire Office’. 
40 Fire Office, A Table, Shewing the Rates of Insuring Houses from One Year to Eleven: at the 
Fire-Office, Kept against the Royal-Exchange in Cornhill; and at the Rainbow Coffee-House by 
the Inner-Temple-Gate in Fleet-Street (1693). 
41 ‘Fire Office’ on a printed form, dated 1713, TNA, E 192/29; ‘Barbon’s Insurance’ and 
‘Barbon’s Insurance Office’ on a petition, 1703, TNA, PC 1/1/274. 
42 Fire Office, [A Table,] Shewing the Rates of Insuring Houses from One Year to Eleven: at the 
Fire-Office, Kept against the Royal-Exchange in Cornhill: and at the Rainbow Coffee-House by 
the Inner-Temple-Gate in Fleetstreet (1698); Fire Office, A Table, Shewing the Rates of Insuring 
Houses from One Year to Seven: at the Fire-Office, Kept against the Royal-Exchange in 
Cornhill: and at the Rainbow Coffee-House by the Inner-Temple-Gate in Fleetstreet (1700). 
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visual impact. The combination likely forged recognition of the company from its 
viewers, in the same way as a newspaper’s masthead. 
 
The Sun’s name was a key component of its identity just as for the Insurance Office. 
But in its early years it too equivocated, as the previous chapter outlined. At its 
establishment in 1708, the Office was the Exchange House Fire Office.43 It became the 
Company of London Insurers in 1709 when Charles Povey brought in partners.44 By 
this time, the Office had already become known by its symbol of a sun that Povey had 
chosen for it. Thus in 1710 its new managers promoted it with both names: ‘The 
Company of London-Insurers’ took the central position in the title to the Proposals, 
while an annotation, ‘From the Sun-Fire-Office’, was set at the top right of the sheet. 
(See Illustration 3.21.) However, by the Proposals in 1712, the ‘Sun-Fire-Office’ was 
the unanimous name; the official name left public use. (See Illustration 3.22.) This 
nomenclature remained until 1891 when the company officially became the Sun 
Insurance Office and expanded the insurance products that it sold. Still, the old 
nickname remained in play.  
At the start of the nineteenth century, the techniques at the Sun’s disposal to 
emphasise its name in print were not different to the Insurance Office’s: position, 
typeface and size. ‘Sun Fire Office’ sat atop the Office’s Proposals, in a typeface that 
gave emphasis by upper case or by weight. (See Illustrations 3.23, 3.24 and 3.25.) The 
Sun’s receipts picked out the name in black-letter type, the same type as the Insurance 
Office had commonly used (see Illustration 3.26); as did other formats (see Illustration 
3.27). But the typesetters varied the methods they used to pick out the name. They did 
not do so in a consistent way; the name did not function as a logo. The Sun generated 
more formats of printed matter than the Insurance Office. Accordingly, its name was 
spread over an increased diversity of printed matter, in higher print runs. The range 
included receipts, forms, notices and lists of personnel. (See Illustrations 3.26 to 3.32.) 
This printed matter had a wider reach across the country, as the Office’s network of 
agents took root. (See Illustrations 3.29, 3.33 to 3.37.) Many of these sheets were 
designed for display; on these a large name was an important constituent. The Sun’s 
name, graphically emphasised, now had far greater reach than had the Insurance 
Office’s at the end of the seventeenth century. 
When new, large, heavy sizes of display fonts began to be produced after 1815, the 
company name was the beneficiary. (See Illustration 3.38.) In the twentieth century, the 
Sun’s policy emblazoned the name, revelling in the choice of typefaces and sizes now 
                                                
43 P. G. M. Dickson, The Sun Insurance Office 1710–1960: The History of Two and a Half 
Centuries of British Insurance (Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 20–26. 
44 Ibid., p. 28. 
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on offer. (See Illustration 3.39.) Large typefaces allowed the name to be larger in 
proportion to the rest of a sheet than had been possible in the previous period. But 
smaller sheets also enjoyed the differentiation. (See Illustrations 3.40 and 3.41.) At the 
turn of the twentieth century the great diversity of possible typefaces only encouraged 
the enthusiasm of the Sun’s typesetters for making use of as many as they could for 
display words. In the same period, the corporate name anchored company stationery, 
for use within the company and outside it. (See Illustrations 3.42 and 3.43.) The size of 
the company at this point and its reliance on printed matter made the name as 
significant internally as externally. 
 
Emblem 
While a name provided definition to the corporate entities of the Insurance Office and 
the Sun Fire Office, an emblem was a means to mark authenticity. The Insurance 
Office used the symbol of a phoenix in flames. As a seal in wax, this accompanied the 
signatures on each policy and thereby endorsed it.45 The same image was the Office’s 
firemark and made the badge for its firemen.46 The repetition of the same symbol 
across materials proved their relationship to the company. It also created a cohesive 
material identity for the companies in public space. The identity in print worked with 
other materials. Charles Povey used his chosen symbol of a sun with a face in the 
same way.47 For both offices, the familiarity of this symbol inspired new names, the 
Phoenix and the Sun.48 While they changed their names over their lifespan and varied 
how they presented them in print, they did not change their corporate symbol.  
From the early eighteenth century, fire offices placed woodcut imprints of their 
symbols at the top of their promotional handbills. In this regard, the symbol visually 
identified the company, and its position on the sheet stood in for the name in the title 
beside it. This practice especially complemented the companies in this period, like the 
                                                
45 Insurance Office, policy, dated 1682, is stamped with this seal, Museum of London, 49.8. 
46 Firemarks were in use by 1684, when they were mentioned in Friendly Society, A Breviate of 
the Establishment of the Friendly Society for Securing Houses from Loss by Fire, by Mutual 
Contribution Agreed on by the Trustees Inrolled in Chancery, and to be Seen at Large at the 
Office [1684]. A supporter of the Corporation of the City of London’s fire insurance scheme 
sarcastically says of the Insurance Office’s firemen: ‘tho being arm'd Cap a Pe, they look as if 
they were design'd to encounter another Enemy than the Fire,’ in L. R., Second Letter to his 
Honoured Friend Mr M.T. Thomas DeLaune, Angliae Metropolis or Present State of London 
(1690), Section 12, quoted by Francis Boyer Relton, An Account of the Fire Insurance 
Companies Associations Institutions Projects and Schemes Established and Projected in Great 
Britain and Ireland during the 17th and 18th Centuries, including the Sun Fire Office: Also of 
Charles Povey, the Projector of that Office, his Writings and Schemes (London: Sonnenschein, 
1893), p. 44, confirms that firemen wore badges by 1690.  
47 I discussed these symbols in Miranda Clow, ‘From Nothing to Something: The Making of the 
Sun Fire Office in the Eighteenth Century’ (MA thesis, Royal College of Art, 2013), pp. 48–51, 
78–80. 
48 Similarly, the Amicable became known by its symbol as the Hand in Hand. 
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Phoenix and the Sun, whose names matched their symbol. (See Illustrations 3.44 and 
3.45.) The choice of a phoenix in flames as emblem was a vivid piece of imagery to 
adopt. It was a powerful metaphor for the product. It gave the office character. The Sun 
followed the Insurance Office in selecting an evocative picture which alluded to fire. 
The face of the sun similarly gave Charles Povey’s office personality. Both companies 
used their corporate symbols from their opening.49 Historian of the Sun Fire Office, 
Peter Dickson ascribes Povey’s choice to his interest in astronomy, but it was also an 
impactful graphic, well known to the public from street signs and woodcut prints.50 
Other fire insurance offices chose emblems that made reference to their mutual 
structure rather than their product. The Insurance Office and the Sun carefully chose 
symbols that gave them vivid graphic identities. 
On paper, the emblem evoked identity and elicited recognition. At the start of the 
nineteenth century, it assumed a quarter of the front page of the Sun’s Proposals as a 
round woodcut. (See Illustration 3.46.) Its prominence overshadowed the company’s 
name. The face stared at the reader from the top, surrounded by space such that it 
stood out. It and the title ‘proposals’ in capital letters below it, spread out across a line, 
were the key graphic identifiers of the page, conspicuous from a distance. The sun 
face was used on other sheets intended for display. (See Illustration 3.47.) On 
occasion the symbol stood in for the word ‘sun’. (See Illustration 3.34.) Or it was the 
sole identifier of the company. (See Illustration 3.48.) It was used in newspaper 
advertising. (See Illustrations 3.35 and 3.36.) In the twentieth century, it was 




The illustration which sat atop the Sun’s policies was another visual representation of 
the company, one which bestowed it with a character. In the nineteenth century and 
into the twentieth century, the Sun still used the same scene of firemen that had been 
originally engraved in the 1740s. (See Illustration 3.49, and compare to Illustrations 3.2 
and 3.39.) This scene of firemen posing either side of the emblem of the sun had 
idealised the company’s work since its earliest days. A naïve rendition of a similar 
scene first ornamented policies in the 1720s. (See Illustration 3.50.) The policy scenes 
were themselves reminiscent of a small woodcut, a factotum, used on the Office’s 
                                                
49 The earliest known Insurance Office policies are stamped with the seal of a phoenix in 
flames. Charles Povey, who founded the fire office that became the Sun, decided on ‘a mark 
representing the Sun’ as part of his Salvage Corps Scheme, as outlined in the ‘Regulations’ for 
the Salvage Corps Scheme, in General Remark, No. 440, 22–24 December 1708.  
50 Dickson, Sun Insurance Office; Clow, ‘From Nothing to Something’. 
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Proposals to usher in the main text, even before that.51 (See Illustration 3.51.) In each 
iteration, the composition was heavy with the Sun’s identifying emblem: its sun. It is the 
focus of the scene. It is worn by the firemen. It marks their sack or their engine. It is a 
firemark on the wall of a building. By the repetition of the one symbol, the protection 
provided by a policy, both literally and figuratively, was ascribed exclusively to the Sun 
company. By its appearance atop the policy, the illustration acted as a visual title to 
that agreement, a document which otherwise, by convention, did not carry a title. By 
unlocking the meaning behind the product, the illustration accomplished far more than 
the company’s name could have in that position. 
The Sun’s illustration, like its emblem, distinguished it from other fire offices, in an 
industry in which differentiating the product was a challenge.52 When the Sun’s 
managers commissioned an engraving for the Office’s policy, they sought to capitalise 
on the popularity of prints at the time. The engraving made the policy both special and 
particular to the company. This was a competitive decision as other fire offices added 
an engraving to their policies in the same period. As offices competed by 
commissioning increasing numbers of printed formats, their differentiating emblem 
became all the more important. As discussed above, in the twentieth century the Sun 
used the opportunity of more formats to apply its policy illustration more frequently than 
before. By then, the company’s identity dominated its policy. The object resembled a 
souvenir more than an agreement backed by law. 
 
A name and images in print transformed a fire insurance scheme into a corporate 
entity, with which a buyer could form a relationship. By making a sheet specific to a 
company, these graphic markers also made the sheet trustworthy. A policy with a seal 
or an engraving communicated its validity. Print concretised and aggrandised the name 
and shared emblems in coordination with other materials. As the Sun printed more 
formats to reach across Britain in a competitive environment, so the same practices as 
had been used by the Insurance Office were heightened.  
 
                                                
51 Sun Fire Office, From the Sun-Fire-Office, July 4, 1712. Proposals Set Forth by the Company 
of the Sun-Fire-Office, in Threadneedle-Street, behind the Royal-Exchange, London, for 
Insuring Houses, Moveable Goods, Merchandize, Furniture, and Wares, from Loss and 
Damage by Fire, in Any Part of Great Britain (1712); Sun Fire Office, Nov. 5. 1716. Proposals 
Set Forth by the Company of the Sun Fire-Office, in Threadneedle-Street, behind the Royal 
Exchange, London, for Insuring Houses, Moveable Goods, Merchandize, Furniture, and Wares, 
from Loss and Damage by Fire, in any Part of Great Britain (1716). 
52 In 1681, the Insurance Office struggled to differentiate its product from the Corporation of the 
City of London’s scheme. Robin Pearson comments on the sophisticated marketing of the fire 
insurance industry as a means of competition, in Robin Pearson, Insuring the Industrial 




The Insurance Office and the Sun used print not only each to create an identity but to 
cultivate a reputation.53 Their managers established these Offices by making them 
familiar to the public through print. Familiarity was propelled by printed formats and by 
quantities of print. The Insurance Office came into being by a vociferous media 
strategy. Between May 1680 and the close of 1681, it generated six single sheets and 
two four-page pamphlets, sometimes in multiple editions.54 Its use of print was such 
that one of the Office’s detractors made reference to ‘all those several Pamphlets, 
which have been scatter’d (like their Brains) and so industriously spread abroad by 
them’.55 These sheets were a means of publicity. The publicity was necessary given 
that the Office’s backers initially aired an intention to insure 10,000 houses, with more 
in future tranches.56 Already in the 1710s the Sun printed its Proposals in the tens of 
thousands, and it published a news-sheet to help publicise its business. One hundred 
years later, the Sun’s print runs matched its thousands of policy holders. This quantity 
of print made fire offices known. Thereby in a weak sense, it gave them reputation. 
But this quantity of print also conveyed personality traits to attach to the corporate 
identities. The Insurance Office’s authors moulded a commercial entity which called for 
loyalty and foregrounded authenticity. They encouraged discussion of their sheets’ 
content. For its part, the Sun came to emphasise its longevity. Thus did their backers 
style these businesses. These traits were the facets of a good reputation. 
 
Loyalty 
The Insurance Office’s sheets spun the exertions of its formation into a narrative. This 
narrative sought to persuade its readers of its credibility. The notice September, the 
16th 1681 furnished a lively report of the Office’s development since the first publication 
of its Propositions. It began with resolve: ‘These are to give Notice, That the Office and 
Security … is NOW Perfected and Setled’. It ended with the same: ‘This Design could 
not have been sooner perfected.’57 Inbetween, in systematic fashion, September, the 
16th 1681 recounted the sequence of this progress: ‘The first Debate’, ‘The next 
                                                
53 On the importance of reputation in the era of the Insurance Office see Natasha Glaisyer, The 
Culture of Commerce in England, 1660–1720 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2006). 
54 The bibliography lists the known output of the Insurance Office in chronological order 
according to my determination. Fire Office, Propositions went through three editions, two in 
1680 and one in 1681. Fire Office, Enquiry and Fire Office, Observations were published in two 
versions. These versions are evident from small changes in the text from one to another. The 
bibliographical information given by the ESTC shows the wide survival of the Insurance Office’s 
printed output. 
55 L. R., Second Letter to his Honoured Friend Mr M.T., p. 1. 
56 Fire Office, Propositions [1680], p. 1, and Fire Office, Propositions [1681], p. 1. 
57 Similarly in Fire Office, [Advertisement] from the Insurance-Office, ‘It was promised in the 
Printed Propositions, That the Names of the Insurers, and Places, where the Estates or 
Securities lye…’, is followed by paragraphs which deliver these details. 
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Debate’, ‘Last of all’. The resolution of each matter was demonstrated, as was the 
resolution of the scheme as a whole. As the sheet summarised solemnly, ‘Much 
Labour, much Time hath been spent in Settling this Affair’. Readers were reminded of 
‘the Greatness of the Concern’ and ‘the Weightyness of the Affair’.58 Here was an 
enterprise that dispelled doubt and beckoned to believers. 
Amidst this narrative, the men behind the Insurance Office defined their actions and 
decisions around reason. They associated themselves with what was ‘convenient’, 
‘probable’, ‘effectual’, ‘plain’, ‘necessary’. They aimed at ‘general satisfaction’ and to 
avoid what is ‘troublesom’. On behalf of the company, they promoted ‘advantage’ over 
‘disadvantage’. Thereby, the Insurance Office’s backers endowed the office with a 
trustworthy personality, to which readers would be well disposed.59  
In the Insurance Office’s sheets, the reasonable character of the Office stood in 
contrast to a series of opponents. From the first, the Office’s authors used dramatic 
language for the causes of fire: ‘the carelessness of Servants or evil Designs of wicked 
People’, against which the Office would be a foil.60 The same authors raised the 
possibility of ‘Opposition from Objections’ to the design.61 In fact, they encouraged such 
objections and made known how they acted upon them in subsequent publications.62 
As they wrote it, the Insurance Office’s proposers had to deal with other naysayers, for 
the slow progress of the Office ‘hath occasioned several Discourses, as if it were a 
Project in its own Nature, not to be Practised; and would prove like the Abortive 
Conceits of several Others, in this last Twenty Years, on this Subject’.63 September, the 
16th 1681 batted away these skeptics by turning the delay into a virtue which proved 
the Office’s robustness. The Insurance Office’s publicity was descriptive. It turned the 
office into a protagonist for whom the reader might root. 
The efforts of the Insurance Office’s authors to work up a reputation for the Office in 
print were matched by their efforts to accrue loyalty by degrading the reputation of the 
rivals that arose; first, the Corporation of the City of London’s insurance scheme in 
                                                
58 Fire Office, September the 16th, pp. 1, 2. 
59 Kate Loveman, Reading Fictions, 1660–1740: Deception in English Literary and Political 
Culture (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), brings to light the association of truth-telling with plain-
speaking and bluntness in politics and literature in this period. ‘[T]he appearance of plain-
speaking was … a rhetoric with a skill of its own’ (p. 37). 
60 Fire Office, Propositions, p. 1. By contrast, Newbold, Londons Improvement, had more gently 
cited the ‘Casualties of Fire’ (p.[i]) and the ‘Accident of Fire’ (p. 1). 
61 Fire Office, Propositions, p. 2. 
62 The most significant amendment to the second edition of the Propositions was that it now 
incorporated houses ‘Blown up, and Pulled down, as well as Burnt down’, as explained in Fire 
Office, [Advertisement] from the Insurance-Office. In Fire Office, September the 16th, p. 2, the 
Office’s proposers were apparently open about the substance of objections. They admitted that 
they had been out-voted on one matter, and that some of the intended estates ‘were not all 
Finish’t’. 
63 Fire Office, September the 16th, p. 1. This refers to at least two earlier proposals for fire 
insurance: De Laune’s in c. 1670 and Newbold’s in 1679 (on which see Chapter 2). 
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1681 and then the Friendly Society in 1684. The authors summoned their most 
histrionic and barbed language when they faced the Corporation. The Corporation’s 
long-standing institutional reputation threatened their own, newly and carefully 
constructed in print.64 Their strategy was to smear their rival and thereby garner loyalty 
to their Office. The rhetorical skills that had thus far been used to build an entity were 
now used for a debate. In two handbills and two pamphlets, they undermined the 
Corporation and its scheme, above all its security, in enumerated steps. They 
insinuated that the Corporation was trying to profit in an area where there was little to 
be gained. In various ways, they accused it of ‘Rashness and want of Knowledge’ in its 
undertaking.65 They intimated corruption in the matter.66 They sowed doubts over the 
Corporation’s trustworthiness and its running.67 They inferred dishonesty from the rival 
scheme’s two outward points of difference from the Insurance Office: the cheaper 
premium was ‘a great Contrivance to draw Customers’ and the offer of a one hundred-
year term of insurance was ‘another Stratagem to bring in Customers’.68 The catalogue 
of insults was cushioned by flattery towards the institution’s social status.69  
In another line of attack, the Insurance Office’s supporters turned the contest into a 
spectacle of justice and truth. They accused the Corporation of copying their design for 
insurance, claiming that they were the ‘Authors of the Designe’ and ‘the First Inventors 
of this Designe’.70 This claim to originality will be discussed in the next section, but the 
military language in making it marks the gravity with which they viewed the threat: 
‘When Right is Invaded, all manner of Defence is Lawful’; the Corporation was their 
‘Adversary’.71 The sheets repeated the motif that this adversary ‘in the End, must Ruine 
                                                
64 The Insurance Office’s authors repeatedly try to undermine the Corporation’s ‘Seal’. 
65 Fire Office, Observations, p. 3. The same pamphlet accused the Corporation of ‘not 
understanding the Reasons of the Design’ (p. 1), of ‘not understanding’ (p. 2), of failure ‘to 
attend Counsel’ (p. 3); it ‘did not well Understand the Design they were about’ (pp. 3–4). Fire 
Office, Enquiry, p. 1, called the Corporation, ‘Misinformed’. The Corporation was said not to 
have yet settled the estates in trust.  
66 Fire Office, Enquiry, p. 1: ‘Private Interests do sometimes govern Publick Councils’. 
67 Fire Office, Enquiry, p. 2. The same pamphlet refers to the Corporation’s potential ‘ill 
Management and Loss’ (p. 2), makes suggestion of ‘uneasy delays to Business’ and ‘ill 
Consequence’ (p. 4). Fire Office, Observations, p. 1, indicated that the Corporation’s fire 
insurance scheme could undermine its ‘Justice, Wisdom, or Credit’. 
68 Fire Office, Observations, p. 2. 
69 It is not within my expertise to take sides but Cornelius Walford considered that the points 
against the Corporation of the City of London were reasonable: Cornelius Walford, The 
Insurance Cyclopaedia: Being a Dictionary of the Definition of Terms Used in Connexion with 
the Theory and Practice of Insurance in All Its Branches: a Biographical Summary ... a 
Bibliographical Repertory ... an Historical Treasury […], 6 vols (London: Layton, 1871–1880), 
vol. 3, p. 446. 
70 On copying: Fire Office, To the Right Honourable the Lord Mayor, commented that the 
Corporation of the City of London’s intention ‘seems to be exactly the same with their [the 
Insurance Office’s] Proposals’; Fire Office, Enquiry, p. 1, claimed that the Corporation had 
undertaken ‘the same design’. On authorship, see Fire Office, Observations, as well as these. 
71 Fire Office, Observations, p. 1, so it begins. 
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the Designe’.72 The righteous indignation with which the Insurance Office’s 
representatives presented themselves was a strategy by which to maintain the 
allegiance of the audience. They intended their audience to sympathise with the 
injustice. 
The men of the Corporation of the City of London took notice of the attack on their 
institution’s reputation. At Court they discussed the ‘two small pamphlets lately printed 
tending to ye disparagement and disability of this Citty to undertake ye said designe.’ 
The pamphlets did not receive the desired result of the termination of the City’s 
insurance scheme. Instead, the City’s men resolved: 
This Court doth therefore refer it to the said Committee to vindicate ye Cittys reputation and 
creditt as well against ye said pamphletts as any others that shall bee published to the 
hindrance of ye said designe, in the manner as the said Comittee shall think fitt.73  
In the two pamphlets that followed, L. R. from the Corporation’s side not only 
responded to the criticisms of his institution’s scheme but repeatedly made assertions 
against the private individuals’ credit and credibility; for instance in his rhetorical 
question, ‘whether the Lands of a man, liable to a Statute of Bankrupt 3 years ago, can 
now be a sufficient Security?’74  
When the Insurance Office’s backers faced the Friendly Society in 1684 there was 
no institutional reputation to attack, so they focused on the design of its scheme of 
mutual contribution: ‘To Conclude, the Friendly Society, is a more Profitable design, 
than the Fire Office, for the Insurers… But the Insured are just in the same Condition 
or rather Worse than if they had not Insured.’75 Henry Spelman, the proposer of the 
Friendly Society, countered their arguments with ease and sarcasm.76 He implied that 
they had deliberately misconstrued and misrepresented the figures, with ‘mistakes’.77 
They made ‘Dark, Forreign, and Unreasonable Computations’ and ‘unreasonable 
Calculations’. Spelman posited ‘Matter of Fact’ against ‘Guess and Imagination’; ‘these 
things may serve to amuse some, tho not to convince any’. The Insurance Office’s 
confrontations with both the Corporation of the City of London and the Friendly Society 
reflect its active use of print. In building their office, its supporters made it a loud 
                                                
72 Fire Office, Observations, p. 4, and ‘Spoil the whole Design’ (p. 2). Fire Office, Enquiry, had 
already riffed on this theme: ‘hazard the ruins of the Design’ and ‘the Design it self will be 
Ruined’ (p. 4). 
73 Report of 16th Nov 1681, read 16th December 1681, LMA, COL/CC/06/01/0015. 
74 L. R., Second Letter to his Honoured Friend Mr M.T., p. 2. 
75 Barbon, Letter to a Gentleman in the Country, p. 3. In fact, the Insurance Office began to offer 
fire insurance by mutual contribution as well from the 1693: London Gazette, 20 November 
1693. 
76 H[enry] S[pelman], An Answer to a Letter to a Gentleman in the Countrey, Giving an Account 
of the Two Insurance-Offices; the Fire-Office & Friendly-Society (1684). 
77 Ibid., p. 4. One ‘mistake’ was ‘I fear a wilful one’. 
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presence in public. They compelled readers to take sides. They aggrandised the Office 
at the expense of others.  
Amidst the competition with the Corporation of the City of London, the Insurance 
Office’s supporters also sought to earn people’s loyalty by appealing to expediency. 
They made the offer that purchasers could ‘bring back their Policies’ within a year and 
receive their money back: ‘So that if the City, or any other Persons in that time shall 
offer better Security or easier Terms, they will have liberty to Accept them: and in the 
Interim, they have the Advantage to be Insured by this Office.’78 This offer was taken 
up.79 The offer implied that the Office acted according to people’s interests, that it was 
trustworthy. When the Insurance Office lowered its rates to match the City’s, its 
backers promised to repay the difference to those who had already bought a policy.80 
Thus they sought to demonstrate their financial honesty.  
The Insurance Office already made offers of discounts on the price of insurance. At 
the start, this was a sales strategy to award early interest. Subscribers ‘shall have a 
years purchase allowed for incourageing the Office by their readiness to agree’.81 The 
offer came with a deadline to strengthen its credibility but this was twice extended.82 
Subsequent offers committed the purchaser to the Office: ‘That they should Insure 
Eight Years for Five Paid, Twelve for Seven, Twenty-One for Nine, and Thirty-One for 
Ten’. Thereafter, the Insurance Office continued to promote a ‘Discount’. The term 
‘discount’ had associations with the culture of property investment, for specialist 
manuals in this field provided tables of interest, compound interest and discount.83 The 
Insurance Office partook in this culture, at the same time as it appealed to people’s 
                                                
78 Fire Office, Enquiry, p. 4: ‘That all Persons that shall Insure their Houses, shall have Liberty 
till the First of January, 1682 to bring back their Policies; and the Insurers will Oblidge 
themselves, and their Security by Indorsement on their Policies to Accept of a Surrender, and 
repay the Premium, only Deducting a Proportion for the time Insured’. The offer is publicised in 
London Gazette, 20 October 1681, p. [2]. 
79 Insurance Office, policy, dated 6 October 1681, has a handwritten note on its back, made on 
25 November 1681, that confirms this offer, LMA, COL/CC/BHC/10/028. 
80 Fire Office, Observations, p. 4: ‘to those Gentlemen that have Insured their Houses, at the 
Office at the back-side the Royal-Exchange, If they will come to the Office, they shall be Repaid 
the Over-plus of their Premium’. Christine Ferdinand highlights similar ‘persuasive strategies’ in 
book selling, such as money-off for early purchasers, with examples in c. 1681 and 1688: 
Christine Ferdinand, ‘Constructing the Frameworks of Desire: How Newspapers Sold Books in 
the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, in Joad Raymond, ed., News, Newspapers and 
Society in Early Modern Britain (London: F. Cass, 1999), pp. 152–173, p. 163. 
81 Fire Office, Propositions [1680], p. 2; Fire Office, Propositions [1681], p. 2. 
82 Fire Office, Arguments, p.2, made the first extension to the offer: ‘They that shall Subscribe 
before the Writings are Sealed, are to have the same Benefit with those that have already 
Subscribed.’ Then, Fire Office, September the 16th, p. 2: ‘It is therefore thought fit to propose; 
That those Gentlemen that shall Insure their Houses, and take their Policies before the First 
Day of November next, shall have the same Advantage with those that did Subscribe.’ 
83 William C. Baer, ‘The Institution of Residential Investment in Seventeenth-Century London’, 
Business History Review, 76:3 (2002), 515–51 (p. 540): ‘Discount was the cost of satisfying or 
discharging an obligation immediately by a sum that, with interest, would equal the value of an 
obligation (a legacy, say) at the time it was due.’ 
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pocket and to convenience.84 For the Office’s part, a discount was a method to achieve 
the largest possible sum from the purchaser and the longest commitment, regardless 
of the risk.85 In 1700, with the risk to the Office capped at seven years, the offer ran as 
follows: ‘But if any Insure for Four Years, the Discount for Paying down the Money, is 
three Years and a Quarter; and Five, for Seven Years Insurance.’86 A discount bound 
the parties together. 
The Sun competed in a wide field on the basis of its identity and marketing. Unlike 
the Insurance Office’s, its publicity did not create a narrative with which to create a 
reputation and undermine its rivals.87 Instead its news-sheet the British Mercury forged 
positive associations for the brand in its early years. However, the Sun did use the 
strategy of a discount to secure commitment. The early-nineteenth-century Proposals 
advised: ‘PERSONS MAY INSURE FOR MORE YEARS THAN ONE, not exceeding 
Seven; and, in such Case, there will be an Abatement of Six-Pence in the Pound per 
Annum, on the Premiums agreed for, for every Year except the first’.88 Policy holders 
were reminded of the offer when they renewed.89 The Sun maintained its ‘Discount on 
Premiums’ in the early twentieth century on ‘Non-hazardous Property’.90 It used a small 
chart to show how the discount increased as a proportion with each additional year of 
insurance. (See Illustration 3.52.) It explained the concept thus, in the same manner as 
had the Insurance Office: ‘a policy for seven years is granted for six years’ premium.’91  
 
                                                
84 For example, Fire Office, A Table (1682): ‘to Discount by way of Purchase; that is, Five Years 
Paid down for Seven Years Insurance, Seven, for Eleven; Ten, for Twenty-One; Eleven, for 
Thirty-One.’ 
85 Fire Office, Propositions, p. 1, rejected annual insurance: ‘because it would be both 
troublesom and chargeable to collect the Money yearly, in small sums, of so great a number of 
persons; therefore it is proposed the Moneys should be paid down for the whole time they 
insure’. 
86 Fire Office, A Table (1700). 
87 In 1806, a Sun manager intended to write a pamphlet against a new rival, the Albion Fire 
Office. But the ‘General Meeting think it very impolitic to enter into any literary contention with 
other fire offices’, 8 January 1806, LMA, CLC/B/192/B/001/MS11931/008. 
88 Sun Fire Office, June 14, 1804 … Proposals. The passage continued: ‘In a Common 
Insurance of £1000 for Seven Years, the Premiums to be paid, by the Table [of Rates], will be 
Seven Pounds, in which the Six-Pence in the Pound per Annum is to be deducted for the last 
Six Years, that is, Three Shillings and Six-Pence per Annum, which amounts to One Pound One 
Shilling, and reduces the Sum to be paid to Five Pounds Nineteen Shillings, and the same in 
Proportion for any other Sum or Number of Years’. 
89 Sun Fire Office, renewal letter-form, 7 December 1804: ‘You may insure for any Number of 
Years, not exceeding seven, and a Discount will be allowed in such Case’. Sun Fire Office, 
receipt, dated 24 June 1801, LMA, CLC/B/192/DD/008/MS38828/001, p.24: ‘This OFFICE 
Insures for any number of years, not exceeding Seven, and will allow after the rate of 2l. 10s. 
per cent. per annum discount, according to the number of years the parties are inclined to 
insure for.’ 
90 Sun Insurance Office, renewal notice (1906), Hillingdon, MC25C/SF1/1570/1/3/1: ‘A Discount 
on Premiums according to the following Scales can generally be allowed on Insurances of Non-
hazardous Property for two or more years, paid in advance’. 
91 Sun Insurance Office, Proposal for Fire Insurance, leaflet-form (1906). 
 116 
The Insurance Office’s authenticity 
In their opposition to the Corporation of the City of London’s scheme, the men of the 
Insurance Office sought to bolster their Office’s reputation by making strident claims 
about its authenticity. They were the ‘Authors of the Designe’ of fire insurance.92 ‘[T]he 
City of LONDON’, they wrote, ‘endeavour to Set Up the Insuring of Houses from fire, 
by the Invention of Other Persons’. Their status as the authors gave them 
credentials; it made them deserving of readers’ support. Moreover, they presented the 
matter as one not only of imitation but stealing, drawing a comparison with copyright: 
‘since the Printing of another mans Copy, is called by the same Name, as Wrongfully 
taking his Goods’.93 The Corporation had ‘taken the Pattern from the Insurance 
Office’.94 As a result, the men of the Insurance Office claimed to have been ‘Injured’. 
The issue of authorship was evidently one that mattered to the audience. The 
Corporation’s writer reversed the accusation: ‘This I cannot but smile at, because ’tis so 
notorious … they have borrowed this Design from the City, though they have the face 
to deny it, and ascribe it to themselves.’95 In his next pamphlet, the same writer 
intensified his point: ‘they have done just as if a man should filch away a piece of Plate 
from his Neighbour, and setting his own Mark upon it, should impudently vouch himself 
to be the right and lawful owner of it.’96 In 1684, when the Insurance Office’s backers 
moved against the Friendly Society, they tried to draw their Office’s authenticity not 
from their being the inventors but from their greater experience: ‘The Older the Fire 
Office, The Better’.97 
 
The Sun’s longevity 
The Sun came to characterise its reputation by its age. Already within its first century, it 
asserted that it was ‘the first that attempted the Insurance of Goods, and that of 
Houses, beyond the Limits of the Bills of Mortality’.98 Its track record was a reason to 
trust the Office: ‘having ever since punctually discharged all Claims on them; therefore, 
the Public have continued a suitable Encouragement to this Office’. By the twentieth 
century, it could package itself as ‘the oldest Insurance Company in the world’. The 
proof of its worth was ‘the acknowledged stability of the Company’ and ‘the well-known 
character which it has obtained for a just and prompt discharge of all Claims made 
                                                
92 Fire Office, Observations, p. 1. 
93 Fire Office, To the Right Honourable the Lord Mayor. 
94 Fire Office, Observations, p. 1. 
95 L. R., To my Honoured Friend Mr M.T., p. 4. 
96 L. R., Second Letter to his Honoured Friend Mr M.T., p. 1. 
97 Barbon, Letter to a Gentleman in the Country, p. 3. Already, against the Corporation of the 
City of London, the Insurance Office had hailed its ‘Maturer Deliberations’: Fire Office, Enquiry, 
p. 1. At the same time, it highlighted the novelty of the project; so delicate that it was at risk of 
ruin. 
98 Sun Fire Office, June 14, 1804 … Proposals. 
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upon it during an existence of ONE HUNDRED AND NINETY-SIX YEARS’.99 The 
renewal leaflet on which this appeared, turned the Office’s age into an important 
number, similar to the value of its fund. The number merited typographical expression. 
In this instance it was stated in spacious capitals in the middle of the page, set apart 
from the main text by empty space. (See Illustration 3.53.) When the Office passed its 
bicentenary, its age was emblazoned on company stationery in red – even for 
departments that were new, such as accident – and in advertisements.100 (See 
Illustrations 3.54 and 3.55.) 
The Sun’s ongoing use of its eighteenth-century engraving of firemen slowly 
transformed it into a pictorial evocation of the company’s age. The Sun retained the 
illustration because it was part of its identity. It held recognition value. But the longer 
the Sun used this same illustration (with touch-ups for new impressions), the more it 
pointed out its long company story. By the twentieth century, the illustration’s 
antiquated appearance was an expression of the years of the company’s reputation. It 
portrayed the historic clothing and out-dated tools of the trade at the company’s 
founding, in an outmoded drawing technique. The composition was now set on the 
policy in a frame, which attached to a label containing the company’s founding year. 
The setting carried the suggestion that the picture had hung on the wall of the Office 
since its founding. (See Illustration 3.39.) The illustration now made an emotional and 
nostalgic connection between the Office and the viewer. 
By reproducing the illustration over time, the Sun created a narrative on top of that 
depicted in the scene: that of the Sun’s history. By the twentieth century, its history had 
been pored over by a former Secretary and written up in industry journals.101 The 
company’s knowledge of its history became part of its marketing. The original policy 
engraving of the composition graced one leaflet, with the caption ‘Copied from Policy 
dated 1726’, and followed by ‘The Oldest Insurance Office in the World’.102 (See 
Illustration 3.56, and compare the illustration there to that on Illustration 3.50.) In 1910, 
the company took the opportunity of its 200th anniversary to publicise this history: there 
were illustrated advertisements in newspapers, an article by The Times and a short 
                                                
99 Sun Insurance Office, renewal notice (1906). Sun Insurance Office, Proposal for Fire 
Insurance, leaflet-form (1906), p. [1]: ‘The oldest insurance office in the world … THE SUN 
FIRE OFFICE has stood the test of well-nigh two centuries, and is the oldest Insurance 
Company in the world.’ 
100 The advertisements will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
101 Relton, Account of the Fire Insurance Companies; Insurance and Financial Gazette (1885), 
extracted in LMA, CLC/B/192/DD/034/MS38846. 
102 Sun Insurance Office, Fire Renewal Notice (1909) and Sun Insurance Office, Fire Renewal 
Notice (c. 1912), Hillingdon, MC25C/SF1/1570/1/3/1. 
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history by another former Secretary.103 In marketing itself, its longevity became the 
Sun’s most significant point of differentiation from other insurance companies. This was 
a credential. 
 
A good reputation is a component of a trusted entity; like trust itself, it is difficult to pin 
down. This section has extracted the different associations that the Insurance Office 
and the Sun made for themselves and pointed out the different ways they did so in 
print. In the period under examination here, the Insurance Office had to style itself from 
scratch. It used narrative and debate to do so. By contrast, the Sun came to use its age 
to reinforce its character, conveyed numerically and by the constancy of its illustration 
of firemen. The passing of time allowed this illustration to express the company’s 
stability as well as its protection.  
 
Transparency 
Transparency was a quality that both the Insurance Office and the Sun Fire Office 
expressed in print at their opening. The Insurance Office’s Propositions transmitted 
transparency by its systematic elucidation of each aspect of the project’s design for 
insuring houses. Moreover, it set in train a consultation period in which to receive 
feedback on that design: ‘that if any objections should in that time arise, they might be 
answered, if possible, or otherwise prevented’.104 In the sheets that followed, the Office 
capitalised on this openness. Its backers broadcast that the settlement of the Office 
had been formed by ‘Publick Meetings’, ‘General Meetings, upon Publick Notice’, 
‘debate’ and ‘scrutiny’.105 There had been ‘Deliberation’ and ‘Regulation’. The Office’s 
books could be ‘Examined’. The rental of the estates in security ‘are to be seen at the 
Office, by all Persons that desire to see them’.106  
The Insurance Office’s openness to comment and criticism suggests a willingness to 
show vulnerability, a quality which can help build trust. The Office’s proposers 
introduced the possibility of ‘objections’ in order to show themselves willing to listen to 
them, ‘for the better settling and carrying on this Design’.107 They admitted to their own 
shortcomings: ‘If it meets with Opposition from Objections, such as only time and 
                                                
103 ‘Sun Fire Office’ advertisement in The Times, 1 June 1910, p. 21;  ‘The Bicentenary of the 
Sun Fire Office 1710–1910’, in The Times, 2 June 1910, p. 9; Edward Baumer, The Early Days 
of the Sun Fire Office (London: J. Causton, 1910). 
104 Fire Office, Propositions, p. 2. 
105 Fire Office, September the 16th, p. 1. 
106 Fire Office, [Advertisement] from the Insurance-Office. 
107 Fire Office, Propositions, p. 2. 
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experience of the Office can answer’, they would revise the design.108 They publicised 
the objections that ensued and the resulting modifications to the design.109   
When it opened in 1710, the Sun Fire Office did not echo the Insurance Office’s 
discursive disposition. It used formal means by which to explain its workings, in the 
Articles that comprised its Proposals. (See Illustrations 3.21 and 3.22.) The Sun did not 
escape the obligation to be transparent by explanation of itself: the Proposals format 
remained into the early nineteenth century. (See Illustrations 3.23 and 3.24.) By the 
1820s, the Articles were printed on the back of each policy, which is how they were 
presented in the early twentieth century. (See Illustration 3.57.)  
The Sun’s publication of a news-sheet, the British Mercury, promoted the company’s 
openness in its opening years. Delivered regularly to policy holders, the British Mercury 
allowed the insurers to keep in touch with the insured, with notification of meetings and 
about premiums at the end of its news stories. With the demise of its newspaper in the 
1730s, the Sun’s strategy of openness dissolved. It was only in 1891 that the company, 
having become public, was obliged to open its accounts. Until then, its books were 
strictly for internal consumption only. As a result of the change, the Office published a 
Report of the Directors annually, a formal expression of transparency.110 
 
Transparency by numbers 
The section above on ‘Security’ argued that numbers authenticated the Offices’ 
statements about this quality. Numbers in print also represented the transparent nature 
of these businesses. The Insurance Office marshalled as supporting evidence for its 
scheme the number of houses in London, the number of fires in London in the past and 
the cost of losses from those fires. The Office set a clear limit on the number of policies 
it would sell, in proportion to its security. It explained to its audience the value by which 
insured houses might increase. Meanwhile, the price of insurance and the amount that 
could be claimed for losses were the product’s essential numbers. The three fire offices 
that existed at the turn of the eighteenth century, were apparently transparent about 
the number of policy holders they comprised as each put it in print. The policy number 
was itself transparent in this regard as it denoted a running total. 
The Insurance Office further demonstrated its transparency by the calculations that 
it made in its prose: ‘Computations’ as it knowingly referred to them. The Office gave 
this explanation for the price of insurance:  
                                                
108 Fire Office, Propositions, p. 2. 
109 See fn. 62. 
110 For example, Sun Insurance Office (Fire), Report of the Directors, 1897, LMA, 
CLC/B/192/B/003/MS15030/001. 
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in a Brick House of fifty pound per Ann. of the second Rate: Ten pounds, the fifth part of fifty 
pound, being deducted the value of the Ground, the remainder is forty pound, for which six 
pence per. pound being paid for Insurance makes 20s. a year.111  
The insurers showed off their confidence with sums.112 They directed this wizardry 
against the competition: in his pamphlet against the Friendly Society, Nicholas Barbon 
examined his Office’s ‘Policy Books’, its ‘Profits and Loss’, in order to make 
calculations and draw conclusions regarding his rival’s likely failure.113 In his riposte, 
Henry Spelman of the Friendly Society mocked Barbon’s flamboyant but empty 
expertise: 
As for your Discoveries that a Thousand Hundred to One, makes One Hundred Thousand to 
One, and that Four times Eight makes Two and thirty, with a great deal more I cannot tell to 
what purpose, I thank you for it; but I know not at present what use to make of it, but will 
remember it if Occasion serve hereafter.114 
In the early twentieth century, the Sun trumpeted the value of property that it 
insured, in order to prove itself ‘The Largest London Insurers’ in its marketing to new 
customers.115 By that century, comparative numbers like these had long engaged a 
dedicated audience of financial specialists. For the previous twenty-five years, such 
figures were compiled to provide statistics about the fire insurance industry as a whole, 
taking into account ‘Premiums’, ‘Losses paid’ and ‘Expenses of management’, among 
other measurements.116 These kinds of numbers allowed insurance companies to be 
compared, for both specialist and general audiences.117 The Sun Insurance Office’s 
Report of the Directors, published annually after 1891, was a compilation of figures and 
sums extracted from the year’s business, fringed with minimal prose.118 This genre 
shows how expressions of transparency had morphed, from openness to formal 
conventions. In Chapter 5, we will consider how the fire offices put people’s names in 
print in order to evoke the quality of transparency. Before that, the next chapter 
                                                
111 Fire Office, Propositions, p. 2. 
112 See, for example, the argument against the Corporation’s calculations of a profit, in Fire 
Office, Enquiry, p. 3: ‘So that the Profit to the City from Insuring Twelve Thousand Houses, will 
Arise thus. The Premium of Twelve Thousand Houses, as appears before, is Fifty One 
Thousand Five Hundred Pounds, which by interest at Six per Cent, makes Three Thousand 
One Hundred Pounds per Annum; Deduct the Loss at One Thousand Three Hundred Pounds 
per Annum; and charge of the Office at One Thousand Pounds per Annum, which makes Two 
Thousand Three Hundred Pounds; then there remains Eight Hundred Pounds per Annum 
Profit.’ 
113 Barbon, Letter to a Gentleman in the Country, p. 2. 
114 Spelman, An Answer to a Letter, p. 4. 
115 Sun Fire Office, Proposal for Fire Insurance, leaflet-form (1906), p. [2]. 
116 ‘Fire Insurance Business, 1877–8 to 1902–3’, a reprint from the Finance Chronicle, October 
15 and November 16, 1903, in a Sun scrapbook, LMA, CLC/B/192/DD/011/MS15050. 
117 A typed list of fire offices, showing ‘London Business in millions for the year 1898’, ‘London 
Business in millions for the year 1899’ and ‘Increase or Decrease’, in a Sun scrapbook, LMA, 
CLC/B/192/DD/011/MS15050. 
118 Sun Insurance Office (Fire), Report of the Directors, 1897. 
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discusses the graphic techniques that contributed to transparency, for example the 
arrangement of the figures discussed here in lists and tables. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has set out how over the course of nearly two and a half centuries fire 
offices used print to express four qualities of trust. In print fire offices associated 
themselves and their product with security and transparency. They furnished 
themselves with an identity and they shaped reputations that would secure loyalty. 
When Airbnb emphasises safety on its platform and Projects by If seeks to promote 
data security, there is a long history to these motifs. For fire offices, print was the 
vehicle by which to articulate these motifs in words. But this rhetoric cannot be 
separated from the visual rhetoric on the printed page. These words worked with 
graphics: the formal qualities of numbers visually confirmed the talk of security and 
conveyed transparency. Fear-mongering scenarios depicted in words by the Insurance 
Office came to be drawn by engraving in the Sun’s hands. Company names were not 
neutral on the page: their position and typography were chosen to give them 
prominence. They had a visual dimension. Thereby print reified the name, which in turn 
reified the company itself. Once a name was in print, it could accrue attributes. 
Because of the language and layout of printed matter, readers might trust fire 
insurance companies. 
In elucidating these qualities of trust, this chapter has conducted a new kind of 
graphic design analysis, one centred on trust and one which integrates the form with 
the content. The chapter shows that in short-form print of the kind produced by fire 
offices, the look of text on the page matters. Even when a typesetter had limited 
choices, language performs visually. This argument is two-fold. Layout worked in tune 
with particular expressions in the text. Furthermore, the roots of subsequent graphics 
lay in earlier statements made with words. The Sun built on the expression of qualities 
laid down by the Insurance Office. These qualities ran through time and between 
companies. They took different forms over time.  
The sampling of different periods of print has made these nuances visible. Despite 
their obvious visual differences, early twentieth-century print has shed light on 
seventeenth-century predecessors. They share fundamental components, as part of a 
continuum. The juxtaposition enables the realisation of the repetition of the notion of 
security and of how it travelled from words to illustration. The Sun’s illustration itself 
picked up meaning as it travelled. It becomes clear that it was important for the 
Insurance Office to emphasise its name just as for the Sun. The method of close-
looking at these sheets reveals the significance of repetition not only through time but 
within a particular time. The Insurance Office’s texts repeat its name. The Sun repeated 
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its emblem and its illustration. The method of looking at the articulation of words on the 
page necessitates the large number of illustrations. 
This chapter began with the knockabout by the Corporation of the City of London’s 
cheerleader that the Insurance Office was a rotten building that his words could pull 
down. L. R.’s irony called into question the trustworthiness of what the Insurance 
Office’s promoters said in print, and therefore the realness and the legitimacy of the 
Insurance Office. The Insurance Office’s promoters made their own claims to 
trustworthiness, realness and legitimacy on the basis that their fund in land was ‘Real 
and Certain’. As a project, fire insurance faced the problem of its own lack of existence; 
there was no proof of concept. Moreover, by its nature it was a product without material 
form, formed of intangibles. As I see it, these facts enlarged the burden of the 
enterprise to cultivate trust. Print filled a gap: it gave it substance both by its physical 
material and by the qualities of trust that it expressed. For these reasons, it looks like 
fire offices, in the way that they created corporate identities, may have extended and 
substantiated ways of using print that made them the forerunners of brands. Fire 
offices bore names that were unrelated to the individuals that ran them, that evoked 
their business or their constitution, but increasingly in imaginative rather than literal 
ways (compare the Phoenix and the Sun as names to the South Sea Company). Their 
names related to symbols and illustrations. Competition between offices encouraged 
these identities. 
The next chapter extends this line of analysis which construes print as the material 
support to fire insurance’s immaterial product. It isolates the graphic technologies by 
which means print built trust. These technologies correspond to the designs, 
mechanisms and patterns illuminated by Part I. In what follows, they are conceived as 
affordances of print. They served to reinforce the qualities of trust outlined here, and 
thereby knit together insurance company, customers and investors. 
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Chapter 4: The Graphic Technologies of Trust 
 
As Part I brought to light, the comparable terms ‘mechanism’ and ‘pattern’ have a 
currency within contemporary design in its engagement with trust. Engineers at Airbnb 
have credited certain mechanisms with engendering reputation on the home-renting 
platform. Projects by If oversees a catalogue of patterns that solve particular problems 
of trust in digital environments. The design studio hopes fellow designers will draw from 
this catalogue to build services that earn their users’ trust. The terms mechanism and 
pattern denote repeatable devices that can be isolated, copied, re-used and shared. In 
both perspectives, there exist such pieces of technology that can cultivate trust.  
Adapting this notion from Airbnb and Projects by If, this chapter identifies the 
technologies of trust by which insurance companies used print to build trust. From one 
period to the next, the fire offices shared the same technologies. Print afforded these 
technologies by means of its graphic and material properties. This chapter begins by 
categorising entire printed objects in these terms, then it singles out specific features of 
printed objects, and finally it examines elements of the page as laid out by graphic 
design. The literary theorist Walter Ong’s made the argument that writing is a 
technology that restructures thought.1 This chapter pinpoints his argument on print, in 
order to illuminate the specific capacities of the printed layout. Ong wrote that texts are 
‘thing-like’. The section here on ‘Graphic objects’ shows how print can emphasise this 
effect.2 To re-apply Ong, these printed objects ‘embed the word in space’; accordingly, 
the chapter’s section ‘Graphic devices’ pulls apart the particular, self-contained aspects 
of a graphic object.3 Ong pointed out the ‘visual organisation’ and ‘effective retrieval’ 
that writing made possible, exemplified by the list in particular.4 The section ‘Graphic 
design’ considers the utilisation of the page’s space. This terminology puts the 
emphasis on function. 
All these were technologies of trust in that they worked to develop qualities of trust 
with the people with whom companies communicated: investors and early adopters, 
policy holders and potential policy holders, and their own employees. For the 
technologies isolated here were formative not only of the companies’ external 
interactions but also for their internal practices. The chapter examines how these 
technologies worked and how they were re-used, from the Insurance Office in the late 
                                                
1 Walter J. Ong, ‘Writing is a Technology that Restructures Thought’ in Gerd Baumann, ed., The 
Written Word: Literacy in Transition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). 
2 Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (London: Methuen, 1982), 
p. 100. Also, Jack Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind (Cambridge University Press, 
1977).  
3 Ong, Orality and Literacy, p. 123. 
4 Ibid., p. 124. 
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seventeenth century to the Sun Fire Office in the early nineteenth century to the Sun 
Insurance Office in the early twentieth century. The focus is on the technologies that 
endured from the Insurance Office’s time, for they became the expected and familiar 
materialisations of the fire insurance product. The product depended on repeating, 
graphic formulas.5 
The designers at Projects by If have facilitated the sharing of design patterns. Their 
attitude contrasts with that of the men of the Insurance Office who argued that their fire 
insurance scheme comprised a proprietary piece of intellectual property, like any 
‘Labour of the Brain’.6 These men accused their rival, the Corporation of the City of 
London, of having ‘taken the Pattern from the Insurance Office’.7 In the pamphlets 
that the supporters of the Insurance Office and the Corporation of the City of London 
exchanged, each side likened its fire office to a physical thing that had been stolen. For 
the Insurance Office, the comparison was with books that contained copyright; for the 
Corporation, ‘a piece of Plate’.8 In both cases, the comparison was to an object with 
weight. As a product, fire insurance inherently lacked mass. The technologies identified 
in this chapter gave it weight. They anchored it, by design. Thus they gave its buyers, 
and those who worked in it, something to hold on to. But these technologies can also 




Two types of printed object were fundamental both to the Insurance Office and the 
Sun. This section examines the origins of this pair, how they evolved and how they 
functioned within the business. These printed objects were made to build trust between 
the insurance company and its policy holders. One was the form which cemented the 
insurance purchase. The other was the vehicle of explanation; in one era to define to a 
reader what they could buy, in another era to define to a purchaser what they had 
bought. 
 
                                                
5 For Ong’s discussion of formulas, see ibid., p. 34. 
6 Fire Office, To the Right Honourable the Lord Mayor … The Proposals of the Gentlemen of the 
Insurance Office is humbly Offered [1681]. 
7 Fire Office, Observations on the Proposals of the City to Insure Houses in Case of Fire (1681), 
p. 1. In 1684, they sought letters patent to gain a monopoly on fire insurance, against the 
Friendly Society. 
8 Fire Office, To the Right Honourable the Lord Mayor: ‘since the Printing of another mans 
Copy, is called by the same Name, as Wrongfully taking his Goods: And if the Reason is, 
because the Bookseller (by Purchase) has a Property; The Argument is the same to the First 
Inventor’; L. R., A Second Letter to his Honoured Friend Mr M.T. one of the Committee Chosen 
by the Common Council of London for the Insuring of Houses from Fire (1682).  
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Policy 
The Insurance Office and the Sun employed a printed form to record their agreement 
with a customer. The men of the Insurance Office set a precedent for this purpose, 
which the Sun retained in its essential characteristics, notwithstanding the changes in 
the text from the seventeenth century to the twentieth century. The Insurance Office’s 
Propositions first referred to this printed form as the ‘Form of a Note or Policy’. 
Thereafter it was simply the policy, which was the contemporary nomenclature for 
agreements in marine insurance.9 Subsequent fire offices used the same term, often 
specified as fire policy. By contrast, the Corporation of the City of London had referred 
to its printed form of agreement as an indenture. 
The policy was a form in two senses of today’s use of the word. It was ‘the 
customary or legal method of drawing up a writing or document’ but it was also ‘a 
formulary document with blanks for the insertion of particulars’.10 As the historian 
Naomi Tadmor has outlined, the phenomenon of forms – in both senses – grew in 
England from the sixteenth century, at the behest of the state.11 Tadmor explains that 
‘the latter decades of the seventeenth century saw considerable expansion’ in the 
production of printed blanks. There arose printed bonds for marriage and other types of 
agreement, printed receipts for the hearth tax and other purposes both official and 
commercial, printed customs forms and, by the end of the century, printed exchequer 
bills and the Bank of England’s ‘running cash notes’.12 However, it was not until the 
middle of the nineteenth century that ‘form’ took the specific meaning of a printed 
blank, denoting a document that needed to be filled in. Despite this, both meanings are 
used in what follows.  
The Insurance Office’s policy was a printed form with blank spaces to absorb the 
purchaser’s name, a description of the property insured, the day’s date, the sum paid 
and the sum up to which the buyer might receive, and a policy number. Each form was 
authorised by the signatures of the representatives of the insurance company, 
endorsed by the company’s seal, and witnesses to that authority. (See Illustration 4.1.) 
The Sun’s policy forms in the early nineteenth century and in the early twentieth 
century demanded the same bites of information in their blank spaces. (See 
Illustrations 4.2 and 4.3.) They spoke in the same legalese prose as had the Insurance 
Office’s, which contrasted with the companies’ plain language in publicity material.  
                                                
9 The document referred to itself as an ‘instrument or policy’. 
10 "form, n." OED Online, Oxford University Press, September 2019, 
www.oed.com/view/Entry/73421. Accessed 21 November 2019. I owe the wisdom of this 
distinction to Naomi Tadmor, 'The Settlement of the Poor and the Rise of the Form in England c. 
1662–1780', Past and Present, 236:1 (2017), 43–97 (p. 81). 
11 Tadmor, 'The Settlement of the Poor’, pp. 52–55. 
12 Exchequer bill, dated 5 June 1697, LMA, CLC/305/MS02834; Bank of England, running cash 
note, dated 24 January 1699, Bank of England I/008. 
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There were differences in how purchasers received their policies. Buyers to the 
Insurance Office left the office with a signed policy.13 Initially they could buy a policy 
with a time span of up to thirty-one years. Whereas, from 1714, purchasers to the Sun 
took delivery of their policies once it had been written up by a clerk in the London 
Office.14 Polices carried stamp duty; by the mid eighteenth century, the Sun’s 
customers also paid a surcharge for a new policy.15 Customers could renew their 
policies annually but receipts replaced the need for a new policy document unless they 
altered their circumstances. The evidence suggests the Sun was the first fire office to 
introduce receipts for payments; thereby it begat a new pattern to sit alongside that of 
the policy.16 
The policy was the foundational and fundamental piece of text by which the 
Insurance Office and the Sun sold their product. When each Office made its first 
announcements to the public, it trailed the text of its policy. In 1680, the Insurance 
Office’s Propositions ended with three specimen texts for its ‘Form of a Note or Policy’, 
to accord with different types of cover. The specimen texts were set in italics to mark 
them out as templates and to give them the ‘appearance of the formal engraved 
letter’.17 (See Illustration 4.4.) Their inclusion demonstrated the undertakers’ 
transparency and credibility. The specimens allowed readers to judge the project for 
themselves. They were proof. With the announcement of the opening of the Insurance 
Office over a year later, its supporters once again drew attention to this foundational 
text: ‘The Form of the Policy was also Settled by the Councel’. The final version was 
largely the same as first promoted. When its managers launched the Sun Fire Office in 
1710, they too foregrounded the policy. The Sun Fire Office’s Proposals began with 
reference to the policy, ‘in Form as is hereafter specified’, and ended with its text in 
italics below a centred title, ‘The Policy’.18 (See Illustration 4.5.) Both Offices used their 
promotional formats to acclimatise potential buyers to the document that defined them. 
                                                
13 Fire Office, September the 16th, 1681. An Advertisement from the Insurance-Office for 
Houses, &c (1681), p. 1: ‘Persons…will Attend every Day at their Office…to Subscribe Policies’. 
14 Francis Boyer Relton, An Account of the Fire Insurance Companies Associations Institutions 
Projects and Schemes Established and Projected in Great Britain and Ireland during the 17th 
and 18th Centuries, including the Sun Fire Office: Also of Charles Povey, the Projector of that 
Office, his Writings and Schemes (London: Sonnenschein, 1893), p. 365. 
15 Sun Fire Office, July 9, 1741. Proposals from the Sun Fire-Office, near the Royal Exchange, 
for Insuring Houses, and Other Buildings, Goods, Wares and Merchandize, from Loss and 
Damage by Fire (1741), Article III: ‘all Persons are to deposite 7s. 6d. for the Policy, Stamp-
Duty and Mark’. This charge ended in the late nineteenth century, as did stamp duty. 
16 Relton, Account of the Fire Insurance Companies, p. 375: ‘As far as we are aware, the Sun 
was the first Office which adopted the use of Renewal Receipts’. 
17 John Lewis, Printed Ephemera: The Changing Uses of Type and Letterforms in English and 
American Printing (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Antique Collector’s Club, 1990), p. 34. 
18 Sun Fire Office, From the Sun-Fire-Office, April the 10th, 1710. Proposals Set Forth by the 
Company of London-Insurers, for Insuring Houses, Moveable Goods, Merchandizes, Furniture 
and Wares, from Loss and Damage by Fire (1710), p. [2]. 
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The form was proof not only as text but by its graphic and material form. In each 
period it was a document of stature: made of large, heavy paper, with decorative 
printed elements. It carried an office’s markers of authenticity: the personal signatures 
of its representatives and its own ‘common’ seal in wax. The promotional material of 
both the Insurance Office and the Sun clarified this.19 The Offices invested in their 
policies’ construction as an object, which underlined their investment in it as a text. The 
Insurance Office commissioned an elegant copperplate engraving. Because it was an 
engraving, the policy used a heavy weight of paper, and it was large at 267 mm by 419 
mm.20 This document was designed to hang around – it was obliged to do so for thirty-
one years.21 Its qualities differentiated it from the many ephemeral sheets the Office 
generated in the anticipation of its opening.  
The Insurance Office’s policy also had weight because it imitated recognisable legal 
formats. The shape of its text bears comparison with bonds of the time. The formats 
share in containing a rectangular piece of text followed by a balance between on the 
right, signatories with their seals, and on the left, witnesses to the signatures.22 (See 
Illustration 4.1, compared to Illustrations 4.6 and 4.7.) As was common in engraved 
bonds, the engraver cut the letters such that they were reminiscent of a clerk’s 
handwriting in a unique document rather than the reality of a mass-produced form. The 
fire policy looks like an adaptation of that existing pattern.23 The Insurance Office’s 
proposers had repeatedly broadcast their consultation of lawyers. The policy 
represented that. It used the materials appropriate for a legal agreement. The 
company’s novelty depended on an instrument that looked familiar.  
                                                
19 Fire Office, A Table of the Insurance Office at the Back-side of the Royal-Exchange (1683): 
‘Any Two of them Sealing, make good the Pollicy [sic].’ Sun Fire Office, From the Sun-Fire-
Office, April the 10th, 1710. Proposals: ‘a Policy sign’d by Three or more of the Members of the 
Company of London-Insurers, and seal’d with the Company’s Common Seal’. 
20 Engravings required a heavy weight of paper in order to take the heavy impression of the 
copperplate. See John Bidwell, ‘French Paper in English Books’, John Barnard and D. F. 
McKenzie, with Maureen Bell, eds, The Cambridge History of the Book in Britain Volume 4, 
1557–1695 (Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 583–601 (p. 586). John Vernon, The 
Compleat Compting-House; Or, the Young Lad ... Instructed ... in All the Mysteries of a 
Merchant (London, 1678), p. 143, described a marine policy as ‘a Sheet of large Paper written, 
(but now of late days they print them) that doth express the Name of the person that causes 
himself to be Ensured, and that names the Place he Ensures for, the Ship, the Masters Name, 
the Sum of Money, the Dangers you are Ensured from, and how long that lasteth; with the 
Name of the Party that Ensures, or underwrites this Policy for you.’ The text of the model that 
Vernon provides (pp. 144–147), however, is quite different to the Insurance Office’s. 
21 The proportion of buyers that bought the longest available term for an Insurance Office policy 
when it was available, is not known. Of the dozen policies that are documented in existence up 
to 1682, all but three are for the thirty-one years. Of course, the longevity of the policy would 
have increased the likelihood of the survival of the document. 
22 Bond, dated 1683, LMA, E/PYM/015; bond, dated 1693, LSE, Clayton 3 C-COR (22/4/6). 
23 Miranda Clow, ‘From Nothing to Something: The Making of the Sun Fire Office in the 
Eighteenth Century’ (MA thesis, Royal College of Art, 2013). 
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The Insurance Office’s policy combined the look of the familiar with details that were 
its own. Two features prevented it from looking generic. First, its subject stood out with 
the word ‘Insurance’ in the first line, and ‘Insuring of Houses against Fire’ in the 
seventh line, cut in a size larger than the text beside it. (See Illustration 4.8.) Secondly, 
‘Number’ stood at the top inside a flourish. Both details specified the document to its 
purpose. The flourish around ‘Number’ made the document difficult to forge and it gave 
it a decorative frisson. The care taken in the making of the Insurance Office’s policy is 
evident in the contrast with another, similar agreement document commissioned by the 
office in the 1690s. It was printed by letterpress on narrower, lighter paper, and gave 
no ornament to ‘Number’.24 (See Illustration 4.9.)  
The Sun Fire Office’s managers highlighted the objecthood of their office’s policy. A 
person ‘took out a Policy’.25 At its establishment, the Sun’s policy was printed by 
letterpress on heavy foolscap paper, which at 200 mm by 330 mm was larger than its 
contemporaneous promotional material. When in 1710 the Sun’s Proposals quoted the 
policy’s text, they rendered in black letter those phrases that were so in the genuine 
document. Thus the Proposals imitated the policy as closely as possible. (See 
Illustration 4.10, compared to Illustration 4.5.) This close copying attempted to prove 
the document in its graphic qualities, because the materialisation of the text mattered. 
In the early nineteenth century, the Proposals presented the policy as a living object: it 
had to be signed and endorsed as necessary.26 The Sun’s policy aped the shape of the 
Insurance Office’s but used a cheaper printing technique. The choice of letterpress is 
an indication that this process had become more acceptable for legal agreements. It 
also reflects the unlimited number of policies that the new office hoped to sell.27  
The Sun’s managers used print technology to dress up their office’s policy 
progressively. In 1725, they ordered ‘that the Policies be on larger paper and from a 
copper plate, with the Sun designed on the Topp’.28 As a result, an engraved illustration 
became the policy’s centrepiece.29 It measured 134 mm by 94 mm, the size of a 
postcard. The document’s text remained printed by letterpress but the transformation 
                                                
24 This agreement committed policy holders to mutual insurance. As a result, policy holders 
would be obliged to contribute if the Office required it due to losses. This agreement was 
prosaic. 
25 Sun Fire Office, From the Sun-Fire-Office, April the 10th, 1710. Proposals, p. [1]. 
26 Sun Fire Office, July 7, 1808. Sun Fire-Office, Cornhill, near the Royal-Exchange, and at 
Craig’s Court, Charing-Cross. Proposals for Insuring Houses, and Other Buildings, Goods, 
Wares and Merchandise, and Ships in Harbour, in Dock, or Building, and Craft, from Loss and 
Damage by Fire (1808), Articles I and IX. 
27 Engraving plates wear out after fewer than five thousand impressions. 
28 Quoted from minutes by Relton, Account of the Fire Insurance Companies, p. 366. 
29 The illustration looks to have been etched and engraved. Both are intaglio techniques, on a 
piece of metal. 
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saw the sheet grow to 275 mm by 420 mm to accommodate the additional element.30 
(See Illustration 4.11.) The illustration made the document instantly identifiable to the 
Sun and arrayed it with a feature that added value; for engravings cost consumers 
money, whether in books or sold individually.31 The combination of the two printing 
processes on a single piece of paper – one intaglio, the other relief  – was rare.32 It 
increased the sheet’s production time and production costs.  
In 1748, the Sun commissioned a new engraving, which sat on a slightly bigger 
sheet.33 It was similar in composition, size and position, but conceived and worked 
more skilfully than its predecessor. In the early nineteenth century, the same engraving 
was positioned in the top quarter of the sheet, which had grown again to 292 mm by 
457 mm.34 At the turn of the twentieth century, the same engraving remained the focus 
of the Sun’s policy but it was now attended by the name and other information about 
the company. These additions intensified the specialness of the object as they were set 
in an array of different typefaces and sizes of type available in the period, consuming 
the top third of the sheet.35 The huge choice offered by the print technology of the 
period allowed this but the inclination to make the policy a special object was long 
engrained.  
In other ways too, the Sun’s managers ensured that the office’s policy made an 
impact. In the nineteenth century, the illustration was situated with the folds of the 
paper in mind: the sheet unfolded such that the illustration was immediately apparent. 
(See Illustration 4.12.) The managers also considered how the object reached the 
insured. In 1804 there was a re-design to the Proposals such that they could be used 
as the branded packaging for a policy and sent either straight to the policy holder or to 
the local agent, who would deliver it directly. For this, the Proposals’ text was squeezed 
on to one side of its sheet. The sun emblem which had been on its front for the life of 
the Office was moved to its reverse. The policy could be folded into the pouch of the 
Proposals, leaving the emblem to fill the space that faced the viewer. (See Illustration 
                                                
30 Sun Fire Office, policy, dated 1726, Bodleian Library, John Johnson Collection, Insurance 
Folder II. 
31 Tim Clayton, ‘Book Illustration and the World of Prints’, in Michael F. Suarez and Michael L. 
Turner, eds, The Cambridge History of the Book in Britain Volume 5, 1695–1830 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), pp. 230–247. 
32 There was no technical difficulty, but engraving shops and printing shops were distinct 
operations in this period. I have not found examples of the combination on one sheet in single-
sheet printing (in books of ephemera, for example). Since the seventeenth century, scientific 
books commonly contained drawings by engraving with letterpress text or inserted individually 
engraved plates among letterpress pages. 
33 In the mid-eighteenth century the Sun’s policy measured 285 x 440mm: Sun Fire Office, 
policy, dated 1754, Bodleian Library, John Johnson Collection, Insurance Folder II. 
34 Sun Fire Office, policy, dated 1808, Private Collection. 
35 The sheet was approximately the same size as it had been in the early nineteenth century. 
Sun Insurance Office, policy, dated 1897: 292 x 457 mm. Sun Insurance Office, policy, dated 
1904: 279 x 457 mm. Both Private Collection. 
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4.13.) The design of the emblem included a box in which to enter the number of the 
policy contained inside. This change made a virtue of the fact that a copy of the 
Proposals accompanied the delivery of a policy.36 In the twentieth century, a branded 
envelop was designed for the policy in which it could travel and be stored. (See 
Illustration 4.14.) It was printed with an iteration of the Sun’s emblem.   
The visual and material qualities of the policies of the Insurance Office and of the 
Sun gave heft to the relationship they defined. To do so, the fire offices exercised the 
print technology of their time – from engraved script to engraved illustrations to the 
gamut of fonts from the late nineteenth century. Their policies emphasised their size by 
the amount of space they left empty. Thus they took up space and they projected a 
sense of space. Their stature spoke of the length of the relationship with a customer. 
The greater the effort in the document, the greater the trust in the promise it made. The 
weight in the policy might assuage doubts over whether claims would be paid. The 
policy ‘had to be produced in the event of a claim’.37 Corresponding to the weight the 
company gave it, policy holders treated their policies seriously. One holder walked 
around with his in his pocket.38 The policy was also active in that it could be read out in 
trials as evidence.39 It was proof. 
The consistencies in layout between the policies used by the Insurance Office and 
the Sun indicate the importance of familiarity to this industry. Just as the Insurance 
Office had used familiar appearances to gain legitimacy for its policy by assuming the 
conventions of a bond, so the Sun reproduced the format that was standard in the 
industry by the early eighteenth century. In the examples of both offices, the main body 
text that constituted the agreement sat self-contained on the page, overseen by a 
strong header. Its first word received graphic emphasis and its shape left space, amply 
so for the signatures on the bottom left and right. A styling in the text also chimed: just 
as the Insurance Office had subtly enlarged ‘Insuring of Houses against Fire’, the Sun 
positioned its name in the middle of the first full line, in capitals. (See Illustrations 4.15 
and 4.16.) Thus the companies used similar detailing to personalise the shared visual 
pattern to themselves.  
                                                
36 Relton, Account of the Fire Insurance Companies, p. 350. 
37 Robin Pearson, Insuring the Industrial Revolution: Fire Insurance in Great Britain, 1700–1850 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), p. 314. 
38 John Bates, who was charged with arson. In the report of his trial, the foreman of the Sun Fire 
Office told the court that he ‘was called to Bates's house on the night of the fire. I asked him 
whom he was insured with – he said with the Sun. I asked to see his policy to take the number 
of it; he produced it from his pocket, and I took the number.’ Old Bailey Proceedings Online, 
September 1820, trial of John Bates (t18200918-2), www.oldbaileyonline.org, version 8.0. 
Accessed 20 July 2019. 
39 Ibid. See also Old Bailey Proceedings Online, October 1819, trial of Jane Cook (t18191027-
39), www.oldbaileyonline.org, version 8.0. Accessed 20 July 2019. 
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The importance of keeping to this visual pattern is shown by the Sun’s policy of 
1808 which hosted two small additional paragraphs, on the vertical axis. (See 
Illustration 4.15.) One of these confirmed that the duty had been paid, the other was a 
note to advise the holder that the policy could be transferred. These notes sat outside 
the policy, and the latter in a small type, in order not to disrupt the pattern. The very 
shape of this document signalled a trusted model. The genre was also cemented in the 
styling. In the twentieth century, the Sun’s policy continued to pick out certain words of 
its agreement in antiquated black letter, despite the loud presence of modern typefaces 
in the document’s header. 
The policies of the Insurance Office, the Sun Fire Office and the Sun Insurance 
Office reveal one substantial shift in their wording and appearance: they increasingly 
represented an identity, one which was corporate rather than tied to individuals. On the 
Insurance Office’s policy, the company’s signatories were well represented. The first 
blank was for two of them and their names were repeated twice again in the course of 
the form, before they signed their names at the end. Though the Sun’s policies retained 
the structure of this union, the institution of the Office was named in the printed text at 
the expense of the naming of the Office’s individual representatives in the blanks.40 In 
1808, the policy referred to ‘the Society of the SUN FIRE-OFFICE in London’, ‘the 
Trustees or acting Members of the said Society’ and ‘the Stock and Fund of the said 
Society’. It was signed by ‘Three of the Trustees or acting Members for the said 
Society’. The policy in 1904 spoke of ‘the SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, (hereinafter 
called the Company)’ and ‘its Capital, Stock, and Funds’. It was authorised by just one 
signature, ‘being one of the Directors of the said Company’. Thus the Sun’s policy 
replaced a bond to individuals with a bond with a company. The policy’s illustration of 
firemen reflected this relationship. It spoke to the policy holder of the impersonal, 
corporate entity with which one made the agreement. The men in the illustration were 
themselves branded by the company insignia. In this aspect, the Sun engineered trust 
differently than had the Insurance Office. 
Conversely, the policy form became more personal in the details it recorded about 
the insured. In each era, the largest blank space was reserved for the most particular 
and personal information about the property insured. That space grew significantly. In 
1682, it contained a brief description of the house to be insured. In the absence of 
street numbers in this period, the essential information here was its location. In 1808, 
that description included moveable goods and property. In an example of 1904, the 
description of insured property was anticipated by a prose list of conventional valuables 
which the policy covered, from jewellery to drawings. (See Illustration 4.17.) This 
                                                
40 In 1710, the policy was with the Company of London Insurers. In 1716, this changed to the 
Company of the Sun Fire Office. Relton, Account of the Fire Insurance Companies, p. 365. 
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printed list was followed by blank lines for additional specific items. The large space 
was divided by a column on the right, in which to ascribe values. The size of the space 
called for proportionate amounts of property and detail.  
 
Terms and conditions 
Projects by If regards terms and conditions on digital products as a pattern which is not 
fit for purpose. The terms and conditions pattern has a long history of use for the 
insurance product. In the early nineteenth century, this pattern took shape as the Sun 
Fire Office’s Proposals, the core of which was a set of ‘Terms and Conditions’. This set 
encompassed twelve articles. The articles were followed by a table of rates and a list of 
engine stations, interspersed by paragraphs of ancillary information. (See Illustrations 
4.18 and 4.19, and 4.20 and 4.21.) In the early twentieth century, the company printed 
fifteen ‘Conditions’, without frills in the lower half of the reverse of its policy. (See 
Illustration 4.22.) The company had first put its Conditions on the back of the policy 
after 1816.41 In both cases, the Sun’s practices accorded with the insurance industry. 
When the Office launched itself with Proposals in 1710, this format was in the course of 
calcifying.42 In the late nineteenth century, the Conditions were broadly standardised 
across the industry.43  
The terms dispelled uncertainty and built trust because they explained and defined 
the product. Fire insurance was neither a straightforward product nor an unchanging 
one; it needed to offer clarification to its purchaser. In this regard, the Insurance 
Office’s long-running format that began A Table was the precursor to the Sun’s 
Proposals and its Conditions. A Table contained a table of rates as its central feature, 
which displayed the product’s variables of value and length of term. (See Illustration 
4.23.) In a series of short paragraphs around the table, the sheet explained the 
calculation of the ‘Premium, or Rate of Insurance’, the compensation should ones 
property suffer, the sources of the security which made good the claims, and the 
names of the ‘Trustees’ and ‘Councel’ who were responsible for the enterprise.  
                                                
41 P. G. M. Dickson, The Sun Insurance Office 1710–1960: The History of Two and a Half 
Centuries of British Insurance (Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 79. 
42 Amicable Society for a Perpetual Assurance Office, An Account of the Amicable Society, etc. 
for a Perpetual Assurance Office (1706) comprised eight conditions; Friendly Society, A 
Proposal for Insuring Houses by the Friendly Society [1707?] and [1710?]; Perpetual Insurance 
Office, Proposals by the Perpetual Insurance Office on Marriages [1710?]. See also the volume 
‘Tracts on Insurance 1710-1711’, British Library, 1890.b.5. When Charles Povey announced his 
new Salvage Corps Scheme in his newspaper, he included its five articles. He also referred 
there to the Articles in the Proposals for insurances on life and on goods. General Remark, No. 
440, 22–24 December 1708, quoted by Relton, Account of the Fire Insurance Companies, pp. 
264–6. 
43 Dickson, Sun Insurance Office, p. 143. 
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The Sun Fire Office’s Proposals in 1808 dealt with the same subject matters as had 
the Insurance Office’s A Table, at greater length.44 It too contained a ‘Table of Rates’. It 
affirmed the security fund and explained the making of a claim.45 It stated the role of 
Trustees in the signing of policies.46 But the Sun’s rubric in 1808 – and even in 1710 – 
was significantly more intricate than the Insurance Office’s had been between 1682 
and 1700.47 Whereas the Insurance Office had made a distinction only between timber 
and brick houses, the reader of the Sun’s Article IV comprehended lists of materials 
and trades which comprised three categories of risk: common, hazardous and doubly-
hazardous, under the subtitle, ‘The several Heads of Insurance’. The change in the 
format which communicated terms makes clear how many more determinants to fire 
insurance there were at the start of the nineteenth century than there had been at the 
end of the seventeenth century.  
The Sun’s Conditions in 1904 poured attention on the making of claims. But they 
forwent any clauses that pertained to explaining insurance to the reader, and they 
bolstered the protection of the Office’s interests.48 They emphasised the contingent 
nature of the policy and the circumstances which would forfeit it.49 This included ‘mis-
description’ of property and fraud in the making of a claim.50 Where the Proposals 
focussed on what was included in a policy, the Conditions focused on restrictions and 
exclusion: a list of eight categories answered the subheading ‘This Policy does not 
cover’.51 The Conditions had no promotional purpose. Their embedded position on the 
policy demonstrated their purpose of protecting the company. The policy side of the 
                                                
44 Cornelius Walford, The Insurance Cyclopaedia: Being a Dictionary of the Definition of Terms 
Used in Connexion with the Theory and Practice of Insurance in All Its Branches: a Biographical 
Summary ... a Bibliographical Repertory ... an Historical Treasury […], 6 vols (London: Layton, 
1871–1880), vol. 3, p. 407, compared the Proposals to ‘our modern prospectus’: ‘Their contents 
were indeed rather in the shape of regulations than of conditions as the term is now 
understood’, quoted by Relton, Account of the Fire Insurance Companies, pp. 316–317. 
45 Sun Fire Office, July 7, 1808. Sun Fire-Office, Cornhill, near the Royal-Exchange, and at 
Craig’s Court, Charing-Cross. Proposals for Insuring Houses, and Other Buildings, Goods, 
Wares and Merchandise, and Ships in Harbour, in Dock, or Building, and Craft, from Loss and 
Damage by Fire (1808), Article XI. 
46 Ibid., Article I. 
47 Ibid., Articles I, II, VI, VIII on what is and is not included in a policy; Article IX on 
circumstances in the event of death; Article X on house moves. Articles III and VII on actions 
which would invalidate a policy. 
48 Ibid., Article XII: ‘NO RECEIPTS are to be taken for any Premiums of Insurance, but such as 
are printed and issued from the Office, and witnessed by one of the Clerks or Agents of the 
Office.’ Sun Insurance Office, policy, dated 1904, Condition 4: ‘No Receipts for any Premium of 
Insurance shall be valid or available for any purpose whatever, except such as are on printed 
forms issued from the Company’s Office, and signed by one of the Clerks or Agents of the 
Company.’ 
49 Four of the Conditions begin with ‘If’. 
50 Conditions 1 and 7. Condition 9 addressed the failure to allow the company to enter a 
property. 
51 Condition 3. 
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paper assumed the promotional weight. The terms were no longer a point of attraction 
for a potential customer. They came after a purchase rather than before. 
For A Table and the Proposals, the explanation of the product performed a 
promotional role. A Table was likely put up and left in public spaces and shops, like 
similar one-sided sheets of its time.52 Throughout the eighteenth century, the Sun’s 
Proposals were produced in different sizes for pasting up as posters and for distribution 
by hand, by walkers, firemen and subsequently by agents too.53 But they were also 
delivered with the policies.54 With the re-design of the Proposals in 1808 with the sun 
emblem on the back, the format’s distribution shifted emphatically to delivery to policy 
holders.55 In the early twentieth century, a colourful leaflet performed the role of 
promoting the company. It was distributed by the Sun’s agents.56 On one side, the 
leaflet furnished information about the company that overlapped with that which the 
Proposals had provided a century before: its locations, its branches, its funds, its rates, 
its long success. (See Illustration 4.24.) Folded out, it became a form, ‘Proposal for Fire 
Insurance’, which a member of the public could complete with an agent in order to 
apply for a policy. (See Illustration 4.25.) In this incarnation, ‘Proposal’ was used once 
again, but as an offering to the company rather than vice versa, and devoid of the 
terms of which it was previously comprised. 
A Table, the Proposals and the Conditions were formats which drew their 
effectiveness from their interaction with each office’s policy. They boosted the policy by 
explaining it. Crucially, they did so in plain and direct English, in contrast to the long, 
dense sentences and legal formulae of the policy. A Table advised that ‘Two Thousand 
Pounds per Annum in Ground-Rents should be Setled on Trustees, as a Security to 
make good the Losses of Five Thousand Houses’. The Insurance Office’s policy put it 
as follows:  
For the Term of [blank] yeares from the Date hereof, Do desire, direct, and appoint, That the 
Trustees, for the time being for Houses and Lands, settled for the Insuring of Houses against 
Fire shall pay or satisfy unto the said [blank] his Executors or Administrators, [Or his or their 
Assigns, by Endorsement on this present Policy] the Sume of _ _ One hundred and thirty _ _ 
Pounds at the end of Two Months, after the said House shall be Burnt down, Demolished, or 
Damnifyed, by, or by Reason or Means of Fire; and so often as any New House, to be Built 
                                                
52 Natasha Glaisyer, The Culture of Commerce in England, 1660–1720 (Woodbridge: Boydell 
Press, 2006), p. 35. 
53 For the commission and distribution of print by the Sun’s managers see LMA, 
CLC/B/192/B/001/MS11931, passim. 
54 Relton, Account of the Fire Insurance Companies, p. 350. 
55 In 1806, the Sun’s Secretary sent a note to agent Francis Cobb that he be sent ‘bills to be 
posted up’. These were not Proposals, which indicates that the Proposals were no longer the 
focus of publicity activity by agents. Edward Griffin to Francis Cobb, 31 October 1806, on Sun 
Fire Office, printed poster (ND), Kent Archives, EK/U1453/B6/2/3. 
56 Sun Fire Office, Proposal for Fire Insurance, leaflet-form (1906) is stamped with ‘A supply 
sent to any agent on application’, in capitals in red ink (Hillingdon, MC25C/SF1/1570/1/3/1). 
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in the place thereof, shall be Burnt down, Demolished, or Damnifyed by, or by Reason or 
Means of Fire, within the said Term…  
Article III of the Sun’s Proposals ran:  
all Persons…shall pay the Premium to the next Quarter-Day, and from thence for one Year 
more at least, and shall, as long as the Managers agree to accept the same, make all future 
Payments annually at the said Office…upon Forfeiture of the Benefit thereof.  
The same sentiment in the Sun’s contemporary policy avowed:  
Now, know ye, That from the Date of these Presents, and so long as the said [James Smyth] 
shall duly pay, or cause to be paid, the said Sum of three pounds four shillings & sixpence at 
the Times and Place aforesaid; and the Trustees or acting Members of the said Society, for 
the Time being, shall agree to accept the same; the Stock and Fund of the said Society shall 
be subject and liable to pay to the same [James Smyth] his Executors, Administrators, and 
Assigns, all such his Damage and Loss which he the said [James Smyth] shall suffer by 
Fire… 
In 1904, the language of the Sun’s policy maintained its differentiation from the 
Conditions on its reverse. While ‘This Policy of Insurance Witnesseth’ on one side, on 
the other, the Conditions preferred to say what the policy ‘covered’. However, the 
difference was now between fusty legalese and modern legalese, for the Conditions 
spoke in long sentences, littered with subclauses and alternatives such as ‘do, and 
concur in doing, and permit to be done’, drafted to cover all possibilities.57 
Nevertheless, there was a clarity to the statements in the terms formats that made the 
product accessible. 
The Sun’s documents made this complementary relationship between the terms and 
the policy explicit. In 1808, its policy included the phrase, ‘according to the exact Tenor 
of their printed Proposals, dated July the 7th, 1808’. Appropriately, most of the articles 
in the said Proposals referred to the policy. Thus, the two formats were interlocked. In 
1904, the company’s policy consummated the relationship between these formats by 
integrating them in one object. The policy was now ‘subject to the Conditions endorsed 
hereon, which are to be taken as part of this Policy’. Accordingly, the Conditions spoke 
repeatedly of ‘this policy’. The dependency between the two was without ambiguity. 
The clear layouts of the terms formats matched their transparent language. Their 
graphic language shared in their purpose. They were designed to appear readable. 
Each layout broke up information into visual bites such that a new paragraph implied a 
distinct topic. Paragraphs were demarcated by space all the way around them. In the 
Proposals and the Conditions, the numbering of paragraphs formalised the rules. It 
also made them usable for reference outside the format. The layout of A Table aided 
legibility by preceding paragraphs with subtitles; thus ‘The Propositions Were’, ‘The 
                                                
57 Sun Insurance Office, policy, dated 1904, Condition 14. 
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Ground-Rents which were Setled to begin this Designe, Were’, ‘The Trustees Names 
which Accepted the Trust, Are’ and ‘The Councel which Approved of the Title and 
Settlement, Were’. The subtitles were centred in italics with a space line before the 
paragraph. Each paragraph began with a drop initial letter to set it apart.  
In a similar way, the Sun’s Proposals flagged information: the initial words of each 
Article were set in capital letters; for example, ‘ALL POLICIES SHALL BE SIGNED’ or 
‘FARMING STOCK’. As a result, the reader could make an immediate grasp of the 
subject matter of a paragraph. By dividing their lists of terms and conditions into 
columns, the Proposals and the Conditions made the text accessible. The inclusion of 
a table of rates in 1682 and 1808 helped to simplify the complexities of fire insurance – 
perhaps also to mask them. For in 1682 the table did not include timber constructions 
and in 1808 it applied only to straightforward risks. 
The Sun’s Conditions did not gesture to graphic niceties in the way of its 
predecessors. It was devoid of the ornaments and the variation in typeface, spacing 
and titles that had enlivened previous formats; instead it communicated repetition, 
severe plainness and straightforwardness. This style direction maintained the 
appearance of tidiness, orderliness and coordination of previous versions but laid bare 
the Conditions’ identity as a set of intimidating, legally enforceable rules. Its design 
sharpened the contrast with the strong personality of the policy, at the turn of the page. 
However, while the Conditions’ sparse and sober delivery might have communicated 
the frankness of its paragraphs, its layout of two wide columns made following the text 
a challenge. It was designed to look readable but not to be read with ease nor 
pleasure. 
Graphically, the Insurance Office’s A Table and the Sun’s Proposals were foils to 
their respective policies. Unlike policies, these formats began with a descriptive title, 
they named their company prominently at the top and they gave its location, and they 
printed the date. They were formatted such that they had character. As was discussed 
in the previous chapter, they represented a company identity, distinct from the policy. 
This identity was solidified as the same format was re-used over many years: in the 
case of the Insurance Office, between 1682 and 1700; in the case of the Sun, from 
1710 into the first quarter of the nineteenth century.58 The Sun’s Conditions did not 
follow its predecessors in these respects, for these features were now pumped up at 
the head of the policy side of the sheet. In 1904, the contrast between the policy and 
the Conditions was extreme in order to differentiate the two sides. 
 
                                                
58 The latest example that I have come across, which is a clear development from the original 
format, is Sun Fire Office, Conditions, 1827, LMA, CLC/B/192/DD/008/MS38828/001, fol. 127. 
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The policy and the terms document were printed objects at the heart of the Insurance 
Office and the Sun. This section has conceived this complementary pair as 
technologies of trust: they materialised the insurance transaction and the insurance 
product; they balanced company and individual in print and handwriting; they proved 
legal standing, should one wish to read it. The development of this pair over time 
illuminates their trust-production. While the form of the policy stayed the same over the 
periods considered here, the terms format saw transformation from period to period. 
The terms formats were graphic objects which by their changing upheld the apparently 
unchanging nature of the policy. The repeating physical existences of these types of 
object reinforced trust in fire insurance. 
It is reasonable to see the policy and the terms document as impersonal means by 
which both insurance company and insurance customer could be relied upon to be 
trustworthy. These printed objects suggested they brook no dissent. The policy 
increasingly emphasised the markers of the company over individuals. While the 
enforcement of an Insurance Office policy rested purely on the policy, the Sun in the 
twentieth century required a list of regulations that were impersonally stated, in contrast 
to the policy’s personal details. The nineteenth-century historian of insurance Cornelius 
Walford put it that: ‘conditions grew out of the necessities of the business’.59 These 
conditions allowed the company definitively to set the limits on its customers’ 
behaviour. As such, the company could trust policy holders as much as vice versa.  
 
Graphic devices 
The previous section considered two printed objects essential to the Insurance Office 
and the Sun: the policy and the terms document. This section concerns one significant 
feature of each of these formats, one that was integral not only to the format’s 
individual function but also to the functioning of the insurance system as a whole. We 
will see how these features made links to other formats of documentation by which the 
insurance business operated. Interaction between documents was crucial to the 
business as the section will finally address. 
 
Policy number 
Each policy document of the Insurance Office and the Sun contained a blank for a 
number at the top. This number stood for the unique combination of customer, 
property, value and time period that the policy described.60 For the Insurance Office 
                                                
59 Walford, Insurance Cyclopaedia, vol. 3, p. 407, quoted by Relton, Account of the Fire 
Insurance Companies, p. 317. 
60 I am not aware of another similar system in use in 1680 whereby a number accorded with a 
purchase. In the 1680s receipts for the hearth tax included a blank for a folio number by which 
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and for the Sun, the policy number was a key part of the policy’s graphics. It stood out 
on the Insurance Office’s policy, where it was set apart at the top of the document, in 
the middle over the main text, enclosed by a flourishing circle. ‘Number’ ushered it in, 
printed distinctively in terms of its position and size, and setting the document apart 
from a bond. (See Illustration 4.26.) On the Sun Fire Office’s policy in 1808, the policy 
number appeared above the policy’s text, in the right margin but similarly set apart. 
(See Illustration 4.27.) Here the number ceded pole position to the engraved 
illustration. It was introduced by ‘No’, with the ‘n’ in a display typeface, the largest type 
on the page. In 1904, the number was again prompted by ‘No’ in enlarged type. On this 
crowded sheet, it took the key position of the page for the eye, at the top left. As in the 
Insurance Office’s days, the number was enclosed, in a grey-toned octagon. (See 
Illustration 4.26.) In each case, the number’s positioning – always at a distance from 
the main text of the policy and with a large prompt – gave the number authority.  
The visual prominence of the policy number bespeaks its pivotal position within the 
Offices. The deed between the trustees of the Insurance Office specified the number’s 
position on the policy and made it central to how the Office kept records:   
In the margin of every policy, every house thereby entitled to be secured shall have the 
number expressed therein according to the order of time wherein the same policy is 
subscribed, except, in the case of surrender or expiration, the same or some other house 
shall have the same number. In order that it may be better known when the number of ten 
thousand houses are insured, and that the trustees and policy holders may be the better 
informed of the true extent and condition of the premises and of all policies, copies of all 
such policies or the substance of the contents thereof shall be entered in a book or books to 
succeed one another in order of time to be kept in a public place of office for that purpose. 
The particulars shall be entered in order of time, and also orderly entries shall be made in 
such books of the dates and contents of all such deeds, wills and administrations whereby 
any persons shall claim to be admitted as executors, administrators or assigns to sign or 
make authentic any such policies, to the intent that the trustees and policyholders may 
inspect, peruse and take notes of all and every or any the books, registers and accompts 
made concerning the premises.61 
                                                                                                                                          
the tax collector linked a receipt to his own records; as in, [blank] the [blank] 1600 and eighty 
[blank] Received of [blank] the sum of [blank] shillings, in full for [blank] half years duty for 
[blank] fire-hearths in his house in [blank] due and ended at Lady daye last past. I [s]ay received 
by [underlined blank] Fol. [underlined blank] L. [blank] Collector. On this subject, see 
Frances Maguire ‘Bonds of Print and Chains of Paper: Rethinking Print Culture and Social 
Formation in Early Modern England, c.1550-c.1700’ (PhD thesis, University of York, 2017). 
Licences at the time for Hackney coaches assigned coachmen a coach number. Their licences 
were not printed, LMA, COL/SJ/06/018-020. For numbers on Bank of England currency and 
exchequer bills from the 1690s, see Clow, ‘From Nothing to Something’, pp. 46–47. 
61 Settlement in trust, 18 December 1683, TNA, PRO C.54/4600, transcribed in John Merriman 
Sims, ‘The Trust Lands of the Fire Office’, Guildhall Miscellany, 4:2 (1972), 88–113. It was ‘a 
settlement in trust by Barbon and his partners of the ground rents of various London properties 
as security for payment of insurance claims. It allowed the insurance of up to 10,000 houses 
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The deed makes clear how the policy number was a device for efficiency in the 
Office. The number allowed the Office to keep a count of the policies that it issued. 
This was important as the Office had placed limits on that number, in proportion to its 
security fund. Through the policy number, an individual’s policy document linked 
directly to manuscript ‘books’. These books repeated the information in the blanks of 
the policy, including name, status or trade, address, length of policy term and date.62 
They recorded the information in the same order as the policy’s number. It is evident 
that this symmetry of information between policy and books would allow verification in 
the event of a claim. Notes about assignments and claims were also added to the 
books.63 Through the certainty of a number, a policy holder could trust the Insurance 
Office’s representatives and vice versa. The device also avoided confusion when one 
person took out multiple policies.64 While the policy was a graphic object to the 
customer, to the company its essence was a number. The key position of the number 
on the policy accords with the fact that it needed to be clear and easily read off. 
But the policy number was also at the heart of a system designed to engender trust 
between the dozen or more ‘insurers’. 65 Any two insurers could subscribe policies at 
the office; thus they needed to process policies in the same way. The books 
maintained transparency between the insurers, and also with other parties. They could 
be inspected by trustees and policyholders and they must be ‘kept in a public place’. 
To promote this transparency, the books, and the system that they comprised, featured 
                                                                                                                                          
(from 5000). This deed followed the initial deed of 29 July 1681 which settled property for 3000 
houses and made provision for a further 2000, when the first batch was reached – or in fact, 
when a further set of houses were finished, as indicated by Fire Office, September the 16th, p.2. 
I have not ascertained whether the previous deed laid out the same system. 
62 John Vernon, Compleat Compting-House, p. 143, endorses a similar process of copying for 
marine insurance: ‘You have a Policy of Insurance….And this Policy of Insurance ought to be 
copied in the Office of Assurance, that is, in a Book kept for that purpose.’ But the Office of 
Assurance was centralised, that is run independently from the people with whom one agreed a 
policy. 
63 Insurance Office, policy, dated 1699, Private Collection, contains a printed note that 
assignments be registered in the office. Assignments were also written on the back of policies. 
N[icholas] B[arbon], A Letter to a Gentleman in the Country, Giving an Account of the two 
Insurance-Offices; the Fire-Office & Friendly-Society (1684), p. 2, indicates that information 
about claims was entered in the books as Barbon used the books to calculate the total paid in 
claims up to that point: ‘This Calculation, any man that will Examine their Policy Books, will find 
to be True.’ 
64 Sir William Twisden held several policies on a row of houses in the Barbican, dated 7 August 
1682, from a list of known policies, in a private collection. 
65 Fire Office, A Table of the Insurance Office at the Back-side of the Royal-Exchange (1683); 
Fire Office, A Table, Shewing the Rates of Insuring Houses from One Year to Eleven: at the 
Fire-Office, Kept against the Royal-Exchange in Cornhill; and at the Rainbow Coffee-House by 
the Inner-Temple-Gate in Fleet-Street (1693); Fire Office, [A Table,] Shewing the Rates of 
Insuring Houses from One Year to Eleven: at the Fire-Office, Kept against the Royal-Exchange 
in Cornhill: and at the Rainbow Coffee-House by the Inner-Temple-Gate in Fleetstreet (1698); 
and Fire Office, A Table, Shewing the Rates of Insuring Houses from One Year to Seven: at the 
Fire-Office, Kept against the Royal-Exchange in Cornhill: and at the Rainbow Coffee-House by 
the Inner-Temple-Gate in Fleetstreet (1700), each name the twelve, 17, 17 and 16 ‘Insurers’, 
respectively. 
 140 
in the Office’s early pamphlets: readers were invited to examine ‘the Books of the 
Insurance Office’, also known as its ‘Policy Books’.66  
The numbers on the Sun’s policies connected to the Sun’s Policy Books or 
Registers, as had the Insurance Office’s.67 But the Sun set no limit on the number of 
policies it intended to issue; it was founded with ambitions to sell fire policies across 
Britain. By 1863, the Sun’s Books ran to 1262 volumes, with each volume containing 
1500–2000 policies.68 The growth of the company meant that it was not convenient to 
enter policies into the books in the order of their number. The Sun instituted different 
streams of registers. From 1793, it introduced a separate series for policies outside 
London. Moreover, different clerks ran their own concurrent registers, which were 
allocated runs of policy numbers in advance. This carried the advantage that a clerk’s 
work could easily be scrutinised. In the early nineteenth century, the Sun’s registers 
included more information than applied in the Insurance Office’s days, because policies 
gathered more data: such as about the tenants and the construction of the property. 
Once policies were sold increasingly by agents from the late eighteenth century, this 
information became crucial to the books. The registers also came to record the policy’s 
renewal date. The Sun’s books were not mentioned in public in the way that the 
Insurance Office’s had been. 
The usefulness of the policy number went beyond the connection between the 
policy and the policy books. Its presence proliferated as the fire offices generated new 
printed forms for their business. It was necessary in correspondence between an office 
and a customer. When the Insurance Office’s clerk sent a printed note to policy holders 
asking whether they wanted to renew, he wrote the policy number at the top. (See 
Illustration 4.29.) The Sun Fire Office’s managers printed renewal receipts with a space 
for the policy number in a clear position at the top left.69 (See Illustrations 4.30 and 
4.31.) The Sun’s renewal notice in the early nineteenth century incorporated the policy 
number into the text of its letter format. It ran: ‘SIR / The Time for Payment on your 
Policy of Insurance in this OFFICE, No. [blank] expires Fifteen Days after Christmas 
Day next’. (See Illustration 4.32.) As the person was not addressed by name, and there 
                                                
66 Fire Office, An Enquiry, Whether it be the Interest of the City to Insure Houses from Fire; and 
Whether the Insured may Expect Any Advantage thereby, more than from the Insurance-Office 
Already Setled [1681], p. 3; Barbon, Letter to a Gentleman in the Country, p. 2. 
67 Sims, ‘Trust Lands’, p. 91, credits the Insurance Office with the institution of this practice, 
‘which remained characteristic of the fire insurance business’. It was likely a model learnt from 
another service or industry, but I have not discovered precedents. I believe that ‘policy book’ is 
the authentic phrase, used in the Sun Fire Office’s Instructions to its agents. 
68 LMA, Information leaflet Number 48, ‘Fire insurance records’. The number of registers beyond 
1863 is unknown. They are held by the descendent company of the Sun. 
69 The Sun issued printed receipts from its commencement, as outlined in its news-sheet: British 
Mercury, 4 October 1710, p. 2. British Mercury, 24 June 1713, p. 1, gave a specimen of the 
Office’s revised receipt. The specimen shows a space for the policy number, though there is no 
reason to assume it was not already in place as a blank on the previous version. 
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was little space to enter a name above ‘Sir’, the note hinged on the number. The Sun’s 
renewal notice in the early twentieth century also gave precedence to policy numbers 
over personal names. (See Illustration 4.33.) The envelop in which a policy travelled 
was committed to the number, as had been the Proposals wrapper before it. (See 
Illustration 4.34; compare to Illustration 4.13.)  
In the early twentieth century, the policy number anchored internal company 
communications too. It was usual for letters between agents and the head office to 
begin with the policy number under discussion, such as might not have been the case 
a century before.70 Some stationery was printed with a space for the number. (See 
Illustrations 4.35 and 4.36.) Similarly, letters were printed or typed with blanks. (See 
Illustrations 4.37 and 4.38.) In this era, claims entailed multiple forms. Each repeated 
the related policy number, and they were kept inside a special envelop which repeated 
the number once again. (See Illustrations 4.39, 4.40 and 4.41.) The external surveyor 
also applied the policy number to his forms. (See Illustration 4.42.)  
In the late seventeenth century and the early eighteenth century, the policy number 
was reproduced on materials other than paper. The firemarks of the Insurance Office 
and the Sun Fire Office were stamped with the number.71 This personalised the 
firemark to the buyer but it was an additional security measure for the offices as it left 
no doubt as to which property a policy covered. In turn, the Sun’s managers mimicked 
the firemark when they printed the sun emblem on the Proposals with a space for a 
policy number. (See Illustration 4.43; compare to Illustrations 4.13 and 4.21.) Certain 
other objects that were insured also had to carry the number that proved it. In the Rate 
Books, the rubric for a ‘Waggon–in Motion’ ran ‘the Office-Mark, with the Policy 
Number, to be on each Waggon at the Time of Accident.’72 
The policy number was a device that facilitated the company’s reliance on agents to 
sell policies. The link between a policy number and a policy book was replicated in 
branches. In the late nineteenth century, agents maintained their own policy books for 
the policies they sold. When an agent received a policy authorised by head office, he 
copied the information from it into his own book, before delivering it to the insured.73 
                                                
70 See correspondence with agent Cobb in the early nineteenth century, Kent Archives, 
EK/U1453/B6/2/3. 
71 Insurance Office, agreement, dated 1697, Private Collection, refers to ‘the Mark of the 
Phoenix affixed to the said House Numbred as above’. The Sun ended this practice in 1807: 
Relton, Account of the Fire Insurance Companies, p. 372. This was likely a cost-saving, as at 
the same time, limits were put on the circumstances in which firemarks were sent out and they 
began to be manufactured in tin rather than lead. 
72 Sun Fire Office, Instructions for the Clerks who Write Policies (1803), p. 45, LMA, 
CLC/B/192/F/023/MS38872/001. The rule must have changed subsequently as in two copies of 
this volume, ‘Number of the Policy painted thereon’ replaced ‘Office-Mark, with the Policy 
Number’ by hand. 
73 Sun Insurance Office, Instructions for the Agents to the Sun Insurance Office (Fire) (London: 
J. Donnison, 1897), p. 38, LMA, CLC/B/192/DC/001/MS15671. 
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(See Illustrations 4.44 and 4.45.) He used the pages of the books as a place to store 
additional documents relating to a policy holder. (See Illustration 4.46.) Policy books 
began with an index by surname of the policies in the book, in order that the agent 
could navigate the non-sequential numbers. Agents’ ‘cash books’ tallied sums received 
for renewals in each quarter with renewal receipts. They too maintained the chain 
between policy number, policy and policy books.74 The chain extended to the Renewal 
Register, into which agents extracted each policy’s basic information from their policy 
books and marked when the premium was paid each year. The renewal register 
recorded ‘Number’, ‘NAME’, ‘Sum Insured’, ‘Annual PREMIUM’, ‘Address’ and 
‘County’, in pre-printed columns.  
The Sun’s managers impressed on their agents the importance of the policy 
number. They instructed agents that in the event of a claim, estimates of damages 
must be transmitted to the office, ‘with the addition of the number of the policy, and 
other requisite particulars’.75 Regarding the classification of risks, ‘Reference should 
always be made by number to any existing Policy covering the same risk’.76 The policy 
numbers of adjoining buildings should also be given so that the Office knew how far it 
might be exposed. The number was no help if the agents mistook it; hence the 
managers reminded agents, ‘To be very careful that you insert the proper number of 
each policy.’77 The policy number was the key to accessing the vast information held in 
the Sun’s books. This was an impersonal device that denoted personal information. 
Through its use, information about individuals and their circumstances flowed between 
different forms and formats and between different groups of people.  
Not only did the Sun expand the use of the policy number but it used other series of 
identification numbers. The company’s renewal receipts each contained a receipt 
number, which was stamped on in the early twentieth century. (See Illustrations 4.47 
and 4.48.) This allowed the Sun’s managers to establish those which had not been 
remitted and by whom, and to monitor the clerks and agents who handled receipts.78 In 
the twentieth century, losses engendered their own series. (See Illustration 4.49.) The 
Sun was secured by these repetitions of numbers and information. They were more 
robust and efficient than the use of personal names. The repetition of numbers 
engendered a trustworthy system. 
 
                                                
74 Sun Fire Office, Instructions for the Agents of the Sun Fire-Office (London: W. P. Norris, 
1807), p. 26, LMA, CLC/B/192/DC/001/MS15671. 
75 Ibid., p. 29. 
76 Sun Insurance Office, Instructions (1897), p. 32, Para. 45. 
77 Sun Fire Office, Instructions (1807), p. 34. 
78 One of the formulae in each General Quarterly Meeting was the auditors’ report of the 




Germane to the terms documents discussed in the previous section was a printed date. 
Each issue of the Insurance Office’s A Table printed its year of publication in the 
colophon. By contrast, the Insurance Office’s previous sheets had not regularly carried 
a date.79 Issues of the Sun’s Proposals printed the day’s date at the top. The Sun’s 
Conditions ended with the day’s date in abbreviated form (‘(12/02/1904.)’), in small 
print. (See Illustrations 4.50, 4.51 and 4.52.) In each case, the printed date fixed the 
terms of the insurance in time. A fire policy, which was itself a time-based product, was 
contingent on the terms at the time when it was bought. A printed date eliminated 
ambiguity in this regard. It bounded the product. Through a date, the company’s 
representatives knew whether a sheet was the most recent. These printed dates sit in 
contrast to the ceremonial and individualised manuscript date on the policy. 
The printed date on these formats also tells of shifts in its purpose. The date on A 
Table and the Sun’s early Proposals had a publicity function. It marked the sheets as 
being the latest, and it may have suggested that the offer had a time limit. But for the 
Sun Fire Office at the start of the nineteenth century, the printed date was essential to 
the integration of a policy with Proposals. The policy was printed with a matching day’s 
date. This correspondence protected the company. On the company’s Conditions in 
the early twentieth century, the inconspicuous date would have allowed staff to verify 
that the set of conditions was the most up-to-date. 
New editions of the Sun’s Proposals were issued at varying intervals according to 
amendments that the Office’s managers thought it expedient to make.80 The printed 
date shows that the first two decades of the nineteenth century saw frequent and 
significant changes. These changes reflect the uncertainty in the industry at the time. 
Changing conditions in the market, particularly new kinds of factory risk and 
competitors with innovative practices, compelled the Sun’s managers to assess and 
update their business practices.81 In 1804, the Proposals broke with the schema that 
they had kept since the Office’s establishment. (See Illustrations 4.18 and 4.19, and 
Illustrations 4.20 and 4.21.) 1816 saw a greater break with the practices of the past as 
the terms and conditions were transferred to the back of the policy.82 The old format 
persisted as a separate promotional document but was no longer entitled Proposals. 
                                                
79 The years of publication for the Insurance Office’s broadsides have to be assumed as until 
1682 they were not regularly printed in the colophon, as is clear in the Bibliography. 
80 Between 1800 and 1820, new issues of the Sun’s Proposals were printed in 1803, 1804, 
1807, 1808, 1816 and 1820. 
81 The managers set up a Committee of Enquiry to do so in 1804. 
82 Single-sheets that retained much of the content of the long-running Proposals, but ceased to 
be headed as such, were printed in 1816, 1820, 1826 and 1827; LMA, 
CLC/B/192/DD/008/MS38828/001.  
 144 
The managers used changes to the Proposals to try and contain the uncertainty in the 
industry. 
The printed date was a device that enabled sheets to be linked. Within the periods 
they were in use, A Table, Proposals and the Conditions looked similar. A printed date 
differentiated them. The combination of looks and date made them part of a series, one 
whose familiarity to customers over time made it reliable. Thus a printed date was a 
marker of the same kind of document appearing at regular intervals. In this regard, the 
date made these formats akin to a newspaper. The Proposals led with a masthead 
comparable to that of a contemporary newspaper. It is possible that the Sun’s first 
managers drew inspiration for its design from the news format. Given that they 
published a news-sheet for policy holders at the same time, they believed that news 
was a product that could help sell insurance. Because of its repetition, readers relied 
on the design; they knew what it contained. Like a newspaper, the frame of these 
formats was consistent; but unlike a newspaper, their content saw little change from 
issue to issue. 
The repetition of the format’s layout was convenient to the company but it also had 
benefits in representing the company. The familiarity of the format belied the 
significance of some of the changes. Over A Table’s seven editions, the changes to the 
text and the table looked small, but the longest extent of a policy was reduced from 
thirty-one years to seven years. This change exposed a substantial development in 
how the risks of fire insurance were evaluated since the product was first sold.83 When 
the Sun moved its terms to the reverse of the policy in 1816, it retained the layout of 
the separate document on the policy. This decision maintained the appearance of little 
change, despite the fact that the company’s action had strengthened its legal position. 
A printed date was another means, like the policy, by which the fire offices 
communicated that they were long-lasting and unchanging.  
In the late nineteenth century and into the twentieth century, a printed date was 
germane to another regular series, the Sun’s renewal leaflet, sent to policy holders 
annually. The front page of the leaflet gave a month and year. The leaflet was 
reproduced quarterly according to the expiry points of policies.84 On the inside spread, 
the Sun took the opportunity to gives its policy holders the latest time-specific 
information about the company such as its ‘Funds in Hand’. The need for a date 
reflected the regular contact that the company made with policy holders. Both the 
necessity and fixity of a printed date paradoxically pointed to the restlessness of the 
insurance product. It was not unchanging despite the notions of longevity expressed by 
                                                
83 There was a reduction in the rates between 1682 and 1700 but I have not investigated how 
this might relate to prices over the same period.  
84 The examples I have consulted fall in December, March and June.  
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the policy in each period. These repeating formats were the material means by which 
the product of insurance was renewed and upgraded. 
 
Printed interactions 
It was a feature of how the insurers at the Insurance Office and at the Sun used print 
that their offices’ printed sheets forged links among themselves. The policy number 
and the printed date achieved this, as has been discussed. This practice had another 
manifestation in the way that sheets referred one to another and thereby interrelated. 
By doing so, the companies’ different formats transformed into a web of connections 
which upheld each other. By reinforcing its individual parts, this web strengthened the 
whole company. They encouraged trust in print. But as we have seen with other 
devices, the forging of links between sheets was increasingly a means for the Sun to 
protect its interests over its customers, rather than simply promote itself as previously. 
The Insurance Office built its legitimacy on connections in print. Its sheets in 1680 
and 1681 made the Office’s Propositions their touchpoint. Some sheets opened with a 
nod to them: ‘Since the Propositions for Insuring Houses from Fire … as is, at large, 
Expressed in the Printed Propositions; hath received Approbation from many Persons 
of great Reputation’.85 Another mentioned them repeatedly: ‘as in the Propositions set 
forth’, ‘according to the true intent and meaning of the aforesaid Propositions’, as ‘was 
promised in the Printed Propositions’.86 These sheets sought to attract interest by their 
relationship to the Propositions. At the same time, they drew attention to the 
Propositions and made them legitimate. The existence of the Propositions in print 
validated the project to which they referred. The practice extended to news-sheets. 
Notices in this medium sparked interest in the Propositions: they reported on ‘printed 
papers’ and ‘There being now in print a particular thereof’.87 A Table in 1682 and 1683 
referred to the Propositions, and in 1683 also to the policy. 
The status of the Propositions was further validated by their being a construction 
that endured amendment. September, the 16th made it known: ‘a New Edition now 
expressed; the Former Copy being since Corrected’. The Insurance Office spun to its 
advantage the time that had lapsed between the publication of the Propositions and the 
final settlement of the office. Faced with the prospect of the City of London’s own fire 
insurance scheme, the publication of the Propositions ‘above a Year’ since, formed 
                                                
85 Fire Office, Arguments. As did Fire Office, [Advertisement] from the Insurance-Office for 
Houses on the Back-Side of the Royal-Exchange [1681]: ‘there are Propositions in Print’. 
86 Fire Office, [Advertisement.] From the Insurance-Office. 
87 True Protestant (Domestick) Intelligence, No. 5, 7 May 1680, p. [1]; Mercurius Civicus or the 
City Mercury, No. 241, 12 May 1680, p. [2]: ‘those Persons that have not seen the Propositions 
may receive them at the Office gratis’. 
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part of the Insurance Office’s case that its design had been copied.88 Subsequently, the 
lapse of time was used to show the ‘labour’ that had gone into the Office’s settlement.89 
This body of printed matter took authority from the Propositions; conversely, by 
reference to the Propositions, it worked to build up the Office. A share of the credibility 
of the web of print the Insurance Office nurtured arose from its being public. Sheets 
commonly ended in the colophon with notice of the locations where they could be 
found. Two referred to their own existences in print to show the importance of what 
they said.90 
For the Sun as for the Insurance Office, print had authority. The Proposals and 
receipts were ‘printed’, as was expressly stated. In its opening years, the Sun ran its 
news-sheet, the British Mercury, such that it interlinked with those formats.91 The 
company used the Proposals and then the Conditions as a central hub from which it 
directed readers about the key sheets in the company’s arsenal, namely the policy and 
the receipt. Thus it legitimised its own paper processes. The Proposals explained the 
signatures that made a policy legitimate.92 They advised of the nature of a legitimate 
receipt: printed and witnessed by a clerk or an agent of the Office.93 In turn, the receipt 
itself repeated and expanded upon these statements. In 1804, the renewal notice 
referred to the policy and the Proposals. It ran:  
SIR / The Time for Payment on your Policy of Insurance in this OFFICE, No. [blank] expires 
Fifteen Days after Christmas Day next; … NB You may insure for any Number of Years, not 
exceeding seven, and a Discount will be allowed in such Case, according to the present 
Proposals.94  
Its counterpart in the twentieth century referred to the policy and to the receipt. 
The Sun rested on this set of documents. The Proposals also itemised the host of 
written documents that were required from a policy holder in order to make a claim: an 
Account of the Loss and Damage; Proof by an Oath or Affirmation; and ‘a Certificate 
                                                
88 Fire Office, To the Right Honourable the Lord Mayor: ‘since the Gentlemen of the Insurance-
Office, did for above a Year, publickly expose their Propositions for Insuring of Houses from Fire 
… now finding that the City have Published their Intentions to Settle a Fund in Ground-Rents, 
which seems to be exactly the same with their Proposals, are extreamly Surprized thereat’. 
89 Fire Office, September the 16th. 
90 Fire Office, Enquiry, p. 4: ‘the Gentlemen of the Insurance Office think fit to make this 
Publication’; W. I., A Letter to a Gentleman of the Insurance Office, Concerning the Cities 
Insuring Houses [1681]: ‘If you judge these Thoughts useful, you may Publish them’. 
91 The British Mercury informed policy holders of the company’s procedures, such as its 
receipts, e.g. British Mercury, 4 October 1710, p. 2, and upon the revision of the receipts, British 
Mercury, 24 June 1713, p. 1. The news-sheet also publicised the Proposals. In turn, the 
Proposals informed readers that they could expect the British Mercury as a benefit of a policy. 
92 Sun Fire Office, June 14, 1804. Sun Fire-Office, Cornhill, near the Royal-Exchange, and at 
Craig’s Court, Charing-Cross. Proposals for Insuring Houses, and Other Buildings, Goods, 
Wares and Merchandize, and Ships in Harbour, in Dock, or Building, and Craft, from Loss and 
Damage by Fire (1804), Article I. 
93 Ibid., Article XII. 
94 Sun Fire Office, renewal letter-form, 7 December 1804, LMA, 
CLC/B/192/DD/008/MS38828/001. 
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under the Hands of the Minister and Church-Wardens, together with some other 
reputable Inhabitants of the Parish’.95 In the twentieth century, a policy holder must 
‘give notice in writing’ and then deliver ‘a Claim in writing’ and be prepared to show a 
list of other writings such as invoices and plans.96  
 
In the midst of the many differences in this body of printed material that surfs time, the 
repeating use of particular devices becomes clear. This section has shed light on 
features that persisted through time: the policy number, the date and the capacity of 
one printed format to refer to another similar but different. But repetition also defines 
the performance of these devices; the policy number was copied from one format to 
another, from print to manuscript and back. These devices formed a connective tissue 
that upheld the insurance business. They provided it with a reliable structure. The 
styling of these devices on the page is also revealing. The policy number dressed the 
policy in a conspicuous fashion. It was part of what made the product trustworthy to the 
buyer. Likewise, dating – set apart in the layout – was part of the product. One bought 
into a set of paper. 
 
Graphic design 
The section above on ‘Terms and conditions’ mentioned how the visual language of the 
Insurance Office’s A Table and the Sun’s Proposals and Conditions reflected their clear 
and direct written language. This section hones in on the expressive powers of graphic 
design, in particular its powers to evoke the qualities of trust. The sheets generated by 
the Insurance Office and the Sun shaped the furniture of the page as a supplementary 
line of communication with their customers. Their sheets show that metal type was not 
thrown on the page at random but set into a frame by design. Arguably, metal type 
exaggerates the ‘visual organisation’ that Walter Ong conferred on writing because it is 
itself standardised and regimented: in one frame it produces multiple copies. The list, 
being Ong’s exemplar of the ‘visual organisation’ of the page, receives its own heading 
here.  
On the Insurance Office’s and the Sun’s sheets, paragraphs, empty space, 
headings, numbers, emphasis, variations of typeface, positioning and printers’ 
ornaments guided the reader’s eye to what was important and novel. They also shaped 
these sheets to strike a balance between clarity and personality; qualities of trust which 
correspond to transparency and identity discussed in Chapter 3. These are the details 
that confirm language in the ‘visual domain’.97 Between the seventeenth century and 
                                                
95 Sun Fire Office, June 14, 1804 … Proposals, Article XI. 
96 Sun Insurance Office, policy, dated 1904, Condition 6. 
97 Goody, Domestication of the Savage Mind, p. 78. 
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the early nineteenth century, there was no change in the equipment available to 
typesetters. While the options expanded in the nineteenth century, the principles of the 
graphic design changed little in the fire insurance industry.  
The paragraph was the graphic building block of these sheets. The Insurance 
Office’s Propositions consisted of a dense main text but each of its paragraphs was 
dedicated to an aspect of the new project. For that reason, the paragraph conveyed 
clarity. The terms documents performed similarly. As in the Sun’s Proposals, many of 
the paragraphs in the Insurance Office’s Propositions led with their subject; such as, 
‘As to the Quantity of the Fund, it is proposed…’ or ‘The Houses that are burnt down 
shall be rebuilt at the Charge of the Office…’. By opening in this way, each paragraph 
was more effective as a vehicle of information.  
The numbering of paragraphs added to the clarity and the transparency. By setting 
known limits, this technique served to formalise the Sun’s Proposals and Conditions. In 
the Insurance Office’s Propositions and in its Observations, numbering also had a 
rhetorical effect. There were two sets of bullet points in the Propositions, which were 
itemised on the page. These numerical points accentuated the persuasive capacities of 
‘The Advantages of such a Design’ and ‘To render such a Design effectual there 
seems to be three things more especially necessary’. (See Illustration 4.53.) The writer 
of the Insurance Office’s Observations built his argument against the Corporation of the 
City of London’s insurance scheme around a four-part structure, which was trailed by a 
list of the four topics he would address. (See Illustration 4.54.) He introduced each 
theme as follows: ‘As to the First’, ‘The Second Observation Is’, ‘The Third 
Observation is’ and ‘The Last Observation is’. The last part was broken down into a 
further four parts. What reader could doubt such simplicity of expression? The 
typesetter used the effects at his disposal to sharpen the contrast from one topic to the 
next: black letter and a line of space highlighted each part. Each discrete part related 
back clearly to the trailed topics. The typesetter’s work heightened the text’s 
crescendo, from one to four. An Enquiry’s writer devised a similar numbered structure 
reinforced by graphics.98 The Insurance Office’s sheets suggest that the texts were 
written with their graphic impact in mind: print’s visual rhetoric helped write the text.99 
Subtitles were another means to clarity, as on the Insurance Office’s A Table and 
the Sun’s Proposals. The Sun produced a rate card in the early nineteenth century 
                                                
98 As does Barbon, Letter to a Gentleman in the Country. 
99 Christine Ferdinand has remarked on the ‘genius’ shown by newspaper printers in their use of 
type. She highlights the combinations of capital letters and small capital letters, italic, roman 
type, in various sizes, along with pointing hands, asterisks, daggers and rules to separate 
columns and advertisements. Christine Ferdinand, ‘Constructing the Frameworks of Desire: 
How Newspapers Sold Books in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, in Joad Raymond, 
ed., News, Newspapers and Society in Early Modern Britain (London: F. Cass, 1999), pp. 152–
173, p. 166. 
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which applied a centred title in capital letters above each list of rates. (See Illustration 
4.55.) A century later, the company’s promotional leaflet labelled the rates in a similar 
fashion. (See Illustration 4.56.) Both these formats were crowded with content but by 
allowing bands of space at the margins and centred headings, their designers 
organised the information so that there were many ways in to reading it. The designers 
of these formats also used rules to demarcate subject matter within space. The rates 
card used horizontal rules, while the leaflet distinguished each page with a border. The 
form on the inside of the leaflet grouped its questions into sections by means of wide 
horizontal lines. (See Illustration 4.57.) The size of the blanks on forms afforded 
material resistance to the person who completed it, as a guide. 
Graphic emphasis could also supply a sheet with personality. The same graphic 
strategies that underscored the Insurance Office’s clarity of thinking in its Observations, 
also made the Office look lively and diverting. Key words and phrases popped out in 
italics as well as in black letter. In concert with its title, its numbers were argumentative. 
As a result, the Observations had a rambunctious character. (See Illustration 4.54.) It 
drew the reader in to the debate which it stoked about the Corporation of the City of 
London’s proposals for fire insurance. The Sun’s leaflet in the twentieth century 
similarly drew in the reader: it interplayed green and red ink, capital and lower case 
letters, different levels of headings and bold emphasis for words and phrases, 
particularly for those that trumpeted the company’s reputation. (See Illustration 4.56.) 
Here the message was its name and its superiority. 
The company’s name was the main zone in which the Insurance Office and the Sun 
bestowed their sheets with individuality. The Sun’s policy in the twentieth century 
demonstrated this. Similarly, the promotional leaflet just mentioned, subsumed ‘Sun 
Fire Office’ into its illustrated front cover, drawing on the art nouveau style fashionable 
at the time. This identity was underlined by repetition: ‘Sun Fire Office’ was repeated in 
red capital letters twice on two other of the six pages. In 1693, the Insurance Office’s 
typesetter had used the tools of his time to give prominence to ‘Fire Office’ in a 
comparable way. On A Table, he dramatically set the name in capitals in a display 
type, alone in the line. (See Illustration 4.58; compare to 4.50.) A poster produced by 
the Sun in 1806 demonstrated the same tactics: ‘Fire Office’ sits spaciously at the top 
in a display type, the largest type on the sheet. (See Illustration 4.59.) In this case, the 
company’s emblem augmented ‘Fire Office’ and stood in for ‘Sun’.  
By the end of the second decade of the nineteenth century, new display types 
provided typesetters with many more options. With a new hierarchy of sizes to access, 
the typesetter of a poster in 1819 kept to the convention of using the definition of the 
company’s name to confer distinction. (See Illustration 4.60.) The gravity that a 
distinctive type could bring to a company’s name was also effective at a small scale. 
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An otherwise unremarkable letter to policy holders regarding renewals and a handbill 
about a new agent both articulated ‘Sun Fire Office’ in black letter at the top in order to 
sprinkle some personality on the formats. (See Illustrations 4.61 and 4.62.) The Sun’s 
twentieth-century renewal leaflet was jammed with markers of the company’s identity 
and reputation. Its modest size contained the emblem twice, the Sun’s original policy 
illustration, and statements about longevity and security, as has been discussed in the 
previous chapter. (See Illustrations 4.63 and 4.64.) Moreover, the company’s name 
was prominently repeated three times on its four pages. Despite the many options of 
typeface then available, the Sun’s managers chose to retain black letter for the 
company’s name on the front.  
  
Lists 
The list is a technology of written language which deserves its own heading, for the fire 
insurance business was formed of lists. A sensitivity to graphics created these lists. A 
list has ‘a clear-cut beginning and a precise end, that is, a boundary…it encourages the 
ordering of items, by number, by initial sound, by category’.100 The Insurance Office 
and the Sun rested on their policy books, which were lists of the information from each 
policy. This ever-evolving list constituted the company. It could also enable trust in the 
company: the Insurance Office’s projectors had publicised their ‘Books’ as being 
available for inspection. This function of the lists in the book as proof of the company is 
akin to the Sun Insurance Company’s Report of the Directors. When the Sun became a 
public company in 1891, it was obliged to print a Report of its financial health annually, 
for shareholders and the wider financial market.101 The Report comprised a list of 
figures that summarised the detailed accountancy lists held by the company. Thus the 
Sun’s internal lists were re-purposed in print, for public consumption and transparency. 
(See Illustrations 4.65 to 4.69.) 
The collection of information in lists informed the fire insurance industry. The act of 
listing stores information.102 The Insurance Office’s projectors twice used a list of the 
number of houses burnt in London since the Great Fire in 1666 to prove their 
knowledge of the subject upon which they based their business.103 (See Illustrations 
4.70 and 4.71, and 4.72.) Thus they associated their risky project with factual, empirical 
information.104 They displayed the evidence that informed their calculations of the risks. 
                                                
100 Goody, Domestication of the Savage Mind, p. 81. 
101 For example, Sun Insurance Office (Fire), Report of the Directors, 1897, LMA, 
CLC/B/192/B/003/MS15030/001. 
102 Goody, Domestication of the Savage Mind, p. 87. 
103 Fire Office, Arguments, p. 2, and Fire Office, Enquiry, p. 3. 
104 Mortality figures were collected in London and printed in a similar fashion in the Bills of 
Mortality, since the start of the seventeenth century; David Jury, Graphic Design Before Graphic 
Designers: The Printer as Designer and Craftsman 1700–1914 (London: Thames & Hudson, 
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The list, broken into three columns, visualised their credibility to financially savvy 
readers who might join the project. When the projectors printed a similar table a second 
time, they further demonstrated their command of their subject, particularly over the 
Corporation of the City of London. In this second list they sorted the columns according 
to whether houses were ‘Brick’ or ‘Timber’.  
The price of fire insurance was determined by a set of variables in relation to value, 
materials and time. The Insurance Office’s backers first used the technology of a table 
to demonstrate the relationship of price to value and time in 1681:105 they ended the 
Observations pamphlet with a table set apart by a rule and a lengthy heading that 
began, ‘A Table for Insurance of Houses from Fire, from One Pound per Annum to a 
Hundred for Thirty-One Years, or Under, after these Rates, viz …’.106 (See Illustration 
4.73.) Subsequently, their format A Table revolved around an exactly similar table of 
rates. (See Illustration 4.50.) It is possible that the Insurance Office’s backers were 
inspired to print a table of rates by a piece of publicity for the Corporation of the City of 
London’s insurance scheme, which had a table at its heart and began ‘A Table of all 
Terms of Years’. (See Illustration 4.74.) However, the Insurance Office’s table was 
more sophisticated: it presented the value insured as well the length of term. It ran the 
different options of term on the horizontal axis, leaving the vertical axis for value. This 
showed the reader the saving when one chose a longer term. One could use both axes 
of the table to determine one’s own insurance product. The price was double for 
timber, but this was noted outside the bounds of the table. The table included a final 
column for ‘Houses Burnt, Money Paid’, which implied the profitability of the purchase if 
one suffered a fire. Compared to the Corporation’s, the Insurance Office’s table looked 
complete, as it had clear headings inside a neat outline.  
The Corporation of the City of London’s and the Insurance Office’s tables of rates 
fitted their product into mathematical and commercial culture in the late seventeenth 
century. Commercial culture ran on lists and tables of prices and rates in news-sheets 
and merchants’ guides.107 They echoed annuity tables, but they showed the inverse: 
                                                                                                                                          
2012), p. 52. The ordering of empirical information in this way associates the enterprise with 
scientific culture at the time, as well as financial culture.  
105 On a table as ‘one or more vertical lists’, see Goody, Domestication of the Savage Mind, p. 
75. 
106 The heading ends: ‘and Double for Timber. This is Under the Cities Proposals Two Shillings 
and Nine Pence per Cent.’ In another issue of Observations, the heading to the table instead 
begins: ‘The Premium, or Rate of Insurance for Brick-Houses (the same to be reckoned Double 
for Timber) from One Pound per Annum Rent to an Hundred …’ It ends: ‘which is Under the 
Cities Proposal, Two Shillings Two Pence per Cent.’ 
107 Carolyn Nelson and Matthew Seccombe, ‘The Creation of the Periodical Press 1620–1695’, 
in John Barnard and D. F. McKenzie, eds, The Cambridge History of the Book in Britain Volume 
4, 1557–1695 (Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 533–550; Anne L. Murphy, The Origins 
of English Financial Markets: Investment and Speculation Before the South Sea Bubble 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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what one paid rather than what one might earn.108 The Corporation’s table in particular 
resonates with the form of a compound interest table in William Webster’s ready 
reckoner, first published in 1634.109 Contemporary tables tended to have long captions 
and there are precedents for the caption comprising the title to a sheet.110 The 
existence of a table constructed the substance of the sheets. 
Just as ready reckoners simplified calculations, the Insurance Office simplified its 
product by the display of a table of rates.111 It sold policies by its series of publicity 
sheets that began A Table. In the early nineteenth century, the Sun retained a trace of 
this practice. A table of rates was a component of issues of its Proposals, as also in its 
annual letters to policy holders concerning renewal and on its handy rates card. (See 
Illustrations 4.19, 4.20, 4.32, 4.55 and 4.75.) In an era when the premium was informed 
by more variables than before, in the twentieth century the Sun’s promotional and 
renewal leaflets displayed just a taster of information about their rates in lists. (See 
Illustrations 4.56 and 4.76.) The tabulation of rates remained the shop window for the 
product. Tables were promotional tools designed to make an attractive offer to potential 
customers, one which could be easily compared with competitors.112  
Unlike the Insurance Office’s, the Sun’s tables of rates tended to incorporate the 
classification of risk: in the nineteenth century, the industry decided premiums 
according to the categories ‘Common’, ‘Hazardous’ and ‘Doubly-Hazardous’. The 
articles of the Proposals provided a prose list of the trades and materials that defined 
these ‘Heads of Insurance’. Although the table appeared to show a clear product, it 
masked the complexity which now powered the setting of premiums. It was necessary 
for the Sun’s clerks to decide many premiums case by case. In 1808, the table itself 
indicated the subjectivity: ‘Sums above 6000l. hazardous and doubly hazardous, may 
be insured by special agreement.’ As the range of risks had vastly increased since the 
Insurance Office’s distinction been ‘Brick’ and ‘Timber’, and the upper limits of value as 
well, the table showed its limitations. The limitations are demonstrated in the Sun’s 
Rates, Rules, and Classes, of Insurance, on Cotton-Mills, which consumed an entire 
                                                
108 For contemporary annuity tables: William Leybourn, A President for Purchasers, Sellers and 
Mortgagers, or, Anatocisme (Commonly Called Compound Interest) Made Easie, without 
Arithmetical Calculation (1678). 
109 William Webster, Webster’s Tables (1634), reproduced in Bruce O. B. Williams and Roger G. 
Johnson, 'Ready Reckoners', IEEE Annals of the History of Computing, 27:4 (2005), 64–80 (p. 
65). See also John Newton, The Scale of Interest: Or the Use of Decimal Fractions (1668). 
110 This remark is based on a search of the ESTC. Examples are: A Table of Rates for Garbling, 
[1679], and St Dunstan’s in the West, A Table of the Accustomed Rates for Burials, for the 
Parish of St Dunstan’s in the West [1679]. 
111 On the superficial order afforded by a table and how a table is loaded with the meanings of 
other tables, see Goody, Domestication of the Savage Mind, p. 68. 
112 The Insurance Office’s successor, the Phoenix, used a table format to compare its rates with 
those of its rival, the Friendly Society: Fire Office, Phenix Office, Houses are Insured at the 
Phœnix Office for a Sum Certain, without any Contribution or Contingency whatsoever. And 
also by Mutual Contribution [1705?]. 
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page in explaining the distinctions in this type of risk. (See Illustration 4.77.) This table 
was a feat of information design but an inadequate substitute for a person’s knowledge 
and judgement. 
The Sun used other printed lists to define its product in the way of the ‘Heads of 
Insurance’. The Proposals and the Conditions were themselves lists. The Conditions 
recorded a list of those objects or events the policy did not cover. In the twentieth 
century the company’s policy printed a prose list of property, thereby showing those 
possessions that a policy covered by default. The Proposal for Fire Insurance form, in 
which a customer requested a policy via an agent, mimicked this list in anticipation of 
the policy. (See the middle section in the lower half of Illustration 4.25, under a title in 
red capital letters ‘Property to be Insured’.) On each of these documents, beside the list 
there was a blank column where the value of the possessions was to be entered by 
hand.  
The usefulness of the printed list extended inside the Sun. In the early nineteenth 
century the company’s classification of the Heads of Insurance in the Proposals was 
mirrored internally by its Rate Books. The Rate Books was a printed list of every 
possible trade a fire office would consider. Beside the trade were three columns for the 
price of its ‘Rate or Class’, whether ‘Brick’, ‘Timber or Brick & Timber’ and ‘Thatched’. 
(See Illustration 4.78.) Clerks added notes and alterations to the descriptions of the 
trades and changes to the prices. The printed nature of this lengthy list gave clerks a 
standardised system from which to conduct their work. They used it to identify and 
measure risk, facilitating the making of trustworthy decisions.  
The printed list was fundamental to how the Insurance Office and the Sun presented 
themselves. It simplified and promoted, defined and classified, and it had the look of 
transparency. In the twentieth century, league tables of insurance companies were 
printed, apparently to bestow transparency on the now-crowded insurance market. 
(See Illustration 4.79.) Other subjects were suitable for a list: the next chapter 
examines the purpose served by printed lists of people – of the Insurance Office’s 
insurers and lawyers, and the Sun’s managers, agents and firemen – in newspaper 
advertising, trade directories and posters. 
 
Additional messages 
In the section above on ‘Graphic objects’ we saw how the sheets in the name of the 
Insurance Office and the Sun left blank spaces and empty space. It was also common 
for these Offices’ sheets to use up space on the page with short messages that were 
afterthoughts to their main purpose. The layout itself conveyed their secondary status. 
For example, the information given to potential customers about discounts on the 
premium – a means to secure loyalty that was discussed in Chapter 3 – was set apart 
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from a format’s main text. The Insurance Office’s sheets contained this information at 
the end of a sheet, usually in italics. (See Illustrations 4.80 to 4.83.) The Sun 
compartmentalised its notices of discounts with a boundary of space. (See Illustrations 
4.84, 4.85 and 4.86.) The Sun’s formats in the first decade of the nineteenth century 
show the apogee of this flexible use of the page. In that period, the Proposals was a 
vehicle for multiple paragraphs about the company’s offer, notifying readers of its 
discount, the stamp duty, its fire patrol and its engines. In the same period, the form 
component of the Sun’s receipt was followed by a trio of additional paragraphs that 
morphed this object into an information sheet. (See Illustration 4.87.) In both cases, 
these paragraphs were additive to the patterns of the Sun’s Proposals and its receipt 
since they had originally been designed in the eighteenth century. These regular 
formats became an opportunity for various communications with a customer. 
The Insurance Office’s and the Sun’s managers stretched a format’s graphic 
conventions above all in order to safeguard the interests of the company. By 1699 the 
Insurance Office’s policy contained an additional sentence which alerted policy holders 
that the assignment of a policy had to be recorded at the office.113 (See Illustration 
4.88.) In the early nineteenth century, the Sun’s policy carried analogous advice about 
endorsement.114 These additions show how the Offices’ managers – or their typesetter 
– perceived no genre as too precious on which to add clarification as to the 
practicalities of fire insurance. The managers disrupted the policy as tactfully as 
possible: in both cases, the sentences sat outside the familiar format. The managers’ 
desire to protect their interests in the policy and avoid conflict with policy holders 
determined their flexible approach to graphic design. 
Further barricading the company, the Sun’s managers specifically used the 
company’s formats as a space in which to reiterate clauses from its Proposals and its 
Conditions. On the Sun’s receipt in the early nineteenth century, one paragraph 
repeated an article of the Terms regarding the removal of goods in a fire.115 Another 
paragraph, lengthy and in small print, reminded customers that it was their 
responsibility to remember to pay their premium for the year. The importance of these 
notes was reinforced by italics, capital letters, ‘NB’ and a pointing hand, used in turn. 
(See Illustration 4.87.) The variety of styles was likely intended to encourage the 
                                                
113 Insurance Office, policy, dated 1699, Private Collection: ‘Upon Assigning this Policy it is 
necessary that the Assignment be Registred in the Office’. The note is not on earlier surviving 
examples of the Insurance Office’s policy, which in all other aspects remained the same at least 
until the turn of the century. (I am not aware of an Insurance Office policy after 1699.) 
114 ‘The Interest in this Policy may be transferred by Indorsement, made and entered at this 
Office, if the Trustees or acting Members approve thereof, but not otherwise.’ 
115 ‘To encourage the Removal of Goods in Cases of Fire, this Office will allow the reasonable 
Charges attending the same; and makes good the sufferer’s Loss, whether destroyed, lost or 
damaged by such Removal.’ This reiterates Article 11 of the Terms on the Sun’s Proposals in 
1803, 1804, 1807 and 1808. The same sentiment was included on the Proposals in 1816. 
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comprehension of the different warnings. In the twentieth century, the Sun’s renewal 
notice repeated the condition about receipts.116 These sheets were put into dialogue 
with policy holders. They were active. These notes were an attempt to solve problems 
of communication through the use of leftover space on the printed page. Insurers 
evolved how they used their formats. Particularly in the early nineteenth century, these 
notes point to exasperation on the Sun’s part to make its customers accountable for its 
own rules. 
 
It is neither appropriate nor accurate to talk of graphic designers creating the sheets 
sampled in this thesis, even in the final period considered here. Particularly in the first 
two periods, convention determined the look of these sheets. But that does not prevent 
their being evidence of intention and design. Writers, managers or typesetters made 
decisions about layouts. The study of those layouts expands the perspective of graphic 
design as a practice and a discipline. The design of these sheets co-constructed the 
text and its meaning. In the late seventeenth century, printed lists brought their cultural 
baggage from other formats to fire insurance and infused the new enterprise with visual 
markers of authority and transparency. By doing so, the list was the shop window into 
the enterprise. Lists, paragraphs and layouts are windows into the cultural impact of 
fire insurance, in a way that deepens James Raven’s analysis of business print. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has taken the notion of repeatable patterns, mechanisms or devices from 
Part I’s design projects and spied it in fire insurance print. In this chapter, the label 
technology has subsumed these repeatable and repeating devices both integral and 
integrated – from entire objects to graphic inflections. This allows resonance with 
Walter Ong’s insight that writing is a technology that restructures thought. Here, 
graphic technologies structured fire insurance. The technologies enumerated and 
analysed here were generated by design practice working in print. This analysis shows 
what a flexible material print was to work with: it could afford different kinds of object, it 
could afford connecting devices between objects or parts of an object, it led a dance 
with the reader. The sampling of periods brings to light the repeating nature of these 
technologies. 
This chapter and the previous have rested on a delicate distinction. Where Chapter 
3 argued that print forged trust in fire insurance through language and tropes 
graphically depicted, this chapter’s attention went to technologies. The technologies 
                                                
116 Sun Insurance Office, renewal notice (1906), Hillingdon, MC25C/SF1/1570/1/3/1: ‘No 
Receipts will be recognised as valid but such as are printed and issued from the Office.’ This 
matched: Sun Insurance Office, policy, dated 1904, Condition 4. 
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powered the qualities of trust discussed in Chapter 3; the one set is entangled in the 
other set. The argument is that these were all means by which to materialise the fire 
insurance product. They stood in for the emptiness of the product. The policy gave it 
weight, materially. The policy number, dates and lists gave it weight conceptually. 
Graphic design styled it.117 The materialisation was visual. These were the means that 
made fire insurance believable to buyers. To materialise the product was to materialise 
trust. Part of that materialisation was the construction of a reliable system for the 
insurers themselves. Paradoxically, a quiet ring of mistrust has reverberated around 
this chapter. The Insurance Office’s eagerness to prove one piece of print with another, 
and the Sun’s reiteration of its terms and subsequent defensive staging of its 
Conditions on the policy, speak of a lack of certainty around these Offices’ positions 
and processes. The ring of distrust resounds into the next chapter, while the next Part 
of the thesis shifts the emphasis to this flipside of trust. 
The materialisation of the fire insurance product militates for its impersonal nature. 
In each period, the fire offices re-used and built upon the technologies of the past, both 
entire graphic objects and the components of graphic objects. Graphic objects such as 
the policy and the receipt recorded relationships between strangers. Over time, the 
policy evolved to be a bold souvenir of an insurance company, with fewer signatures of 
the individuals who represented the company. Meanwhile, terms formats became 
characterless rather than representing the character of the company. The policy 
number made customers anonymous by fashioning them as numbers in a sequence. In 
a manner that resonates with and predates Theodore Porter’s technologies of trust in 
the accountancy industry, the Insurance Office and the Sun depended on objects and 
devices that apparently bypassed interpersonal relationships.118 Before that can be 
settled, the next and final chapter in this Part, turns to the integral role that people 
played in the print culture of these two offices. People interacted with print and print 
represented people.  
                                                
117 ‘[T]hese technologies of the word do not merely store what we know. They style what we 
know’: Ong, Orality and Literacy, p. 155. 
118 Theodore Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life 
(Princeton University Press, 1995). 
 157 
Chapter 5: The Personality of Graphic Objects 
 
Amidst the explanation of its safety measures, Airbnb’s ‘Trust’ portal has a sprinkling of 
human faces; one of which stands for safety when things go wrong. As was also 
discussed in Part I, designs for trust by students at the RCA incorporated face-to-face 
meetings as key moments in their service designs. This chapter echoes this human 
input into the design of trust; it is concerned with how people built trust in the Insurance 
Office and the Sun. The staff at these fire offices performed an essential role. They 
worked in tandem with graphic objects. The previous chapter looked at two persistent 
graphic objects used by fire offices. This chapter embraces a slew of others. Graphic 
objects balanced trust in individuals with trust in a corporate body.   
In the seventeenth century, a two-dozen ‘Councel’, ‘Trustees’ and ‘Insurers’ cast off 
the Insurance Office, aided by a band of firemen. In the early nineteenth century, the 
Sun Fire Office ran on twenty-four managers – from a larger body of shareholders – 
with up to fifty firemen and five or so patrolmen, about 150 freelance agents and 
another two dozen of clerks, collectors, surveyors and porters. When it became a 
public company as the Sun Insurance Office in 1891, the company’s total staff had 
grown to about 150 and its agent force to over a thousand, numbers which continued 
to grow.1 These numbers activated fire insurance, and they met the growing number of 
policy holders. The Sun’s managers spent much time in hiring people and in deciding 
benefits and salaries.2  
In each period, different articulations of this staff were presented in the print that 
was intended for policy holders and potential policy holders. On the one hand, people 
were integrated with graphic objects: their names were printed, signed and listed, and 
in the case of firemen, their bodies appeared in illustrations. On the other hand, graphic 
objects determined this staff: print was essential in endorsing, advertising and soliciting 
for business in the context of local conditions, in the form of advertisements, notices 
and handbills. Graphic objects also tried to shape and discipline company agents, 
firemen and customers. In this regard, a key object is the book of Instructions for 
agents that the Sun’s managers commissioned in the first decade of the nineteenth 
                                                
1 P. G. M. Dickson, The Sun Insurance Office 1710–1960: The History of Two and a Half 
Centuries of British Insurance (Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 297. Also, Michael Heller, 
London Clerical Workers 1880–1914: Development of the Labour Market (London: Pickering & 
Chatto, 2011). 
2 As shown by minutes and letter books: LMA, CLC/B/192/B/001/MS11931, 
CLC/B/192/B/003/MS15030, CLC/B/192/B/009/MS11932 and CLC/B/192/DA/001/MS18243. 
For a contemporary view on the desirable insurance employee and on staff as both 
‘instruments’ of an insurance office and its representatives, see T. E. Young and R. Masters, 
Insurance Office Organisation, Management, and Accounts (London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, 
1904). 
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century. The Sun was reliant on agents for its expansion across Britain in the 
eighteenth century; the Instructions attempted to regulate and standardise this errant 
body.  
 
In 1804, James Hall, a surveyor to the Sun, wrote a report to the managers setting 
down his low opinion of the company’s staff and its inattentive management.3 His 
report responded to a Committee of Enquiry that had then begun to conduct a review 
of the company’s staff and operations.4 James Hall’s stinging commentary underlines 
the importance of the Sun’s staff to trust in the company, both internally and externally. 
Hall distrusted every group. He condemned the ‘drunkenness’ of firemen, who were in 
a ‘state of insubordination’, exhorting ‘that they ought to be under better regulation and 
that with proper management they may be made of more use to you than they are at 
present’.  
The surveyor articulated his criticisms in the language of trust. He denounced the 
‘abuses’ by staff in the system of disbursements, and he considered new arrangements 
that could be implemented to ‘secure confidence to your servants’. Hall decried 
‘fraudulent claims’ and the reliance on those who settled claims in London: ‘I feel 
myself bound to say that the power and confidence placed in me and in them [other 
servants of the office] is greater than I think ought to be delegated to such persons’. He 
disapproved of the use of ‘alien assistance’ to settle claims: ‘the practice of introducing 
strangers for the purpose of settling losses should be limited within narrower 
bounds…as it produces an unnecessary expence without an adequate advantage…[It] 
is an improper custom’.  
But it was the lack of sophistication of its agents that threatened trust in the Sun 
itself. James Hall expounded: 
Settlement of losses in the country … deserves your most serious attention … it has been 
much the custom to employ the agents to adjust the claims – these as you well know are 
persons of both sexes, various ages and different occupations, very rarely indeed qualified 
either by their education or their habits, for the due execution of the onorous business they 
are on such occasions invited to perform – Their confined manner of life contracts their ideas 
and makes them strangers to that broad & liberal scale of conduct which is at all times so 
essentially necessary to improve the credit & reputation and support the character of and 
confidence in an establishment like yours.  
Hall continued that personal relations dictated claims, rather than the contract of the 
policy. He had no trust in agents serving the company: 
                                                
3 LMA, CLC/B/192/DE/002/MS38849. 
4 The Committee of Enquiry was first appointed in 1804. See Chapter 2. For a description of 
James Hall’s work as surveyor of stock, see LMA, CLC/B/192/E/045/MS38856. 
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your agent has it in his power to connive at his own neglect or error in the framing of a policy 
or in his instructions transmitted to the Office for it, and of qualifying the terms of it by an 
unauthorised and forced construction.  
The consequence of this was ‘an act of immunity to him and of liberality to the sufferer’.  
Moreover, one could not trust the agents’ judgement, for on occasions when they 
transferred the settlement of losses to others, ‘your purse and your reputation, both 
wide open, are committed to persons (without restraint) perfectly unknown to you either 
for their abilities or their integrity.’ The result was that the Sun ‘will be certain to suffer 
all the disadvantages … from their infidelity, partiality or ignorance’. 
Regardless of their bile, James Hall’s opinions highlight the vulnerabilities of this 
geographically extended business, in which face-to-face encounters represented a 
corporate reputation. This chapter shows how graphic objects moderated the risks 
posed by people in Hall’s era as well as in the periods studied in this thesis that 
preceded and succeeded it. Within three years of Hall’s report, the Sun had issued a 
new book of Instructions for agents. Despite that, a theme of this chapter is the risks 
that people presented to the fire insurance industry, and the distrust with which 
personal relations were imbued.  
 
Personal names on graphic objects 
So far this Part of the thesis has examined printed matter in a somewhat dispassionate 
manner. This could give the impression that the material is itself impersonal. To 
counter that, this section surveys the different ways in which the Insurance Office and 
the Sun put names to work on their printed output. This output was infused with names, 
fixed in print and prompted by blanks.  
 
Names on display 
At its first presentation, the Insurance Office was a mysterious enterprise. In 1680, the 
Propositions associated no individuals with the project except the booksellers from 
whom copies of the sheet were available.5 But the Propositions promised that names 
would come: ‘The Names of the Insurers, and places where the Estates or Security 
lies; with the Names of the Trustees, and an exact draught of the Conveyance will be 
hereafter set forth.’ The author of this assurance showed his belief that the disclosure 
of the people behind the scheme was a vital ingredient for its credibility. A year later, 
the Advertisement from the Insurance Office provided just two names, of the insurers 
‘Samuel Vincent Esq and Dr Nicholas Barbon’. The ‘others’ remained anonymous.6 But 
                                                
5 Fire Office, Arguments for Insuring Houses from Fire [1680], mentions no names whatsoever. 
6 Fire Office, Propositions for Insuring Houses from Fire [1681]; Fire Office, [Advertisement] 
from the Insurance-Office for Houses on the Back-Side of the Royal-Exchange [1681]. 
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the importance of names to the Office’s infrastructure was conveyed in the graphic 
design of the sheets. ‘Names’ was picked out in black-letter type four times. (See 
Illustration 5.1.) These emphases created anticipation: ‘the Names of the Insurers … 
with the Names of the Trustees, should in a short time, be set forth’. The names were a 
presence, even before they were named. 
The Insurance Office’s Advertisement in September 1681 delivered on the 
expectation, providing lists in prose of the project’s eleven trustees, eight counsel and 
four insurers; the latter names authenticated policies.7 (See Illustration 5.2.) These 
personal names supported the impersonal nature of the Office’s security fund and trust. 
Print publicised them. Names were a refrain on each edition of the Insurance Office’s A 
Table, on which they were transformed into part of the display. (See Illustration 5.3.)  
The Insurance Office’s anonymous authors affirmed the prestige of the names 
involved in the project. At the Office’s ‘Publick Meetings’, ‘several Gentlemen, and 
Eminent Citizens were present’. Its trustees were the ‘Eminentest Councel at Law’.8 
Lists arranged names in order of their status, starting with knights and identifying 
prestigious roles, such as ‘late Speaker to the House of Commons’. Even if a reader 
was not familiar with a name, he or she could recognise status. The Insurance Office’s 
backers listed names to show the Office’s transparency and to endow their nascent 
office with reputations.9 This transparency may also have been a strategic attempt to 
counter the poor reputation of the Office’s main driver, Nicholas Barbon. The author of 
the pamphlets which defended the Corporation of the City of London’s insurance 
scheme obliquely used Barbon’s reputation as a property developer as ammunition 
against the Insurance Office, making jibes about his law suits, his debts and his failure 
                                                
7 Of those named in 1681, two are known to have been associated with Nicholas Barbon in 
property projects: Samuel Vincent, who was one of the four insurers, and George Bradbury, a 
close legal adviser to Barbon, who was named as a trustee of the Office. Of those named on 
the list of ‘the Insurers’ in Fire Office, A Table, Shewing the Rates of Insuring Houses from One 
Year to Eleven: at the Fire-Office, Kept against the Royal-Exchange in Cornhill; and at the 
Rainbow Coffee-House by the Inner-Temple-Gate in Fleet-Street (1693): Sir John Parsons is 
thought to have provided Barbon with the money for the purchase of a piece of land, and 
Edward Noell was another close legal adviser. The source for Barbon’s associates is Elizabeth 
McKellar, The Birth of Modern London: The Development and Design of the City 1660–1720 
(Manchester University Press, 1999), pp. 51–52. 
8 Fire Office, A Table, Shewing the Rates of Insuring Houses from One Year to Seven: at the 
Fire-Office, Kept against the Royal-Exchange in Cornhill: and at the Rainbow Coffee-House by 
the Inner-Temple-Gate in Fleetstreet (1700). Also, Fire Office, September, the 16th 1681. An 
Advertisement from the Insurance-Office for Houses, &c (1681), p. 2. 
9 Natasha Glaisyer, The Culture of Commerce in England, 1660–1720 (Woodbridge: Boydell 
Press, 2006). According to McKellar, Birth of Modern London, p. 53, those who invested in 
property speculation were ‘self-made men, rather than from the gentry and aristocracy’. ‘[T]he 
majority of financing was organized through credit networks’. Although some of the names 
printed on Insurance Office sheets are known to be Barbon’s associates in property, it is notable 
that he was compelled to find other, more eminent names to promote the insurance enterprise. 
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to pay his workers their wages.10 The Gentlemen of the Insurance Office ‘should not be 
trusted’ with people’s premiums.  
The personal untrustworthiness of an individual was exactly the possibility that the 
legal structure of the Insurance Office was designed to counteract. Its foundation in a 
trust made it trustworthy. But the Office’s spokesmen tried to have it both ways. One 
pamphlet argued that fire insurance was better as a private enterprise than run by the 
Corporation of London:  
taking it for granted, That the Security is in all respects equal; yet there are differences that 
make the same security better, as it is now setled by private persons, than if setled by the 
City … First, it will be better managed for the Advantage of the insured and insurers. Mens 
credit, care and industry, are more concerned to preserve private interest, than publick: By 
this means fires will be better prevented and extinguished.11  
The Insurance Office’s printed matter gave the impression that individuals were 
accountable. But the Friendly Society’s spokesman was suspicious of the Insurance 
Office’s lack of personal accountability: ‘neither is any Personal Security given, but 
especial Care taken that nothing in their Settlement should Charge their Persons’.12  
In the eighteenth century, the Sun Fire Office’s governing body did not embed itself 
in print in the way that the Insurance Office’s had. The company promoted its terms 
and conditions and it built its corporate identity. But this convention shifted in the first 
quarter of the nineteenth century, during which the company tentatively gave space in 
its publicity to the names of its managers. Names were organised in the display format 
of a list. In this shift, it followed its competitors. In 1805, managers discussed the 
‘propriety’ of putting names ‘in the different calendars and directories’.13 The company’s 
entry in the 1808 edition of the Post Office Annual Directory for London consisted of 
the list of its managers. The company’s Chairman and Secretary headed the list, with 
the rest, including two knights, in alphabetical order, unlike the Insurance Office’s 
hierarchical order. Each name was printed with an address for correspondence. The 
                                                
10 L. R., To my Honoured Friend Mr M.T. one of the Committee Chosen by the Common Council 
of London, for the Insuring of Houses from Fire (1682), p. 2: ‘And I dare say this Office, erected 
by the City, shall pay the Losses of those whose Houses are burnt down sooner than this 
Enquirer shall the wages of those that built his up’; ibid., p. 4: ‘I do not think it strange, that he 
who refuses to pay what he is indebted to others, should refuse to acknowledge what he owes 
to you’; L. R., A Second Letter to his Honoured Friend Mr M.T. one of the Committee Chosen by 
the Common Council of London for the Insuring of Houses from Fire (1682), p. 2: ‘the many 
Suits that are every Term between them and their Creditors’; ibid., p. 3: ‘I ask how Private men, 
and Persons so much in Debt should come by such a Bank’; ‘their many Creditors’. 
11 Fire Office, An Enquiry, Whether it be the Interest of the City to Insure Houses from Fire; and 
Whether the Insured may Expect Any Advantage thereby, more than from the Insurance-Office 
Already Setled [1681], p. 2. The City’s spokesman disagreed: that ‘Publick Revenues ... 
committed to the care of a few private Persons, have been miserably perverted’, L. R., To my 
Honoured Friend, p. 2. 
12 H[enry] S[pelman], An Answer to a Letter to a Gentleman in the Countrey, Giving an Account 
of the Two Insurance-Offices; the Fire-Office & Friendly-Society (1684), p. 1. 
13 LMA, CLC/B/192/B/025/MS38773, 29 October 1805. 
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name of the Office Secretary punctuated the list; his address was the company’s office 
on Cornhill. (See Illustration 5.4.) This format became incorporated into the Sun’s 
masthead. From 1820, a list of the managers in two columns was positioned with the 
Conditions. (See Illustrations 5.5 and 5.6.) From 1824, the company listed the names 
of its managers at the top of its advertisements in newspapers.14 The Sun’s governing 
body came to publicise its names as a component and endorsement of the company’s 
identity. 
In the early twentieth century, the list of the Sun’s directors (as they were now 
called) was grander in content and display. Among the twenty names in 1904, was a 
greater proportion of members of the aristocracy than in 1820.15 The names were now 
positioned beside the illustration on the policy. (See Illustration 5.7.) The same 
alphabetical list was part of the masthead on the company’s annual reports and on 
stationery. (See Illustration 5.8.) Policy holders also saw this list of names on their 
annual renewal notice. (See Illustration 5.9.) Like the Insurance Office’s proclamations 
in the seventeenth century, this leaflet marshalled the social standing of these names 
in order to endorse the Sun’s performance: ‘The Directors can confidently recommend 
the SUN FIRE OFFICE, the oldest Insurance Company in the world, to the notice of the 
Public’.  
 
Names to promote 
Names also appeared in print in order to advertise individuals to the public and to 
proclaim their trustworthiness. As the Sun Fire Office extended its service across the 
British Isles in the eighteenth century, names on print accrued this new purpose, one 
that the Insurance Office had no need to tap. From the late eighteenth century, the 
company made use of local newspapers to advertise its local list of agents. Its 
managers 
Resolved, that it will be beneficial to this office that their agents in every county, by name & 
residence, be made known to the county in general, by a public advertisement in the country 
newspapers twice before every quarter day – And that it be referred to the Committee of 
Country Insurances to frame the Advertisement.16  
The company’s identity manifestly endorsed the agents’ names, as the Sun’s emblem 
hung over them. A list organised agents’ names according to the towns in the county. 
                                                
14 Sun Fire Office, advertisement specimen,1824, LMA, CLC/B/192/DD/008/MS38828/001, fol. 
110. 
15 The grandness of the names of the Sun’s directors in the period concords with the evidence 
on directors at new technology companies from 1890 to 1910, presented in Fabio Braggion and 
Lyndon Moore, ‘The Economic Benefits of Political Connections in Late Victorian Britain’, 
Journal of Economic History, 73:1 (2013), cited by Jonathan Haskel and Stian Westlake, 
Capitalism without Capital: The Rise of the Intangible Economy (Princeton University Press, 
2018).   
16 LMA, CLC/B/192/B/001/MS11931, 11 October 1792. 
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(See Illustrations 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12.) The Sun had posters printed in London to make 
known the names of its local agents. The names were similarly organised in a list and 
by county for ease of reference. (See Illustration 5.13.) The Sun’s printer in London 
produced an appointment form for agents, in which blanks were left for the agent’s 
name, address and county. (See Illustration 5.14.) The printed nature of the form, and 
its heading in black-letter, endorsed the authenticity of the written name. 
The Sun also encouraged agents to print their own publicity. In 1795, the Sun’s 
governing body 
Resolved, That the respective agents of this office in the country should be informed of this 
advertisement [a template form], & acquainted that it’s insertion is not meant to preclude 
them from publishing such advertisements, as they think will tend to increase their particular 
business.17  
The agent in Lincoln in 1804 used a handbill notice to name himself and four others in 
the region, for those ‘who live at an inconvenient distance from Lincoln’. The 
individuals’ names, set in capitals, sat under the aegis of the much larger heading, 
‘SUN-FIRE-OFFICE, LONDON’. (See Illustration 5.15.) Agents commissioned their 
own posters from local printers. A poster about the change of the agent in Leeds in 
1819 made use of new, heavier display types to make an impact. (See Illustration 
5.16.) The message was reinforced by a handbill of the same. (See Illustration 5.17.) 
The Sun also put names on print in the early nineteenth century for its own internal 
purposes. Its managers found a need for a list of its agents, perhaps as a means to 
formalise the group and distribute to its network. (See Illustration 5.18.) The managers 
also commissioned lists of its firemen and porters, in a size and layout suitable for 
display. (See Illustration 5.19.) This kind of list was put up in the locations of the fire 
patrol, so that each one knew the authenticity of the other. By listing the names 
according to badge number, the posters also made clear the order of command. The 
list in 1811 differentiated clearly between ‘foreman’, ‘deputy foreman’ and the rest. 
(See Illustration 5.20.) These poster lists allowed the Sun’s managers to revel in the 
office’s manpower, at the same time as they were concerned about how to control it. 
 
Signatures 
Signatures were another manifestation of personal names on the printed page. Graphic 
design left space for them. Signatures and seals authorised the Insurance Office’s and 
the Sun’s policies. They were an index of security to the company and the customer. 
The Insurance Office’s A Table explained of the Office’s twelve insurers: ‘Any Two of 
them Sealing, make good the Pollicy.’18 The Insurance Office’s insurers signed policies 
                                                
17 Ibid., 29 January 1795. 
18 Fire Office, A Table of the Insurance Office at the Back-side of the Royal-Exchange (1683). 
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in the presence of their customers. The signature recorded a meeting and an event. By 
contrast, the Sun’s managers in the early nineteenth century signed policies in batches 
at meetings of the Committee of Management, for which they received an attendance 
fee.19 But even this process of authentication was inconvenient for a company of the 
Sun’s size, and it was reduced as far as it could be within the law.20 In 1806, the 
management decided upon a change to procedure, such that  
in future, the blank policies be signed by only two names, & placed under the care of Mr 
Cole: that, at all times, the policies be deposited & locked up by him in a safe place; &, after 
they are filled up, the third name shall be inserted.21  
In the early twentieth century, only one Sun director needed to give his signature to 
each policy.22 
The signing of the Sun’s internal documents was also an obligation and a burden. In 
the early nineteenth century, fair copies of reports were made ‘for signature’ by the 
various members of a committee.23 When there were unexpected changes in 
personnel, usually caused by death, the security and efficient running of the company 
were put at risk. Quick allowances were necessary regarding the signing of cheques.24 
On occasions when a clerk injured his hand, the management grudgingly allowed him 
to use a stamp to automate the authenticity his autograph conferred; ‘provided that the 
stamp be kept locked up, and the key retained by him’.25 
 
Printed signatures 
The policy required authentic signatures but on other graphic objects for the customer, 
type was a substitute. In the first two decades of the nineteenth century, the Sun’s 
renewal receipt contained a printed signature of two members of the company and an 
actual signature of a ‘Witness’, who was the clerk, agent, receiver or collector who 
received the money. The Sun’s management had used printed renewal receipts since 
the Office’s commencement but it instituted the practice of printed signatures in 1713.26 
It used its news-sheet at the time to explain the rationale to policy holders: ‘Because it 
                                                
19 LMA, CLC/B/192/B/009/MS11932. For example, managers sign policies in a batch of 1000 
(fol. 1) and 600 (fol. 238, December 1803), with the sequence of policy numbers given as ‘from 
760,000 to 760,600’. 
20 A recent law suit was reported to have implications on ‘the present mode of attesting policies’, 
LMA, CLC/B/192/B/001/MS11931, April 1806. 
21 Ibid., 13 February 1806. 
22 On the directors signing policies, see Dickson, Sun Insurance Office. 
23 LMA, CLC/B/192/B/026/MS38774. 
24 LMA, CLC/B/192/B/007/MS38769, fol. 6. 
25 Ibid., fol. 16. 
26 British Mercury, No. 84, 4 October 1710, p. 2: 'All Persons who have Insur'd their Houses or 
Goods from Loss by Fire, in the Sun-Fire-Office in St. Paul's Church-yard, are desir'd to take 
Notice, that according to the Proposals, and the Tenour of their Policies, they are oblig'd to pay 
their Quarteridge within ten Days after every Quarter-Day; for which they will have a printed 
Receipt, sign'd by two of the Members of the Company of London-Insurers.'  
 165 
would be almost endless for two members of the Committee to set their hands to so 
great a number of receipts as there are persons now insured in the said Office’.27 Thus 
the managers justified printed signatures as a solution to the problem of the size of the 
company.  
The company’s printer in the early eighteenth century, Hugh Meere, designed the 
receipts in specialist typefaces, ‘to avoid being counterfeited’. Meere set the body text 
in Pica Cursorial and the signatures in Union Pearl. He marketed the latter as 
‘Scriptographia, or, Written Print-Hand, (which can’t be imitated by any other Printer)’ 
and he recommended it for bills of lading, bonds, receipts and other legal 
instruments.28 Scriptographia was ‘the First English Display Type’.29 Its exclusivity 
secured the form, but its decorative style also gave the names the human touch. (See 
Illustrations 5.21 and 5.22.) As a result, the printed names stood in for an interaction 
between the insured and the insurers which had not in fact happened.  
In the 1730s, the Sun’s printer increased the authenticity and the security of the 
renewal receipts by commissioning woodcuts of the members’ autographs.30 (See 
Illustration 5.23.) The resulting receipts clearly signified a hierarchy of names. The 
representations of the two members’ names appeared large against the letterpress 
text. Those two overshadowed the space for the real signature of the ‘Witness’. (See 
Illustrations 5.24 and 5.25.) In the example of 1801, another name signed on behalf of 
(‘for’) the clerk, perhaps an assistant. It was essential for the document at this time to 
represent people who were responsible for the company. 
The Sun’s renewal notice in the early nineteenth century enacted the same 
principle. This was another format that contained a printed signature of someone in a 
superior position in the company, in this case the accountant or secretary. It requested 
payment for the renewal of a policy. In some versions, the printer used a weighted italic 
type in a large size for the sign-off as a suggestion of a personal touch rather than a 
mark of authenticity. (See Illustrations 5.26 and 5.27.) In another version, the sign-off 
was differentiated from the main text by being in capitals. (See Illustration 5.28.) 
A century later, the Sun produced a leaflet for the same purpose. It contained a list 
of the company’s directors. The personal touch mattered here too, but the mark of a 
staff member from head office was no longer necessary. The leaflet was designed with 
a space for the agent to sign his name on the front page, and to enter his location: 
                                                
27 British Mercury, No. 416, 24 June 1713, p. 1. 
28 Hugh Meere advertised his specialist services in the Observator, 7 February 1708, and in the 
British Mercury, 20 December 1712. 
29 John Lewis, Printed Ephemera: The Changing Uses of Type and Letterforms in English and 
American Printing (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Antique Collector’s Club, 1990), p. 21. 
30 It is my supposition that these were very fine woodcuts, as I can see no sign of an engraving 
plate on the paper. By 1724, the main body of the receipt was set in roman type rather than 
cursorial pica: LMA, SC/GL/NOB/C/064/9. 
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‘Agent at…..’. The policy holder would have known the agent personally through 
meeting or through correspondence.31 The agent at Uxbridge applied his ink stamp in 
this space. (See Illustration 5.29.) By the same principle, the renewal receipts of the 
same era did not use printed signatures; the clerk’s or agent’s signature alone was 
enough. The corporate identity of the receipt showed its security. (See Illustration 
5.30.) 
 
Changes in personnel 
A change in the company’s top personnel was another reason for the Sun’s 
management to put names in print. In particular this custom applied to the secretary. 
The historian of insurance Robin Pearson has enumerated the secretary’s 
responsibilities in the nineteenth century:  
to supervise the daily work of the clerical and other waged staff, to oversee the provincial 
agents, to check their remittances were accurate and up to date, to consider proposals for 
insurance and make recommendations to the board, to communicate with agents regarding 
losses on insurances sold through their agencies, and to arrange for the adjustment of 
losses and the inspection of property proposed for insurance. The secretary was usually the 
first line of communication with shareholders and policyholders. Thus most of the daily 
operations of the company were devolved upon his office.32  
The secretary was the figurehead to whom agents were instructed to address 
communication.33  
1806 saw the retirement of Hugh Watts as the Sun’s secretary after twenty years. 
He left in bad health, ‘unable to give that active assistance now so necessary in the 
office’.34 His son had aided his father ‘for several years last past’. Up until this point the 
role of secretary was fulfilled by one of the Sun’s managers. The managers took 
Watts’s departure as an opportunity to split the role’s increasing workload in two: a 
manager as (Board) Secretary and from among the clerks, an Office Secretary, who 
would supervise the administration of business.35 With this settled, the management 
decided that  
notice be given to the agents by a circular letter that they must in future correspond with Mr 
Edwd Griffin he having been appointed Secretary and that a notice of the above appointment 
                                                
31 For the amount of correspondence that passed between agents and policy holders 1882–
1920, see Hillingdon, MC25C/SF1/1570/3. 
32 Robin Pearson, Insuring the Industrial Revolution: Fire Insurance in Great Britain, 1700–1850 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), p. 251. 
33 Sun Fire Office, Instructions for the Agents of the Sun Fire-Office (London: W. P. Norris, 
1807), p. 40; Sun Insurance Office, Instructions for the Agents to the Sun Insurance Office (Fire) 
(London: J. Donnison, 1897). (Both, LMA, CLC/B/192/DC/001/MS15671.) 
34 LMA, CLC/B/192/B/001/MS11931, 3 April 1806, fols 123–124. 
35 Dickson, Sun Insurance Office, pp. 54–55. 
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be sent to the Royal Exchange, & Phoenix – & such other offices as may be thought 
necessary.36  
The Sun’s managers hesitated over whether to include the information ‘on the 
resignation of Mr Watts’.37 They decided against it. Griffin’s was the newly created 
position.  
The purpose of the notice was to ensure a smooth transition for the network of 
agents and for communications within the fire insurance industry. But the format points 
to equivocation within the company’s management as to whether trust rested in known 
individuals or in the institution and its stationery. The use of print reflected the size of 
the network that needed the information. Subsequent circulars to agents showed no 
signs of the new secretary, except for the new name that signed them off. At the same 
time, announcements like this reveal that trust rested on individuals who did not retire 
until forced to by their health. This left the Sun vulnerable to unexpected departures at 
the same time as it tried to fortify its institutional identity.  
In 1821, the Sun’s management was frank with agents about the reason for the next 
change in secretary. Edward Willis Griffin replaced his father, ‘who has retired on 
account of ill health’, admitted the notice.38 Just four months later, this Griffin was 
replaced ‘in consequence of the bad state of his health’, by John Richards.39 Agents 
were here ‘directed by the Board to indorse to him all Bills, which you may have 
occasion to send to the Office’. This individual held great responsibility, but the 
substitution appeared seamless. The practice was in place at the turn of the twentieth 
century. In 1897 a notice ran: 
I regret to have to announce that Mr E. H. Mannering has been compelled, on account of ill-
health, to resign the Secretary-ship of this Office, which he has held for nearly fifteen years. 
The Directors have appointed Mr Edward Baumer as his successor.40  
As a result of the change in the company’s structure in 1891, there were more key 
personnel who were worthy of notifications, such as the Manager.41 In this period, 
typed letters were also sent to newspapers regarding changes in the membership of 
the company’s board.42 When the Sun’s own name-change from the Sun Fire Office to 
the Sun Insurance Office was announced in 1891, the governing body explained that 
the change had no consequences: contracts were ‘unaffected’.43 (See Illustration 5.31.)  
 
                                                
36 LMA, CLC/B/192/B/026/MS38774, 9 April 1806. 
37 The phrase was crossed out of the draft minutes. 
38 LMA, CLC/B/192/DD/008/MS38828/001, fol. 96 (12 April 1821). 
39 Ibid., fol. 100 (13 October 1821). 
40 LMA, CLC/B/192/DD/011/MS15050 and LMA, CLC/B/192/DD/034/MS38846, 13 May 1897. 
41 LMA, CLC/B/192/DD/034/MS38846, 31 December 1912: Mr Mead succeeded Mr Manvell as 
Manager, after 49 years’ service, and maintains his role as Secretary.  
42 LMA, CLC/B/192/DD/034/MS38846. 
43 LMA, CLC/B/192/DD/011/MS15050. 
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This section has catalogued how names appeared in body text and in lists; they 
appeared as spaces for a signature or an endorsement; they appeared as printed 
signatures. Names could represent company managers or company clerks; they 
performed for policy holders and potential policy holders alike. They authenticated 
different printed formats. Some graphic objects existed purely to communicate names. 
All graphic objects were grounded in a name of some sort. For the Insurance Office as 
for the Sun in each period, confidence rested on the naming of the names involved in 
it. The ways in which this was achieved vacillated, yet consistently these Offices built 
and maintained their corporate identities by naming individuals. The names of 
individuals endorsed the company and vice versa. Personal trust was then an essential 
component of impersonal trust. However, each company trod a clumsy path between 
forming itself as an entity irrespective of the personal reputation of its insurers and 
which would outlive those individuals, and of relying on the personal names of those 
concerned in it. Visual branding on company stationery matched up against personal 




Firemen were the first group of people which a fire insurance company employed and 
upon which it depended. Augustus Newbold’s design for fire insurance in 1679, which 
anticipated the Insurance Office and the Corporation of the City of London’s insurance 
scheme, specified the ‘having in readiness a further supply of Persons of Skills, for 
managing of Engines, Buckets, &c.’44 The Insurance Office’s projectors made this 
provision part of its sales pitch to investors. They promised:  
it is altogether improbable that ever any Loss by Fire should be so great as to surmount the 
Security, especially considered, when it is the business and particular care of the Office, to 
have a certain number of men to be always in pay, to be ready night and day both to prevent 
and extinguish the Fire.45  
In the projectors’ presentation, the value of these men was to the Office, by reducing 
losses by fire and thereby reducing the risk to the scheme.46 This band of men 
                                                
44 A. Newbold, Londons Improvement and the Builder’s Security Asserted, by the Apparent 
Advantages that will Attend their Easie Charge, in Raising such a Joint-Stock, as many Assure 
a Re-building of those Houses, which shall hereafter be Destroyed by the Casualties of Fire 
(1680), p. 4. This specification was ‘further’ to the provisions that local parishes were required to 
make. 
45 Fire Office, Propositions, p. 1. 
46 Fire Office, Arguments, p. 2: The Office would be ‘Assisted by the Contrivance, and Industry 
of a Company of Men, Versed and Experienced in Extinguishing and Preventing of the Fire. 
What Advantage that may be, is best guest by considering what Old and Experienced Souldiers 
are able to perform, in respect of a Tumult, and Raw, and unexperienced Men.’ These men 
would help the Office to ‘Support it self’ and ‘Subsist’. 
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protected the security of the Office. They made it more secure.47 Only once did the 
Insurance Office’s projectors articulate the benefit of firemen to policy holders 
themselves.48  
By contrast, firemen as the protection of customers were at the forefront of the Sun 
Fire Office’s publicity. London’s firemen were ‘walking advertisements’, who paraded 
London in the eighteenth century, in the livery of their office.49 Chapter 3 discussed the 
illustration of a firemen and a porter which graced the Sun’s policy document from 
1726. Even before that, two editions of the Sun’s Proposals carried a woodcut of 
firemen extinguishing a fire. The Proposals of the early nineteenth century listed the 
fire stations in London. They highlighted the land and river fire-engines, firemen and 
engineers, and the night patrol as advantages to purchasers: ‘for the farther 
encouragement of persons insuring…which tends greatly to the public security’.50 
Where the Insurance Office had associated firemen with its own financial security, the 
Sun promoted its concern for public safety.  
Following modifications to the fire patrol in 1807, the Sun’s managers resolved:  
That the new Plan of Fire Patrole be made public by introducing proper words to that effect 
in the new notices, ordered to be issued to the insured at this office, & likewise by a proper 
Advertisement in the public Papers, & at the Foot of our Proposals.51  
Communicating with the public was part of the Sun’s strategy of fire prevention. Even 
after fire prevention was no longer in the charge of fire offices, the Sun’s publicity 
maintained the company’s association with the protection offered by firemen. The 
company promoted its contributions to salvage and to the fire brigade. The long-
standing illustration of firemen remained on the policy as well as being used on leaflets 
and in newspaper advertisements in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century. This graphic was now an empty substitute for the role this group had played in 
                                                
47 Nicholas Barbon promoted his design for a waterwork, to provide a ready supply of water, in 
similar terms. In a nice slogan, the waterwork would make insurance ‘safe to the Insurers, 
cheap to the Insured’, in An Advertisement. Being a Proposal by Dr Barbon and Partners for 
Insuring Houses and Goods from Fire, by a Water-Work […] (1694). 
48 In a pamphlet to undermine the foundations of the new Friendly Society in 1685, which was a 
mutual scheme for fire insurance, Nicholas Barbon reasoned, under the slogan, ‘Better 
Preserves the Insured from Fire’: ‘In the Fire Office the Insured are better preserved from Fire, 
than in the Friendly Society: It is more the Interest of the Insurers: Because the Loss is their 
own; and experience hath already shewn, how great the advantage is to the Insured, from those 
Industrious men they keep to Extinguish the Fires; like Old Disciplin’d Souldiers, that do greater 
things, then Ten times that Number of Raw and Unexperienced men.’ N[icholas] B[arbon], A 
Letter to a Gentleman in the Country, Giving an Account of the two Insurance-Offices; the Fire-
Office & Friendly-Society (1684), pp. 2 and 3. 
49 Pearson, Insuring the Industrial Revolution, p. 284. The Sun’s firemen marched in London 
quarterly until 1761, thereafter once a year, Dickson, Sun Insurance Office, pp. 37, 71. 
50 Sun Fire Office, June 14, 1804. Sun Fire-Office, Cornhill, near the Royal-Exchange, and at 
Craig’s Court, Charing-Cross. Proposals for Insuring Houses, and Other Buildings, Goods, 
Wares and Merchandize, and Ships in Harbour, in Dock, or Building, and Craft, from Loss and 
Damage by Fire (1804); Sun Fire Office, Instructions (1807), p. 57. 
51 LMA, CLC/B/192/B/001/MS11931, 22 January 1807. 
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the Office. The company offered guidance to its agents on how to respond to members 
of the public who still believed that fire offices managed fire-fighting.52 
In the early nineteenth century, the Sun’s managers debated the number of firemen 
the Office should retain.53 At that time, the Sun had the most of any fire office.54 On 
inquiry, a committee of managers learnt that many firemen were too infirm for the job. 
One of them had ‘adopted another line of life, viz a bird stuffer, and seldom attends a 
fire’.55 As a result of such discoveries, and closer observation, the brigade reduced 
from about fifty firemen and eight porters in 1803 to thirty-five firemen and five patrol in 
1811 and 1820.56  
The Sun’s managers used printed matter to guide the behaviour of its firemen. They 
secured each fireman to the Sun with a printed bond, by which a third party guaranteed 
a person’s conduct at a price. (See Illustration 5.32.) Often three names stood for a 
fireman, including his father.57 An eighteenth-century printing of the bond, still in use at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, displayed its purpose by the impression of a 
factotum of Sun-branded firemen fighting a fire, the same image as used occasionally 
on the company’s early Proposals. (See Illustration 5.33.) The text of the bond set out 
what a fireman should and should not do. He should ‘do his utmost Endeavour, 
according to the best of his Skill and Power, to extinguish and put out’ any fire he 
attended. But he should not ‘purloin or embezzle’ any property in the vicinity of a fire. 
He must not cause ‘Damage, Complaints or Trouble’. He must  
civilly and quietly demean and carry himself towards each of the Members of the said 
Society, and obey, execute, perform, and confirm himself to all the Orders, Directions and 
Instructions, which from Time to Time shall be sent to him, signed by one or more of the 
Trustees or acting Members of the said Society.  
He must return, when required to, his blue coat and silver badge, which belonged to 
the Sun. 
                                                
52 Sun Insurance Office, Instructions (1897), p. 52. Sun Fire Office, Instructions for the Agents to 
the Sun Fire-Office (London: Marchant Singer, 1890), in a section on ‘Fires’: '83. Although the 
Office has really nothing to do with the extinction of fires, that being a function which properly 
belongs to the Local Authorities, nevertheless, for the guidance of Agents who may be 
consulted on the subject, the following suggestions are offered...', such as the use of wet 
blankets. 
53 Committee of Enquiry, 6th report, 17 January 1805 and 1st report, March 1808, LMA, 
CLC/B/192/B/023/MS38771. 
54 LMA, CLC/B/192/B/026/MS38774/001. 
55 LMA, CLC/B/192/B/011/MS11935A/001, fol. 44. 
56 Sun Fire Office, The List of Firemen and Porters, with their Places of Abode, and Stations of 
the Engines, Belonging to the Sun Fire-Offices, in Cornhill, and Craig’s Court, Charing Cross, 
March 25 1803, LMA, CLC/B/192/DD/008/MS38828/001, p. 75; Sun Fire Office, A List of the 
Firemen, with their Places of Abode, and Stations of the Engines, Belonging to the Sun Fire-
Offices, in Cornhill, and Craig’s Court, Charing Cross, January 2 1811, LMA, 
CLC/B/192/DD/008/MS38828/001, p. 81; Sun Fire Office, A List of the Firemen, with their 
Places of Abode, and Stations of the Engines, Belonging to the Sun Fire-Office, in Cornhill, and 
Craig’s Court, Charing Cross, January 1820, Private Collection. 
57 LMA, CLC/B/192/DE/001/MS15046. 
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In the early nineteenth century, the Sun’s managers also directed its firemen using 
printed lists. Posters entitled Fire-Watch. Instructions for the Engineers and Firemen 
Employed on the Fire-Watch hung in the stations of the fire-watch.58 (See Illustration 
5.34.) The fourteen enumerated rules defined the hours of expected attendance from 8 
p.m. to 6 a.m., the chain of command, the system of ‘walks’ of the streets in pairs, the 
equipment on said walks (a great coat and a fire-axe), what to do ‘upon the first 
Appearance of any Danger of Fire’, and the handling of the engine.59 These clearly 
stated instructions emphasised orderliness (‘not to go into any Ale-House…unless in 
case of Accident’) and the intolerance of misbehaviour.  
In 1804, the Sun’s managers commissioned print for firemen to carry on their 
person, in a tin case, deciding that:  
every firemen [sic] be furnished with a printed list of the names and places of abode of the 
different Foremen and Turncocks belonging to the New River Company and also with the 
Regulations hereafter provided for the Guidance of Firemen at Fires that a Tin Case be 
provided, in which such List and Orders shall be deposited & at all times kept in the Pocket 
of every Fireman and a Fine to be levied on any Fireman found without it.60  
The list of staff of the New River Company would ensure that firemen could get access 
to the water supply in the event of a fire.61 Furthermore,  
Lists of the Firemen, Supernumerary Firemen, and Turncocks, residing in each District, will 
be hung up at the several Stations, and the Officers and Men are desired to obtain the fullest 
Information respecting the Means of obtaining Water in each District, both in regard to the 
Situation of Fire-Plugs and other Means of Supply, as from Wells, Pumps, Water-Backs 
belonging to Manufactories, and all other Sources whatever.62 
 
Firemen reduced risk. Fire offices were dependent upon firemen for their working. This 
review of the interrelations between firemen and print shows that fire offices were also 
dependent for their working upon print representing firemen. Placed in print, firemen 
proved and personalised the security offered by a policy. Graphic objects were infused 
with their group persona, in words and in illustration. This group visually defined fire 
insurance. But the Sun was dependent on print’s interrelation with firemen in another 
way: print made objects – such as bonds, instructions and lists – which could be 
                                                
58 The fire-watch was a joint initiative at the end of the eighteenth century by the three big fire 
offices in London to bolster each company’s own brigade. See Dickson, Sun Insurance Office, 
p. 65. 
59 May 21 1804. Fire-Watch. Instructions for the Engineers and Firemen Employed on the Fire-
Watch (1804). 
60 LMA, CLC/B/192/B/025/MS38773. The firemen received the tin case on 14 November 1804. 
61 This list is an example of the practical means by which the fire offices worked in collaboration 
with water companies; see Carry van Lieshout, ‘“The Most Valuable Means of Extinguishing the 
Destroying Fires”: Fire-fighting and the London Water Companies in the Long Eighteenth 
Century’, London Journal, 42:1 (2017), 53–69. 
62 May 21 1804. Fire-Watch. Instructions. 
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distributed to firemen in order to regulate their conduct. Whether print manifested 
firemen as a group persona or it regulated them individually, it was personal. 
 
Agents 
The acceptance of ‘country’ risks, that is policies outside London, was the motivation 
for the Sun Fire Office to form in 1710. This proved ambitious; the managers did not 
find the demand.63 In 1721 the Office renewed efforts and hired its first agent.64 By 
1725 it had nine agents. In the late eighteenth century the Sun’s expansion picked up 
pace and it outran its London rivals inside and outside London. In 1804, the Sun 
counted about 170 agents, among them five women.65 The presence of an agent 
mattered. In 1806, the Sun’s managers ascertained that the company’s customers in 
Stratford had deserted it because there was no longer an agent in the area.66 Policy 
holders could not easily renew if no one visited them to collect the premium. By 1880, 
the number of agents had reached 1213. In 1881 the Sun followed rivals in beginning 
to open branch offices.67  
In the early nineteenth century, the work of a Sun agent was run alongside a trade, 
as it had been in the eighteenth century. Agents were hired on the recommendation of 
managers and local connections. As the century went on, they were more likely to be 
drawn from the professions, such as solicitors, auctioneers, estate agents and 
accountants, or to hold positions in banks.68 They worked on a 5% commission for 
each premium taken, and a flat fee for each new policy.69 They were trusted to remit 
the greater proportion of the money they received to the Office.  
At the turn of the nineteenth century, the Sun was threatened in the country market 
less by other London offices than by the local fire offices that began to form in the final 
quarter of the eighteenth century.70 Local offices could leverage deeper ‘personal 
connections and business reputations’. If the Sun could not hire similarly trusted 
individuals then it had to match the advantage of those offices with reliability and 
national reputation. A fire office was also at an advantage if it insured the local 
                                                
63 Dickson, Sun Insurance Office, p. 40. 
64 These figures are taken from Francis Boyer Relton, An Account of the Fire Insurance 
Companies Associations Institutions Projects and Schemes Established and Projected in Great 
Britain and Ireland during the 17th and 18th Centuries, including the Sun Fire Office: Also of 
Charles Povey, the Projector of that Office, his Writings and Schemes (London: Sonnenschein, 
1893), p.389, and Dickson, Sun Insurance Office, pp. 67 and 133. 
65 LMA, CLC/B/192/DC/004/MS38813. (Five have women’s names.) 
66 LMA, CLC/B/192/B/011/MS11935A/001, p. 24. 
67 Dickson, Sun Insurance Office, pp. 70, 133, 136. 
68 Ibid., p. 134. 
69 Ibid., p. 71. 
70 On the competition posed by local offices from the late eighteenth century, see Pearson, 
Insuring the Industrial Revolution, pp. 119, 131–133. 
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grandee.71 In turn, agents were squeezed between on the one side, the ‘need to keep 
the goodwill of customers and keep ahead of rivals’, and on the other, their head 
offices, ‘keen to ensure accurate and careful risk selection’.72 At the end of the 
nineteenth century, an agent was in salaried employment.73 
Unlike firemen, agents were not an identifiable group there at the opening of a fire 
office. Rather, the Sun’s marshalling of this manpower grew gradually over time, as did 
its reliance on it, and exploded just as fire-fighting became the responsibility of local 
government. We shall now see how print intervened on the work of this loose and 
geographically scattered group, as it did firemen.  
 
Securing and vetting 
The Sun’s records speak of the ‘fraud, incompetence, indiscipline, inactivity’ of agents, 
as described by Robin Pearson.74 The Sun’s managers tried various ways to combat 
this. When the Sun began to hire agents in the 1720s it had employed a ‘Rider’, who 
collected insurance throughout the country and acted as ‘Inspector of Agents’.75 From 
1727 onwards, it provided agents with ‘Instructions’ for their work, an enduring format 
that will be discussed below. In the early nineteenth century, graphic objects 
represented the security of agents. As with firemen, the Sun’s managers insisted upon 
bonds.76 In 1786, it became the Sun solicitor’s job to see that ‘proper bonds of security 
are given by the clerks & agents to the office, and are enter’d in a Book to be prepar’d 
for that purpose, the said Book to be laid before every General Quarterly Meeting’.77  
In 1807, the managers resolved to keep all bonds taken from clerks, collectors, 
messengers and agents ‘in a tin box & deposited in the Strong Room under the care of’ 
the secretary, who should ‘report what he has to the chairmen of the town and country 
committees in time for their meeting before each Quarter Day’.78 Despite the delegation 
of these processes of trust, their maintenance was a burden. In 1806, the secretary 
reminded the agent in Kent, Mr Cobb: ‘In April 1801, you were written to, to send up 
the names of two respectable persons, as your sureties, which does not appear to 
have been attended to’.79 
                                                
71 As shown by Philip Bewicke’s comments, LMA, CLC/B/192/B/011/MS11935A/001. 
72 Pearson, Insuring the Industrial Revolution, p. 289. 
73 Ibid., p. 283. 
74 Ibid., p. 286. 
75 Relton, Account of the Fire Insurance Companies, p. 389. 
76 I have not discovered a surviving example of a written or printed bond between the Sun and 
an agent. 
77 LMA, CLC/B/192/B/001/MS11931, 5 January 1786. LMA, CLC/B/192/DC/005/MS14386, is 
the resulting ‘List of cities and towns in Great Britain, with the names and trades of the 
company's agents therein, and the amounts of their sureties’, maintained from 1786 to 1841. 
78 LMA, CLC/B/192/B/001/MS11931, 9 April 1807. 
79 Letter from Edward Griffin to Mr Cobb, 17 September 1806, Kent Archives, EK/U1453/B6/2/3. 
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The security of an agent proved an unsatisfactory guarantee of his or her 
performance of the role. In 1804, the managers conducted a review which discovered 
that at least fifteen of its one hundred and seventy agents were in arrears and one was 
dead as well. The review resulted in several brusque letters to agents threatening to 
sue them for sums not received.80 In 1806, the managers decided they needed to take 
a closer look at the network. One manager, Philip Bewicke, travelled around England 
and then Scotland, meeting the agents face to face. He found agents who were 
‘zealous good’, ‘respectable and intelligent’ and ‘active and intelligent’, and ‘a 
madman’.81 Mrs Buchanan in Glasgow was ‘very active and as attentive to the 
business as a female can possibly be expected to be’.82 The purpose of Bewicke’s 
travels was also to supplement ‘the little local knowledge we possessed’.83 He 
produced reports for the managers of what agents had told him about the business 
conditions in their local area. 
By the late nineteenth century, the railways made regular, personal meetings 
between agents and the administration in London easier.84 The head office remained 
closely involved in the hiring of staff in agencies: it reviewed applications and it 
confirmed appointments, even at the lowest level. It did so by means of 
correspondence, combined with reliance on the judgement of its branch manager. The 
Sun’s assistant secretary Edward Baumer wrote that a new appointment could be 
made: 
subject of course to your being satisfied, either from a personal knowledge of Mr Kershaw or 
from enquiries additional to those made of the District Manager of the “State”, that the 
applicant is respectable and of good character. Kindly let me hear from you upon this point, 
so that I may be able to put the appointment forward for formal confirmation in due course.85  
Mr Baumer bundled this as ‘the routine which has to be observed in connection with 
our staff appointments’.86 
Staff turnover at the Sun’s Leeds branch was high at the end of the nineteenth 
century. One episode shows the power dynamics in the approval of new staff, and it 
shows up the failures of ‘the routine’. In April 1898, the district manager of the Leeds 
branch named his preferred candidate for the newly vacant post of junior clerk as 
                                                
80 LMA, CLC/B/192/DC/004/MS38813. 
81 LMA, CLC/B/192/B/011/MS11935A. 
82 LMA, CLC/B/192/B/011/MS11935A/001, fol. 31. 
83 CLC/B/192/B/011/MS11935A/001, cited by Pearson, Insuring the Industrial Revolution, p. 
304, fn. 21. 
84 Relton, Account of the Fire Insurance Companies, p. 390. 
85 Assistant secretary Edward Baumer to district manager of the Leeds branch, J. B. Roberts, 5 
July 1898, LMA, CLC/B/192/DE/007/MS18266. 
86 Ibid. 
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Harold S. Brown, who ‘appears to be a smart youth and respectably connected’.87 By 
June, the youth had proved himself ‘not equal to the position’, and the district manager 
awaited instruction from the Sun’s head office.88 Edward Baumer gave authorisation for 
the routine to begin again for a replacement for Harold S. Brown: 
we regret to learn that Harold S. Brown who was so recently appointed has proved to be 
unsatisfactory, and under the circumstances it is desirable that, as you suggest, you obtain 
some one else to fill his place. Please take steps accordingly, forwarding the application with 
your recommendation at your early convenience.89  
 
Determined by graphic objects 
In their local environments, agents represented the Sun physically. In 1795, the Sun’s 
management ruled,  
That the agents of this office in the country, should be particularly recommended to affix 
such public marks to the place where their business is done, as may be sufficient to 
distinguish it with more notoriety than is generally used at present – a practice which we find 
is observed by the other offices with considerable success.90  
The managers believed that this presence mattered. In the early nineteenth century, 
they learnt that their rivals in Liverpool, a local office, ‘make a great shew by having 
expensive offices and fire establishments’.91 By contrast, the Sun carried on business 
at the Stamp Office with discretion: ‘in a pane of glass on one of the windows the 
words Sun Fire Office appear’. However, it did run ‘a great many engines’ in the city. 
By 1807 the managers had turned the recommendation for ‘public marks’ into an 
obligation: ‘You must, likewise, affix a sign-board over your door, painted in capital 
letters with your name, “Agent to the Sun Fire-Office, in London.” For which you will be 
allowed one guinea’.92  
Agents also represented the Sun with an armoury of graphic material. Each edition 
of the Instructions book directed agents on how to use it.93 Since 1727, agents had not 
been trusted to fill up policies themselves, but they mediated them.94 In the early 
nineteenth century, the Sun management instructed agents:  
                                                
87 District manager of the Leeds branch, J. B. Roberts to assistant secretary Edward Baumer, 
16 April 1898, LMA, CLC/B/192/DE/007/MS18266. 
88 District manager of the Leeds branch, J. B. Roberts to assistant secretary Edward Baumer, 
30 June 1898, LMA, CLC/B/192/DE/007/MS18266. 
89 Assistant secretary Edward Baumer to district manager of the Leeds branch, J. B. Roberts, 5 
July 1898, LMA, CLC/B/192/DE/007/MS18266. 
90 LMA, CLC/B/192/B/001/MS11931, 29 January 1795. 
91 LMA, CLC/B/192/B/011/MS11935A/001. 
92 Sun Fire Office, Instructions (1807), p. 40. 
93 This chapter mainly draws on the 1807 and 1897 editions of the Instructions, as these fall in 
the periods under close examination. 
94 Relton, Account of the Fire Insurance Companies, p. 389. Up until that time, policies were 
sent to agents ‘signed in blank’. 
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You are to transmit your instructions to the office, as speedily as possible, after you receive 
them, pursuant to which, policies will be sent, which you are to deliver, free of expense, as to 
carriage, to the persons insured, and receive from them the first payment of the premium 
and duty, for which the policy will be a receipt or discharge.95  
In the late nineteenth century, agents completed an ‘order sheet’ form for this purpose, 
which they were instructed to submit to the Office ‘within forty-eight hours’.96 (See 
Illustration 5.35.)  
The management gave responsibility to agents to check each policy: 
On delivering a new policy, read it over carefully, with the insured, when possible, and, if the 
buildings should be wrongly described, which may vitiate the insurance, or any other error be 
found therein, inform the office, and you will be instructed in what manner it may be 
corrected.97  
The agent could correct name misspellings himself but must inform the office.98 In the 
early nineteenth century, agents were given guidance on what to write if the policy 
holder wished to change the cover of his or her policy.99 By the late nineteenth century, 
there existed a printed form for endorsements for this purpose, ‘but if the Risk has 
been increased, the sanction of the Office should be obtained before any Endorsement 
is made.’100 (See Illustration 5.36.)  
Agents maintained Sun-branded policy books of the policies they sold and, in the 
late nineteenth century, Sun-branded renewal registers to track the payments for 
renewal. (See Illustrations 5.37 to 5.42.) Agents were reminded that, ‘All the books, 
furnished by the Directors, are to be regularly kept and carefully preserved, that they 
may be restored to the Office, in the event of any change occurring in the Agency from 
resignation or otherwise.’101 
Pre-printed receipts represented the money that agents received for the renewal of 
policies.102 Agents had responsibility for witnessing and delivering receipts to 
customers.103 (See Illustrations 5.24, 5.25 and 5.30.) For as long as agents worked 
independently, they remitted the money they received, with allowances. The early-
nineteenth-century edition of Instructions warned: ‘But, in respect of future payments 
on such policies and renewals of policies, you will receive printed receipts, for which 
you will be careful to account, as either the money or receipts must be returned to the 
                                                
95 Sun Fire Office, Instructions (1807), p. 24. 
96 Sun Insurance Office, Instructions (1897), p. 37. 
97 Sun Fire Office, Instructions (1807), p. 22. 
98 Sun Insurance Office, Instructions (1897), p. 38. 
99 Sun Fire Office, Instructions (1807), pp. 41–44. 
100 Sun Insurance Office, Instructions (1897), p. 44 and Appendix.  
101 Ibid., p. 43. 
102 The Proposals in the early nineteenth century and the Conditions in the early twentieth 
century conditioned policy holders to expect ‘printed forms from the Company’s Office’. 
103 Sun Fire Office, receipt, dated 1812, was witnessed by the agent in Kent, Francis Cobb, 
Kent Archives, EK/U1453/B6/1/28. 
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office.’104 Agents filled in the margin of a receipt book to record the premiums they 
received. They tallied the sums in the margins with a pre-printed cash-book.105 The 
cash book was ‘divided into three parts, the first, for entering the renewals of old 
policies; the second, (which is entitled new policies,) for entering whatever new policies 
you may receive during the quarter, and the last is the balance-sheet.’106  
The same Instructions impressed upon agents the significance of filling in and 
returning the stubs in receipt books: ‘but if, judging it of no consequence, you should 
not attend to this particular request, and act otherwise, the whole receipt-account of the 
office would be thrown into confusion.’107 The Instructions in 1897 reinforced this 
message:  
It is absolutely necessary for the proper control of the Office business that the Cash and 
Receipt ACCOUNTS be completely balanced and punctually settled every quarter, in 
accordance with the Office regulations, and that care be taken that all the unused and 
spoiled receipts are duly returned to the Office.108  
The Sun relied on its agents not only to work with graphic objects but to maintain them 
as part of the company’s overall infrastructure.  
As part of establishing their business, agents dispersed the Sun’s predetermined 
printed identity. They provided the tracks on which company communications ran into 
local areas. In 1804, the Sun’s management instructed them: ‘By the conveyance you 
recommend for dispatch, you will have a parcel of proposals and advertisements, 
which you are to distribute and put up in such public places as you may judge will best 
answer the end.’109 Agents were a network of distributors that allowed the Sun to 
spread a standardised series of communications to the public, across Britain. The 
Office’s reliance on its agents to do so meant that the public could trust a unified brand. 
By these means, the Office controlled its graphics and its costs. In the late nineteenth 
century, agents were instructed that notices to policy holders about renewal ‘should 
always be issued (on forms supplied from the Office) about ten days before Policies 
become due.’110 The forms in question – renewal leaflets – vividly represented the 
Sun’s brand (see Illustrations 5.43 and 5.44); as did the proposal form, which 
customers filled in with the help of agents, even in its black and white version. (See 
                                                
104 Sun Fire Office, Instructions (1807), p.24. 
105 Ibid., pp. 26, 34. 
106 Ibid., p. 28. I have not come across an example. 
107 Ibid., p. 27 
108 Sun Insurance Office, Instructions (1897), p. 41. Paragraph 73 reiterated this: ‘Receipts not 
to be kept back’. 
109 Sun Fire Office, Instructions (1807), p. 40. 
110 Sun Insurance Office, Instructions (1897), p.38. 
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Illustrations 5.45a, 5.45b and 5.46.) The Sun’s secretary also tasked agents with 
collecting the prospectuses of rivals.111 
In the early nineteenth century, the Sun topped up the Instructions as and when 
necessary by means of printed letters to agents. These circulars were formal and plain, 
headed by the company’s name and the date alone. (See Illustrations 5.47 to 5.50.) 
They addressed ‘Sir’ and they were signed by the secretary either in print or by hand. 
Circulars often concerned the Proposals, a fire office’s primary piece of printed 
publicity. A Sun circular in 1804 sent the agents a table of rates but advised them that 
‘the Proposals are now under Revisal’.112 A month later, the secretary updated them: 
SIR, ACCOMPANYING you will receive new Proposals, as revised and amended by the 
Managers of this Office. I beg you will lose no Time in having them stuck up and distributed 
in your Town and Neighbourhood, and use every means to make as generally known as 
possible; more will be sent with the Circular Notices, to inform the Parties when their 
Premiums become due, as soon as we can get them printed. I am, SIR, Your obedient 
Servant, THOMAS WATTS.113  
The management impressed upon agents the importance of haste and wide circulation 
with regard to printed matter. A further circular demanded, with reference to a small 
notice about a rise in duty: ‘You will make the enclosed Notices as publick as 
possible.’114  
Circulars were as blunt in content as in style. An example in 1808, designed as a 
form, read: ‘We transmit you a List of Errors that appeared in your [blank] Accounts 
[blank] which you will please to correct in your next.’ In 1819, the secretary demanded: 
‘you will return, without fail’ any policies that are ordered by parties but then refused. 
The secretary was anxious about the return of printed matter. In 1816, in issuing new 
Proposals, he told agents to send back ‘any you have on Hand, that have hitherto been 
in use’.115 The management had little trust of agents’ competence and judgement. In 
the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Sun administration’s ad hoc 
communications with agents showed personality because they came on headed 
stationery. (See Illustration 5.51.) 
As well as being sent piles of print, the Sun’s management obliged agents to 
commission print locally according to office templates. In 1806, the Secretary sent 
                                                
111 A stack of prospectuses dated from 1824 to 1917 with correspondence of the same: LMA, 
CLC/B/192/DD/025/MS15048. 
112 Sun Fire Office, circular to agents, 18 May 1804, LMA, CLC/B/192/DD/008/MS38828/001, 
fol. 75. 
113 Sun Fire Office, circular to agents, 20 June 1804, LMA, CLC/B/192/DD/008/MS38828/001, 
fol. 77. 
114 Sun Fire Office, circular to agents, 31 Aug 1804, LMA, CLC/B/192/DD/008/MS38828/001, 
fol. 77, and Kent Archives, EK/U1453/B3/15/2062. 
115 Sun Fire Office, circular to agents, 5 January 1816, LMA, CLC/B/192/DD/008/MS38828/001, 
fol. 87. 
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Francis Cobb, the agent in Margate, a poster to be imitated. The secretary annotated 
the poster:  
Sir, Mr Teissier having represented how essential it is that you should be furnished with 
more printed Bills to be posted up in your Town & Neighbourhood, I have sent you a Copy 
requesting that you procure the same to be printed in the County – which you will please to 
use as you may judge most conducive to the benefit of the Office.116 (See Illustration 5.52.)  
The agent in Lincoln was in favour of the centralisation of agents’ promotional material. 
He thought that handbill advertising ‘might be done with less expense by being printed 
in London (on account of the great number that would be wanted) … as they might be 
easily made to serve the intended purpose without much alteration of the Press’.117 He 
recounted his method of circulation, that ‘to those who do not insure are distributed 
handbills & which we get posted in Inns & Publick Houses’. The agent believed this 
‘mode of advertising’ more cost-effective than advertisements in country newspapers. 
The Sun’s managers used forms to direct agents’ interactions with customers and 
shape the information the company received. The blanks on a form shaped the agent’s 
activity. The ‘Form of Instruction’ for cotton mills left blanks such that the agent 
provided the details that the office wanted in order to price the risk. (See Illustration 
5.53.) The agent would send the form to the London head office to approve and issue a 
policy. The desired details included the size of the mills, its number of stories and its 
tenure. In the early nineteenth century these and other industrial risks were difficult to 
price.118 The form compelled the agent to procure a plan, by the prompt: ‘stated in the 
Plan lodged in’. The Instructions in this period required plans to be ‘lodged in the 
office’. It added: ‘N.B. The plan must be signed and dated by the party to be insured, 
and the number of floors, without any exception’.119 
The Sun’s managers modified forms in order to improve the company’s processes. 
During a general review of the company’s staff and procedures in 1804 and 1805, the 
managers recommended revisions to receipts and receipt books, new printed notices, 
and that receipt books be different for clerks, collectors and agents.120 The managers 
saw how the receipt book could be a tool to monitor an individual’s work, by the 
insertion of a blank in the margin for the name of the staff member who issued each 
receipt.121 In 1806, the secretary advised agents of changes to the use of receipt 
                                                
116 Edward Griffin to Francis Cobb, 31 October 1806, on Sun Fire Office, printed poster (ND), 
Kent Archives, EK/U1453/B6/2/3. 
117 Letter from William Hodson to the Sun Fire Office, 4 June 1804, p. 2, Private Collection. 
118 Pearson, Insuring the Industrial Revolution, p. 305, and p. 134 on ‘the difficulty of assessing 
the new risks associated with the factory system’. 
119 Sun Fire Office, Instructions (1807), pp. 13–14. 
120 Committee of Enquiry, 10th report, LMA, CLC/B/192/B/011/MS11935A. 
121 Mr Teissier reports from the Committee of Management that the 10th report, on collectors, 
was discussed and that a resolution followed, LMA, CLC/B/192/B/025/MS38773. 
 180 
books. His circular instructed them how to use it and made the case that this new 
‘mode’ was ‘more simple’.122  
In the first decade of the nineteenth century, agents were instructed to describe 
property:  
Every separate house or other building must be distinctly valued, as must household goods, 
stock, and utensils, or other effects, as in the preceding examples. – The trade, or other 
profession, situation, or employment, of every person to be insured, must be described, as 
must the name, trade, profession, situation, or employment, of every tenant… Kiln, stove, 
oven, or steam-engine, used in any manufactory, must be particularly described, when 
writing for a policy.123  
In the second decade of the nineteenth century, the Sun’s managers developed lists of 
questions for agents to ask particular types of customer in relation to complex risks, 
such as cotton mills and woollen mills. A circular directed: ‘in sending Orders for 
Insurances, you will likewise transmit Answers to the following Questions’.124 The 
questions were focused on measurable aspects to the mills and their sources of power. 
(See Illustration 5.54.) Like a form, a list guided the agent to gather the precise 
information that the head office wanted. Designed questions provided a script for 
agents. By the late nineteenth century, the Sun’s managers had expanded this practice 
to other types of risk. There existed sets of questions for agents to discover of 
customers in London and of those who sought insurance on farming stock or farm 
buildings.125 For the latter, agents were expected to determine: ‘2nd Whether he is 
unpopular with the labouring class’. This shows how important character had become 
to the judging of risk, rather than materials alone. 
 
Agents’ Instructions as a graphic object 
In the Instructions, the Sun’s managers in London developed a graphic object by which 
to guide and direct their agents at a distance. Its first iteration was a ‘Letter of 
Instruction’, in 1727, revised intermittently in that century.126 In 1807, the Instructions 
took the form of a bound book, ‘much fuller & more instructive, than any, yet 
produced’.127 Its revision was motivated by the review of agents made in 1804, and 
written by the head clerk of the Country department, the department responsible for 
                                                
122 Sun Fire Office, circular to agents, 5 June 1806, LMA, CLC/B/192/DC/006/MS38814; LMA, 
CLC/B/192/DD/008/MS38828/001, fol. 77; and Kent Archives, EK/U1453/B6/2/3. 
123 Sun Fire Office, Instructions (1807), pp. 21–22. 
124 Sun Fire Office, circular to agents, 10 May 1816, LMA, CLC/B/192/F/023/MS38872/001, vol. 
4; LMA, CLC/B/192/DD/008/MS38828/001, fol. 87; and Kent Archives, EK/U1453/B6/2/3. 
125 Sun Insurance Office, Instructions (1897), p. 6. 
126 Relton, Account of the Fire Insurance Companies, p. 389; Dickson, Sun Insurance Office, p. 
71. 
127 LMA, CLC/B/192/B/018/MS11935/010, 19 June 1807. 
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agents.128 Over nine editions in ninety years, this manual was made to be carried 
around, remaining at a handy size around 12 cm by 19 cm.129 The managers ordered 
five hundred copies of the 1822 edition.130 The 1807 edition ran to seventy-two pages 
and the 1897 edition to ninety-eight pages.  
The book of Instructions gave weight to the work of an agent. Each edition was 
branded with the Sun’s identity to forge pride and loyalty among the workforce. The title 
page in 1807 contained a woodcut illustration of the Sun’s emblem, familiar from its 
firemarks and other branding. (See Illustration 5.55.) This set it apart from the 
company’s contemporaneous circulars to agents. The cover of the volume in 1897 was 
embossed with ‘Sun Fire Office / Agent’s Instruction Book’. (See Illustration 5.56.) The 
books spoke personally to the agent. The 1807 edition may have included a blank on 
the opening page for the agent to enter his name, as the 1822 edition.131 It was not 
‘the’ but ‘his Book of Instructions’.132 The 1807 edition addressed the agent in the 
second person. The 1897 edition spoke to ‘the Agent’, but in other ways it spoke of a 
special relationship: it opened with a letter from E. H. Mannering, the Secretary, 
proving his role at the centre of the agents’ universe. The letter, in italics to suggest 
handwriting, began: ‘This Volume…has been prepared for the private use and 
guidance of the AGENTS of the SUN FIRE OFFICE’.133 (See Illustration 5.57.) The title 
page was marked ‘confidential’. (See Illustration 5.58.) 
The language used by the Instructions was emphatic. Editions used the future tense 
and imperatives, and indicated agents’ obligations with words such as ‘must’, ‘should’, 
‘you are to’, ‘invariably’, ‘always’.134 They advocated agents’ care and attention.135 A 
sticker on the cover of the 1822 edition read: ‘The Managers request the Agents to 
peruse this Book with GREAT ATTENTION.’ The Instructions of 1897 emphasised 
saving time and avoiding inconvenience in a manner not evident in 1807. The section 
on ‘Lapsed Policies’ demanded a list of the same every quarter, adding that: ‘Particular 
                                                
128 Committee of Enquiry, 4th report, 11 October 1804, LMA, CLC/B/192/B/011/MS11935A/001; 
LMA, CLC/B/192/B/018/MS11935/010, 19 June 1807 and 17 July 1807; LMA, 
CLC/B/192/B/001/MS11931, 1805 and 2 July 1807. 
129 LMA, CLC/B/192/DC/001/MS15671 comprises editions dated 1807, 1822 (two copies), 1834, 
1843, 1865, 1872 (two copies), 1884, 1890, 1897. It is unknown whether this represents a 
complete set of the editions printed in the nineteenth century. 
130 LMA, CLC/B/192/B/001/MS11931, 5 June 1822. The print run must have depended on the 
number of agents but this is the only figure for print run that I have come across in the Sun’s 
minutes.  
131 One page of the 1807 edition has been torn out, but in most ways the 1822 edition follows its 
predecessor.  
132 LMA, CLC/B/192/B/018/MS11935/010, 25 March 1808. 
133 Sun Insurance Office, Instructions (1897), p. 3 
134 Sun Fire Office, Instructions (1807), pp.6, 13–14. ‘Must’ on pp. 21–22. Sun Insurance Office, 
Instructions (1897): pp. 32, 41, 42. 
135 Sun Fire Office, Instructions (1807): pp. 30, 33–35; Sun Insurance Office, Instructions 
(1897): pp. 15, 42, 43, 49. 
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attention is requested to this point, as great inconvenience results from the absence of 
definite information as to the discontinuance of Insurances.’136 Inconvenience flowed 
from ‘unnecessary correspondence’ in particular.137 Given the quantity of 
correspondence that the Office received in the late nineteenth century, ‘It will greatly 
facilitate the transaction of business, and ensure more prompt attention to 
communications, if Agents will conduct their correspondence with the Office on the 
undermentioned subjects by separate letters’.138 
Editions of the Instructions were not designed to be read from start to finish but to 
be dipped into. Crucial to the functioning of each edition was its thorough index, which 
allowed navigation. The index to the 1807 and the 1897 editions contained a hierarchy 
of two levels: a primary word, ‘Accounts’, for example, leading to alternatives: ‘How to 
be made up’, ‘When to be transmitted’, ‘How to remit the balance of’. (See Illustrations 
5.59 and 5.60.) The preface to the 1897 edition drew attention to the usefulness of the 
index: ‘it is hoped that an Agent will, before writing to the Office on any subject, 
ascertain, by reference to the Index, whether or not the information to be required is to 
be found herein, as much unnecessary correspondence will thereby be saved.’139  
The design of the information in the books made them navigable and clear. 
Numbering created a progression through the books and allowed easy reference. The 
1807 edition began with twelve numbered examples of policies. In each example, the 
location and trade were set in italics so that they stood out. The 1897 edition consisted 
of just over a hundred numbered paragraphs. In each edition, paragraphs were short 
and focused on a particular topic. The 1807 edition used italics to convey the 
importance of the detail of an instruction.140 The 1897 edition made use of more 
architecture of the page than the 1807 edition. It had a contents page and chapters. It 
put headings in bold type. It emphasised key words and phrases in italics and bold 
type. The Instructions were manuals. They showed tables, examples and templates, of 
policies, forms, plans and protocols. They gave explanations, such as of the average 
clause. The Sun’s management was reliant on this manual being used. It wanted to 
trust this object. 
The usefulness of the Instructions expanded outside the object itself. The Sun’s 
secretary could refer to them in circulars to agents in order to adapt working practices: 
‘the Specifications hitherto required … as per Example, No. II. Page 10, in the Book of 
                                                
136 Sun Insurance Office, Instructions (1897), p. 42. 
137 Ibid., pp. 11, 15, 32. 
138 Ibid., p. 37. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Sun Fire Office, Instructions (1807), p. 21, 24. 
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Instructions, will, for the future, be dispensed with.’141 The secretary also used the 
Instructions to reprimand agents individually: as ‘you will observe by your Book of 
Instructions’.142 Prior to the thoroughness of the book, an agent had claimed: ‘If I had 
been informed of such directions I certainly should have obeyd their commands.’143 
Agents used the books in their own way. One agent marked examples in his 1822 
edition as ‘Discontinued’.144 He made crossings out and additions. The owner of an 
1872 edition customised the index such that he could navigate the letters of the 
alphabet on the outside. 
 
Instructions direct agents’ behaviour at a distance 
The managers relied on agents for the company’s geographical reach, as articulated at 
the start of the 1897 Instructions: ‘The Directors rely upon the Agents of the Company 
exerting every possible influence at their command to extend its connection and 
procure insurances’.145 The agent’s attention to the instructions was conducive to ‘the 
successful working of the Agency’. The Instructions sought to make agents reliable. 
They stipulated the procedures for the paperwork that the agents maintained, 
procedures which have been set out above.  
The Instructions also directed agents’ personal interactions in their neighbourhoods, 
particularly during and after a fire. They made clear the expectations of agents as 
informers in their locales. The 1807 edition shows the extent of the Sun’s dependency 
in that period. The responsibility as company representative was critical at a fire. ‘When 
a fire breaks out, you are, if possible, to repair to the place, and encourage the 
extinguishing the same’.146 The instruction continued:  
It is particularly wished, that, at the instant you repair to a fire, you will endeavour to obtain 
every information from what cause the accident arose. …if you have any reason to 
apprehend fraud or ill design, you are to give immediate notice to the secretary, from whom 
you will receive farther instructions.  
Such information might include an inference of criminal activity. In 1809 the General 
Committee discussed a letter from an agent that ‘some discovery has been reported 
respecting a fire’ in Bedfordshire. The Committee resolved that they would ‘cheerfully 
                                                
141 Sun Fire Office, circular to agents (ND), stuck into Sun Fire Office, Instructions for the Agents 
of the Sun Fire-Office (London: Norris and Son, 1822), p. 2, LMA, 
CLC/B/192/DC/001/MS15671. 
142 Edward Griffin to Francis Cobb, 15 March 1817, Kent Archives, EK/U1453/B6/2/3. LMA, 
CLC/B/192/B/018/MS11935/010, 25 March 1808: the managers decided ‘that Mr Tooze be 
written to, pointing out to him the duties of agents in settling losses & referring him to his Book 
of Instructions’. 
143 CLC/B/192/DC/006/MS38814. 
144 Sun Fire Office, Instructions, (1822), University of Illinois Library, Google ebook. 
145 Sun Insurance Office, Instructions (1897), p. 5. 
146 Sun Fire Office, Instructions (1807), pp. 28–9. 
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contribute half the expenses of a prosecution, if, upon investigation, he shall think it 
right to commence one.’147 
The 1807 Instructions also defined the agent’s responsibilities following damage by 
fire:  
you will, if from its importance it should seem requisite, employ a proper person to examine 
the same, or, if deemed necessary, from the magnitude of the damage sustained, you will 
employ a surveyor on the part of the office, to meet whoever is appointed by the claimant, to 
estimate such damage, which estimate….signed by each surveyor, you will transmit to the 
office, with the addition of the number of the policy, and other requisite particulars, as per 
example. 
The Office warned that though it would pay moderate expenses at fires, for those who 
assisted – which was a form of good publicity for the office – there was a problem at 
the time with public houses opening their doors with an expectation of 
reimbursement.148  
The Sun relied on an agent to make judgements regarding expenses. In 1812 an 
agent quibbled the Sun’s refusal to pay more than £4 expenses at a fire. The Secretary 
Mr Griffin explained that: 
The Principle on which the Managers always act respecting expences is this. They take into 
consideration the sum insured & if that sum does not cover the value of the property where 
the Fire happens, in that case the exertions of the persons employ’d are for the benefit of the 
insured in proportion to the difference.  
But Mr Griffin relented, persuaded that ‘it would be for the interest of the office to do 
so’.149 The agent balanced the circumstances in his locale with the company’s 
interests. He could pay out large claims in his area only if the management directed 
him to do so.150  
The Instructions of the late nineteenth century groomed agents’ eyes and ears. In 
the instance of a policy holder transferring to the Sun from another fire office, agents 
were directed to ‘ascertain the rate which has hitherto been paid’.151 If agents ‘happen 
to hear of’ alterations being made to an insured building, they were told to make 
inquiries.152 The book devoted a chapter to ‘Fires in Agent’s District’. It emphasised the 
speed with which the Office wanted information:  
                                                
147 LMA, CLC/B/192/B/001/MS11931, 2 August 1809. 
148 See also Sun Fire Office, Instructions (1822), p. 59. 
149 Letters from Edward Griffin to Francis Cobb, 25 March 1812 and 27 April 1812, Kent 
Archives, EK/U1453/B6/2/3. 
150 Letter from Edward Griffin to Francis Cobb, 6 March 1812, Kent Archives, EK/U1453/B6/2/3. 
Sun Fire Office, Instructions (1822), p. 58. See LMA, LMA, CLC/B/192/DC/006/MS38814 for 
expenses claimed by agents and surveyors, which likely includes small claims paid out on 
behalf of the Office. 
151 Sun Insurance Office, Instructions (1897), p. 32. 
152 Ibid., p. 29. 
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The Directors are always desirous of having the earliest intimation of any fire which may 
happen… The Agents are therefore requested to furnish, as soon as possible after the 
event, such information under these heads as may come to their knowledge.153  
Following a fire on Judd Street in London in 1904, in which six people died, the local 
Sun agent sent immediate notification to the branch manager, including the number of 
a policy which the company had issued on the property. At the top of the post card he 
added: ‘Please forward me a few prospectuses’, not missing an opportunity.154 In this 
period, agents were instructed to report on the items of loss before the insured 
submitted their own estimate.155 But still an account should be ‘procured, without delay, 
from the Assured’. Agents were warned not to give their assistance in this.156  
Through the clear language and layout of the Instructions, the Sun’s managers 
hoped to regulate their agents. The Instructions were a tool for the company as well as 
a tool for the agent. They stood in for one-on-one interaction and communication 
between agents across the country and staff stationed in London. They did not prevent 
instances of ‘[f]raud, incompetence, indiscipline, inactivity’, but that need not endorse 
the verdict of a guide to insurance published in 1904, that: ‘even the most exact and 
systematic instructions are likely to be neglected or disobeyed, – from varied causes of 
personal infirmity residing in the character and will, – by the subordinates on whom 
their execution is devolved.’157 
 
Where the Sun regulated its firemen by a sheet or two, it produced a book in order to 
prescribe its agents’ activities. This difference in weight tells of the role and 
responsibility vested in agents. Not only were agents’ Instructions heavier but the 
number of printed formats that agents worked with grew exponentially in the nineteenth 
century and changed frequently. For the growth of the Office depended on numbers of 
agents, and these dispersed characters necessitated and caused the growth of 
bureaucratic processes, both printed and manuscript. In turn, agents received direction 
to the processes. The colour in the exchanges between agents and the Sun shows 
how much human resistance – deliberate or careless – there was to these processes. 
Printed objects grappled with people. Printed objects show that agents’ work was both 
bureaucratic and personal. As a solution to regulating this body, we have seen 
evidence here of how the Sun’s managers pushed print’s design aspects, to make 
processes ‘simple’, to use forms to standardise, to use lists to determine forthcoming 
                                                
153 Ibid., p. 51. 
154 LMA, CLC/B/192/F/043/MS38869/001. 
155 Sun Insurance Office, Instructions (1897), p. 45: Chapter on ‘Claims’, with a paragraph on 
‘Advice of the Loss’. 
156 Ibid., p. 46 
157 Young and Masters, Insurance Office Organisation, p. 11. 
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information. Moreover, the dispersion of the Sun’s designed and printed identity – of its 
name, its emblem, its branding – across Britain depended on individual agents. There 
was a strong personal aspect to the spread of the Office’s impersonal accoutrements. 
 
Customers 
A customer’s relationship with the Insurance Office and the Sun was forged by the 
policy and the terms document, graphic objects examined in Chapter 4. Unlike the 
Insurance Office, the Sun never imposed a limit on its number of customers. It sought 
as many policy holders as possible, as long as their property accorded with its 
classifications. The Sun’s managers added to the formats the company issued to 
customers: receipts and renewal notices were routine printed matter which materialised 
customers’ ongoing relationship with fire insurance. Customers were on the opposite 
side of the business to firemen and agents; nevertheless they carried risks that print 
was designed to mitigate. This section considers the one-off formats that the Sun’s 
managers directed at customers to advise and regulate them.  
The Sun used print to warn its policy holders about circumstantial risks. In 1809, the 
managers responded to a spate of robberies during neighbourhood fires by ordering 
the ‘distribution of a Caution, in the Form of a Handbill’ with each receipt for renewal.158 
(See Illustration 5.61.) The managers sought to protect the company’s interests: ‘the 
great expence incurred by removals’ at fires was an ‘alarming evil’. They hoped that by 
this handbill and a circular to magistrates, ‘some good will certainly arise’. The display 
type of ‘Caution’ on the bill was designed to make the message unavoidable to 
readers: not to ‘suffer Strangers to enter their Houses in Cases of Alarm’.  
Fire offices were perennially afraid of servants ‘careless setting fire to houses’ and 
they endeavoured to pass this fear onto policy holders.159 The perception was a 
consequence of servants being responsible for candles and open fires (for cooking and 
hearths) in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century households. An act of 1707 had 
established punishments for servants found guilty of acting negligently. The agents’ 
Instructions in 1807 transcribed an abstract of the act so that agents remembered to 
impress the risks upon customers.160  
In 1806, the Sun’s managers reformed the procedures for claims and used pieces of 
print to help change customers’ long-held behaviours. Prior to reform, ‘The clerks 
expect some small fees to the amount of a few guineas’ from policy holders, when they 
                                                
158 LMA, CLC/B/192/B/001/MS11931, 1 March and April 1809. 
159 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries fire offices distributed abstracts of the act in the 
form of poster notices. Pearson, Insuring the Industrial Revolution, p. 315. 
160 Sun Fire Office, Instructions (1807), p. 45. 
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paid out a claim.161 Clerks’ salaries were adjusted to compensate for a loss in these 
gratuities. A new printed letter to claimants advised them that they could come to the 
London office to receive a claim and that ‘N.B. You are particularly desired not to give 
either Fee or Gratuity to any Person belonging to this Office.’ (See Illustration 5.62.) At 
the same time, the Sun’s managers commissioned ‘the following notice be hung up in 
the most public part of the office / To the Public / By order of the Managers / No Fees, 
or Gratuities, whatever, are allowed to be received in this Office’.162  
Just as by the second decade of the nineteenth century the London office weighed 
up the quality of agents, agents were expected to do the same regarding customers. A 
circular directed agents: ‘In taking instructions...you will inform yourself particularly as 
to the Respectability of the Parties’.163 At the end of the nineteenth century, the 
Instructions devoted a section to ‘character’:  
In all cases where the party proposing the Insurance is a stranger, especial enquiries as to 
his or her character should be made, and no proposal should be sent to the Office for 
consideration unless the Agent can vouch for the character of the Proposer, either from his 
own personal knowledge or as a result of enquiries from persons upon whom reliance can 
be placed.164  
This instruction placed agents in chains of personal relationships. 
As a result of this responsibility, agents could be applauded for choosing the right 
customers. In 1909, a branch manager wrote to the secretary that ‘Mr Fletcher … has 
been very successful in steering us clear of undesirables in his district.’165 In turn, an 
agent’s judgement of character could be challenged. In 1904, a fire killed six people in 
a tenement house in London (the same incident as referred to just above). The Sun 
had sold a policy on the ground-floor hairdresser’s shop, which suffered from the blaze. 
The shop was run by a widow, Sarah Ann Thiers, whose husband had been French.166 
The assistant secretary wrote to the local branch manager to inquire as to why the 
branch had accepted the risk, given that, 
a suspicion as to the respectability of the establishment might reasonably be entertained, 
and, as you are aware, we do not regard Foreign Hairdressers as desirable risks and I shall 
be glad if you will inform me through what channel the proposal came to you and whether 
there were any special reasons which induced you to accept it.167  
                                                
161 John Trusler, The London Adviser and Guide: Containing Every Instruction and Information 
[...] (London, 1790 [1786]), p. 10. 
162 LMA, CLC/B/192/B/001/MS11931, 24 April 1806. 
163 Sun Fire Office, circular to agents, 10 May 1816. 
164 Sun Insurance Office, Instructions (1897), p. 5. 
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The branch manager defended himself that ‘this policy … was issued on the strength of 
your Surveyor’s report … and the fact that the family had been insured in the Office for 
some years.’168  
The Instructions to agents in 1897 set out how a risk could be ‘more or less 
desirable as a subject for insurance’, based on the ‘degree of danger from fire 
attaching to any particular building or its contents’.169 The two exchanges above 
between agents and head office show how ‘desirable’ also applied in practice to 
people.170 In the twentieth century, a new way arose by which the Sun tried to adduce 
a customer’s character: a list of four questions posed on its proposal form. The purpose 
of the list was to filter for suspicious proposers. The third question asked: ‘Has any 
Proposal of Insurance against Fire made by you on this or other property been 
declined?’ The fourth inquired: ‘Has a Fire occurred in any Building whilst wholly or 
partially occupied by you?’ A list of questions had been used since the 1810s to shape 
agents’ interactions with customers; now it was a device by which customers might 
incriminate themselves directly. The Sun’s managers now designed print to be as 
untrusting of customers as it had historically been of agents. 
 
It comes as a surprise that the Sun came to use print to shape its customer body. The 
Sun’s managers’ approach to customers shifted such that it became increasingly 
concerned with their ‘character’. Print could help standardise character, just as it had 
for firemen and agents. This new approach to customers reflects a shift whereby risk 
was perceived to rest in people as much as in flammable materials. The managers 
issued guidelines to agents by which to make judgements. At the same time as 
customers chose a fire office, the Sun wanted its agents to choose the company’s 
policy holders. Print facilitated a hierarchy of selection processes: selection of 
customers followed selection of agents. 
 
Locations on graphic objects 
This chapter began by showing how the Insurance Office and the Sun put personal 
names in print in order to endorse their own standing. It ends by showing how these 
Offices also put their addresses in print. The motivation for a geographical location 
shifted. Where once an address stimulated a face-to-face meeting, it came to be the 
expression of an institution’s status.  
                                                
168 Ibid., 31 October 1904.  
169 Sun Insurance Office, Instructions (1897), p. 15. 
170 ‘Desirable’ is used of a risk in LMA, CLC/B/192/B/001/MS11931, 7 July 1803. However, 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ were more common adjectives in that period, for example in Philip Bewicke’s 
reports in 1804 and 1805. 
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From the outset, part of the purpose of the Insurance Office’s print was to anchor 
the scheme to a location. The Propositions ended with the details of the Office:  
The Office will be kept at the House which was formerly the Ship-Tavern behind the Royal 
Exchange, from the hours of Nine in the Forenoon to Twelve, and from Three in the 
Afternoon till six, and will be open next Thursday, being the 6th of May instant.171  
An address was the kind of circumstantial detail that reinforced an office’s credibility.172 
The address ‘on the Backside of the Royal Exchange’ was repeated in the colophon 
and similarly in all subsequent sheets from the Office in the seventeenth century.173 
Despite this, the Advertisement in September 1681 admitted that there had not been 
‘due Attendance given at the office’, which was said to have prevented ‘many more’ 
from subscribing.174 An address in print made the Office more real than it was.  
The Insurance Office’s location by the Royal Exchange situated it in the heart of the 
City of London’s trading of goods and shares and of news-sheet advertising.175 The 
Office’s sheets also connected it to other locations that might be known or were 
findable, where readers could access further information. The colophon to the 
Propositions stated: ‘These Papers will be delivered gratis at Mr Starkey’s a Bookseller 
near Temple-Bar, at Mr. Hinchman’s a Bookseller in Westminster-Hall’ in addition to 
the office.176 As well as being a fixture in the colophon, the importance of the Office’s 
own address came to be denoted in the titles to its sheets, in May 1681 and throughout 
the series A Table.177 (See Illustrations 5.63 to 5.70.) The Office’s location 
distinguished it and identified it; thereby, it was essential to its identity print. 
                                                
171 Fire Office, Propositions [1680], p. 2. The two subsequent versions of the Propositions were 
modified to take into account that the opening was no longer in the future. 
172 Kate Loveman, Reading Fictions, 1660–1740: Deception in English Literary and Political 
Culture (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), p. 37, points out how circumstantial details, such as dates, 
times, places, surroundings, in a work’s content are used by its author to convey credibility and 
affect impartiality. 
173 On the commonness of ‘backside’ as a preposition in street directions in the eighteenth 
century, see Laura Wright, 'Street Addresses and Directions in Mid-Eighteenth Century London 
Newspaper Advertisements', in Nicholas Brownlees, ed., News Discourse in Early Modern 
Britain: Selected Papers of CHINED 2004 (Bern; Oxford: Peter Lang, 2006), pp. 199–215.  
174 Fire Office, September, the 16th 1681, p. 2. There is no evidence of the office in hearth tax 
records, according to John Merriman Sims, ‘The Trust Lands of the Fire Office’, Guildhall 
Miscellany, 4:2 (1972), 88–113. 
175 Glaisyer, Culture of Commerce; Michael Harris ‘Timely Notices: The Uses of Advertising and 
its Relationship to News during the Late Seventeenth Century’, Prose Studies, 21 (1998), 141–
156; Anne L. Murphy, The Origins of English Financial Markets: Investment and Speculation 
Before the South Sea Bubble (Cambridge University Press, 2009); Ann Saunders, ed., The 
Royal Exchange (London: London Topographical Society, 1997). 
176 Fire Office, Propositions [1680], p. 2; Fire Office, Propositions [1681], p. 2; Fire Office, 
[Advertisement] From the Insurance-Office for Houses. 
177 Fire Office, [Advertisement] From the Insurance-Office for Houses; Fire Office, A Table of the 
Insurance Office at the Back-side of the Royal Exchange (1682); (1683); (1685); Fire Office, A 
Table of the Insurance Offices: one, against the Royal-Exchange in Cornhill; and the Other, at 
the Rainbow Coffee-House, next the Inner-Temple-Gate (1687); Fire Office, A Table, Shewing 
the Rates of Insuring Houses from One Year to Eleven: at the Fire-Office, Kept against the 
Royal-Exchange in Cornhill; and at the Rainbow Coffee-House by the Inner-Temple-Gate in 
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The Insurance Office’s location in print stood for the possibility of personal 
interaction with its backers. The backers relied on face-to-face meetings to attract 
support to their scheme. They designed their earliest printed sheets to draw people to 
the address: ‘That the Undertakers … be ready to hear what may be said to the 
advantage or disadvantage of this Design, they will attend every day at their Office’.178 
They directed this invitation to discuss the scheme at those who would ‘agree’ to it and 
‘subscribe to Pay their Money’ at this preliminary stage. Subsequently, this group was 
described as the ‘Several Gentlemen’ who had shown ‘their Willingness to Encourage 
this Design’.179 Readers of the Propositions in 1680 were given a window of a month in 
which to visit the office. This was another detail which pointed to the seriousness of the 
project. In fact, the same opportunity was offered a year later in the revision to the 
Propositions. 
Print stimulated involvement and interaction in the project from the early 
subscribers. In turn, the Office vaunted the initial personal interactions. In the revised 
Propositions, it announced that ‘the Trustees upon whom the Estate is to be settled, 
and the Council to peruse the Title, and draw the Conveyances, shall be named by the 
Persons that subscribe’. Once again, print facilitated this: ‘to that end publick notice 
shall be given of a day of meeting for that purpose’. An Advertisement invited ‘all 
Persons that have Subscribed … would please to meet at the said Office, on the Eighth 
of June, next, at Three of the Clock in the Afternoon’.180 
Once the Insurance Office was open for business, print promoted the personal 
meeting required for the purchase of a policy. It did so with the necessary practical 
details, which also served the Office’s credibility. The opening paragraph of 
September, the 16th 1681 ran:  
Persons … will Attend every Day at their Office on the Back-Side of the Royal-Exchange, 
from the Hours of Nine till Twelve in the Forenoon, and from Three till Six in the Afternoon, to 
Subscribe Policies for all Persons desirous to Insure their Houses, as far as the Number of 
Three Thousand Houses.181  
‘Subscribe’ was now the action of the insurers on the policy rather than of the early 
encouragers. At its opening, the minimum length for an Insurance Office policy was 
                                                                                                                                          
Fleet-Street (1693); Fire Office, [A Table,] Shewing the Rates of Insuring Houses from One 
Year to Eleven: at the Fire-Office, Kept against the Royal-Exchange in Cornhill: and at the 
Rainbow Coffee-House by the Inner-Temple-Gate in Fleetstreet (1698); Fire Office, A Table, 
Shewing the Rates of Insuring Houses from One Year to Seven: at the Fire-Office, Kept against 
the Royal-Exchange in Cornhill: and at the Rainbow Coffee-House by the Inner-Temple-Gate in 
Fleetstreet (1700). 
178 Fire Office, Propositions [1680], p. 2; Fire Office, Propositions [1681], p. 2. 
179 Fire Office, September, the 16th 1681, p. 2. 
180 Fire Office, [Advertisement] from the Insurance-Office for Houses. 
181 Fire Office, September, the 16th 1681, p. 1. The times of attendance were stated 
subsequently on the editions of Fire Office, A Table in 1693, 1698 and 1700. 
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seven years, so most policy holders would have no reason to meet the insurers 
again.182  
The Insurance Office’s undertakers viewed the existence of an office as crucial to 
their scheme’s identity and to its feasibility. They attempted to undermine the 
Corporation of the City of London’s insurance scheme with the charge that, ‘The 
Payment of losses and Satisfaction of Damages’ by its rivals would be difficult for 
policy holders as it would involve the ‘attendance upon the Court of Aldermen or 
Committees’.183 The City’s representative shot back: ‘The City have erected an Office, 
where there shall be constant attendance, and ready dispatch given.’ 184 This exchange 
is evidence that the reality of an office underlined the viability of an Office. 
 
The Sun Fire Office’s address was a mainstay at the top of its Proposals in the early 
nineteenth century, just as an address had been at the top of the Insurance Office’s A 
Table at the end of the seventeenth century. The inclusion of details of attendance at 
the office shows that the Sun’s managers similarly used an address in print as a 
prompt to a personal meeting: ‘CORNHILL, near the ROYAL-EXCHANGE, and at 
CRAIG’S COURT, CHARING CROSS’. (See Illustrations 5.71 and 5.72.) The 
Proposals ended:  
FOR THE EASE AND CONVENIENCY of the Inhabitants of the City of Westminster and 
Places adjacent, this Society has an Office in CRAIG’S COURT, Charing Cross, where, as 
well as at their Office in CORNHILL, near the Royal-Exchange, Attendance is daily given 
from Nine in the Morning until Four in the Afternoon.  
In other ways too, the Sun’s managers used print to solicit personal contact. The 
Sun’s procedures in the early nineteenth century required that policy holders interact 
with the company’s staff annually to renew their policy, either in the office or with a 
‘receiver’.185 The receipt, which confirmed payment of the premium, reminded policy 
holders that they could ‘pay their respective Insurance and Duty into the said Office, 
where proper Persons daily attend to receive the same, or to the said Receivers’.186 
The company also circulated a notice to policy holders to advise them when it was time 
                                                
182 The Insurance Office began to include the option of one-year insurance in 1687, Fire Office, 
A Table (1687). 
183 Fire Office, Enquiry, p. 2. 
184 L. R., To my Honoured Friend Mr M.T., p. 2. The Corporation of the City of London outlined 
the ‘constant Attendance … daily given’ in the ‘Chamber at the Guild-hall’, in City of London, A 
Table of all Terms of Years from One to Thirty One Inclusive; and from thence by Every Ten 
Years to One Hundred Inclusive, and from thence for ever; where is Set Down the Sums of 
Money to be Paid for Insuring a Brick House for any of those Terms of Years Proportionably to 
Four Pounds for ever, for every Hundred Pounds Value Insured on such Buildings; Calculated 
by Order of Common Council (1681). 
185 When the Sun opened in 1710, policy holders interacted with Sun staff at regular intervals as 
they paid the premium quarterly. This changed in the 1730s. 
186 Sun Fire Office, receipt, dated 29 September 1812, Kent Archives, EK/U1453/B6/1/28. 
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to visit the office to pay the premium. The address to which the reader should come sat 
enlarged, like a title, at the top of the notice: ‘From the Sun-Fire Office, in Cornhill, near 
the Royal-Exchange’. In 1804, the notice ran:  
The Time for Payment on your Policy of Insurance in this OFFICE, No. [Blank] expires 
Fifteen Days after Christmas Day next; the Managers of the said OFFICE (in Regard to your 
Security) have ordered me to give you this Notice, that you may not lose the Benefit of your 
Policy by omitting the Payment.187 (See Illustration 5.73.)  
The format of this notice for renewal, introduced in the late eighteenth century, looks 
to have been designed as a substitute for a personal visit by a receiver or other 
representative. It took the shape of a letter, it spoke to ‘you’ and ‘your’, and was signed 
off by ‘Your humble Servant / Job Marks’, typeset to give a personal touch (as 
discussed in the earlier subsection on ‘Printed signatures’).188 The Office spoke as if 
this notice had its customer’s interests in mind (‘Security’ and ‘Benefit’); yet the blanks 
spoke of a desire for efficiency in the Office’s own processes. A ‘P.S.’ read: ‘You are 
requested to bring this Letter.’ This request would expedite the policy holder’s visit, to 
the company’s benefit. The printed letter would systematise the interaction and make it 
a transaction. 
While the address at the top of the Sun’s Proposals in the early nineteenth century 
solicited a personal interaction with an audience in London, to those outside London it 
was symbolic. The company’s agents distributed the same Proposals as were used in 
London, yet customers interacted and paid for policies locally. Agents advertised their 
locations through other print. For ‘country’ customers, the address on the Proposals 
was disconnected from being a place to interact. Instead it was a constituent of the Sun 
Fire Office’s identity, in opposition to the local offices which existed. ‘London’ became 
part of the company’s identity outside London, as shown by the following examples of 
print distributed by agents. (See Illustrations 5.74 and 5.75). Local fire offices had 
advantages in the market, but the London offices accrued trust and status from their 
experience. A manager of the Sun identified the competition from ‘the Glasgow Office 
from possessing so much local influence’.189 But this rival ‘have suffered some severe 
losses & have experienced some costly lawsuits besides which their mode of settling 
losses has not contributed to raise their character’. 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the disconnection between the 
Sun’s location as printed in a title and an actual meeting was total. A geographical 
position was wholly a part of the company’s brand. The policy recorded the ‘Chief 
                                                
187 Sun Fire Office, renewal letter-form, 7 December 1804, LMA, 
CLC/B/192/DD/008/MS38828/001, fol. 77. 
188 An example from 1785 shows how the letter-form was filled in, folded and delivered: LMA, 
CLC/B/192/DD/008/MS38828/001, fol. 57. 
189 Bewicke’s report, LMA, CLC/B/192/B/011/MS11935A. 
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Office–63, Threadneedle Street, London, E.C.’, below the illustration which had sat 
atop the agreement since the eighteenth century. (See Illustration 5.76.) Most 
customers would have no relationship with that office. The Sun’s contemporary 
renewal notice printed just ‘London’, while a blank space welcomed the particular 
location of the customer’s agent. (See Illustration 5.77.) The precise address of the 
Sun’s head office in London was printed on the back of the sheet as a note in case the 
leaflet could not be delivered. Renewal receipts in this period either printed ‘London’ or 
they specified the address of an agency. (See Illustrations 5.78 and 5.79.) In the 
twentieth century, even a meeting between agent and policy holder at the agent’s 
address was no longer necessary. Agents wrote and received correspondence with 
customers. Renewals could be carried out by remittance. ‘This Notice intact should 
accompany a Remittance’, ran perpendicular up the front page of the Sun’s renewal 
leaflet. (See Illustration 5.80.) This direction was final proof that a location in print stood 
for interpersonal trust among people who might never meet in person. 
 
An address was essential to the materialisation of an insurance office. We saw in 
Chapter 3 that one way that the Insurance Office proved itself real was by its fund; 
another was by its address. A printed address was reality; did it matter if the office at 
the address turned out not to be open yet? A printed address was where one could 
meet the people behind a fire office. It was another means by which people were 
implicit in print. However, over the periods examined here, the meaning of the printed 
address changed. It now reflected the possibility of meeting, a possibility that might 
rarely be actualised. 
 
Conclusion 
The fire insurance industry needed people. At first, a small group of insurers needed 
customers in the thousands, protected by a small band of firemen. The fire insurance 
product rested not in a physical substance but in the design of a large number of 
customers sharing the cost of the suffering of individuals in that community. Over time, 
the customers grew, abetted by a growing number of agents, over a growing 
geography. This chapter has shown how these various people percolated fire 
insurance print, as individuals and groups. This challenges theories about the 
impersonal nature of institutions in the modern era. Print brought personality to a fire 
office. It divulged and represented people. The corporate identities of the Insurance 
Office and the Sun rested not only on their own names set in type – as Chapter 3 
discussed – but on individuals’ names, namely Insurance Office insurers and Sun 
managers and secretaries. In turn, those corporate identities signified individual 
employees as trustworthy.  
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Print negotiated the personal interactions which were necessary for trust in fire 
insurance. But the graphic objects generated by the fire offices did not imitate one-on-
one relationships that pre-dated them; rather, they created brand new possibilities for 
personal interaction and geographical extent. The nature of the personal relations 
impressed in print changed over time. This is best shown by the printed address: 
where once it encouraged an encounter, it latterly stood for status. Furthermore, 
increasingly, print took responsibility for trying to streamline agents and customers. 
Print was not a sufficient condition for the agent network but it was certainly necessary. 
Print’s mission creep constructed a particular kind of business. It determined the nature 
of fire insurance. 
Print’s interrelations with people had two purposes. On the one hand, people 
substantiated an office’s branding and its status. On the Insurance Office’s policy, the 
important names were autographs at the bottom-right. On the Sun’s twentieth-century 
policy, they were in print at the top. Promotional material was rooted in people. 
Relatedly, agents spread a company’s branded promotional material around the 
country. On the other hand, the entanglement of people and print was a matter of a 
company’s running: print was the tool by which to standardise types of people. The 
policy set in blank spaces a person’s property. Over time, the property and then the 
person became subject to increasingly fine appraisal. The difficulty for the Sun was that 
they could mass produce policies and other printed material but not agents.  
The distinction between qualities and technologies that defined the previous two 
chapters has been implicit here: in terms of qualities, this chapter has attended to the 
language of reliance and security directed at firemen and agents; in terms of 
technologies, one such was the agents’ Instructions, which used other, finer 
technologies such as indexes and layout to perform its function. Blanks and lists were 
means to shape people on the page.  
This chapter’s argument about the role of people in print contributes to the analysis 
of this Part of the thesis of how print built trust in the fire insurance industry. Chapters 3 
and 4 showed insurance’s materialisation in print. Those chapters raised the question 
of whether materialisation in print resulted in impersonal institutions. We now see that 
part of that materialisation was the manifestation and marks of people by graphic 
design. The interweaving of various people was a way of making this business real.  
This understanding finds a link in the human faces with which Airbnb sprinkles its 
website. In this way, Part II has directly addressed two of the thesis’s themes: the 
material and personal nature of fire insurance. These two lead to a third: how trust can 
be visible. The analysis of print on its own terms has provided these insights into the 
business. 
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This chapter has had a different timbre to the rest of the Part. It resounds with many 
quotations from correspondence. With the previous chapters having focused intently on 
graphic objects and their texts, the source material introduced here, from both 
manuscript and print, provides a snapshot of the people at the centre of the Sun. As 
terse as their words often are, they humanise the business, show the personal 
communication at its heart and uncover the human beings in its records. Thus this 
chapter has tried to draw out the printed texture of how the Sun rested on individuals, 
of how it dealt with the particular groups upon whom its business depended in different 
ways. The numbers and lists of the previous chapter do not represent the business on 
their own.  
This humanisation continues in the next and final Part, which considers how another 
kind of print – news print – helped to build trust in the fire insurance industry. Part III 
resonates in another way. The tone of the personal communications heard in this 
chapter imply a level of distrust within Sun. The surveyor James Hall’s biting words that 
began this chapter pinpoint uncertainty. Layers of paperwork were never enough to 





Part III: How News Print Built Trust and Distrust in the Fire 
Insurance Industry 
 
Chapter 6: News Print as a Site of Subversion 
 
An article in the Figaro, a London newspaper of the late nineteenth century, points to 
how the news media could threaten the reputation of the fire insurance industry. Under 
the headline ‘Insurance Companies and the Public’, the short piece fought the corner of 
a rich widow – ‘of unimpeachable character’ – whose claim to the Sun Fire Office after 
her furniture was destroyed by fire, had been rejected.1 (See Illustrations 6.1 and 6.2.) 
After seven months, still ‘not a penny’ had been received. Her case, so the piece 
explained, had even been represented in a pamphlet, ‘A Warning to Holders of Fire 
Insurance’. Aware of the consequences of bad publicity, the article’s author began 
provocatively: ‘It would be a serious matter if the public lost faith in insurance 
companies, which are among the best institutions of modern times.’ The author 
continued:  
People insure their lives in order to provide for their families when they are dead; they insure 
their property for the purpose of securing themselves against loss by fire; and they insure 
their limbs for the sake of obtaining compensation in the event of accident…. Nobody would 
question the ability of the Sun Fire Office to satisfy any claim that might be made against it. 
The high respectability of the Office is beyond all dispute. Its directors are men of good 
standing, and its financial position is unassailable. But…it appears to have committed a 
grievous error of judgment.  
Then the author clarified the grounds on which refusal of a claim would be acceptable: 
‘If fraud is suspected, it is the duty of an insurance company not only to defer, but to 
resist, the payment of a claim’.  
In this article, the Figaro gave voice to uncertainty over fire insurance: could a policy 
holder count on the compensation she believed she had purchased? A member of the 
Sun’s staff read the article, clipped it, and stuck it into a guard book labelled 
‘Memoranda Book’, where it remains as part of the company’s archives.2 This 
Memoranda Book contains primarily legal materials, miscellaneous printed materials 
and, like other guard books and scrapbooks maintained by Sun staff, cuttings from 
newspapers. These practices demonstrate how the company’s record keepers kept a 
keen eye on the reputation and representation of their employer and the industry in the 
news media. (See Illustration 6.3.) In other instances, clerks took cuttings as evidence 
                                                       
1 ‘Insurance Companies and the Public’, Figaro, 18 July 1885, p. 9. 
2 LMA, CLC/B/192/DD/007/MS11935G, fol. 117. 
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or for context; for example, fastening them to the documentation of claims.3 (See 
Illustration 6.4.) 
The relationship of fire insurance to news media dated to the first fire offices, for the 
stirrings of the Insurance Office and the Corporation of the City of London’s scheme in 
1680 were deemed newsworthy, as will be seen in this chapter.4 Long before its staff 
cut and pasted news clippings into guard books, the Sun ran its own news-sheet, the 
British Mercury and then the Historical Register in the course of its first two decades.5 
(See Illustration 6.5.) Thus the Sun Fire Office as an institution held a long appreciation 
of the value of news culture to fire insurance. 
In this final part of the thesis, serial print offers a counterpoint to the print produced 
by fire insurance companies, which has been turned over in the previous Part. This 
single chapter’s study of the presence of the Insurance Office and fire-related matters 
in time-sensitive publications between 1680 and 1700, and of the Sun in The Times 
between 1800 and 1820 and then from the 1880s to 1910, discovers how the service of 
fire insurance made use of and was suited to the affordances of timely print.6 In the first 
section on those affordances, we shall see how fire offices’ presence in news print 
grew as newspapers grew. In the late seventeenth century, news-sheets consisted of 
two to four pages, with two columns to a page.7 In 1800, The Times consisted of four 
pages, with four columns across an expanded page size. By 1910, it contained twenty 
immense pages, six columns wide.  
But serial print was a medium beyond the companies’ control. The more it covered 
subjects within the orbit of the fire insurance industry, the more ambivalent might be its 
consequences. It spread stories which could raise questions about the industry, like 
that in the Figaro. It stimulated feelings of anxiety and uncertainty in the reader. These 
might be the qualities of distrust, and they are discussed in the second section, on 
risks. In drawing attention to the risks of news print for fire insurance, this chapter 
echoes the Design and Trust publication discussed in Part I in drawing out how 
designs for public cohesion and safety might have an opposite effect.  
                                                       
3 LMA, CLC/B/192/DD/006/MS19494, CLC/B/192/DD/011/MS15050, 
CLC/B/192/DD/022/MS38839, CLC/B/192/DD/025/MS15048, CLC/B/192/DD/029/MS38841, 
CLC/B/192/DD/035/MS38847 and CLC/B/192/F/043/MS38869/001. 
4 Protestant (Domestick) Intelligence, 2 April 1680, pp. 1–2; True Protestant (Domestick) 
Intelligence, 7 May 1680, p. 1. 
5 For a study of the British Mercury, Natasha Glaisyer, The Culture of Commerce in England, 
1660–1720 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2006). 
6 This chapter adapts the notion of an object’s ‘affordances’ from James J. Gibson, ‘The Theory 
of Affordances’, in The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1979). 
7 Carolyn Nelson and Matthew Seccombe, ‘The creation of the periodical press 1620–1695’, in 
John Barnard and D. F. McKenzie, with Maureen Bell, eds, The Cambridge History of the Book 
in Britain Volume 4, 1557–1695 (Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 533–550, especially p. 
545 on the format of the London Gazette. 
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The Affordances of News Print 
Let us examine how the affordances of news print intersected with the needs of the fire 
insurance industry. 
 
Publicity under authority 
News print offered to fire insurance companies a ready-made graphic object inside 
which they could communicate with, and make themselves familiar to, an audience. 
The Insurance Office’s proposers used this object as a vehicle in order to make known 
their endeavour. A news story about ‘a New Office’ appeared in the True Protestant 
(Domestick) Intelligence in May 1680.8 (See Illustration 6.6.) Thus the True Protestant 
(Domestick) Intelligence corroborated the identity of the nascent Office. The language 
of the story suggests that it was written by the proposers of the Office themselves.9 In 
this first phase of fire insurance, the Office’s novelty suited the content of the news. 
The proposers reinforced this story by ‘Advertisements’ in the advertising sheet the 
Mercurius Civicus in May and June 1680.10 (See Illustration 6.7.)  
Once the industry was established, fire offices continued to use news print to reach 
audiences. At the end of the seventeenth century they placed notices ad hoc, to make 
known a change in their circumstances – a change of address, a change of personnel, 
a change in offering – or a forthcoming meeting. In the early decades of the eighteenth 
century, fire offices placed notices in newspapers which listed the names of victims of a 
fire who had received reimbursement. These names bore witness to the honesty of the 
office, in the public space of the newspaper.11 (See Illustrations 6.8 and 6.9.) 
In the early nineteenth century, the notices placed by the Sun Fire Office in The 
Times were narrowly focused; they related either to customers’ renewals or to 
shareholders’ dividend payments. At the end of the century, the Sun advertised itself 
more regularly in The Times, with a small, sparse and simple notice. At its most basic, 
it named the head office and recorded the sums of the office. (See Illustrations 6.10 
                                                       
8 True Protestant (Domestick) Intelligence, 7 May 1680, p. 1. 
9 This is suggested by the similar language between the report and the Insurance Office’s own 
writing – a ‘very reasonable sum’ and ‘considerable bank of money’ –, and the very different 
wording from the report on the Corporation of the City of London’s scheme the month before. 
Similarly, the report on the Corporation’s scheme was likely written by those involved. Compare 
A. Newbold, Londons Improvement and the Builder’s Security Asserted, by the Apparent 
Advantages that will Attend their Easie Charge, in Raising such a Joint-Stock, as many Assure 
a Re-building of those Houses, which shall hereafter be Destroyed by the Casualties of Fire 
(1680) with the news story: ‘Easie Charge, in Raising such a Joint-Stock, as may Assure a Re-
building’ and ‘asserting the easie Charge of raising such a Joynt Stock as may for ever assure 
the Rebuilding’. 
10 Mercurius Civicus or the City Mercury, No. 241, 12 May 1680, p. [1], and No. 243, 4 June 
1680, p. [2]. On the Mercurius Civicus, see Michael Harris, ‘Timely Notices: The Uses of 
Advertising and its Relationship to News during the Late Seventeenth Century’, Prose Studies, 
21 (1998), 141–156 (p. 150). 
11 Medical products placed similar testimonial adverts in this period. 
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and 6.11, and 6.12 and 6.13.) A more generous version displayed information about 
branches. (See Illustrations 6.14 and 6.15.) In the early twentieth century, an 
advertisement with branded elements – an image and a phrase – replaced this generic 
notice. (See Illustrations 6.16 and 6.17, and 6.18.) By the twentieth century, the graphic 
elements of the Office’s identity were at the forefront of the actual notice. 
The fire offices benefited from the distribution patterns of news publications and 
their regular readership. As a commercial product that was purchased, the longevity of 
a publication was proof of its readers: the True Protestant (Domestick) Intelligence had 
existed in some form since 1679, while the Mercurius Civicus had gone past 240 
issues.12 The Times had an audience of up to 5000 in the early nineteenth century and 
up to 40,000 in the early twentieth century.13 The people behind the Insurance Office 
and the Sun evidently believed that their market overlapped with these captive 
audiences.14 
News publications were brands which lent fire offices authority as well as audience. 
They were designed objects in that they contained a continuity of content from one 
issue to the next, predictable to reader and advertiser alike, harnessed by a title and a 
date.15 Each had a distinct graphic identity resting in the fixed formats of its masthead. 
(See Illustrations 6.6, 6.19 and 6.20.) These brands were detectable from a distance by 
their shape, however poorly printed an issue might be. (See Illustration 6.21.) This 
gave them authority.16 Reports and advertisements of a fire office came clothed in the 
authority of these formats, which gave its own existence and its own words credibility. 
This was a printed authority independent from the sheets which an office might 
commission itself. Thus the news report in the True Protestant (Domestick) Intelligence 
in 1680 acted as an endorsement to the ‘New Office’. It also gave it the stamp of being 
newsworthy, as a topic that might be discussed.  
 
                                                       
12 True Protestant (Domestick) Intelligence was the latest incarnation of Benjamin Harris’s 
Domestick Intelligence, as it was originally named in 1679. While he was in prison in this period, 
his writer is understood to have taken it over with this modified name; as recounted by James 
Sutherland, The Restoration Newspaper and its Development (Cambridge University Press, 
1986), p. 15. 
13 Oliver Woods and James Bishop, The Story of The Times (London: Joseph, 1983), pp. 12, 
184–210. The Times reached a peak circulation of 60,000 in the mid nineteenth century. Sales 
reached 150,000 in the run-up to World War I. 
14 On the ‘defined market’ offered by a newspaper, see Christine Ferdinand, ‘Constructing the 
Frameworks of Desire: How Newspapers Sold Books in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries’, in Joad Raymond, ed., News, Newspapers and Society in Early Modern Britain 
(London: F. Cass, 1999), pp. 152–173. 
15 Joad Raymond, ‘The Newspaper, Public Opinion, and the Public Sphere of the Seventeenth 
Century’, in News, Newspapers and Society in Early Modern Britain, p. 131, highlights the 
continuity of information offered by news print. 
16 The contention between Benjamin Harris and Nathanial Thompson shows the importance in 
the recognition and authority of news titles in the late seventeenth century. Thompson copied 
Harris’s title, in order to reach and mock his audience. 
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Timing 
It was because news publications were published regularly that they defined their 
audience and published predictable content. This seriality gave fire offices the ability to 
time their announcements in the textual space of the news-sheet with events outside 
it.17 The Insurance Office’s proposers timed their first notice in the Mercurius Civicus 
specifically with their presence at a location: ‘the persons that propose to insure 
Houses from Fire do now attend at their Office in Threadneedle Street’. The Office’s 
second notice was timed with a meeting: ‘Teusday the 8 of this inst. June, at 3 of the 
clock in the afternoon, is appointed by the Undertakers for insuring Houses from Fire, 
for nameing the Trustees and Councel’. Later the Office announced its change of 
address, to ‘Cornhil over against the Exchange, between Popes-head Alley, and 
Exchange Alley’.18  
News print allowed the Insurance Office to be reactive to events. Following a 
serious fire in Wapping in 1682, the Office put its service on show with this 
advertisement:  
These are to give notice to those Persons whose Houses were burnt or demolished in the 
late Fire in Wapping, which were Insured at the Office on the Backside of the Royal 
Exchange, That although there is some time allowed by their Policy for the Payment of the 
Money, yet if they have occasion for their Money in the Interim, they may receive it at the 
Office upon discount of the Interest for the time it shall be paid before it is due.19 
Other fire offices of the period similarly timed notices.20  
In the early nineteenth century, the Sun timed its advertisements precisely with 
dates and deadlines. Most commonly, its notices prompted readers when the 
premiums were due:  
All Persons insured in this Office, the Premiums on whose Policies fall due at the Lady-day 
quarter, are hereby reminded to pay the said Premiums, either at the Offices in Cornhill, near 
the Royal Exchange, and Craig’s-court, Charing-cross, or to the Agents in the Country, on or 
before the 9th day of April, 1800, when the 15 days allowed by this Office, over and above 
the time they are insured for, will expire. – The above notice is given, to prevent the insured 
losing the benefit of their Policies, by omitting to make such payments in proper time. No 
charge will be made for Policies in which the sum insured amounts to 300l. or above, and all 
                                                       
17 ‘Textual space’ is Raymond’s term in ‘The Newspaper, Public Opinion, and the Public Sphere 
of the Seventeenth Century’. 
18 London Gazette, 6 January 1686. 
19 London Gazette, 20 November 1682, under ‘Advertisements’, p. 2. 
20 The Amicable placed notices of forthcoming meetings: Post Boy, 10 December 1698; Flying 
Post, 27 July 1699; Post Man, 4 May 1700. The Amicable also gave notice for people to collect 
recompense after a fire: Flying Post, April 1700. The Friendly Society placed notices that the 
office had moved and the collectors had been sacked, so members should come to a new 
address to pay their dues: Post Man, 28 April 1698 and 3 May 1698. The insured were 
reminded that they needed to pay their dues or they would lose their cover: London Gazette, 1 
October 1688. Fire offices used news print to announce changes of address, changes in 
personnel, and advise of changes in their offering: London Gazette, 6 January 1687. 
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losses by Fire are paid without any deduction. This Office has always paid for damage by 
lightning.21 (See Illustration 6.22.)  
In this way, news print facilitated the industry’s system of annual renewal. Less 
frequent but still precise were the small notices about dividends:  
SUN FIRE OFFICE, 8th Jan 1808 – Notice is hereby given, that a DIVIDEND will be paid the 
Proprietors of this Office, on Thursday, the 14th instant, between the hours of eleven and 
two; and on every Thursday following, at the same hours, till the whole is paid.22 (See 
Illustrations 6.23 and 6.24.)  
As compared to advertisements in the late seventeenth century, the Sun’s notices 
received greater individual graphic definition. They began ‘Sun Fire Office’, followed by 
a date. In the renewal adverts, the company name was centred as a title in capital 
letters on the line above the text. In the dense Times of this period, the title helped the 
reader to scan the page and identify what related to his or her interests.23 It also made 
the advertisement resemble, at a small scale, the kind of individual notice that might be 
distributed by the Office itself.  
In the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries, timed advertisements like these 
were also timed with the Offices’ own publications. The report of the Insurance Office in 
the True Protestant (Domestick) Intelligence and the first notice in the Mercurius 
Civicus went to press only once the Office’s Propositions were in hand. The Insurance 
Office’s advertisement in the London Gazette on 19 September 1681 corresponded to 
its own broadsheet, headed, September 16th 1681, An Advertisement.24 The Sun’s 
notices in The Times in the early nineteenth century shared the purpose of its renewal 
notices delivered to policy holders. Thus news print worked with the messages 
communicated by other means of print and distribution.  
The Insurance Office went further in that it used news print to promote its own 
sheets. The news in the True Protestant (Domestick) Intelligence told readers, ‘There 
being now in print a particular thereof’. The Mercurius Civicus tempted readers: ‘those 
persons that have not seen the propositions may receive them at the Office gratis, at 
Mr Starkey’s, Bookseller, near Temple Bar, and at Mr Hinchman’s, Bookseller, in 
Westminster Hall’.25 An advertisement in the London Gazette directed readers towards 
one of its adversarial pamphlets against the City’s insurance scheme: ‘a Paper is lately 
Printed, and delivered at the Office gratis, which shews that the Insured cannot haye 
                                                       
21 The Times, 28 March 1800, p. 2. 
22 The Times, 8 January 1811 and 12 January 1808; repeated 11 July 1808. 
23 The Times in c. 1800 would have required different reading practices to the brief news-sheets 
of the seventeenth century, but that is a subject outside the scope of this study. 
24 London Gazette, 19 September 1681. 
25 Mercurius Civicus, 12 May 1680, p. [1]. 
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greater advantage from the City’.26 The Insurance Office used the forum of the news-
sheet to make its own sheets not only public and transparent but fashionable. 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, timing was no longer a 
determining factor for Sun advertisements in The Times. Instead, they were placed in 
greater frequency than before and without specific regard to renewal. They were less 
personal in that they were not directed at a specific constituency among the 
readership. They focused on company identity, as we shall see below. But timing could 
still have its worth. In June 1910 the Sun placed in The Times a specific advertisement, 
a quarter of a page, to ring in the celebration of its 200th year.27 (See Illustration 6.18.)  
 
Repetition 
The correspondence between information delivered by the news and a company’s own 
publications enabled motifs to be repeated. The Insurance Office used the Mercurius 
Civicus to mirror key information about its location, its hours and the opportunity to 
meet its proposers.28 In the small space allowed by news-sheets, the Office made its 
financial ‘security’ a recurring refrain.29 The notices pointed to the ‘advantage’ if readers 
subscribed before a certain date, just as has been identified in its own material, in 
Chapter 3.30 The Sun’s renewal advertisements echoed its renewal notices in warning 
that it should ‘prevent the insured losing the benefit of their Policies’. These 
advertisements, having been very small notices, began to take up more space in The 
Times from 1807. From that time, they included information that was incidental to 
renewal, but that corresponded to the company’s Proposals, such as about its Fire 
Night Patrol, established ‘for the purpose of preventing fires’, and with a list in prose of 
the patrol’s locations in London. (See Illustrations 6.25 and 6.26.) Thus the overlap 
between advertisements and other printed matter was strengthened once again. These 
repetitions built up trust, layer by layer. 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the Sun’s advertisements in The Times were 
brief and general. Their content consisted of the company’s branches. (See 
Illustrations 6.12 and 6.13, and 6.14 and 6.15.) But they repeated what were the 
                                                       
26 London Gazette, 10 November 1681. It must refer to Fire Office, An Enquiry, Whether it be 
the Interest of the City to Insure Houses from Fire; and Whether the Insured may Expect Any 
Advantage thereby, more than from the Insurance-Office Already Setled [1681]. 
27 Advertisement for the Sun Insurance Office, The Times, 1 June 1910, p. 21. 
28 Mercurius Civicus, 12 May 1680, p. [1], and Fire Office, Propositions for Insuring Houses from 
Fire [1680]. 
29 The first report on the Insurance Office twice alluded to the security offered by the office: it 
undertook ‘to secure the Houses … from Fire’ and underpinned by ‘a Fund of Free-Land to such 
a value as will secure those that shall agree with the Office’. Subsequently, advertisements in 
the London Gazette drew attention to the matter of the Office’s ‘security’: London Gazette, 19 
September 1681, 20 October 1681 and 10 November 1681. 
30 Mercurius Civicus, 12 May 1680, p. [1], and 4 June 1680, p. [2]; London Gazette, 19 
September 1681, 20 October 1681 and 10 November 1681. 
 204 
distinctive markers of the company, familiar from its renewal leaflets, proposal forms 
and the policy: ‘Founded 1710’; ‘The oldest purely Fire Office in the World’; ‘SUM 
INSURED’. They were motivated to keep the Office in readers’ minds. By 1905, a new 
version of the Sun’s advertisement replaced most of the text with the antiquated 
illustration of firemen that had adorned its policy for a century and a half. (See 
Illustrations 6.16 and 6.17.) By 1909, the Sun’s renewal leaflet reproduced the even-
earlier policy illustration, used from 1726, to underline the company’s age. In 1910, the 
Sun’s advertisement in The Times now employed that same earliest illustration. (See 
Illustration 6.18.) This correlation makes it clear that the printed material produced by 
the Sun played off its newspaper advertisements and vice versa. 
Due to its serial and regular pattern, news print also allowed fire offices to repeat 
certain messages at the reader.31 The Insurance Office’s advertisement in the London 
Gazette in November 1681 was a repeat of that of October with new sentences at its 
beginning and end. The Sun repeated its renewal advertisements: its notice in The 
Times on 28 March 1800 was repeated on 1 April. The formula of the text changed little 
from one renewal period to another. At the end of the nineteenth century and into the 
twentieth, the Sun would place the same two notices regularly: in 1895, it appeared 
twelve times, and in 1903, eight times. Fire offices tied themselves to regular cycles. 
Newspaper made them and their messages familiar. 
Repetition could also be constructed across publications, both to reach all news 
readers and to bolster a notice in one organ with that in another. The report of the ‘New 
Office’ in the True Protestant (Domestic) Intelligence came just days before an 
advertisement in the Mercurius Civicus. In July 1698 the Insurance Office repeated an 
advertisement in three publications: the Flying Post, the Post Man and the Post Boy.32 
At the start of the nineteenth century, the Sun placed advertisements in newspapers 
across Britain. In another tactic, the Insurance Office placed different announcements 
in one publication in close succession. So it was in the Mercurius Civicus in 1680, and 
three times in the London Gazette in the autumn of 1681, when it began issuing 
policies in earnest.33 By this means the Insurance Office made its presence known, and 
it created an unfolding narrative for the reader to follow. 
 
                                                       
31 On the importance of the regularity of news papers, see Raymond, ‘The Newspaper, Public 
Opinion, and the Public Sphere of the Seventeenth Century’, p. 131, and Ferdinand, 
‘Constructing the Frameworks of Desire’, p. 160. 
32 Flying Post, 5 July 1698; Post Man, 14 July 1698; Post Boy, 23 July 1698. The report on the 
grant of letters patent to the Insurance Office (to the disadvantage of the Friendly Society) had 
been repeated in the London Gazette, 16 February 1687, 20 February, 1 March 1687 and 5 
March 1687. 
33 London Gazette, 19 September 1681, 20 October 1681 and 10 November 1681. 
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The Insurance Office and the Sun used the advantages of timing and repetition 
provided by news print. Newspapers allowed control over timing. In the first two periods 
examined in this thesis, the content of these notices was time-critical: locations, 
deadlines and meetings were upfront. For the Insurance Office, this endowed events 
with a sense of urgency. For the Sun Fire Office in the 1800s, this underlined that fire 
insurance was a product with a particular relationship to time: it was contracted for a 
set amount, it expired according to the clock. The announcements of both Offices were 
aligned with a genre which printed its date at the top. By the twentieth century, the 
content of advertisements mattered less than their repeating presence, and words 
came to be replaced by identifiers of the company’s brand.  
The affordances of news print were especially fitting to fire insurance because it 
sought a long-term relationship with people, one which would be renewed. Thus, as a 
service, it was distinct from the selling of books and medicines, the two main kinds of 
advertising in news-sheets from the late seventeenth century on. Timing, regularity and 
repetition in newspapers helped the fire insurance industry to build relationships. 
Newspapers were a public sphere in which an office could bring itself before readers’ 
eyes privately, and an alternative sphere in which to repeat and reinforce messages 
from elsewhere. They gave a company a different anchorage. This anchorage also 




A news publication was a textual space. This space juxtaposed well-defined bites of 
information. One of the consequences of this for fire offices was the creation of a 
competitive space. The Insurance Office used the space to build trust for itself at the 
expense of its rivals. In 1680, the news report of the ‘New Office’ in the True Protestant 
(Domestick) Intelligence was a challenge to the news in the same publication a month 
before of the Corporation of the City of London’s consultation into fire insurance.34 The 
Insurance Office’s news report looks like an act of opportunism on the part of its 
proposers. The Insurance Office’s report countered what the Corporation had said. 
While the Corporation promised the ‘Design … in a short time to be Published’, the 
Insurance Office’s was already in print. Thus the Insurance Office made a statement 
through this juxtaposition in one publication, through time.  
                                                       
34 Protestant (Domestick) Intelligence, 2 April 1680, pp. 1–2. The True Protestant (Domestick) 
Intelligence, in which news of what was to be the Insurance Office appeared a month later, is 
understood to have been a wilful continuation of the former publication, with ‘True’ added to its 
title, following the imprisonment of the former’s publisher. On this subject, see Sutherland, The 
Restoration Newspaper, p. 15.  
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The flow from juxtaposition to competition can be seen in the following year, when 
the Advertisements section of an issue of the London Gazette ran a notice from the 
Corporation’s scheme, followed by one from the Insurance Office.35 (See Illustrations 
6.27 and 6.28.) The latter’s notice undermined its rival by the promise to return money 
for policies should a customer decide to move to the Corporation’s undertaking once 
that undertaking was up and running. As previously, the Insurance Office sought 
advantage by being a step ahead of the Corporation. It made the same promise in its 
own printed sheets.36 In the course of the same autumn it distributed its lively 
invectives explaining why the Corporation of the City of London should not manage an 
insurance scheme.37 This advertisement, and others that followed, were part of its 
campaign. The Insurance Office used news print to foster distrust in its rivals just as it 
used its own printed products. 
In the nineteenth century, the juxtaposition of advertisements for fire insurance was 
competitive but not confrontational. It spoke of the wide acceptance of the industry into 
people’s consumer habits. For it was the custom for multiple advertisements for fire 
offices to rub up against one another. (See Illustrations 6.29 and 6.30; 6.31; 6.32 and 
6.33; and 6.34.) In the early nineteenth century, each company set out its terms for 
renewal in its own manner. As a collective, the industry implicitly displayed its pre-
existing relationships with readers. However, by 1810, there was a shift such that 
juxtaposition was complemented by competitive devices which deepened the apparent 
differentiation of one from another. Fire offices offered more information about their 
services and improved the layout of their notices. During a period of new entrants to 
the industry, the choice for readers was not whether to take insurance but which 
company to trust. A century later, advertisements were designed to seize attention, 
thereby intensifying the differentiation. The Sun’s notice with an illustration stood on a 
page that was a blanket of text. For the time being, the Sun set itself apart from 
competitors with its illustrated advertisements. Moreover, the illustration drew attention 
to the company’s longevity, as it was a reproduction of the mid-eighteenth-century 
policy design. (See Illustration 6.16.) 
 
                                                       
35 London Gazette, 20 October 1681, p. 2. 
36 Fire Office, Enquiry, p. 4. 
37 Fire Office, Enquiry and Fire Office, Observations on the Proposals of the City to Insure 
Houses in Case of Fire (1681). The Insurance Office had already attempted to ward off the 
Corporation with: Fire Office, To the Right Honourable the Lord Mayor … The Proposals of the 
Gentlemen of the Insurance Office is humbly Offered [1681]. The final broadside on the subject 
from the Insurance Office’s side was, W. I., A Letter to a Gentleman of the Insurance Office, 
Concerning the Cities Insuring Houses [1681], dated 10 November. 
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Amplification 
In the late seventeenth century, news-sheets helped to make fire insurance public by 
carrying news and notices about it. In the opening decades of the nineteenth century 
and of the twentieth century, the broader content of The Times endorsed the industry 
as a public institution. An office’s address mattered not only in the textual space of the 
newspaper, but in physical space. An advertisement for ‘extensive premises’ in 
Leicester Square, was declared to be ‘particularly eligible for a public institution, a 
capital hotel…a subscription-house, chambers, banking-house, fire-office, auction 
rooms, &c.’38 An insurance office was a positive landmark such that property adverts 
located a site by reference to the Sun’s offices. In the past, both the Insurance Office 
and the Sun had defined their location in relation to others; the Insurance Office in 
relation to the Royal Exchange and the Sun inside a coffee house. Now a fire office 
had prominence in its own right because of its size and deliberate stature.39 A notice for 
a sale by auction of shares in the Sun described it as ‘an old established and highly 
respected concern’.40 (See Illustration 6.35.) 
Through the space of news pages, the Sun was a presence in public and in space. 
In these pages, it honed a public reputation as a public body and a moral presence. At 
the end of the century the Sun’s location was illuminated in official ways. In 1902, its 
head quarters was among those named in The Times as having been lit up for the 
coronation. The Office involved itself in public commemorations that were reported in 
The Times. In 1898 it commissioned a painting of the Great Fire of London to hang in 
the Royal Exchange in the City. It made donations to charitable causes. Thereby, its 
name appeared among others in lists which were published in The Times on behalf of 
a beneficiary, such as a hospital or a country in need of relief. Meanwhile, 
advertisements in The Times incidentally confirmed the everyday necessity that fire 
insurance had become: property for sale or let was advertised as being already 
insured. 
In the late nineteenth century, The Times dedicated pages to financial news, ‘The 
Money Market’, as the section was called in 1894.41 These pages reflected the growing 
importance of the City of London and its financial institutions to general readers.42 The 
Sun was appreciated as a long-standing player among City institutions. The financial 
                                                       
38 The Times, 31 October 1820. 
39 On the architecture of stability in the nineteenth century, see Liz McFall and Francis 
Dodsworth, ‘Fabricating the Market: The Promotion of Life Assurance in the Long Nineteenth-
Century’, Journal of Historical Sociology, 22:1 (2009), 30–54. 
40 The Times, 30 September 1805. There were several such sales of shares in the Sun between 
1800 and 1820. 
41 In the ‘Contents’, The Times, 7 June 1894, p. 9. On the rise of financial journalism in the 
nineteenth century, see David Kynaston, City of London Volume 1: A World of Its Own 1815–
1890 (London: Pimlico, 1995). 
42 Kynaston, City of London Volume 1. 
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news pages reported on the Sun’s meetings, dividends, shares, staff deaths, and after-
dinner speeches. In addition, there were reports and editorials on the duty paid by the 
fire insurance industry, its total premiums and its profitability.  
 
The threads of the Sun as a bastion of social stability and public life, and the alignment 
of these qualities of trustworthiness with its financial status, came together in a full-
page article published by The Times in June 1910.43 Its title was ‘The Bicentenary of 
the Sun Fire Office 1710–1910’, and its publication coincided with coverage of the 
birthday elsewhere in the paper.44 (See Illustration 6.36.) On the previous page was a 
report of the ‘Bicentenary Celebration’: a dinner the previous evening with speeches, 
an occasion which the article mentioned in its opening.45 Several pages on, there was 
a report of the Sun’s annual meeting, itself with a mention of its passing its 200th year.46 
The previous day’s paper contained the special quarter-page bicentenary 
advertisement for the Sun, already mentioned. (See Illustration 6.37.) The coverage of 
the Sun’s anniversary in different parts of The Times likely left no reader ignorant of the 
occasion. 
The Times’ spread ‘The Bicentenary of the Sun Fire Office 1710–1910’ emphasised 
the Sun’s age, its identity, its stability, its security and its significance. In this 
encomium, the company had outrun the vicissitudes of history. By presenting the Sun 
so, The Times showed the extent to which its own voice upheld trust in the company, 
and it did so at a great size, literally. The uncredited journalist of the piece gave an 
informed and lively potted history of the Office, using subheadings to direct the 
narrative and pick out themes, from ‘Early Forms of Insurance’ to ‘The Present 
Position’, pausing for ‘Charles Povey’ (the colourful character who founded the office 
originally) and ‘Early Forms of Advertising’ among other points of interest on the way. 
The writer quoted from the Sun’s earliest minute book, likely using the published 
histories of the Office.47 He covered the Office’s ‘Early Methods’ and its news-sheets. 
He told the story with humour, highlighting how office life had changed over two 
centuries: 
The earliest [minutes] … record some quaintly worded resolutions and proceedings which 
excite a smile when compared with the severe gravity of more modern deliberations. One 
                                                       
43 The format of the article – a full-page story related to an industry – appears to have been a 
regular feature of issues of The Times in this period. For example, there was a page article on 
milk on 9 June 1910 and on the timber industry on 8 June 1910. 
44 ‘The Bicentenary of the Sun Fire Office 1710–1910’, The Times, 2 June 1910, p. 9 (of 20 
pages). 
45 The Times, 2 June 1910, p. 8. 
46 The Times, 2 June 1910, p. 17. 
47 The article shares its colourful tone with Edward Baumer, The Early Days of the Sun Fire 
Office (London: J. Causton, 1910), which was published in the bicentenary year. 
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would hardly, for example, expect a modern Board to record instructions to its clerk to “buy a 
handsome pair of brass candlesticks” for the committee table.  
The article gave this company history great significance within insurance history: 
‘The year 1710 stands out as a landmark in the history of Fire Insurance’. Following a 
trot through early fire offices, the writer pronounced: ‘Of the offices surviving from this 
early period the SUN is the oldest as well as the greatest of fire insurance institutions’. 
The company history was also placed within British history. The scene of its foundation 
was set against a series of familiar phenomena: ‘There were plenty of people living at 
the time of the foundation of the Sun Fire Office who had witnessed the execution of 
Charles I’ and the cotton trade was ‘almost unborn’. This was partly to illustrate vividly 
how old the Sun was. This age demonstrated the company’s strength. ‘The confidence 
which for six generations has been placed in the SUN rests upon a foundation so 
strong and so secure that no shock – financial, political, and otherwise – has been able 
to move it.’  
The Times wrote what the Sun wanted to hear: it was ‘an enterprise which has lived 
and flourished amidst all the changes and convulsions of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries’. This note chimed with the Sun’s advertisement, which was topped by ‘The 
Oldest Insurance Office in the World’ in black letter type. At moments, the praise 
lavished by the piece may have gone too far. In touching on new enterprises in fire 
insurance from 1800, the writer commented: ‘Amongst all these newcomers, the SUN, 
typical, indeed, of the great luminary whose name it bears, stood as the central orb 
with its attendant satellites, alike in nature, but inferior in rank and splendour.’ As it was 
presented, the Sun garnered authority, as well as security and stability, because of its 
own history. 
Moreover, ‘The Bicentenary of the Sun Fire Office 1710–1910’ interpreted the Sun’s 
history as having general historical significance. As the article’s opening paragraph put 
it: 
the Bicentenary … is a reminder that within the span of the existence of this famous 
Company lies the whole history of the growth and development of practically every known 
form of insurance. It is Carlyle who says that masses of books might be profitably exchanged 
for a single history of book-sellers, and just so we are beginning to recognise that the social 
and commercial aspects of a people’s history are not only vastly more interesting, but 
immeasurably more important than the records of the drum and trumpet and the chronicles 
of baseness, littleness, and treachery, which too often make up the staple of what is called 
History. To know how the ‘common people’ lived in the reign of Henry VIII would be more 
valuable than to fathom the causes of Anne Boleyn’s fall, and to have an exact account of 
the first twenty years of the life of the Sun Fire Office would be of greater interest than to 
possess the most elaborate details of the conspiracies and intrigues which had for their 
object the recall of the ejected James. 
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The Sun’s history, then, was national and social history. Moreover, the article endorsed 
insurance as an everyday necessity in the twentieth century:  
The practice of Insurance against all manner of risks is now so closely interwoven with the 
daily affairs of our national life that it is difficult to carry the mind back to the time when to 
insure even against the common contingency of fire was in the nature of a novelty.  
The narrative left no doubt that the Sun had been at the forefront of that development. 
This article bestowed the Sun with authority by recourse to the company’s history. 
The final chapter of the story turned to the Office’s unassailable ‘financial position … 
never more solid than it is today’, substantiated by a handful of its financial figures. In 
spite of large recent losses in San Francisco, ‘the Company was able to increase its 
dividend in the year of the fire by 5 per cent.’ The writer enumerated the company’s 
credit balances since 1908, before concluding: ‘It is unnecessary to emphasise further 
the bounding prosperity of the Sun Fire Office … [A]ge has not withered nor prosperity 
staled its enterprise’. The page ended:  
At the close of 200 years the Office is, in this respect, as young and as mobile as it was at 
the beginning of its career. Far beyond Insurance circles the Company has a name and a 
place, and representing as it does the best characteristics of the commercial eminence of 
Great Britain, who is there that will not heartily join in the wish for the continued existence 
and prosperity of this ancient Office? 
 
The Times’ page-long article marking the Sun’s bicentenary reflected back at the Sun 
many of the attributes to which the Sun had long made claim: its age, its historical 
significance, its security both financial and for the individual. The article’s wordsmith 
even had fun with its identity – the Sun’s name and symbol. The earliest days of the 
fire insurance industry show the seeds of these attributes and the skill with which they 
were promoted from the beginning. Here in The Times’ voice was the pinnacle of how 
a newspaper could substantiate a fire office. News print provided an environment 
which the industry could use and flourish in. News print’s affordances reinforced the 
qualities of trust promoted by the industry’s own means. The offices’ presence in news 
print reinforced the relationship between them and news readers and gave the 










The Risks of News Print 
The previous section uncovered how the Insurance Office and the Sun inserted 
themselves into the pages of serial print. The Times aggrandised the industry’s 
presence and the Sun’s specifically. This section brings to the fore ambivalence in the 
interaction between serial print and fire insurance. The reporting of fires points to this 
ambivalence. In each period examined here, time-critical publications variously 
reported on fires as well as on fire offices. In fact, the first fire insurance enterprises 
established themselves just as the reporting of fires in print dug in its roots. Stories 
about fires appeared in the breed of unauthorised printed news-sheets that sprang up 
when the Licensing Act lapsed in 1679. By contrast, the London Gazette, the licensed 
paper of state since 1660, did not report on fires. The inclusion of fire stories in the 
content of news-sheets implies that they held entertainment and commercial value to 
news publishers; readers considered them worth paying for. At just a paragraph in 
length, a report of a fire was a miniature version of the for-profit pamphlets that gave 
accounts of the latest fires across the country, which extended from two pages to eight 
to over twenty.48 (See Illustrations 6.38 and 6.39.) Thus, fire offices publicised 
themselves in new publications that lent space to the incidence of fire. Designs for 
security against fire conveniently shared space with the accident of fire. 
As we shall see, fire reporting and other subsequent types of reporting implicated 
and involved fire offices. By their presence in news print, fire offices entangled 
themselves in public conversations about the cause of fires, about protection from fires, 
about cases of arson and fraud before the law. While this juxtaposition served their 
interests by enjoining them in the community, it posed risks. These types of stories 
stoked feelings of fear, loss, insecurity and uncertainty. The fire insurance industry 
promised to protect against these feelings but its reputation depended on maintaining 
those promises. It fed off bad feelings, which could backfire.  
 
                                                       
48 Examples are: Sad and Lamentable News from Northampton, or, A Full and True Relation of 
the Late Great Fire: Whereby the Far Greater Part of that Antient and Eminent Corporation is 
Destroyed: There Being the Great Church of St All-Hallows and Two Other Parish Churches, 
the Market-place, and Most Part of the Chief Streets in the Town Burnt Down and Consumed. 
On Monday the 20th of This Instant September, 1675 (1675) (8 p.); A Sad Relation of a 
Dreadful Fire at Cottenham, Four Miles Distant from Cambridge. It Begun upon Saturday the 
29th of April, 1676, and in the Space of Five Hours Consumed above a Hundred Dwelling 
Houses, besides Barns, Stables, Out-houses, Stacks of Corn, Hay, Faggots, Turffs, &c. To the 
Value of Many Thousands of Pounds. With an Account of a Gentleman's Servant that was 
Burn'd in a Miserable Manner, by Venturing to Save Some House-hold-stuff, &c. Written by an 
Eye-witness (1676) (6 p.); A True Narrative of the Late Dreadful Fire which Happened near 
Limus in Ratcliff, on Wednesday Last, Being the Eighteenth of This Instant September, about 
Five of the Clock in the Morning, and Continued till Four in the Afternoon, and Burnt Down 
above Forty Houses ere it Could be Extinguished. With an Account of Two Women which were 
Burnt in their Beds, and Several Others Spoil'd and Maim'd during this Fatal Conflagration. 
(1678) (8 p.). 
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Fear 
Like the contemporary pamphlets that recounted recent fires at length, the news-
sheets briefly narrated news of fires with flair. Even with just a paragraph in which to 
recount it, a fire was ‘dreadful’, ‘lamentable’, it ‘broak forth’, it ‘battered’.49 It ‘burnt very 
furiously’, ‘very vehemently’.50 In the early nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
The Times described events as ‘Destructive’, 'Dreadful’, ‘Great’, ‘Serious’; ‘FATAL’.51 
Fires were 'alarming' and ‘calamitous’, they ‘burst forth’. As The Times set titles to its 
reports, these adjectives often sat above the horror, frequently in capitals. Titles were 
emphatic, such as ‘FIRE at the ROYAL AMPHITHEATRE’ or ‘FATAL FIRE AT ST 
PANCRAS’. Moreover, The Times used its greater extent to recount stories of fires in 
greater detail. (See Illustrations 6.40 and 6.41.) This storytelling kept the risk of fire at 
the forefront of readers’ minds. It heightened the perception of the need for fire-
protection products.  
The factual details of a fire were key to its reporting: its location, its timing, where it 
started and the extent of its destruction.52 In one report, ‘the loss is said to be 
considerable, having burnt some of their Books, and the [?Cl]arks House ruined and 
consumed’.53 Fire allowed for tales of ingenuity: one story recounted how great 
damage was prevented by the use of beer to extinguish a blaze in an alehouse.54 The 
goriness of accidental death was not spared. Another story told how: 
a very Ancient Woman being alone in her house, her Husband keeping Newgate Market, 
came home late at night, and opening the door missed his wife, and searching for her, found 
nothing but her Legs, all the rest of her body being burnt.55  
The woman was supposed to have stooped and fallen into her home fire. The writer of 
this story did not omit its pathos: ‘There was no other damage done to the House only 
a Towel that hung by the Chimney was singed with the Flame’. Over a hundred and 
fifty years later, the female occupant of a property in East Smithfield, London, ended 
her life thus: ‘The head was lying near the grate, and the body in a dreadfully mutilated 
                                                       
49 Protestant (Domestick) Intelligence, 20 February 1679/80; Domestick Intelligence, 21 October 
1679, p. 1; Impartial Protestant Mercury, 22 November 1681, p. 1; English Intelligencer, 24 July 
1679, p. 1. 
50 English Intelligencer, 24 July 1679, p. 1; Impartial Protestant Mercury, 22 November 1681, p. 
1 
51 ‘FATAL FIRE AT ST PANCRAS’, The Times, 20 October 1904, p. 9. 
52 Protestant (Domestick) Intelligence, 20 February 1679/80: ‘in the dead of night’; Impartial 
Protestant Mercury, 22 November 1681, p. 1: ‘This morning about 4 or 5 a Clock’. ‘FIRE at the 
ROYAL AMPHITHEATRE’, The Times, 3 September 1803, p. 3: ‘yesterday morning … two 
o’clock in the morning … four o’clock in the morning … half past four o’clock’; The Times, 20 
October 1904: ‘early yesterday morning … Shortly before 1 o’clock’. The hour of the fire was 
also given in Protestant (Domestick) Intelligence, 4 February 1681, p. 2; English Intelligencer, 
24 July 1679, p. 1; Domestick Intelligence, 18 November 1679, p. 2. 
53 Impartial Protestant Mercury, 22 November 1681, p. 1.  
54 Post Man, 23 December 1697. 
55 Domestick Intelligence, 16 December 1679, p. [1]. 
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state, buried in the ruins.’56 A notice for perfume followed the story in its column. The 
small details of an accident underlined the credibility of the news publication. They may 
also have changed the perception of fire for readers. In the late nineteenth century, a 
breed of newspaper published photographs of fire scenes, which substantiated the 
details.57 
The reports brought to life the horror of fire in a readable, entertaining fashion. Fire 
insurance could not bring back lost relatives but fire stories could leave powerful 
impressions of the risks of everyday life, recounting destruction at first in livery halls 
and alehouses; subsequently in theatres, printing houses, warehouses, turpentine 
factories, the customs house; and always in living quarters, both rich and poor.58 It is 
reasonable to infer that the coverage of fires raised the fear of fire. News reports 
reminded readers who might forget. One pamphlet’s author complained about people’s 
ease of forgetting after a conflagration in Wapping in 1682:  
One would think the many Fires that have been, might put every man upon a more than 
ordinary Watchfulness. But alas! How soon are those awakening Judgments forgotten; a 
Month hence possibly this Fire will be so little in the thoughts of some as if it had never 
been[.]59  
Reports raised the awareness of fires far away; the Domestick Intelligence updated 
readers on a fire in New England across issues.60 The Domestick Intelligence regularly 
reported on fires in 1679.61 In the following year, this same publication wrote up the 
news of the Corporation of the City of London’s fire insurance plan, followed by the 
news of the Insurance Office.62 The publication’s regular reporting of fires may have 
well disposed its readers to the prospective enterprise. However, it is noticeable that 
the Domestick Intelligence often suspected ‘design’ at work in the incidence of fires, 
whereas the authors of the Insurance Office’s broadsides accepted fire as an accident 
                                                       
56 The Times, 4 November 1823. 
57 For example, the Illustrated London News and the Penny Illustrated Paper. 
58 Business historian Robin Pearson has explained how over time fires became more costly, 
because people’s possessions were more valuable and there were larger industrials plants and 
warehouses than previously. Robin Pearson, Insuring the Industrial Revolution: Fire Insurance 
in Great Britain, 1700–1850 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004). Sad and Lamentable News from 
Wapping: Giving a True and Just Account of a Most Horrible and Dreadful Fire, which 
Happened on Sunday the 19th of Nov. 1682 (1682), specifically distinguishes the sufferers of a 
fire in terms of their wealth.  
59 A More Full and Exact Account of that Most Dreadful Fire, which Happened at Wapping on 
Sunday Night the Nineteenth of This Instant Novemb. between 10 and 11 a Clock[.] Also a True 
and Full Account of the Damages Sustained by that Dreadful Fire whilst it Continued Burning All 
Day on Monday. With a True Account as near as Can Yet Be Given, of the Manner of its First 
Beginning, the Number of Houses Burnt Down, and of the Number of Persons that Have 
Perished in the Raging Flames (1682) (4 p.), p. 2. 
60 Domestick Intelligence, 21 October 1679 and 2 December 1679. 
61 The Domestick Intelligence reported on fires in July, October, November and December 
1679, and in January and February 1680.   
62 See fn. 12 on the changing name of this publication. 
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of life.63 Benjamin Harris, the publisher of the Domestick Intelligence, likely had his own 
political reasons for covering fires widely.64 He was fiercely partisan against Catholics 
and fire had an association with the ‘designs’ of plotting Catholics, a subject he 
frequently returned to. Reports served to stir the flames of political disjunction and 
suspicion as to maleficence.65 His paper made this conjecture about a fire in Smithfield: 
‘It is verily believed to be done by Treachery and nothing but Popish Malice could have 
better contrived a place for Mischief, it being among old Wooden Houses, and the 
Street very narrow’.66 
At times the incidence of fires could be enough to make a story in The Times.67 This 
corroborates the supposition that news of fires stoked fears. Fires needed not to end in 
utter devastation in order to be reported; they might result in minimal damage. Even 
false alarms were considered worth reporting.  
The printed matter of the Insurance Office and the Sun intersected with the 
compassionate side of the literature of fires. The Insurance Office wrote of the 
‘melancholly apprehensions of being undone in a night’ and of ‘that Dismal Cry, Of 
Fire, Fire’.68 The Sun paraded its illustration of a fireman and a porter returning from 
the flames, laden with rescued possessions. Newspapers delivered the real versions of 
these evocations. Fire sold fire insurance. Agents knew to target a neighbourhood that 
had recently suffered a fire.69  
Stories of fire could be directly correlated to the selling of fire prevention products. 
On a page of ‘Advertisements’ in the serial publication the Collection for Improvement 
of Husbandry and Trade in 1694, copy promoting the New Sucking-Worm-Engine 
began just as one would expect a report of fire: ‘Whereas on the 30th December, 1693 
between one and two of the Clock in the Morning, a Terrible Fire broke in the House of 
Mr William Broome, Linnen-Draper…’.70 But it turned into a commendation of the 
engines that ‘to our great satisfaction totally extinguished the said Fire’, by those who 
had suffered it. It ended: ‘These Engines are to be sold at the Companies Warehouse 
in Bow Church-yard, London’. Fire reports showed the benefit of fire products. 
                                                       
63 See, for example, Fire Office, Propositions for Insuring Houses from Fire [1680]. 
64 Benjamin Harris was the editor–publisher of the Domestick Intelligence and the Protestant 
(Domestick) Intelligence and the True Protestant (Domestick) Intelligence was published while 
he was in prison.  
65 One fire report considered whether a Catholic was to blame. Catholic plotters were regularly 
accused of plotting to start fires. 
66 Domestick Intelligence, 18 November 1679, p. 2. 
67 There were columns which simply enumerated recent fires. 
68 Fire Office, Propositions, p. 1; Fire Office, Arguments for Insuring Houses from Fire [1680], p. 
2. 
69 Evidence of the local agent’s request for prospectuses following a fire in St Pancras, as 
recounted in Chapter 5; LMA, CLC/B/192/F/043/MS38869/001. 




Fire insurance benefited from the repetition in news print of the problem to which it 
provided the antidote. The repetition legitimised its value. In addition, insurance 
entered the stories of fires. These inclusions helped the enterprise to build a reputation 
for itself. In the late seventeenth century, the arrival of engines to a fire in London often 
marked a flashpoint of events in news-sheets as in pamphlets.71 In 1682, two hot-off-
the-press accounts of a fire gave credit to the work of the band of men that the 
Insurance Office had put in place. One praised ‘the diligence of the Water-men 
imployed by the Insurers, who very boldly adventured their lives, hoping to secure the 
houses Insured’.72 Another declared, ‘nor were the Water-men retained by the Insurers 
less active then the rest, even to the indangering their Lives, Especially about 
preserving those Houses that were insured of which there were a considerable 
Number’.73 In an account of a fire on Thames Street in 1688, the fire-fighting watermen 
were now known as the Insurers Men: ‘the Insurers Men and others used extraordinary 
Diligence to suppress and bring under the Fire … [T]he Engines, where they could 
come at it, or endure the heat, played with as much dexterity as could be expected’.74 
These comments firmly associated fire offices with the safety and security of the social 
fabric. 
In the pages of The Times, fire engines and firemen were key to the story. In the 
early nineteenth century, firemen in London exclusively belonged to the fire offices, and 
they commandeered their company’s engines except for those owned privately. The 
Times commended firemen: ‘Every effort was however used with all that promptitude 
which the firemen of this city are known to exert upon such occasion’.75 Firemen did 
‘splendid work’.76 In the 1820s the brand identity of firemen and engines was at times 
noted.77 After 1865, firemen were independent of the fire insurance companies but the 
public continued to associate the fire service with the industry, and the Sun maintained 
the connection by its illustration.78  
                                                       
71 For example, Impartial Protestant Mercury, 22 November 1681: ‘by the application of Engines 
which were brought within the Square, the same was extinguished’. Post Man, 4 January 1698. 
72 Sad and Lamentable News from Wapping: Giving a True and Just Account of a Most Horrible 
and Dreadful Fire, which Happened on Sunday the 19th of Nov. 1682 (1682), p. 4. 
73 A Full and True Account of the Lamentable and Dreadful Fire (1682), p. 3. 
74 A True Relation of the Sad and Dreadful Fire in Thames Street on the 8th of August, 1688 
Containing the Manner of its Beginning, Progress, and Dismal Effect, the Number of Houses &c. 
Consumed and Blown Up, Parties Kill’d and Wounded &c. During that Fatal Conflagration 
(1688), p. [2]. 
75 The Times, 28 September 1802. Similar remarks are made in ‘Alarming Fire’, The Times, 3 
February 1803; ‘FIRE at the ROYAL AMPHITHEATRE’, The Times, 3 September 1803, p. 3; 
‘Destruction of the Custom House by Fire’, The Times, 14 February 1814. 
76 The Times, 20 October 1904. 
77 The Times, 26 May 1825. 
78 See Chapter 5, fn. 51, on the association between fire insurance and fire service in the mind 
of the public. 
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Security 
On occasion, the writers of fire news thought fit to mention fire insurance. Two of the 
reporters of the fire at Wapping in 1682 made known the insurance policy of Sir William 
Warren: he ‘hath lost some hundreds a year, besides what he had Insured’.79 Another 
wrote that ‘Sir William Warren owned the most part of Cinamon-Lane, but thanks to the 
insuring Office he is like to redeem satisfaction for 500 l. Per Annum.80 In 1800, the 
mention of insurance added to the desperation of another scene, also at Wapping: 
‘perhaps a more distressing scene could not be witnessed than that which was 
exhibited by the poor inhabitants in Queen’s Head-alley, and Courts adjoining, who 
were not insured, each endeavouring to save what little furniture they could, at the 
hazard of their lives.’81 In 1823, the report of a house fire ended, ‘The houses were 
mostly insured.’82 In the 1890s, when the chief fireman reported officially on big blazes, 
he regularly recorded the insurance companies liable.83 Such details brought the 
insurance industry into personal and commercial stories and they underlined the 
security offered by the industry. 
 
Safety 
The reporting of fires in The Times was juxtaposed with a discussion of fire safety that 
went beyond fire insurance. The culture of fire safety amplified the ‘security’ with which 
insurance associated itself. As the advertisement for the New Sucking-Worm-Engine in 
1694 showed, fire was an opportunity to sell prevention products in general. In the 
early nineteenth century, there were new inventions to protect against the threat of fire, 
alongside fire insurance and engines. Advertisements for domestic tools shared pages 
with those for the Sun Fire Office. Fire prevention was a selling point for products, just 
as security was for fire insurance. ‘TO PREVENT ACCIDENTS BY FIRE’ screamed a 
recommendation for T Cato’s ‘WIRE FIRE-GUARDS and FENDERS.84 (See 
Illustrations 6.42 and 6.43.) Others marketed folding screen grates for the same 
purpose, fire buckets that could be kept on one’s premises at all times, extinguishers 
and sprinklers. In the late nineteenth century, products were promoted which were 
designed with fire safety as a secondary characteristic. Safety lamps received publicity, 
‘with the approval and recommendation of the leading insurance offices’.85 An inventor 
gave a demonstration of his new ‘non-inflammable cinematograph films’, in the 
                                                       
79 Sad and Lamentable News from Wapping, p. 4. 
80 More Full and Exact Account of that Most Dreadful Fire, which Happened at Wapping, p. 2. 
81 The Times, 7 October 1800, p. 3. 
82 The Times, 1 February 1823. A similar comment is made in The Times, 3 December 1823. 
83 ‘Insurance, Sun and others’, The Times, 16 August 1892, p. 9; The Times, 7 September 
1891, p. 5. 
84 The Times, 28 March 1800. Advertising for T. Cato also ran in The Times in 1807. 
85 The Times, 14 March 1888, p. 13. 
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presence of a member of the Sun.86 Property agents stated that offices and flats were 
‘fireproof’.87 Fire prevention products served the interests of fire offices as they reduced 
the risks. The marketing of these products kept readers alert to the risks of fire.  
Readers contributed to this fearful discourse with letters suggesting inventive means 
to mitigate fire-related disasters: for example, a mattress onto which people could jump 
from burning buildings. Following a ‘melancholy event at Sadler’s Wells’, a 
correspondent suggested a board with ‘False Alarm’ written on it to prevent scares at 
‘public amusements’.88 Another complained that the fashion for wooden verandahs on 
newly built streets was both dangerous and contrary to the Building Act, and building 
officers should take note.89 Victims also gave thanks for assistance at fires to 
‘neighbours and friends’ and the private water companies such as the London Bridge 
Waterworks for the ‘plentiful supply of water’.90  
The nod to water companies tapped into a debate in The Times in the first quarter of 
the nineteenth century over the water supply in London. For the supply was essential 
to the working of fire engines. Some blamed water scarcity for unnecessary damage by 
fire, while the clerks to the water-works companies wrote in to defend their operations, 
and quoted certificates signed by firemen to make their cases.91 There were then public 
doubts about the reliability of the safety measures. Notices of thanks also served to 
give information that a business affected by fire was back on its feet or moved to a 
temporary location. These notices certified survival. In one instance, a reader wrote to 
correct a story about a fire as he believed it had misattributed the credit for fire-fighting. 
A piece of news explained a ‘very large cast-iron cylinder’ being fitted to a building, an 




Reports of fires detailed loss. As an account in 1682 put it: ‘what vast Treasures may 
be devoured in a Moment of time’.93 Fire commonly occasioned theft too: a notice in 
1700 called for the return of goods looted during a fire in Red Lion Square.94 In the late 
seventeenth century, insurers positioned their product within a discourse of lost 
                                                       
86 The Times, 29 September 1910, p. 8. 
87 The Times, 8 April 1891. 
88 The Times, 20 October 1807, p. 3. 
89 The Times, 11 October 1824. 
90 Following a ‘dreadful fire adjoining Fishmongers’ Hall’: The Times, 24 January 1820. 
91 For how water companies used the press to tell positive news stories about their contribution 
to the public good, see Carry van Lieshout, ‘“The Most Valuable Means of Extinguishing the 
Destroying Fires”: Fire-fighting and the London Water Companies in the Long Eighteenth 
Century’, London Journal, 42:1 (2017), 53–69 (pages 61–62). 
92 The Times, 21 November 1812, p. 3. 
93 More Full and Exact Account of that Most Dreadful Fire, which Happened at Wapping, p. 2. 
94 Post Man, February 1700. 
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belongings. The advertisement sections of news-sheets in this period were scattered 
with pleas for lost belongings including watches, pets, apprentices and ‘writings’, and 
hopes of their return. In 1687, a notice ran: 
Lost the 21st past, between the Royal Exchange and Charing-cross, a Silver gilt Cup, Salt 
Box, Pepper Box, Knife, Fork and Spoon, with screwed Handles, all Silver Gilt, Ingraved, in a 
black Shagreen Case, lined with green Plush. Whoever brings them to Mr Brocke at the Sun 
Tavern in the Strand, shall have a Guinea Reward.95 
Losses like these sat beside notices about the same kinds of possession stolen.96 
Insurance was a design against the loss documented in news-sheets, in a period when 
a range of ‘designs’ were reported on and announced in the same sheets. The 
Insurance Office protected against ‘Loss by Fire’.97 Like many other of these designs, 
its aim was ‘security’. The culture of news print reinforced the value of fire insurance 




There was a second kind of narrative in The Times in which fire was recounted: reports 
of cases before legal authorities.98 These reports piqued interest with titles such as 
‘ARSON’ and ‘An Insurance Fraud’.99 Insurance companies held an interest in legal 
actions in relation to arson and fraud. In a case in 1803, arson was alleged at a house 
in Dulwich in order to defraud the Sun.100 In another in 1819, a servant in the dock at 
the Old Bailey admitted that ‘her friends had all turn[ed] their backs upon her, that her 
character was blasted, and she had no remedy whatever to get rid of all her enemies, 
but to be burned in the flames’.101 The Sun was present at these and other trials: Sun-
branded watchmen and firemen gave witness testimonies, company surveyors gave 
expert valuations, legal counsel spoke on its behalf, its treasurer might be named as 
the individual defrauded, and the policy was presented and read aloud, as it could be 
evidence of arson.102  
The reporting of these court appearances reaffirmed the fire offices as a mainstay of 
public and social life. These appearances showed the company as protecting not only 
its own interests but those of the community of policy holders who lost out from 
                                                       
95 London Gazette, 1 March 1687. 
96 London Gazette, 1 October 1687 has separate notices for a stolen gold clock, silver tankard 
and a horse. The latter two notices describe the thief. 
97 Fire Office, Propositions, p. 1. 
98 News-sheets in the late seventeenth century reported on, for example, cases at the Old 
Bailey but I have not found any that related to fire. 
99 ‘ARSON’, The Times, 30 October 1819; An Insurance Fraud’, The Times, 18 October 1905. 
100 The Times, 26 March 1803, p. 3. 
101 The Times, 30 October 1819, p. 3. 
102 The Times, 14 September 1820, p. 3. The Times, 8 August 1820, makes mention of the 
participation of the Sun’s treasurer. 
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fraudulent activity. But the reports also exposed the industry’s vulnerabilities and a 
company was itself vulnerable in these situations. For the circumstances of desperate 
people might well win the jury’s – and the reader’s – sympathy. The evidence was 
stacked against this arsonist in Dulwich:  
The following state of things then presented itself: – There evidently had been no fire in the 
fire place, and the bed curtains on the feet were drawn up, and thrust through the ceiling, 
from which some plaister had been broke down, so as to form a line of communication for 
the fire to the rafters and floor of the cock-loft. Two of those floor-boards were raised up, and 
supported at the ends in that position, evidently for the purpose of giving access to the air, to 
increase the flame; on the bed was a deal box, in which a quantity of turpentine had been 
spilt. 
But the Old Bailey found the servant ‘“Not guilty, being at the time in a state of mental 
derangement”’, and sent her to an asylum for life. ‘At her removal she wept much, but 
not aloud; indeed, her whole demeanour indicated a person labouring under a deep 
melancholy and dejection of spirits.’  
The rich details of these crimes as reported, their vulnerable perpetrators and the 
fraught relationships involved, indicate that the Sun had to be careful of its reputation 
and the industry’s. The need for vigilance helps explain the company’s archiving of 
newspaper cuttings.103 In 1809, the Sun’s reputation for paying claims was called into 
question when it was sued, having refused to pay out for the loss by fire of two 
paintings (one by Leonardo da Vinci, according to the claimant). The Sun made its 
case on the basis that various witnesses had put the cause of fire under suspicion and 
experts had doubted the declared value of the paintings. The case was thrown out 
when a witness revealed that the plaintiff had tried to collude with him; a clause in the 
Sun’s Proposals stated that any collusion made void the policy.104 Law reports also 
exposed fraud in the Sun’s own ranks. In 1896 a father and son – a manager and 
agent at the company – were charged with having conspired to forge receipts for sums 
of money ‘with intent to defraud’ their employer.  
 
The stigma of causation 
In the late seventeenth century as in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
consideration to the cause of a fire was an essential constituent of its reporting. In the 
seventeenth century, writers keenly distinguished between accident and design on this 
matter. About a fire in Southwark, which destroyed twelve houses, the writer was: ‘not 
certain whether it happen’d by chance or designedly; but it is rather thought by design’. 
                                                       
103 See for example, its archiving of the clipping ‘The Uncertainty of Fire Insurance Policies’, 
from The Times, 17 November 1891, in ‘Scrapbook’, LMA, CLC/B/192/DD/011/MS15050. 
104 The Times, 7 March 1809, p. 4. 
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He followed this with an explanation for the assumption.105 A fire in Boston, New 
England, was immediately ‘suspected to be done by Treachery and Design’.106 Two 
months later, ‘[i]t seems they have cleerly discovered that it was done by Treachery 
and Design, and there is a Frenchman in Prison upon the same Account’.107 As to a 
house fire which caused damage of ‘fifty pound onely’, ‘[b]y what means it happened is 
yet unknown, but is suspected to be done by Treachery, the Master of the house being 
last up, and leaving all things secure when he went to bed’.108  
Accidents were hardly less free of blame. Reporters sought out a person to be 
accountable, just as in cases of treachery. One fire was thought to have been caused 
by ‘the Carelessness of the Horse-keeper’.109 Another was ‘occasioned by the neglect’ 
of ‘a person not very sober’.110 In Wapping: ‘[t]he report (as in such accidents) being 
various, many affirm it was by the carelessness of a Sarvant [a woman] … others say it 
came by carelessness of a Sawyer … he being little less than Drunk’.111 Female 
servants attracted the blame.112 They were generally responsible for laying fires and 
cooking over them. A story about a female servant trying to burn her master’s house 
down, ended, ‘this may be a warning to Housekeepers to take care what Servants they 
take into their House’.113 
However, there were writers who showed some even-handedness in their 
assessment of the testimonies of witnesses. One concluded his report: ‘[A]s to this 
matter we leave the determination of it to time and a further Enquiry; and wish all 
person to be careful for the preventing any future deplorable Disaster’.114 Another 
surmised: ‘the truth of that … must be left for future time to discover’, but not without 
castigating servants: ‘it would be well if this might be a Warning to all negligent 
Servants, who by their carelessness may ruine more Familiss in a Day and a Night 
than a whole Age may Repair again’.115 
The Insurance Office’s proposers absorbed the blunt moral division made by fire 
news: they explained that ‘such Losses happen either by the carelessness of Servants 
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115 True Account of the Dreadful Fire. 
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or evil Designs of wicked People’.116 The Office was apparently prepared to pay out in 
either circumstance. By contrast, the promoters of the Corporation of London’s scheme 
did not fan the flames of division; it put the focus on ‘dangerous Accidents frequently 
happening by Fires’.117 But in another way, the Insurance Office’s projectors rejected 
the premise of the blame-game of fire reporting. They showed an acceptance of fire as 
a part of life as they built their business not by trying to prevent fires but by using 
calculations of the incidence of fire – whatever the causes – to predict them and 
recompense for them.118 They calculated that their exposure would be reduced by the 
rise of brick buildings, a geographical spread of policies and a ‘Company of Men’ to 
extinguish outbreaks with expertise.119  
In The Times of the early and late nineteenth century, fire reports did not leap to 
deliver a verdict of accident or design. Reporters might even admit ignorance: ‘How 
this fire originated is a mystery’, wrote one.120 The cause of fires was given in a more 
measured manner than in the late seventeenth century, and it often honed in on an 
object rather than a person. ‘The fire is said to have been occasioned by the boiling 
over of a pitch kettle, which had been left to the care of a boy while the workmen were 
gone to breakfast’.121 ‘[T]he accident is supposed to have been occasioned by the 
bursting of a flue of the chimney of a large copper’.122 In a fire scene in London, it was 
insinuated that ‘the broken pieces of an oil lamp with a pink glass reservoir,’ which ‘had 
only three legs and was very unsafe’, revealed the cause.123 As in the seventeenth 
century, women’s roles put them in the firing line but reporters treated maleficence 
more tactfully given the law. After ‘an attempt was made to destroy by fire the premises 
of Mr Masterman, Banker, in White-hart-court, Lombard-street,’ the report chose not to 
prejudice the public by giving away further information about the female servant who 
was under suspicion.124 
The focus on objects as cause substantiated the conversation on fire-safety 
products that we have seen in other parts of The Times. This suited the interests of the 
Sun, for whom cause had significance in a way that it had not for the Insurance Office. 
In the early nineteenth century, the Sun actively encouraged safety measures in 
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commercial properties, and premium rates depended on them.125 The insurance offices 
distributed circulars specifically warning policy holders to beware of their servants 
causing fires, drawing on parliamentary acts on the subject (mentioned in Chapter 5). 
The late-nineteenth century scrapbooks in which staff compiled leaflets on fire-safety 
technology, prove the Sun’s interest in the subject. Fire by accident, then, was no 
longer acceptable. Fire by design entailed legal action, in which the fire offices 
participated, as we have seen.  
 
Reports of fire were part of the coverage news print gave to the accidents of life.126 Fire 
insurance was a beneficiary of this literature. Initially, fire offices assured against loss 
without attention to a fire’s cause. Their interests likely helped shift the debate over 
cause such that accidents were perceived to be prevented by safe objects and ‘evil 
designs’ were crimes to be prosecuted as arson or fraud. Newspapers advertised the 
purchase of possessions and documented their loss alongside the antidotes that 
people might think up to prevent that eventuality. This was the shared culture of 
newspapers and of fire insurance. The content of the former provided the context for 
trusting the latter. But the culture of newspapers also magnified the messy aspects of 
fire, fire offices and fire insurance. Fire was alarming and dreadful. Fire insurance was 
at risk of fraud and arson, twin threats to fire offices’ security and reputation. Equally, 
arsonists might garner sympathy where fire offices did not. And to end where the 
chapter began, would fire offices actually pay out? 
 
Conclusion 
This third and final Part of the thesis has looked at a different set of historical material 
to that of Part II, over the same periods of time: news print. In news print this Part has 
found concordance and discordance with fire insurance’s own print. Similarly to the 
name, the policy, the purposing of people by each office, news print substantiated the 
reality of the Insurance Office and the Sun and the product they sold, in a way that 
complemented their own print. News print repeated the offices’ messages and their 
branding, it supported their running, it made competition visible. News print reinforced 
the qualities identified in Chapter 3. News print had its own properties – such as its 
reach, its timing and its branding – which fire insurance businesses could exploit. Fire 
offices enjoyed benefits from being wrapped up in a newspaper’s package. 
                                                       
125 Pearson, Insuring the Industrial Revolution. 
126 Paul Fyfe has made a comparison of nineteenth-century news and the nineteenth-century 
novel: Paul Fyfe, By Accident or Design: Writing the Victorian Metropolis (Oxford University 
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But in news print, fire offices were part of a composite product which they did not 
determine. News print recorded everyday events, which they could not control. Fire 
offices may have benefited from juxtaposition with testimony of fire, but a business that 
traded on suffering – even as a solution to it – had to tread carefully. Newspapers 
raised uncomfortable questions about causation, crime, claims, just actions and 
desperate circumstance. The rise of the fire business gave rise to the crime of arson. 
On this front, it is helpful to use the thrust of the Design and Trust publication 
discussed in Part I as a refractor of the distrust that fire insurance was subject to and 
which news print exposed. Fire insurance was a product built on trust that also brought 
about the opposite. News shows the complexity of fire insurance, its cultural 
consequences and its ethical implications. But it is also the case that news print shows 
up print as a material that generates trust and distrust.  
This Part examined news print for insight into fire insurance for two reasons. First, at 
a remove news print and fire insurance were both designed products formed of print, 
making use of its design, graphic and communication possibilities. Both used that 
material to create repeating brands. There looks to be a natural relationship. Secondly, 
the pair came into frequent close contact: from 1680 onwards fire offices stepped 
inside news as a means of publicity; in the next century the Sun ran its own news-
sheets; in the century after that, the Sun kept books of newspaper clippings, which it 
has never thrown away. Because newspapers were so multifarious by the end of the 
nineteenth century, this Part has veered. But the benefit is that as a result Part III has, 
like Chapter 5, marshalled small, human stories that underlie fire insurance. They have 
offered a glimpse of the people affected by fire rather than those working in fire 
insurance, seen previously. 
 
This Part ends with a coda that puts in sharp relief the concatenation of threads in this 
chapter, in the previous chapter, and in the thesis as a whole. An incident at the start of 
the twentieth century unfolded in the news and at the Sun’s offices. It instances the 
Sun’s staff responding to news reports with frustration at a customer, a claim and 
shade on its reputation. 
In the early hours of 19 October 1904, a fire broke out at 107 Judd Street in 
London.127 That day’s Evening Standard gave an account of it, under the headline 
‘Terrible Fire at King’s Cross / Six Lives Lost / Gallant Rescues by Firemen / Exciting 
Scenes’.128 Three of the dead were children. The Times reported on the fire the next 
                                                       
127 Chapter 5 touched upon this same incident. 
128 Clipping from Evening Standard, 19 October 1904, p. 1, in LMA, 
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day, and on the inquest the following day.129 The following weekend’s illustrated news 
magazines ran pictures of the scene’s desolate remnants.130 They pointed out the 
rooms where bodies were found. (See Illustration 6.44.) The inquest failed to reach any 
conclusions as to the events. On the night in question, a pair of witnesses testified to 
hearing ‘loud voices and abusive language between a man and a woman’ from the 
first-floor back room where the fire started. They were ‘quarrelling about money’. The 
room’s tenant claimed not to have left on her light before going out that evening, but 
suspicion rested on a ‘pink glass lamp which she kept on a table which had only three 
legs and was very unsafe’. The next day, ‘[a]mong the débris on the floor were the 
broken pieces of an oil lamp with a pink glass reservoir’.131 
The contradictions in the statements of the property’s inhabitants made certainty 
about the events impossible. ‘Accidental death’ was the only verdict possible given the 
lack of evidence ‘to show how the fire originated’. A juryman advised the coroner: ‘We 
are not satisfied with the way in which this house was conducted, and we are not sure 
what was going on in the house on the night of the fire.’ The fire and the inquest 
unravelled a property in which four members of the Hunt family lived on the third floor; 
Charles Thiroff (or Tehiroff), an unemployed waiter, lived on the second floor with his 
four children and a tenant Miss Churchill, while his wife worked in service; ‘middle-aged 
German’ Amelia Britten (or Pritten), also known as Mme Metz, lived on the first floor 
and rented out the front room to a Miss Webb;132 and Mrs Thiers lived and ran a 
hairdressing salon on the ground floor and basement, a business she had continued 
after the death of her French husband.133 The Hunt family perished along with two of 
Mr Thiroff’s children. 
Mrs Thiers had insured her household possessions and the ‘stock and utensils’ of 
her salon with the Sun for £150. She made a claim for £247 for the loss. On 25 
October, she received £100. The newspapers carried no mention of fire policies on the 
building; nevertheless the Sun’s top brass was unhappy to be involved in the property’s 
perceived impropriety. The assistant secretary G. E. Mead sought to learn from the 
branch manager responsible for the policy, how the Sun had come to insure Mrs 
Thiers. Mead began his inquiry as follows: 
Dear Sir, The circumstances connected with the fire on the premises referred to in the above 
policy and of the Inquest held on the death of those who lost their lives on the occasion, 
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which have been reported in the Press, are probably known to you. It would appear 
therefrom that a suspicion as to the respectability of the establishment might reasonably be 
entertained…134 
Mead’s line of questioning is an indication of the Sun’s sensitive relationship with the 
press. The press had exposed a customer the Sun would rather have avoided, for, as 
Mead continued, ‘we do not regard Foreign Hairdressers as desirable risks’. As was 
seen in Chapter 5, by this period the Sun selected its customers. The fact that it had 
sold a policy in this case had not only brought it a claims bill but had associated it with 
a shady, disreputable episode. Its reputation was vulnerable to the nature of the fires 
its customers suffered. The bureaucracy of fire insurance that has been described in 
Part II relied on the structure of newspapers as described in this Part. By the end of the 
sweep of time covered by this thesis, the Sun’s staff consumed the press and archived 
its clippings. Clippings informed the Sun at a moment in time, before being folded into 
its records and its archive. The coverage of fires and of insurance in the news could 
direct the Sun’s internal responses and processes.   
                                                       







In 2011 I began a two-year MA in the History of Design jointly run by the Victoria and 
Albert Museum and the Royal College of Art in London. I anticipated that this was the 
master’s degree that would let me think and write about riot grrrl music and its 
paraphernalia: record sleeves and inserts, zines, photography, graphics and personal 
style.2 Riot grrrl describes a particular scene of feminist punk rock bands in the 1990s 
in the USA and the UK, to which I had spent my 20s belatedly devoted. I wanted to 
understand the thrills that it gave me. In the event, I did not attempt to research this 
passion. Instead I found fire insurance. In the V&A’s print collection I came across a 
small business card for the Hope Insurance Company, dated c. 1808.3 An object-based 
study of this card led me to the miles of fire insurance records. I have not turned back 
from this research material.  
But I had not left riot grrrl material behind. I found correspondences between that 
material and the careful composition of fire insurance documents and their 
arrangement and retention in archives. Riot grrrl documentation thrilled me because it 
seemed to contain the movement’s ideas that I found so exciting. Riot grrrl zines were 
less interesting as texts than as things, visual things. One did not need to read a zine, 
rather see it, hold it and look at it.  
Fire insurance documentation demonstrated a similar carefulness in its making as 
well as effort by those who collected it. It too expressed ideas that may well have been 
stimulating – or merely reassuring – to its recipient or its purchaser. The Insurance 
Office’s printed matter is held by libraries’ special collections but it is not rare. This 
corroborated my conjectures: it piqued its contemporaries and they kept hold of it. The 
Insurance Office was a novel project, helped along by a rabble-rouser, Nicholas 
Barbon.  
The Sun’s archive indicates custodians who cared about it. They collected multiple 
copies of, say, similar receipts. The Sun’s guard books and scrap books show these 
custodians’ curiosity and that they too found satisfaction in collecting this printed 
matter. Although their purpose was not obvious, guard books were appealing as visual 
objects. (See Illustration 0.1.) Until the late twentieth century, those who wrote about 
insurance were those who were, or had been, employed by the industry. Those inside 
the industry took great interest; those outside it, little.  
																																																								
1 This conclusion is the fulfilment of the corrections set by my examiners Liz McFall and Celia 
2 See Lisa Darms, The Riot Grrrl Collection (New York: Feminist Press at CUNY, 2013). 
3 V&A E.296-1967. 
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I was drawn to the outsider quality of fire insurance print. Despite its quantity, it has 
been ignored on its own terms. I have found no explanation for, nor appreciation of, its 
rich archives. It does not fit beauty standards of material to-be-researched. Its banality 
– which arises from its subject matter, its looks and its characteristic repetition – hides 
its craft. It is everyday and design. The production of printed matter was a dedicated 
profession; its products were made with intention. The matter of its print is one route 
from fire insurance to design; another is the fact that fire insurance was a designed 
product, conceptually. In 1680 it was spoken of as a design. The early fire offices used 
print to materialise their design concept and thereby to sell the product. It was mass 
produced. It was a template that could be copied and adapted. While everyday objects 
are celebrated in academic study, everyday graphic design of this kind is only recently 
receiving scholars’ attention.4 Scholars have lacked a vocabulary by which to explain 
its design aspects. I have tried to deliver this. 
The printed remnants of the fire insurance industry since the late seventeenth 
century far outweigh the much younger morsels of punk bands. The insurance industry 
has been more careful, productive and pervasive than the punk rock industry. Clearly 
there was within insurance an institutional imperative to preserve, which punk 
collectors cannot match. I chose to make trust a lens to understand and analyse the 
weight and effectiveness of fire insurance material. The central question to this 
research project was how does trust take material form and how can it be designed? 
This question reversed the order of thought by which the project came into being. 
Although I have compared the pleasures that insurance and punk offer, trust makes a 
portal to the former and not the latter. However, the method of analysing print offered in 
this thesis has wide applicability, as will be discussed. 
 
Back to the themes 
To answer its central question this thesis has juggled two temporal dialogues: one 
between the past and the present, another between three historical periods. Part I 
contained the present. It set up the first dialogue by extracting from contemporary 
design ways of refracting a material approach to trust that the subsequent Parts 
answered to. The survey of contemporary projects set the scene for the second 
temporal dialogue. Parts II and III split the two kinds of historical source material: that 
produced by insurance companies and news publications. The interplay between 
historical periods allowed the tracing through time of particular material characteristics 
of trust. It made them visible.  
Four themes have run alongside the two temporal dialogues, at the fore of Parts II 
and III. These strands were: the visibility of trust, material forms of trust, the 																																																								
4 I have in mind Sarah Lloyd, James Raven, Naomi Tadmor and Frances Maguire. 
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classification of trust as either impersonal or personal, and distrust, which seems to 
accompany trust. They emerged from the theoretical accounts of trust. Their benefit 
was to shape my empirical argument that trust has material and tangible qualities that 
can be, and were, designed through insurance’s print culture. Part II showed how print 
materialised both fire insurance and trust. This opened up discussion as to whether this 
print was impersonal. In fact, insurance print was found to be invested with its own 
ways of connecting people. It does not fit Giddens’s notion of disembedding 
mechanisms that distantiate. Instead, Giddens’s notion served to make obvious print’s 
personal properties. Trust was visible in these material and personal investments. But 
the print culture in which insurance played a part also speaks of distrust. Print was 
often designed in order to counter a lack of trust. At the same time, the news could be 
a source of distrust, spreading fear and doubt about the industry. We can agree with 
O’Neill that distrust is a companion to trust. This study has put theories of trust into 
practice, and contributed a consideration of trust in history and in materials. 
 
The theme of materialisation is central to the thesis. A premise to the study was that 
fire insurance was a product without a body. As Parts II and III showed, print gave it 
body in various ways. The achievement of this printed matter was to build trust from 
company to people. This leads to the central claim that the materialisation of insurance 
was aligned with material forms of trust in print. Print substantiated fire insurance by 
endowing it with material signifiers of trust. The materialisation of fire insurance 
furnishes a view of the materialisation of trust.  
In Part II, Chapter 2 set up the theme of materialisation by bringing to the fore the 
printed objects which anchor the development of fire insurance. The rest of Part II 
dissected these printed objects in terms of trust. Chapter 3 showed how they 
constructed trust by what they said and how they looked. A printed sheet was a vehicle 
in which a fire office could make assertions of its trustworthiness. It could align itself 
with qualities of trust. But the materialisation of the words in print mattered. Layout, 
repetition and emphasis through type created a visual rhetoric. The words cannot be 
differentiated from their appearance in type.  
Chapter 4 turned to another capacity print had to materialise trust in fire insurance, 
one which goes beyond words on a page. Print makes words into an object, and on 
such objects it can parcel off particular words, numbers or phrases that serve their own 
function. It is the chapter’s assertion that these – categorised as print’s technologies – 
gave the fire insurance product weight materially and conceptually, and for its material 
delivery. They turned the wheels of the business. Thus materialisation is also a matter 
of visualisation. Trust took shape in graphic objects and in their devices, blanks for 
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numbers, and repeating motifs in words and illustrations. I have drawn out the visual 
details of the page which conveyed its trustworthiness. 
Chapter 5 argued that the manifestation of people in fire insurance print was also a 
factor in the materialisation of insurance and of trust. This chapter faced the theme of 
whether the use of print by fire offices shows the business to work by impersonal 
means. Had the enterprise built a trust which proved the rise of impersonal institutions? 
Was its trust based on an imitation of face-to-face bonds? This chapter found that fire 
offices used print to make manifest the personal. Their identities depended upon the 
constitution of the personal in print. This personal aspect was another way in which 
trust-building was visible. 
In its examination of news print, Part III addressed the theme of distrust. News print 
laid fire offices open to threats on their reputation. Although bits of print built trust in the 
industry, wider print culture – that is, the kind of content suited to a newspaper – 
enmeshed it in a risky discourse. The dissection of fire insurance print carried out by 
this thesis according to four themes urges us to focus not on trust’s invisibility and its 
disappearance – as is the case in public discourse – but on its visibility in materials and 
how it can be built – as in design discourse. 
 
Print culture 
This study has found that print constructed trust through what it said, how it looked and 
what it could do, and through people embedded in it, either literally or working with it. 
The study points to two different kinds of trust built into print, in its division between 
qualities and technologies: there is a name, an identity, and eventually a brand, and 
there is the fulfilment of that promise, best represented in the policy number. This 
interpretation offers print historians a way of analysing the commercial printed page in 
terms of design and trust. What are the particular tropes that were deemed suitable to 
express in business print? Scholars might track the use and rendering of particular 
elements of the printed page, such as business names, titles to sheets, blanks and 
connecting numbers. This would advance James Raven’s important work on business 
print. Graphic design history would benefit as much as print history. For we might look 
at the printed page not merely by genre or as a reflection of new machinery but in 
terms of its affordances: what is the effect of a printed name? What does a space for a 
number enable? How did such details of the printed page spread between industries? 
When we look at print in this way, it becomes three-dimensional. Ephemeral print was 
built to look to last, not to be ephemeral. We can isolate print’s possibilities and ask 
how they led to more paper use and new developments in technology. 
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Let us return to a fire office’s name as the epitome of this study in demonstrating the 
relationship between design, trust and the establishment of fire insurance. In 1681 the 
Insurance Office defined itself in print as the Insurance Office. The Office’s promotion 
by means of print entailed that it take on a name. That name claimed a monopoly in the 
field – a claim which failed. This name was not casually laid on the page. The 
projectors positioned it at the top of their sheets in an emphatic typeface and they 
repeated it, similarly emphatically, throughout their texts. Such techniques, within 
limited means, made the name immediately important, conspicuous before the sheet 
had even been read. This graphic prominence made the name itself an entity, a thing, 
and in turn did the same for the business. Once there was an entity, values and ideas 
could be attached to it. A reader could believe in it – or not. The printed name creates 
the potential for trust and distrust. The Insurance Office’s projectors played hard to 
differentiate their office from the Corporation of the City of London’s plan. The 
Insurance Office’s plethora of print occasioned the repetition of its name. 
The Insurance Office did not invent the taking of a name and its emphasis in type. 
This study’s purview has not been to identify origins. The Office capitalised on existing 
conventions. Print constructed the company, within a print culture. However, the fire 
insurance industry does appear to have developed a specific culture of names and 
emblems. This kind of business was never named after its owner, like other shops and 
businesses in the centuries considered here, including banks. Emblems became 
names and names became bombastic: from Fire Office to Phoenix to Sun to Atlas and 
on. Fire insurance businesses quickly came to choose words for their names that 
already contained resonance, and which made for an effective image. More research 
would be needed to compare this industry to others. This study opens the way to 
consideration of naming habits and the role of print. In the absence of that research, 
one speculates as to whether this immaterial product made necessary particular 
methods of materialisation through which promotion and competition could take place. 
Medicine brands and news-sheets offer points of comparison.  
Further research would also shed light on whether an enterprise like fire insurance 
augmented and proved the value of existing printing techniques, and thereby spread 
their usage to other kinds of product. The Sun Insurance Office brand identity as 
represented on a policy in the early twentieth century – with its large name and large 
illustration –, has correspondence with the Insurance Office’s promotional sheets. The 
roots lie in the effect that type has on a name. If a business is reliant on print – if its 
customers do not take home a hat nor a pin –, then it is compelled to use print 
differently, to exploit its possibilities. This prompts the realisation of how print was 
shaped by the need to produce trust. Because of a fire office’s need to promote itself 
with authority, its name became more pronounced, it was amplified with an emblem. 
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Print became more visually impactful. For the same reason, it incorporated paragraphs, 
articles and headings, numbers, tables and lists. 
When a name is in print, it is visual and physical – qualities that type can intensify. A 
name in print moves around, it gets disseminated. It is proof of an effort by people to 
make it so – both commissioner and printer. It implies an audience other than oneself 
of the same thing. Therefore it speaks of publicness, openness and transparency. At 
the same time as it looks fixed, it is open to critique. It is impossible to imagine opening 
a fire insurance business in 1680 without print, without print culture, without its 
distribution networks. 
The effect of print on a name assists speculation as to what it is about print that 
enables it to support trust. Three affordances stand out. Print’s virtue is its mass 
manufacture. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the uniformity of available 
typefaces made print’s making a quality of how it looked. The impression of metal type 
on a sheet indicates the investment and the commitment of those who commissioned 
it. The investment is proportionate to a number of copies. Secondly, a printed sheet is 
both repetitive and unique to its holder, such that it is individual, yet one of a whole set. 
It creates the inference of a community of readers. The skill of print’s design is to 
communicate this duality. An agent’s copy of Instructions in which he writes his name, 
comes to mind. Similarly, blank forms exemplify this dual expression, with high contrast 
between the printed and the written. The Insurance Office’s and the Sun’s policies 
achieved the combination of individual and company with panache, striking the balance 
with a prominent policy number. Their policies went beyond forms to objects. Print’s 
individuality is showcased by the fact that it can be annotated or a hand-written 
signature can be added. These personal markers can be official or otherwise. Lastly, 
the addition of names or numbers transforms print into a system. Print is plastic in the 
specific functions it can be adapted to perform. 
 
On the one hand, this study concludes with a way of interrogating print that could prove 
productive in other corners of print culture. This would apply particularly to business 
print, where it can help describe the development of commerce and financial services. 
How was commercial culture shaped by print? Insurance companies were not alone in 
settling near to printing houses, coffee houses, advertising and newspapers. There is 
certainly more to discover about the links between the insurance industry, the printing 
industry and the newspaper industry, in London and in the rest of Britain.  
On the other hand, this study holds conclusions specific to the fire insurance 
industry. Due to its nature, this industry made use of lurking capacities of print, in a way 
that other business may not have. From 1680 to 1914 it stuck to its practices. The 
industry was suffused with questions of distrust from its inception. It engineered its 
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trust, by design and not by accident. My study has made explicit a topic that insurance 
historians have hinted at: how insurance history intersects with promotional history and 
branding history. This is a matter not only for advertising historians. Scholars that make 
use of insurance source material should have greater appreciation of what they are 
looking at. This study has not provided answers but it urges scholarship not to take the 
paperwork for granted as they sift through it.  
 
The contemporary and the historical 
This study’s temporal dialogue between past and present pivoted on a sketch of four 
contemporary design projects. I chose these examples because they engaged with 
trust specifically from a design perspective. From the start I intended there to be a 
contemporary component to this study, to reflect my split between the RCA and the 
V&A. One institution prepares the designers of the future, the other is underpinned by 
its collection of products of the past. I came across the four design subjects in the 
course of my historical research. They gave life to design and trust, a pairing that is not 
obvious. One example was a design studio that promotes its interest in building trusted 
digital products and services. Another was a project by design students. A third was a 
publication from an academic institution taking the title Design and Trust. The final was 
the digital company Airbnb.  
In its fundamentals, Airbnb was comparable to other companies that defined the 
digital age’s new consumer habits when I began my research in 2014: eBay, Uber and 
Deliveroo. This new type of company was formed from tapping the possibilities of 
digital material. Digital material – software engineering and the widespread availability 
and use of wifi-enabled devices – made it possible. I saw correspondence with fire 
insurance companies of the past in two ways: first, I perceived fire insurance also to be 
formed of a generic material – in this case, print. The shaping of print made it feasible. 
Secondly, fire insurance looks like a forerunner of today’s intangible companies that 
lack their own physical products. The product packages up value, time and uncertainty. 
This business model increases the importance of branding. 
Of the digital companies, I chose to survey Airbnb. Airbnb served my purpose 
because conveniently it has created a chic brand on the basis of sophisticated design 
and it has marketed its engineering as being designed for trust. No fire insurance 
company was so explicit in 1680. I deliberately avoided contemporary insurance 
companies as a subject because I wanted to root this study in design rather than 
insurance. I intended its impact to be in the former field rather than the latter. In the 
course of this research, digital insurance companies have arisen: insurtech. Insurtech 
businesses use technology to innovate on the insurance model, just as Airbnb has 
disrupted the accommodation model. Had I taken into consideration this new breed of 
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insurance company, my suppositions about the specific nature of insurance would be 
more robust. However, to have done justice to a comparison between twenty-first-
century insurtech and fire offices up to 1914 would have made another research 
project.  
The motivation for this study’s dialogue between past and present was to create a 
method for design history that was relevant to design practice, as long since advocated 
by Victor Margolin and lately by Catharine Rossi. Design history as it stands does not 
offer much to designers in today’s financial services, to service designers or to those 
working in the public and private sectors where design thinking has recently become a 
mantra. Design history largely limits itself to the world since the late nineteenth century, 
which artificially limits practitioners’ imaginations. This study was designed to explore 
the role of design in a financial service. I transferred insights from the design projects to 
the historical sources. My interrogation of those sources was enriched by, for example, 
looking for patterns in text and in printed components. Good design can be hard to see, 
especially in the absence of a designer role. Designers themselves can help illuminate 
it. Their practices encourage one to look. My examples also showed the everyday 
nature of most design work. This study presented the importance of the design of trust 
now in order to prove it in the past. 
Can I hope that contemporary designers can take anything from this historical 
research? It is impossible to predict. Questions of trust only get louder as does 
Western society’s reliance on digital products and services. Designers might find it 
sobering to approach the design of trust with an awareness that they are invariably 
designing pathways to distrust as well. The projects considered in Part I demonstrated 
that designers refer back to precedents, such as railway safety features. They have 
passed over the objecthood of print in this regard. Design history could benefit from 
recognising documentary print as a designed artefact. Designers of financial 
technology might realise that behind their lines of code are layers of paper. Moreover, 
fire insurance itself was a safety system. An exhibition in 2005 under the title ‘Safe’ at 
the Museum of Modern Art in New York displayed products that respond to people’s 
fears and the dangers that threaten them.5 Despite its being sponsored by an 
insurance broker, ‘Safe’ did not consider insurance artefacts. Yet fire insurance is an 
intangible component of a city’s infrastructure. 
 
Inventive method 
The evidence base of this thesis has rested on quantity and repetition. This study has 
emerged from a mound of material and it has tried to be true to it. The quantity of 
illustrations seeks to reproduce the materiality and experience of working with 																																																								
5 Paola Antonelli, Safe: Design Takes On Risk (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2005). 
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insurance archives. Bafflement precedes any sense making. I have discovered a way 
of talking about the very quantity of this material, its endless repetition and minor 
variation. The documents on their own are mundane but their repetition becomes 
fascinating. My argument is dependent on the quantity of evidence presented. The 
repetition of documents that manifest minor variation is tangible evidence of trust-
building. It speaks of the repetition on which collective trust is based and the repetition 
on which design is based. Repetition has been a method and a means of discovery. I 
have looked at the same examples across chapters, in different ways. They demand 
repetitive looking. The chapters have returned to the same material in the same way as 
in an archive the same formats, qualities and technologies appear again and again, 
differentiated by a different date, a different era, a different office, a different person’s 
name, a different property. The Sun’s illustration of firemen ripples through Parts II and 
III, connecting themes, time periods and source material. This repetition constructed 
trust and the fire insurance industry. 
 
In the Sun’s archive there is an 1822 edition of the company’s Instructions to agents. 
Stuck on its title page is a letter, on the headed stationery of the Sun’s agency in 
Belfast, dated 1 January 1904. In the letter, the Sun’s agent in Belfast, Richard Barter, 
addresses Mr Coote, at the London head office. ‘I enclose a copy of the Sun Fire Office 
book of Instructions to their agents dated 1822,’ he writes, ‘as you are I believe 
interested in old documents of the office.’ He goes on to summarise the life of the 
book’s original owner: Morgan Jellett had been a bookseller in Belfast before 
emigrating to America. 
This thesis has held a similar interest in old documents. As Walter Ong recognised, 
the electronic age illuminated the print age. So the demands of digital culture help one 
to see print more clearly. Ephemeral print is not simple, flat constructions but three-
dimensional design products that have been historically shared, folded and stored, on 
which practices businesses have been built. Nor has the print age passed; the digital 
age is made up of its layers and its graphic techniques.  
This thesis offers a prototype for how design history might address concerns in 
design practice. It has tested theories of trust against a sample of archival material. 
Printed paper created the visible structures for the invisible product of fire insurance, 
that made it credible and trustworthy. But design practitioners might take from this 
analysis that their designs for trust are unlikely to escape entanglement with new ways 
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